13 The Political Context of Land Reforms II

Prof N Purendra Prasad

Introduction:

In India, the question of land reforms assumed a high priority at the policy making level immediately after Independence. The agrarian upheavals in different parts of the country, including major movements such as Telangana revolt and the Tebhaga movement, on the eve of the transfer of power made land reforms an issue of urgent discussion, deliberation and action at the highest political and government levels. In fact, soon after Indepndence, there emerged three major agrarian theses based on which three blue-prints for political action relating to the land problem:

Three Major Agrarian Theses:

1. In 1949, the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee, a high-level body appointed by the President of the Indian National Congress released its report which presented an analysis of the agrarian problem in India and also a programem of land reforms within the partliamentarydemocracty framework. This report was a major policy document which provided the guiding principles for agrarian policy to be followed by all congress governments in the country.

2. In 1948 the communist party of India (CPI) adopted a new political thesis at its second congress at Calcutta which put forward the slogan of land to the tiller and the strategy of militant mobilization of the peasants for an agrarian revolution. The basic thesis was further elaborated in a major policy document titled `On the Agrarian Question in India’ in the same year.

3. Again in 1948 some of the followers of Mahatma Gandhi made a major policy decision under the leadership of VinobaBhave to launch the Sarvodaya movement. A year later this assumed the form of well-known BhoodanGramdan movement.

These were not only three major programmes for social action but also three diagnoses of and approaches to the land problem. The leaders associated with the above theses were guided not merely by their intuition and political instinct. They also tried to seek a theoretical basis for these experiments in land reforms. Infact social scientists were associated with all these three political theses. The Congress reforms committee, for instance, had among its members one of the most distinguished economists M L Dantwala, who played a major role in preparing its report. He was responsible for the conceptual and analytical framework of this report on the basis of which it recommended the adoption of peasant farming assited by cooperative organization. The committee suggested a lower as well as an upper limit to peasant farming.

Similarly in preparing the agrarian thesis of the communist party the major role played by BhowaniSen, the Marxist expert on the agrarian question. Drawing upon Lenin’s approach to the agrarian problem, BhowaniSen showed how the land to the tiller programme could not be achieved unless there was a simultaneous attack on feudalism inherited from the past and on capitalist landlordism fast emerging at that point of time. Apart from emphasizing the necessity of a political revolution which would decisively change the balance of power in favour of the peasants, he emphasized the role of economic measures to achieve the political objective. In his view abolition of landlordism by itself was not enough unless it was reinforced by other measures to break the monopoly of land which was earlier in the hands of the feudal landlords and may now shift to capitalist landlords and rich peasants. He put forward the idea of nationalization of land for this purpose.

Finally, in VinobaBhave’sBhoodan-Gramdan movement, a leading role was played by leaders like Jayaparkash Narayan and other social scientists of the Institute of Gandhian Studies, Varanasi. VinobaBhave’s movement had as its intellectual basis the Gandhian theory of trusteeship. It was an attempt to soleve the problem within the Indian traditions of `rural communalism’ by urging through social pressure the landed classes to voluntarily surrender a part of their land for the landless of the village.Thus these three initiatives were the three major movements for changing the agrarian structure.

Evaluation of Land Reforms:

Political acceptability of the concept of land reforms and subsequent legislative measures in the early years of Independence was partly attributed to the intensity of the Telangana and Tebhaga movements. Similarly the rise of Naxalism and the threat posed by it in the late 1960s was one of the main factors responsible for the sense of urgency with which the ruling elite revived the question of land reforms during late 1960s and early 1970s.

Attempts to alter directly the pattern of distribution of land holdings in India assumed the form of four types of experiments:

i. Land reform `from above’ through land legislation on the lines broadly indicated by central government, enacted by state legislatures and finally, implemented by agencies of the state governments.

ii. Land reform through militant peasant action `from below’ as in the case mainly of Telangana and naxalbari movements and also to some extenint eh case of the land grab movement.

iii.Land reform through legislative enactments `from above’ combined with peasant mobilization `from below’ as in the case of the controlled land seizure in west Bengal united front regime and of protection of poor peasants in Kerala under the congress supported by CPI ministry.

iv.Land reform from below through persuasaion of landlords and peaceful pressure by peasants as in the case of Bhoodan and Gramdan.

While all the four experiements took place in different regions and states, the first one i.e. land reforms from above was the process that took place in almost all the states. Therefore, state initiated land reforms are believed to have been unsuccessful in getting land to the poor in India with some exceptions such as West Bengal. However few studies suggest that much more redistribution has taken place than it is often assumed (See Yungandhar and Iyer, 1993; Yugandhar and Datta, 1995; Aziz and Krishna 1997) in Bihar, Rajsthan, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.

Scholars like Daniel Thorner argued that it is not merelyhow much land has been redistributed but one needs to see the `perceptible ’ change that happened due to land reforms. In his book `The Agrarian Pospects in India ’, he suggests that if one were to evaluate land reforms, it will have to be done in terms of the areas with least change, some perceptible change and areas of great change.Thorner locates Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh as the areas of great change. However, he attributes great change in Kashmir not only due to land legislations but unusual political circumstances of the valley since 1947 which gave stimulus to these changes. Regarding erstwhile Andhra Pradesh, he attributes it to the peasant organizations which exerted pressure from below to get land reforms implemented more effectively in certain parts of the state.P.C Joshi (1975) indicated that land reforms did bring important changes in the agrarian structure. He gives instances, such as the practice of forced labour, of Begari and illegal extractions, social tyranny and non-economic compulsions in employment especially in ex-Zamindari and Jagirdari areas, have undergone change.

As land reforms in west Bengal are considered to be most successful, an attempt is made here to analyze the process in order to understand the implications of it for the entire country.

Land Reforms in West Bengal:

The old Bengal presidency and later on west Bengal (since 1947) suffered fromagricultural stagnation for about a century from 1881 to 1981. In the pre-second worldWar days, cheap rice used to be imported from Burma (Mynmar) to meet the deficit. In 1943, there was terrible famine, during which between three and four million people diedof starvation and hunger (See, AmartyaSen, 1999). This horrendous event left indelible mark on the individual, community and administrative psyche regarding food security in the state. Since 1944 the state had some type of public distribution system (PDS) on the ground, statutory rationing was abolished in the 1950s, but a modified rationing-system continued all over the state.

Major legislation concerning land reform was passed by the Congress regime in the 1950s. One of the first acts passed was the Bargadar Act of 1950, which aimed at making eviction of bargadars difficult. Eviction was henceforth only allowed in cases where the landowner wanted to take back the land for self-cultivation. Although the Estates Acquisition Act of 1953 had individual ceiling provisions, thetotal area voluntarily surrendered by big landowners was only around 3 lakh acres. These lands were not fertile and some of them were disputed properties.The dominant force in the rural area was the rentier class, which was not interested inproduction. So the land that they kept clandestinely beyond the ceiling was not used by them for production by direct means. These were all let out to tenants- at-will, the sharecroppers who had no formal rights. Some of them just kept lands fallow.Many recorded tenants also had vast areas under their possession. Though theintermediary class lost its intermediary rights, its social and political position stillremained high.In 1954 the state government passed the west Bengal estates acquisition act, the major purpose of which was to abolish the intermediary interests in land.

The provisions of these two acts (1953 & 1954) were incorporated in the comprehensive Land Reforms Act of 1955. This act stipulated a ceiling of 25 acres on all agricultural holdings. Concerning the bargadars, the act stipulated that these were entitled to 60%of the crop, if they contributed both labour and inputs (in most places the tradition was for the bargadarsto receive only 50%).The reason why no systematic effort was made to raise production during these years, except implementing some all-India schemes of the central government, had to be found in the antiquated production relations in the agrarian sector.Zamindari and all forms of intermediary tenure were abolished in 1955. Those whowere recorded as settled or”occupancy tenants and their under-tenants became proprietors of land under the state. But the erstwhile landed aristocrats still continued to have control over huge areas of agricultural land, which retained through various devious means, particularly through ‘benami’ transactions.

The land reforms passed in favour of the bargadars in reality worked contrary to the purpose for which they were intended. The period following the first act of 1950witnessed large scale evictions of bargadars. Most of these had no written contract, and in collaboration with the land reform administration and the local police it was quite easy for the landowners to deny the bargadars their rights. Even though in most cases the landowners did not resume the land for self-cultivation but hired agricultural labourers, the bargadars were helpless, as few of them had access to or could afford to hire lawyers to defend their rights. The result was a significant increase in the percentage of agricultural labourers during the 1950s and 1960s.

Though all political parties, particularly the Left, had always been very sensitive to the food issue, the entire attention was on public distribution of food grains (rice and wheat); rather than on production of food. With the deteriorating food situation in the mid-1960s in eastern India, statutory rationing was reintroduced in Kolkata metropolitan area and in industrial towns. In the popular mind, it was always thought that it was the obligation of the centre to arrange supply of food grains for public distribution either by importing food from abroad or by procurement from other states. Infact, from the mid-1960s, the state lived from ‘ship to mouth’ under PL 480 regime. Exaspereated by the frequent threat of disruption of supply to the rationing system, the then chief minister P C Sen took drastic measures for compulsory levy and procurement of rice from surplus farmers and rice mills. In 1966~67,six lakh tonnes of rice was procured to build a fall back stock position for the statutory rationingsystem. This measure made P.C Sen and the ruling Congress party very unpopular with the rural farming communities, which voted the Congress out of power in the 1967 general election. The first non-congress united front government of 1967, which hadsome leftist parties in the coalition, took a soft line onprocurement and practically gave it up to appease the middle and upper peasanty.

United Front Government – 1967:

When the first United Front (UF) government came to power in February 1967, the countryside in west Bengal was seething with agrarian discontent.The first arrow of the militant and Naxalbari movement was shot in that village soon after the new government assumed power.Hare KrisbnaKonar,the charismatic peasant leader who became revenue minister,tried to dissuade the breakway group of the CPI(M) from taking to violence. Hefailed.Though ceiling provisions were introduced in 1955, only 300,000 acres ofland was vested by 1967. This was all surrendered land of big landlords. It was common knowledge that the landed gentry still controlled huge chunks ofagricultural land, way beyond the ceiling through various devious means. They hadwell crafted documents to show that they did not possess any land abovethe ceiling.These documents could be disproved only overwhelming oral evidence of directwitnesses like share-croppers, agricultural workers and other categories of rural workers who directly worked underthe real owners and not under the nominal title holders.

A massive quasi-judicial campaign was launched to unearth the clandestinely heldland strictly according to law and established procedures. By 1970 ( in less than three years), about a million acres of fertile agricultural landvested in the state.It had some important side effects which should be mentioned. The poor peasantryparticipated in the quasi-judicial proceedings in large numbers as witnesses. Theyfound that it yielded results. It was also realized that violence had created only terror but produced no land for redistribution. They reposedfaith in peaceful collective action, eschewing the path of militancy.The Naxal movement in rural areas faded away.The second important effect was the weakening of the rentier class and landed gentry. It broke the backbone of this parasitic class, who lost their social, economic andpolitical dominance over rural Bengal. The space they vacated was graduallyoccupied by middle and upper peasantry who were productive agents.

West Bengal however was among the poorest states in India. Statistics showed that the percentage of rural population living below the poverty line increased from 40% to66% during the period 1960-61 to 1973- 74. By mid 1970s, west Bengal recorded the highest percentage of poor in India.The NSS data from 1971/72 estimated that 18.7% of the operated area was under tenancy – primarily share-cropping. The number of bargadarsis officially given as 2 million, but even official estimates vary. The NSS from 1971- 72 shows that it is primarily the landless (13%) and marginal farm households with less than 2.5 acres (72%) who cultivate land on a barga basis. One of the major reforms within the reformative development strategy of the west Bengal government since 1977 has been a improvement in the condition of the bargadars.

The situation of the bargadarsfurther improved legally with an amendment passed in 1971. According to this amendment bargadarscontributing both inputs and labour were now entitled to 75% of the crop, while those not paying inputs were to receive 50% of the produce (the traditional share in such cases was one-third). The 1971 amendment also made share-cropping hereditary; and it further required the landowner to issue a receipt in favour of the share-cropper against the crop handed over to him.

There was never a serious attempt to try to implement the provisions in the law which stipulated that the bargadar were to receive a 60% – and later a 75% share of the crop. Following the Estates Acquisition Act and the Land Reform Act, surplus land was appropriated by the government for distribution among the landless. The land distribution has been quite successful. By 1976, 566,417 acres had been distributed, which corresponds to 4% of the operated area. Nevertheless, it has not been possible to distribute all the appropriated land, as the landowners have fought the legislationboth illegally through intimidation, and legally through the courts. Thus it is estimated that approximately 180,000 acres are vested in the government and cannot be distributed because of pending court cases. In 1977 elections, Left Front government came to power.

Left Front Government 1977 and Operation Barga:

When the LF government came to power in 1977 they had to urgently give attentionto the plight of sharecroppers who had suffered badly during the previous regime.BenoChoudhury, another famous peasant leader became the land reforms minister. On vice he agreed to accept Paulo Ireris’s concept, i.e. a process of conscientisationwhich was followed by action. In one such conscientisation camp, SambuTudu, a tribal sharecropper activist who suffered imprisonment of four-and-half years without trial gave the ingredients of the methodology of ‘operation barga’. He stated that sharecropping did not involve any point of law. It was a verifiable fact. Hence, instead of a sharecropper, who did not have scrap of paper, going to the revenue tribunal, why did not the revenue tribunal go to the field and verify facts in the presence of all sharecroppers and landowners?He suggested reversal of the process followed for about 100 years. This procedurewas followed with appropriate modification during Operation Bargaduring 1978-81with startling results of the recording of 1.2 million sharecroppers in three years.

Camps were set up in the rural areas where government officials in collaboration with peasant organizations and the local people would verify the claims of the bargadars, and the bargadars were issued a temporary registration certificate on the spot. The emphasis was on group action to enable the beneficiaries to overcome their fear of the landlords creating a mutual support system.

The first phase of land reform successfully broke the strangle hold of the landed aristocracy on the society and politics of rural west Bengal. How significant thisfactor was became evident in the first election to three-tier panchayats in 1978.In 1978, elections were held for the three tier panchayats system in west Benga1. The CPI(M) had at that time a total membership of around 30,000 in west Bengalconcentrated in the Kolkata metropolis and a few other industrial centres. This partyalong with minor partners had to put up around 80,000 candidates.Where would they get so many candidates when they had hardly any base in the rural areas? The upper and middle peasantry now free from the social and economic yoke of the landed gentry, seized the opportunity. Enmasse they moved in to offer themselves as candidates of the LF. They came in not for any ideological consideration but to protect their own interests.

The class that came to power in the panchayatswere productive agents and so wereinterested in production. They were tasting the power for the first lime in generationsafter the political demise of the rentier landed gentry. From 1980s onwards, in the sixth five year plan, a massive transfer of plan fundsstarted for rural development and poverty alleviation schemes. The middle peasantry now in the power in the panchayats, started using public funds (particularly wage employment funds) for creating public works in support ofagricultural production.While public investment in irrigation (as reflected in canals) was not significant eitherin west Bengal or in the all-India context, the state surpassed surprisingly the all-India figures of “Tubewells’ and other sources. These other sources were created by panchayats under the control of the ascending middle peasantry.Tubewells were sunk mainly through private sources. Panchayats also in some places played a role. Investment of wage employment funds (such as NRER, RLEGP) by panchayats for ‘other sources’ acted as a catalyst for mobilising private funds for shallow/small power tubewells.

In the Panchayat elections, left front got a large majority, and especially to the CPI(M) which won about 70% of the seats in the Panchayats. According to the Panchayat Act, the panchayats were entrusted with various functions ranging from sanitation, road construction to rural upliftmeny and tax collection. However once left front captured the rural seats of power, the state government has utilized the panchayats for the implementation of its rural development programmes and land reform policies. In Bengal, special emphasis was given to tenancy legislation. In order to implement the bargadar legislation, the government launched operation barga, the object of which was to facilitate the recording of the bargadars’ rights to cultivation.

The main difference between the agrarian programme of the left front government and the attempts made earlier in west Bengal or other states is that an attempt has been made to supplement the traditional measures of agrarian reforms by developing a broad support mechanism by establishing functional linkages with the bureaucracy, elected rural self-growing institutions and peasant organizations.

The purpose of Operation Barga as well as of the tenancy legislation was to secure the right of the bargadars to cultivate the land. The rationale behind the strategy is that, control over the main resource, land, would make the bargadars less dependent on the landowners. Many bargadars are indebted to the landowners whose land they cultivate, as they often have to take loans at very high interest rates from them for cultivation and even consumption. Because of this indebtedness they were reluctant to press for the higher shares of the produce to which they are entitled according to the law.

While registration of occupancy and cultivation rights does ensure that the bargadars will not be evicted, it does not in itself make the bargadars economically independent of the landlords. In order to help the bargadars become economically independent of the landlords, the government launched a special credit programme for registered bargadars who are entitled to receive production loans on favourable conditions. This supplementary programme in principle enabled the bargadars to press for his/ her share one produces, as they would no longer be dependent on the landlords for loans.

Increased access to credit on favourable terms and higher shares of the produce would in turn improve the economic situation of the bargadars. Apart from measures to improve the situation the bargadars, the Left front government took measures to improve the economic situation of landless labourers, many of whom remain unemployed for many months of the year. The most important programme for the landless and land- poor is the National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) which engages workers road building and other construction programmes during the lean season. Left front government conceived this as a relief programme rather than a structural reform progamme, as the government introduced minimum wages for agricultural labourers and encouraged the laborers to organize themselves. The objective was not to end exploitation, because that Could not be accomplished within the framework of the Indian constitution by a state government, but to ensure that the highly pesonalized dependency relationship, a remnant of feudalism, was reduced as far as possible. While the programme did bring a great deal of relief and economic support, the objective was primarily political. The rationale was that increased employment opportunities on the NREP would makethe agricultural labourers less dependent on the land lords and thus make it possiblefor them to press for higher wages.

Another programme which was given priority was the registration of titles to homestead land. Many landless labourers and share-croppers do not possess the land on which their huts are built but live on the land of the landowners who because of this tie – are in a position to dictate the terms for share-cropping arrangements and labour contracts. The previous government had in 1975 passed a homestead land acquisition act, but no attempts had been made to implement it, and those without homestead had not tried to press for their rights because of their economic dependence on the landowners. Along with the policies to reduce the economic dependence of the share-croppers and the landless laborers the left front government took measures to implement the registration of titles to homestead land. In addition, the left front government pressed for more vigorous implementation of the land legislation to detect surplus land and distribute it to land less.

Taking advantage of a law passed during the internal emergency (1975-77), whichallowed free title to homestead plots up to five cents for a homeless family, 500,000 such cases were also recorded in tandem with operation barga, giving title to suchactual occupiers. In quantitative terms over 1.6 million sharecroppers were recorded giving themhereditary right of cultivation, and a fair deal in crop snarmg with certificate ofsharecropping which could be used as a document to establish one’s identity and alsofor securing crop loans from institutions.About a million acres of vested land were distributed among 2.5 million beneficiaries who were landless or land-poor peasants.Half a million households were given title to homestead plots.Land reform thus directly benefitted a little over four million rural households – asignificant proportion of the rural population.

There has been a controversy regarding the percentage of arable land covered by land reforms. About a million acres of land redistributed would constitute 7 -8 percent of the total cultivable land. Scholars computing from NSSO figures suggest that the percentage area under operation barga would be around 7 per cent.However, Land revenue commission’s assessment would put it around 25-28 percent of the arable land in west Bengal, which went in favour of the direct beneficiaries of landreforms. This is a sizeable area.One can reasonably presume that these lands, which were either indifferentlycultivated or kept fallow, started to be cultivated at the sub-optimal level tothe extent labour can substitute capital. The impact of it on total production musthave been significant.Independent studies conducted in mid 1990s revealed that there was 17-18 per centincrease in productivity in their fields operated by registered sharecroppers.This finding validates the hypothesis that with security of tenure and fair crop sharing, sharecroppers would have incentive to increase production. They might be using more labour per unit of land than necessary but such efforts would certainly enhance production.

To sum-up, the main features of the left front government were:

1.Recording of share-croppers to secure their legal rights (operation barga)

2.Distribution of available land to landless and land-poor with the active cooperation of the Panchayats.

3.Drive to detect and vest more ceiling surplus land.

4.Giving institutional credit to share-croppers and assignees of vested land (i.e. persons who have been granted land from the government out of surplus acreage available from persons who occupied more than allowed according to the stipulated land ceiling).

5.Assigning permanent title for homestead purposes to all who are occupying land of others as permissive possessors.

6.Provision of irrigation to the assignees of vested land.

7.Provision of subsidies to the assignees of vested land for the development of their land.

8.Change in revenue system.

9.Restoration of land alienated by poor and marginal farmers through distress sale.

10.Designing food for work programmes for infrastructure benefitting primarily the poor.

In the election to these Panchayats the left front parties had mobilized the rural poor in order to ensure people’s participation in the implementation. The legal frame does allow for land reform measures, and it is in this context that “land reform is considered as the cornerstone of the entire rural development strategy in west Bengal”. One of the main concerns of Operation Barga was to record share croppers in order to secure their legal rights. It should be pointed out that this concerns the right of occupancy only and not the right ownership. As a supplement to registration, the reform stipulates a reduction in the share of the produce to be paid to the land-owner, and the recorded share-croppers are further entitled to special credit provisions and subsidies. The purpose of this measure is twofold:

   1. One is to brake the traditional social institution of patron-client relationship where the share-cropper is dependent on the landowner for credit;

2. The other is to establish the precondition for a alleviating the poverty among the share-croppers by securing them control over the means of production, viz. Land and Working capital.

Also the landless and land-poor who are assigned vested land are provided with special credit and subsidies.

Agrarian Change in 1990s &2000s:

West Bengal with a growth rate of7% per annum in agricultural value, addedmorethan two and half times the national average which can be described as the agricultural success story of the 1980s. Commenting on the land reforms story, D Bandopadhyay (2003), the then commissioner of land reforms of west Bengal says that there is no contradiction between some measure of egalitarianism and efficiency.Thus it is the combination of three factors:

a.Re-distributive and tenurial reforms.

b.Access to non-farm inputs and services necessary or farming, and

c.Institutional reforms enabling peasantry to exercise some degree of governmental functions and influence policies.

These are essential for successful resource reform to enhance poor peasants’ capacity to increase production and reduce poverty.

The rate of growth of foodgrains in west Bengal slackened in the 1990s to 2.39percent from 5.15 in 1980-90. Bandyopadhyay argues that 1.6 million or so recorded bargadarsbecame fullowners ofland they cultivate. The change of status from secure leaseholder to owner wouldopen up various possibilities for enhancing production.Secondly, acute fragmentation of holding has become a major constraint to intensive use of electro-mechanicapplianances, and even biochemical technology in some cases. Without consolidation of landholding, a major breakthrough can be made. Thirdly, insufficiency of institutional credit in rural areas is seriously impeding growth of agriculture in the state. Left Front government failed to provide a cooperativecredit supply system at large for the last two decades (1990s and 2000s). Hence new breed of unlicensedshahukars emerged who lends at Rs 5 per 100 per month which amounts 60% interest per annum.

However, West Bengal’s unique achievement indicates that with an appropriate mix of changes in agrarian relations, institutional reforms and technology, higher productivity and improved livelihood options can be accomplished for the peasants.

Conclusion:

The history of land reforms in India is not a gift from an enlightened benevolent state. Rather, the modest reforms that have till now legislated and implemented have been the outcome of long and protracted struggles by the peasants. In West Bengal, the most notable aspect of the reform process was not legislative change – many of the central provisions had been on the statute books since 1950s but political change at the state level, reinforced by effective institutions at local level. With popular support from Panchayat Raj institutionsand local political representative bodies, well publicized land settlement camps moved from village to village, updating land records and offering tenants the right to register their tenancies at the same time. This concerted effort between government and citizens’ representative bodies helped to bring about a significant shift in the bargaining power of the tenants in relation to landlords which was ultimately the key to success.

In several parts of India there has been a significant increase in agricultural production. This is especially the case in wheat production areas where it has been possible to increase the productivity of land through the introduction of HYVs as part of green revolution. In these areas the emphasis has been on technological innovations with in agriculture. In west Bengal the emphasis has been on structural reforms aiming at ‘changing the production-relations’ in favour of the land-poor and share-croppers.

References

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• BardhanPranab andDilipMookherjee (2005). Political Economy of Land Reforms in West Bengal 1978-1998. Unpublished Paper.
• Joshi P C (1975). Land Reforms in India – Trends and perspectives. Delhi: Allied Publishers.
• Kirsten Westergaard (1986). People’s Participation, Local Government and RuralDevelopment — The case of West Bengal. Copenhagen: Centre for DevelopmentResearch, March.
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• SenAmartya (1999). Poverty and Famines – An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation.Oxford University Press.

Land Reforms in India- West Bengal (Web Links)

• http://www.jstor.org/stable/4396841?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contentsDepeasantisation Discontinued: Land Reforms in West Bengal, G. K. Lieten.
• http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/publications/pub1966land.pdfImplementation of Land Reforms,A review by the committee on Implementation of Land Reforms, Government of India Planning Commission New Delhi August, 1966.
• http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1904/19040810.htmThe experience of Kerala and West Bengal in the matter of land reforms, as discussed at an international conference in Kolkata.
• http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y5026e/y5026e0b.htmCurrent land policy issues in India, by R.S. Deshpande.
• http://indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/Changes%20in%20Land%20Relations.pdfChan ges in Land Relations: The Political Economy of Land Reforms in a Kerala Village, Suma Scaria.
•   http://www.clraindia.org/include/LandReformsekta.pdfLand Reforms in India: Unfinished Task, by Sita Devi, EktaParishad activist.
• http://www.landesa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/RDI_112.pdfLand Reform Law and Implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and Recommendations, by Tim Hanstad Jennifer Brown.