15 Class, Culture and Power: Pierre Bourdieu I

Partha Pratim Borah

1.  Introduction

Pierre Bourdieu is one of most well known French sociologists who has immense contribution in diverse areas that encompassed areas like peasants in Algeria, sociological analysis of nineteenth century writer and artist, education, language, consumer and cultural tastes etc. His important contributions include „The Algerians‟ (1962), „Reproduction: In Education, Society and Culture‟(1977), „Outline of a Theory of Practice‟(1977), „The Logic of Practice‟ (1990), „Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste‟(1984), „Language and Symbolic Power‟(1991), „The field of Cultural Production‟(1993). Bourdieu was a prolific writer who has immense contribution to the conceptual and methodological development of sociology. His concept of cultural capital, habitus and field along with the study of the intellectuals as specialists of production of symbolic power are worth mentioning. This module attempts to give an introduction to the works of Pierre Bourdieu with an emphasis on his theoretical orientation and the major concepts that he develops.

2.  Theoretical Orientation of Pierre Bourdieu 

The major theoretical orientation of Pierre Bourdieu can be better described in his own words as „general science  of  practices‟.  It  is  based  on his  „relational‟  method  of  analysis  that  rest  on  his  objection  of„ subjectivist‟ and „objectivist‟ mode of knowledge. In fact, „relational‟ method forms the basis of new sociological understanding of Pierre Bourdieu.

The work of Bourdieu tries to go beyond the subject/object dichotomy or partial view of the reality because of the conflict of subjectivism and objectivism. For Bourdieu, neither objectivist nor subjectivist analysis can give us complete picture of reality. Bourdieu states that the subjective/objective dichotomy „has a social foundation but they have no scientific foundation‟ (1990a: 34).

The following passage from the „Outline of a Theory of Practice‟ (Bourdieu 1977a) gives a sequence of Bourdieu‟s thinking: „The social world may be the object of three modes of theoretical knowledge, each of which implies a set of (usually tacit) anthropological theses. Although these modes of knowledge are strictly speaking in no way exclusive, and may be described as moments in a dialectical advance towards adequate knowledge, they have only one thing in common, the fact that they are opposed to practical knowledge. The knowledge we shall call phenomenological…sets out to make explicit the truth of the primary experience of the social world…The knowledge we shall term objectivist…constructs the objective relations… which structure practice and representations of practice…Finally, it is only by means of a second break, which is needed in order to grasp the limits of objectivist knowledge- an inevitable moment in scientific knowledge- and to bring to light the theory of theory and the theory of practice inscribed (in its practical state) in this mode of knowledge, that we can integrate the gains from it into an adequate science of practices (Bourdieu 1977a: 3).

While making distinction between the subjective and objective understanding, Bourdieu states that the subjective approaches are associated with the various micro approaches. In the process of breaking with agents self understanding, Bourdieu (1990b) states that although the scientific representation are constructed out of the representation of the everyday practices, representation of everyday practices cannot be substituted by the scientific representation. The critical examination of the „informant‟s account of the peer behaviour also form the part of Bourdieu‟s attempt to break with subjectivism (Bourdieu 1977a: 16-22).

For Bourdieu (1977a: 27) objectivism refers to two general forms i.e. the uncritical recording and statistical analysis of empirical regularities of human behaviour and the forms of conceptual abstraction to the social realities. On the other hand, Bourdieu also states the need of doing away with objectivism as he opines that practices are constitutive of structures as well as determined by them and as such he looks for practical character of agency and in the process he develops the concept of habitus. While developing general theory of practices, Bourdieu introduces reflexive perspective in sociological practice. Bourdieu argues that a sociological view of social world is possible with a critical reflection and empirical investigation of social and epistemological conditions and he terms it as „participant objectivation‟ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 68; Wacquant 1989: 33).

Bourdieu also criticises three form of objective knowledge i.e. positivism, structuralism and intellectualism while putting emphasis on the need of breaking away with objectivism. Bourdieu (1977a: 38, 202) looks for a social science that will construct various concepts that can mediate the relation of various theoretical and practical knowledge and thereby he tries to do away with all those approaches that try to establish a direct relation between theoretical and practical knowledge. He says that to have a comprehensive explanatory framework of practices, there is a need of taking into account the actor‟s perception (Bourdieu 1990a: 130). He says that the failure of positivist social science in this context is that while giving priority to the macro structure they fail to see the role of engaged actors. His criticism of structuralism especially propounded by Levi-Strauss and Althusser is because of their attempt to see action as mere theoretical, temporal and logical model which fails to take into account the genesis of the structure. For Bourdieu, practices are part of the objective structure that cannot be explained by the objective account of social life. Bourdieu criticises intellectualism as abstract consideration of practical knowledge of the actor. He says that objectivist knowledge presents practical action as if it is the case for another form of symbolic domination.

In this backdrop of criticism of the dichotomy of objectivist and subjectivist analysis, Bourdieu propagates„ relational method‟ which according to Bourdieu (1968) is the highest method contribution of structuralism to the social sciences. According to Bourdieu (1984: 22) the „relational method‟ studies social life not in„ terms of substance but with the relationships‟. Bourdieu argues that the relational thinking do help us to take object of inquiry from everyday assumptions and perceptions and transform it into object of scientific knowledge (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passerson 1991: 253). He emphasised on the relational method goes to the extent of taking „the real is the relational‟ in science (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97).While discussing the significance of relational method in presenting the reality of the social life, Bourdieu says that it is „a relational technique of data analysis whose philosophy corresponds exactly to what, in my view, the reality of the social world is. It is a technique which “thinks” in terms of relation, as I try to do precisely with the notion of field‟ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96). In the relational method, Bourdieu says that rather than to transform the attribute of individual and groups into variable as seen in the common practice of sociology, it tries to build variables into „systems of relations‟ which are ordered differentially and hierarchically. Thus, Bourdieu offers „relational method‟ as an alternative to the problem associated with the creation of dichotomy subjectivist and objectivist understanding.

3.  Bourdieu’s Idea of Capital and Symbolic Power 

While having an engagement with the dichotomy between subjectivist and objectivist understanding, Bourdieu develops his theory of symbolic power along with the theory of symbolic interest, theory of power as capital and the theory of symbolic violence and capital. In fact, Bourdieu‟s theory can be seen as departure to the assumption of structural Marxist that tries to posit culture in a deterministic framework. In the process, Bourdieu criticises Marxism because it attempts to reinforce the subjectivism/objectivism dualism in the attempt to stress on the significance of economic factors on the social life. Bourdieu tries to tackle the problem by broadening the scope of economic factors to include symbolic and non material pursuits along with the material pursuits. For Bourdieu (1977a: 178), economic calculation should include „all goods, material as well as symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation‟. In the process, Bourdieu wants to have a „science of practices‟ which will see „all practices‟ as „oriented towards the maximisation of material or symbolic profit‟ (1980 a: 209 as cited in Swartz 1997). In this context Bourdieu develops the concepts of strategy and in his study of the kinship relation in the pre capitalist societies, he says that the kinship relation are the „product of strategies (conscious and unconscious) oriented towards the satisfaction of material and symbolic interests and organised by reference to a determinate set of economic and social conditions‟ (1977a: 36).

Bourdieu uses his idea of capital to extend to all forms of power by encompassing how the individual and groups draw various cultural, social and symbolic resources for maintaining and enhancing their position in social order. It was another way Bourdieu tries to move away from Marxism as Bourdieu (1989: 375 as cited in Swartz 1997) sees the various resources as capital as they function as „social relation of power‟. For Bourdieu capital represents power „over the accumulated product of past labour… and thereby over the mechanisms which tend to ensure the production of a particular category of goods and thus over a set of revenue and profits‟ (1991: 230). In this way his idea of capital is somewhat closer to the Marx idea of capital as accumulated labour. Bourdieu tries to give a broader understanding of „capital‟ by locating it in wider system of exchanges and to go beyond the narrower understanding of „capital‟ which is associated only with the economic sphere or monetary exchange. He writes: „It is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in one form recognised by economic theory. Economic theory has allowed to be foisted upon its definition of the economy of practices which is the historical invention of capitalism; and by reducing the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is objectively and subjectively orientated toward the maximisation of profit, i.e., (economically) self-interested, it has implicitly defined the other forms of exchange as non- economic, and therefore disinterested. In particular, it defines as disinterested those forms of exchange which ensure the trans-substantiation whereby most material types of capital- those which are economic in the restricted sense- can present themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa‟ (Bourdieu 2006, 105-106).

Institutionalised form‟. Bourdieu (2006) argues that the cultural capital is different from the economic capital as the cultural capital signifies embodiment and as such cultural capital cannot be separated from the person who posses it. He writes: „Most of the properties of cultural capital can be deduced from the fact that, in its fundamental state, it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment. The accumulation of the cultural capital in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of what is called culture, cultivation, Bildung, presupposes a process of embodiment, incorporation, which insofar as it implies a labour of inculcation and assimilation, cost time, time which must be invested personally by the investor‟ (Bourdieu 2006: 107).Bourdieu (2006) categorised capital into four types: economic capital, cultural capital, social capital and symbolic capital. Bourdieu develops his concept of cultural capital while studying the scholastic achievement of various school children who may have similar social origin but different educational background (Bourdieu 2006). He criticised the assumption that the school achievement is based on the individual aptitudes rather than cultural; capital that is accrued to the family of the children. Bourdieu (2006) argues that cultural capital exist in three different states: „embodied state‟, „objectified form‟ and the Bourdieu sees a historical trajectory in the development of the cultural capital and how the cultural capitals are becoming basis of stratification in the modern societies (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1977). He is especially looking at the unequal distribution of the cultural capital in the objectified and institutionalised form across classes. Bourdieu also talks about the inter-convertibility of capital from one form to another and in „The Logic of Practice‟ (1990b: 122), he even tries to equate capital with „energy of social physics‟ to explain the inter-convertibility and various forms of capitals.

Bourdieu understanding of symbolic form and its analysis signifies his departure from French structuralism. Bourdieu‟s (1990b) emphasises on the symbolic manipulation as a mode of domination rather than coercion or physical violence. It shows the importance that the Bourdieu gives to role of cultural processes, producers and institution in maintaining inequality in the contemporary society. This can be represented as symbolic form and it also shows Bourdieu‟s attempt to move away from Marxism. With the help of the structuralist theory, Bourdieu is able to show that the source of power is the relationship of the symbolic system to the social structure. In this context, he defines symbolic power as „a determinate relationship between those who exercise this power and those who undergo it- that is to say, in the very structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced‟ (Bourdieu 1977b: 117). The various characteristics of the symbolic capital is lucidly expressed by Bourdieu in his following statement relating to scientific field: „The space of positions, when perceived by a habitus adapted to it (competent, endowed with a sense of the game), functions as a space of possibles, the range of possible ways of doing science, among which one has to choose; each of the agents engaged in the field has a practical perception of the various realizations of science, which functions as a problematic. This perception, this vision, varies according to the agents‟ dispositions, and is more or less complete, more or less extensive; it may rule out some sectors, disdaining them as uninteresting or unimportant‟ (Bourdieu 2004: 59-70). Some of characteristics of symbolic capital that can be deduced from this statement are that symbolic capital are embodied which are acquired over time, it is a systematic process of inculcation that express the outer „habitus‟ and differs across the field.

While discussing the idea of symbolic violence‟, Bourdieu emphasises the conditions by which the dominated accept their own condition of domination as legitimate (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The idea of „symbolic capital‟ that Bourdieu gives in order to describe inter convertibility of various forms of capitals is important as other form of capital gets their legitimation through the symbolic capital which masks their material of interested dimension (Bourdieu 1990b: 122).

On the basis of various concepts that the Bourdieu develops over time, he further explains symbolic labour as something that legitimises arbitrary relation of power as something as natural order of things (Bourdieu, 1990b, 122). For Bourdieu (1991, 170), the role of sociology is to describe „the laws of transformation which governs the transformation of different kinds of capital, and in particular the labour of dissimulation and transfiguration … which secures a real transubstantiation of the relation of power by rendering recognizable and misrecognizable the violence they objectively contain and thus by transforming them into symbolic power, capable of producing real effects without any apparent expenditure of energy‟. Thus the various forms of capital and their inter convertibility and use of symbolic capital as a concept to move beyond Marxism provides us a new understanding of social reality.

4.  Bourdieu’s Concept of Habitus and its Sociological Significance 

One of the most important contribution of Bourdieu to sociology is his concept of habitus which he defines as „a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experience, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems‟ (Bourdieu 1971: 83). Bourdieu sees habitus as „a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming to ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them‟ (1990b: 53). Thus, Bourdieu identifies the various dispositions as constituents of habitus. Bourdieu‟s understanding of habitus changes from a normative and cognitive understanding of action to a more practical and dispositional understanding (Bourdieu 1980b: 133 as cited in Swartz 1997). Here, the term disposition is used to mean two key component of habitus i.e. structure and propensity. Bourdieu could see the important role of the habitus shaping the aspiration and practices of the individual and the group. Bourdieu talks about how habitus helps in the internationalisation of various fundamental condition of existence into disposition by means of socialisation. He also says that habitus transforms social and economic „necessity‟ into „virtue‟ when it leads the individual to a „kind of immediate submission to order‟ (1990a: 54). He says that these dispositions of habitus represent an informal and practical form of knowledge when he says „the schemes of the habitus, the primary forms of classification, owe their specific efficacy to the fact that they function below the level of consciousness and language, beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny or control by the will‟ (Bourdieu 1984: 466). Thus habitus exist without our consciousness and language and it cannot be controlled by our will.

The meaning that Bourdieu attributes to habitus is different from his predecessors as he tries to give emphasis on the underlying structures of practices and thereby not meaning „habit‟ when he use the term habitus. Bourdieu writes: „Why did I revive that old word? Because with the notion of habitus you can refer to something that is close to what is suggested by the idea of habit, while differing from it in one important respect. The habitus, as the word implies, is that which one has acquired, but which has become durably incorporated in the body in the form of permanent dispositions. So the term constantly reminds us that it refers to something historical, linked to individual history, and that it belongs to a genetic mode of thought, as opposed to existentialist mode of thought… Moreover, by habitus the scholastics also meant something like a property, a capital (Bourideu 1993: 86).

Bourdieu also talks about the stratifying aspect habitus by the means of socialisation. According to Bourdieu, power and its legitimation forms the core aspect of the structure and functioning of the habitus because habitus is associated with unconscious calculation of what is possible, impossible or probable for an individual in terms of their location in the stratified social order. He writes that habitus can be seen „in the form of dispositions which are so many marks of social position and hence of the social distance between objective positions…and correctively, so many reminders of this distance and of the conduct required in order to “keeps one‟s distance” or to manipulate it strategically, whether symbolically or actually , to reduce it (easier for the dominant than for the dominated), increase it, or simply maintain it (buy not “letting oneself go,” not “becoming familiar,”in short, “ standing on one‟s dignity,” or on the other hand, refusing to “ take liberties” and “ put oneself forward,” in short “ knowing one‟s place” and staying there)‟ (1977a, 82). Thus, habitus does help in the continuation of the stratified order of the society by means of dispositions associated with various social positions that helps to keep distance between various social positions and is not in the awareness of the person.

In his work „Sociology in Question‟, Bourdieu says that „the principle of habitus are inseparably logical and axiological, theoretical and practical‟ (1993, 86). In „Distinction‟ (1984a) Bourdieu tries to see ways in which habitus is responsible for class differences in the aesthetic tastes and life styles. Thus, habitus also forms an important component of the class formation as habitus does influence the aesthetic tastes and life style of individual in a particular habitus that determine its class position.

5.  Bourdieu’s Understanding of ‘Field’ 

Along with the concept of habitus, Bourdieu develops the concept of „field‟ which means structure of the social setting where the habitus operates. Field forms important component of the investigation of Bourdieu especially in his later investigation of education, culture, television, literature, science, housing etc. For Bourdieu, field is „a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology etc.)‟(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97). Bourdieu develops the concept of field in late 1960s in his work on art after reading Weber‟s sociology of religion (Bourdieu 1987). In fact, the concept of field helps Bourdieu in the development of his relational method and he even argues that „to think in terms of field is to think relationally‟ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96).

Bourdieu suggests three important steps in the analysis of field: the first step is the analysis of the position of field with respect to the position of power and it signifies the importance that Bourdieu gave to power and stratification in his analysis. Second step involves forming the objective structure of relation of position occupied by various agents or institutions that are competing to have a legitimate authority. The third step in the analysis of the field involves the analysis of the habitus of the agents in terms of the different disposition they have in term of determinate type of social and economic conditions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

In the context of the field of television, Bourdieu (1998) defined field as follows: „a structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains people who dominate and people who are dominated. Constant, permanent relationships of inequality operate inside this space, which at the same time becomes a space in which various actors struggle for the transformation or preservation of the field. All the individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the (relative) power at their disposal. It is this power that defines their position in the field and, as a result, their strategies‟ (Bourdieu 1998: 40-41).

Although, hierarchy exist in the field, there is also scope for agency and change and as such it is not like the field of physics. Bourdieu argues that the possibility of „free play‟ in field can produce change within them. He write that people constituting the field are „not particles subject to mechanical forces, and acting under the constraint of causes: nor are they conscious and knowing subjects acting with the full knowledge of the facts, as champions of rational action theory believe…(they are) active and knowing agents endowed with a practical sense is an acquired system of preferences, of principles, of vision and…schemes of action‟ (Bourdieu 1988: 40-41).

6.  Concept of Doxa

The concept of doxa is important when we try to understand the contribution of Bourdieu. In fact, doxa attains multiple meaning in the works of Bourdieu, although in the simple sense it means misrecognition of some of the social arbitrariness. It was first used by Bourdieu in his various description and analysis of various „natural‟ practices and attitudes in traditional societies. Doxa simply means those beliefs or opinions that have close association with the „field‟ and „habitus‟. It is „a set of fundamental beliefs which does not even need to be asserted in the form of an explicit, self-conscious dogma‟ (Bourdieu 2000: 16).

The doxa is more applicable in case of understanding of the traditional social organisation where there can be correspondence between social structure and mental structure. Bourdieu writes: „The adherence expressed in the doxic relation to the social world is the absolute form of recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness, since it is unaware of very question of legitimacy, and hence from conflict between groups claiming to posses it‟ (Bourdieu 1977a: 168). Therefore, doxa allows the socially arbitrary nature of power relations to continue misrecognised and to reproduce in a self-reinforced manner.

On the other hand, Bourdieu‟s work on scientific doxa is seen as difficult to reconcile with his earlier works on „habitus‟ in the educational and academic field. In the chapter titled „The Dual Face of Scientific Reason‟ in „Pascalian Meditations‟ Bourdieu writes: „Scientific fields, microcosms which in a certain respect are social world like others, with concentrations of power and capital, monopolies, power relations, selfish interests, conflicts, etc., are also, in another respect, exceptional, somewhat miraculous universes, in which the necessity of reason is instituted to varying degrees in the reality of structures and dispositions… The fact remains that, despite everything, the struggle [for truth] always takes place under the control of the constitutive norms of the field and solely with the weapons approved within the field…so it is the simple observation of a scientific world in which the defence of reason is entrusted to a collective labour of critical confrontation placed under the control of the facts that forces one to adhere to a critical and reflexive realism which rejects both epistemic absolutism and irrationalist relativism‟ (Bourdieu 2000: 110-11).

Bourdieu‟s concept of doxa acquires a reflexive epistemic dimension when used in the intellectual field. He writes: „what philosophers, sociologists, historians, and all those whose profession it is to think and speak about the world have the greatest chance of overlooking are the social presuppositions inscribed in the scholastic point of view, what, to awaken philosophers from their scholastic slumber, I shall call the oxymoron of epistemic doxa: thinkers leave in a state of unthought (impense, doxa) the presuppositions of their thought, that is the social conditions of possibility of the scholastic point of view and the unconscious dispositions, productive of unconscious theses, which are acquired through an academic or scholastic experience, often inscribed in prolongation or originary (bourgeois) experience of distance from the world and from the urgency of necessity‟ (Bourdieu 1998 a: 129). Thus, Bourdieu argues that economic and social privileges of the scholastic position should not be taken as a kind of condemnation but should be seen as impact of the epistemic doxa on the formation of thought.

7  The General Science of Practice: 

Bourdieu tries to develop a general science of practice after developing the concept of habitus, capital and field. Bourdieu develops a model of practice as a result of relationship between habitat, capital and field and he develops this in the form of a formula in his work „Distinction‟ (1984).

[(habitus)(capital)]+field=practice.

While looking at the interrelationship between habitus, capital and field, Bourdieu argues that the practices cannot be „deduced either from the present conditions which may seem to have provoked them or from the past conditions which have produced the habitus… [but from their] interrelationships‟ (Bourdieu 1990b: 56).

8  Conclusion 

The work of Pierre Bourdieu is of immense importance for sociology. The concept of cultural capital, habitus and field provide us a rich conceptual tool to have sociological analysis of the reality. His attempt to go beyond the existing dichotomy between objectivist and subjectivist approaches of understanding of reality creates „relational method‟ that will continue to have  significance in the sociological understanding of reality.

9  References and Further Reading: 

1. Bourdieu, Pierre and Luc Boltanski. “Changes in Social Structure and Changes in the Demand for Education”. in Contemporary Europe, Social Structures and Cultural Patterns edited by S. Giner and M. Scotford Archer, pp.197—227. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.
2. Bourdieu, Pierre and Loie J.D. Wacquant. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
3. Bourdieu,  Pierre,  Jean-Claude  Chamboredon  and  Jean-Claude  Passerson.  The  Craft  of  Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries (2nd ed.). New York: de Gruyter, 1991.
4. Bourdieu, Pierre. “Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Knowledge.” Social Research 35, no.4 (1968):681-706.

– “Intellectual Field and Creative Project”.  in  Knowledge  and Control:  New  Directions  for  the Sociology of Education edited by M.F.D. Young, pp 161- London: Collier Macmillan, 1971.

– Outline of a theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pre 1977a.

– “Symbolic Power”. In Identity and Structure edited by D. Gleeson. Driffield: Nafferton Books, pp:112- 1977b.

– La sens pratique. Paris: Editions de Minui 1980 a.

– Questions de Sociologie. Paris: Editions de Minui 1980b.

– Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1

– Homo Academicus, (tran P.Collier). Cambridge: Polity, 1988.

– La noblesse d‟Etat: Grands cor Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1989.

– In other Words: Essays towards a Reflexive Sociology. Standford: Standford University Press, 1990a.

– The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990b.

– Language and Symbolic Power (tran Gino Raymond and Mathew Adamson). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.

– Sociology in Question (tran Richard Nice). Thousand Oaks Califf.: Sage Publications, 1993.

– On Television and Journalism. London: Pluto,

– Practical Reason. Cambridge: Polity, 1998 a.

– Pascalian Meditation Cambridge: Polity, 2000.

– Science of Science and Reflexivity. Cambridge: Polity, 2004.

– “The Forms of Capital”. In Education, Globalisation and Social Change edited by H. Lauder, P. Brown, J.A. Dillabough and A.H. Halsey. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

5. Grenfell, Michael. Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts. Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2012.

6. Swartz,  David.  Culture and  Power:  The Sociology  of  Pierre Bourdieu.  Chicago and  London:  The University of Chicago Press, 1997.

7. Wacquant, Loie J.D. “Toward a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu.” Sociological Theory 7, no.1(1989): 26-63.