12 Neo marxist perspectives – Jürgen Habermas

Renu Vinod

1. Introduction

Jürgen Habermas, born in the year 1929 in Düsseldorf, Germany, is one of the world‟s foremost philosophers. His work is interdisciplinary in nature because it combines the social, political, moral, and legal fields in his theories, i.e., communication and discourse theories, theory of meaning and democratic theory. In addition to this, his work has covered topics such as aesthetics, psychology and religion.

Habermas is associated with the Frankfurt School of critical theories because of his interest in understanding changes undergone by modern societies in their social, political, moral and legal foundations from an interdisciplinary, neo-Marxist point of view.

Keeping in mind Habermas‟s most influential works, this module is divided into five parts. The first four parts fall within the framework of mature theory, which are:

1. Theory of Communicative Action

2. Discourse Theory

3. Deliberative Democracy

4. Cosmopolitan World System

The last part of the module is:

5. Public Sphere

Habermas‟s theory of the public sphere is one of his earliest works, and the basis of his theory of communicative action. However, in this module it is dealt with at the end, since the first part, comprising of his mature theories, helps to clarify some of the basic terms used in communicative action by rational agents.

2. Theory of Communicative Action 

In his book the „Theory of Communicative Action‟ (1984), Habermas explains that in any form of communication, there are two or more human agents. The inherent aim or teleos of communication is to arrive at a consensus. This consensus is possible through shared knowledge, shared values and shared meanings – shared mutually by everyone in society. It is through this shared knowledge that people can arrive at an „intersubjective consensus‟, i.e. a situation in which everyone agrees to something that has been communicated. According to Habermas, arriving at an intersubjective consensus is very important for maintaining harmony in society.

Habermas gave importance to communication because, according to him, this is the only way in which human beings can first interact, and then, take some form of coordinated action. Action which is based on „intersubjective consensus‟ is called coordinated action. Habermas‟s attempt to do social theory by studying the role played by language in bringing about coordinated action amongst human agents is called the „linguistic turn’.

In the communicative action theory, Habermas used the concept of „formal pragmatics‟ to refer to the conditions required in any communication to arrive at a consensus through shared meanings. To understand these necessary conditions better, Habermas distinguished between two types of meaning: propositional meaning and pragmatic meaning. Propositional meaning refers to the „truth conditions‟ that apply to a speech. This in essence refers to the conditions in which a speech would be true or false. The expressions, ‘The door is shut’ and ‘Good morning’ are two examples. ‘The door is shut’ can be seen to be true or false by checking whether the door is really shut or not. But, the same cannot be said of ‘Good morning’ – this expression cannot be checked to be either true or false. Therefore, to assess the truth conditions in which a speech act applies is to narrow down the definition of meaning itself.

Consequently, Habermas gives primacy to pragmatic meaning. In pragmatic meaning, the emphasis is placed on the role played by language in arriving at an „intersubjective consensus‟. Habermas agrees with the German linguist Karl Bühler (1879 – 1963) according to whom, in any communication one can locate a triad consisting of:

a. The speaker

b. The listener &

c. The world

Any theory of language should thus focus, according to Habermas, not only on what is spoken, but on the relation between the speaker and the listener. The relation between speaker and listener is governed by certain rules, which we will come to later. In communication theory, it is necessary to understand this relation between the speaker and the listener simply because it is the function of speech to bring the participants to an intersubjective consensus. The function of speech of arriving at a consensus amongst participants is far more important to Habermas than its function of conveying some information about the world from the speaker to the listener. In order for the interactions between human agents to take place normally, language provides the (invisible) structures or rules which guide these interactions so that there can be consensus and agreement.

As mentioned earlier, arriving at consensus and agreement is the inherent aim or teleos of language. Habermas calls the process of arriving at an understanding as Verständigung, and the end result of this process, i.e. the understanding that has been reached, he calls rationales Einverständnis. According to Habermas, the pragmatic theory of meaning highlights the fact that there can be consensus and agreement in communication only due to the shared nature of meanings. This means that everyone has agreed upon the meaning of something, which is why meanings have validity for all the human agents involved in the interaction.

In addition to the rules, Habermas identified three more important principles which are central to „sincere‟ speech acts – he called these „validity claims‟. For a speech act or other form of communication to be recognized and accepted as sincere and true by the listener, the role of validity claims is vital. There are three validity claims:

a. Validity claim to truth

b. Validity claim to rightness and

c. Validity claim to truthfulness

To explain the role of validity claims in more detail, Habermas turned to discourse. Discourses play an important role in sorting out discords, which can take place despite the inherent aim of language being to arrive at a consensus or agreement. Discourse, is a technical term. Its aim is to always arrive at a „rationally motivated consensus‟. Discourse is important to avoid potential conflicts in communication and to repair discords which have already taken place.

For the three types of validity claims, i.e. truth, rightness and truthfulness, there are three corresponding types of discourse, i.e. theoretical, moral and aesthetic. Like any communication, discourse is also governed by certain presuppositions or rules which help the participants to arrive at a consensus. Habermas called this type of consensus „rationally motivated‟. Two examples of a general presupposition are, recognizing that every participant in a communication is equal and expecting that every sentence uttered is expressed in truthfulness and is a sincere speech. For e.g., to say ‘It is snowing’ when it is not, is a false utterance and will not meet the validity claims to truth, truthfulness or rightness.

In this context, Habermas distinguished between two types of communicative action:

a. One which aims to arrive at a consensus through shared meanings and acceptance of validity claims and.

b. The other in which an individual aims to bring about a desired end through instrumental and strategic action.

Habermas situated these two types of communicative action in two separate spheres – one, the lifeworld and the other, the system. He borrowed Edmund Husserl‟s (1859 – 1938) definition of lifeworld to explain that the lifeworld is the everyday world that human beings share. It consists of the spheres of family, culture, voluntary organizations and the media. The lifeworld aims to maintain social order by ensuring that the conditions in which communicative action occurs does not result in any discord or disharmony. The lifeworld achieves this through its repository of shared knowledge and shared meanings to arrive at a consensus. The system on the other hand is the sphere of the economy and the state where the main form of interaction is instrumental action amongst human agents.

Habermas warned against what he called the „colonization of the lifeworld‟ by the system. The economy and the state have a tendency to encroach upon the lifeworld. This can lead to the shrinking of the lifeworld, which can result in negative outcomes in the long run. Habermas called these  negative outcomes „social pathologies‟ which arise from, amongst others, the impact of market-activities on non- market domains of the family, culture, voluntary organizations etc. The social pathologies that Habermas warned against include anomie, disintegration, alienation, demoralization and social instability.

To summarize, Habermas‟s theory of communicative action is an attempt to use social theory differently to understand the role played by language in bringing about coordinated action amongst people. Habermas studies the use of language in social contexts by human agents to maintain order and avoid, through discourse, situations that can result in conflict. Language does this through hidden structures, which are the general presuppositions, which guide people to conduct their actions and speeches normally. Other important points in the communicative action theory are the emphasis on rationally motivated consensus in any communication and the existence of validity claims on truth, truthfulness and rightness by the speaker to establish the sincerity of any speech. Finally, sincere communicative action aimed at arriving at a consensus or agreement is rooted in the lifeworld which is the space where traditions are continued and shared meanings, values and reasons are replenished through consensus and agreement.

3.  Discourse Theory 

Habermas‟s discourse theory is outlined in his books „Moral Consciousness‟  and „Communicative Action‟ (1983) and „Justification and Application‟ (1991). In his discourse theory, Habermas notes that whenever individual agents face a moral conflict, they are likely to arrive at a consensus through a rational discourse. This means that participants engage in the discourse voluntarily and the final decision on any norm is arrived at through a reasonable, impartial discourse. So, in a moral discourse every participant is given a patient hearing and an impartial decision is made by all the concerned parties. This involves viewing the norm and its impact from one‟s own perspective and from the perspective of other affected parties.

Habermas‟s discourse theory is based in post-conventional societies.  Post-conventional societies are modern societies in which human beings act only on the basis of norms that can be morally justified. These include norms related to equality, justice, truth and so on. These cannot be questioned. Why are norms important for Habermas in discourse ethics? This is because they are rules of conduct which guide the behavior of human beings in the lifeworld and at the same time help them know what to expect from others. This is important because in this way, valid norms help to resolve conflicts and maintain the social order.

There are two types of discourse, according to Habermas. These are moral and ethical discourse. Habermas places more emphasis on moral discourse. Why is this so? This is because moral discourses make a validity claim to rightness, which is difficult to contradict. Take the statement, ‘One must not lie’. This statement makes a validity claim to rightness. A conflict arises when a validity claim to rightness is rejected. When this happens, a moral discourse aims to find a consensus in which everyone accepts without question the validity of a norm. When a norm is acceptable to all, it becomes universalizable. This is the aim of a moral discourse; to establish the universalizability of an existing norm or of a new one, through its acceptability to all, without any coercion.

To explain this process, Habermas uses the discourse principle, „D‟ and the moral principle, „U‟. „D‟ refers to the principle that all norms, be they general, legal or moral, must be amenable to agreement by all who are affected by that norm. „D‟, however, plays a negative function, i.e., it helps to identify only invalid norms, i.e. norms which will not be acceptable to everyone and which can lead to situations of conflict. Take for example the statement, ‘The caste system is a just system’. The impact of a statement like this on all participants will be different. Moreover, it does not meet the requirement of equality of all in society, which is a universal principle. On the other hand, „U‟ or the moral principle states that the validity of a moral norm relies on how agreeable it is to mutual consensus by all parties participating in the discourse. In doing so, „U‟ can decide the validity and the invalidity of norms. This makes „U‟ a stronger principle than „D‟.

To weigh the validity of norms, certain conditions have to be met:

a. The norm‟s impact has to be accepted by everyone, upon its implementation

b. It must weigh equally the interests of everyone in a moral discourse, so that the norm is accepted by all voluntarily and through a rationally motivated consensus.

This shows that the validity of a norm depends solely on its universalizability. Very simply put, moral discourse helps to determine the universal nature of a norm. The test of a norm‟s validity, through moral discourse, is its universalizability. For Habermas, the universalizability of norms is a tool for social integration of individuals.

Habermas explains moral discourse by bringing in the first person, second person and third person perspectives. Say, for example, that a human agent in the lifeworld is making a validity claim to rightness, ‘One must not steal’. The human agent must conceive a validity claim to the rightness of the norm from his or her own, i.e. first person perspective. Then, following the rules of discourse or the general presuppositions (justice, equality, truth etc.), he or she must look at the norm from the „we‟ perspective. What impact does this norm‟s implementation have on all in the group? Does it help to maintain it or will its implementation result in a disintegration of the group?

In a moral discourse, the ends are seen to be desirable for all. For e.g., ‘Equality of all’ is a norm which is a desirable goal for all concerned. The best means are chosen, by following the rules of discourse, to arrive at this desired end. In an ethical discourse however, the ends are chosen on the basis of a dialogue between two or more people. While moral discourse focuses on establishing the universalizability of a desirable norm through an impartial dialogue, ethical discourse focuses on choosing the good life through a dialogue. In a moral discourse, the emphasis is on the rightness of a norm, applicable and acceptable to all; it is universal. In an ethical discourse, the emphasis is on the good life, on a norm which is good for the individual and the collective. The collective here is a cultural group – therefore, the ends are particular to that cultural group and not necessarily universally applicable.

In moral discourse, norms are the basic constituents – for .e.g. truth, justice, equality are norms which are valid for all. The basic constituents of ethical discourse, on the other hand, are values. A value is particular to a cultural group‟s identity. Unlike norms which are absolute, i.e. they are either valid or invalid, values can be relative – they are applicable to the individual or the culture. For e.g. American society values merit, whereas Indian society still values heredity, to some extent.

A moral discourse is deontological because it is morally binding upon all. The norm „Equality of all’ is good for each and every member of society. An ethical discourse, on the other hand, is teleological because it takes what is considered the good life to be a valid goal. The good life, for e.g. choosing a career in fashion technology over medicine (which can save several lives), can be good for the individual but perhaps not for the collective.

To summarize, a norm, which is the basic constituent of a moral discourse is justifiable when it is general and unconditional. Therefore, a moral discourse is deontological because it makes the norm morally binding on all irrespective of who they are or where they come from. So, norms such as truth, equality and justice are as valid for Indians as they are for the Eskimos. The general and unconditional nature of moral discourse makes norms which are accepted as valid universalizable. This has the purpose of allowing moral norms to serve a social function – which is to regulate potential and actual conflicts. It does this by making all parties adhere to certain common rules, such as equality of all in the discourse, justice, impartiality etc., which all participants in the dialogue have to follow. This makes moral discourse an aspect of the lifeworld because the norm is accepted, shared and understood as valid by all. In this way, the lifeworld is maintained and conflicts are avoided.

4.  Deliberative Democracy 

Habermas‟s theory of democracy is called the „discourse theory of democracy‟. As the name itself suggests, communicative action or dialogue as per certain rules, plays an important role in this theory. As with other communicative acts, discourse theory of democracy or deliberative democracy also has certain underlying pragmatic presuppositions. In deliberative democracy, Habermas states that there is a two- track system of political discourse – one the informal sphere of public opinion and the other, the formal sphere of parliament and legislature. Habermas‟s deliberative democracy is a space where the formal sphere of parliament and legislature converts public opinions and other discussions in the informal sphere into a policy that every person has to abide by.

Participants taking part in deliberative discourse must keep in mind the following „pragmatic presuppositions‟:

a. Anyone can participate in the political discourse

b. All participants are accorded equal status and

c. Voluntary nature of dialogue

Rules people follow while engaging in political communication are themselves the product of a discursive process, and are not imposed on anyone. This is the discourse principle or „D‟ which in the political-legal context Habermas calls the „democratic principle‟. So, „D‟ in the context of general communication means that people have to come to an inter-subjective consensus for coordinated action, and in the legal- political contexts it means that there must be consensus on what norms and rules people will agree to follow. Only those norms and rules which have been arrived at through rationally motivated consensus can  be  considered  to  be  legitimate  in  the  political  context.  In  political  discourse,  the  „pragmatic presuppositions‟ thus refer to the cooperative, voluntary nature of people‟s participation in modern societies.

Modern democratic societies give people two types of freedoms – Habermas refers to them as public autonomy and private autonomy. Public autonomy refers to people‟s freedom to participate voluntarily, as equals in making laws that they have to follow and which spell out their rights. Private autonomy refers to the freedoms that people enjoy as beneficiaries of these laws. Both these types of autonomies are required in modern societies for people to lead meaningful, free lives.

a. The „weak‟ and informal public sphere consisting of the everyday, unregulated communication of individuals, andTherefore, for Habermas, the underlying feature of deliberative democracy is that it allows for political discourse, which is the basis for legitimate government. In other words, the communicative power of people, through public opinion finally metamorphoses into government policy. Communicative power of the people is the everyday communication which gets transformed into a universally accepted law in the domain of parliament and legislature. Thus, there is a two-track structure of politics:

b. The „strong‟, formal public sphere, consisting of the law-making domain, which gets its inputs

from the former

5. Cosmopolitan World System 

According to Habermas, globalization has resulted in the world becoming an ever-more integrated place. This process whereby changes have been taking place in the world as a result of globalization, Habermas called  „postnational  constellation‟.  This  is  the  actual  setting  of  Habermas‟s  initial  warning  of  the „colonization‟ of the lifeworld by the economic processes of the system, here globalization. To avoid the complete disintegration of the lifeworld by the social pathologies that result from the colonization of the lifeworld by the system, Habermas suggests a three-tier model of global governance. This is called Habermas‟s cosmopolitanism – which is a reconstruction of Immanuel Kant‟s (1724-1804) theory of the cosmopolitan right – to suit the realities of a globalized world order.

Governments in modern day societies need to restrain the disintegrative nature of money and administrative power, preserve democratic values and reaffirm their own legitimate authority. To do this in the integrated world system however, governments cannot restrict themselves to administering individual nation-states. Instead, governments must learn to intervene politically at a transnational level. It is for this that Habermas suggested the three-tier model of global governance.

The three-tier model of governance consists of a supranational, transnational and national level – the latter is autonomous from the other two levels. According to Habermas, the main role of the supranational level of governance is to maintain peace and human rights in the world. The supranational level is a world organization with an executive branch and a judicial branch. Its policies and activities are organized on the basis of a Constitution ratified by all the member nation-states. The supranational world organization, for Habermas, is a revamped United Nations Organization, suited to a globalized world order. It would perform its main function of maintaining peace and human rights according to the principles outlined in the United Nations Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Its legislative branch is a General Assembly comprising representatives of national governments and delegates elected directly by the citizens of the member nation-states. The executive branch would be like the Security Council, with its main function being the maintenance of a police force which it can authorize to take action in the event of human rights violations in any part of the world. The judicial branch would be a merged International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice, acting as the highest court of appeal in cases of human rights violations.

At the transnational level of governance, issues which are more domestic in nature, such as the economy, society, health, education and environment, are dealt with. This is because a world organization would be too far removed from such micro-level issues which affect individual nation-states. Instead, according to Habermas, negotiations conducted at the transnational level by regional players would help develop a „global domestic policy‟. An example of a multinational regional or „global player‟ is the European Union. Habermas notes that a fair compromise can be reached only if the global players have a relatively equal power position in the world system.

At the national level are the autonomous nation-states. But, in the globalized world order with this three- tier system of governance, nation-state would be defined differently. Habermas‟s definition of nation-state has an internal aspect and an external aspect. The internal aspect has two dimensions. The first dimension involves the state‟s monopoly over the use of force. But, the nation-state will have to keep its police and armed forces ready when called by the supranational organization for armed interventions in the global system wherever there are human rights violations. The second dimension involves the democratic aspect– here, all the non-democratic nation-states would be pressurized to reform themselves along democratic lines. The external aspect of the definition of the nation-state involves the recognition of a nation-state by other member-states of the supranational world organization only if they are democracies. Those who lack democratic traits would not be recognized by the community of states as a legitimate nation-state.

This is Habermas‟s three-tier structure of global governance. It is not however a world government. As Habermas himself notes, a world government would be too remote and centralized to be able to govern in a democratic manner. The world government is necessary to maintain the autonomy of nation-states, on the one hand, and to maintain the cosmopolitan nature of global governance in which every member nation-state can participate.

6.  Public Sphere 

For Habermas, the public and private spheres are not two dichotomous, mutually exclusive entities. The onset of economic modernization and capitalism in Europe impacted the relationship between the public and private spheres. Capitalist society brought with it new political institutions, particularly seen in the move away from an authoritarian to a democratic state and as a result of this, a more alert and inclusive public sphere.

Habermas‟s definition of public sphere is one in which autonomous individuals transcend the private (familial) sphere to come together as a public that engages in intersubjective discourse. Individual goals are transcended to give prominence to issues that concern the collective and thereby require response from the state. The public and the private are found in every individual in modern societies – the private individual asserts his autonomy only in relation to the public and the social being can engage in communicative discourse only in relation to others. As a result of this, Habermas‟s public sphere and private sphere are spheres that are mutually interdependent and inclusive rather than dichotomous and exclusive.

In the public sphere, individuals act in cooperation with one another. Cooperative agents alone can create a public which has common interests that transcend the sphere of the private. It is this characteristic of the public sphere that makes it the realm where social integration of autonomous individuals is possible. Habermas‟s public sphere is the intermediate sphere between the state and society. For, it is in the public sphere that the tensions between the state and society play themselves out in the hope of resolution and consensus through rational discourse.

Habermas calls his public sphere a bourgeois public sphere. The public sphere is one whose members are property-owning, literate bourgeois who come together in salons and coffee houses to discuss issues of mutual concern. To that extent, Habermas‟s public sphere is exclusive. However, public sphere of the bourgeois is in itself inclusive, i.e. all its members can equally and voluntarily participate in rational critical dialogue of the state and itself.

An important criterion for the public sphere to exist is the presence of rational communication amongst its members. The members of the public sphere are rational, i.e. they are capable of rational thought, speech and action, all of which are open to criticism within the public sphere. Habermas considers his public sphere to be emancipatory to the extent that it empowers members through their dialogue and discourse. In addition to this, members can also engage in criticism of their own communication process. This characteristic of the public sphere to allow rational, self-critical communication plays an important role in fuelling cooperation and coordinated action amongst its members.

For Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere is emblematic of the transition from ancient to modern society since its members are vocal critiques of an authoritarian state that monopolizes rights and powers and question the legitimacy of such a state to rule. At the same time, its members remain alert to incursions even by the democratic state upon the rights and liberties of its individual members. A democratic state, for the rational members of the public sphere, needs to be open to scrutiny by its citizens. This is what empowers the members of the public sphere – the fact that it can compel the state to make its operations public and therefore, under the vigilant eye of its citizens. Finally, while delineating the rights and obligations of the state, the public sphere remains watchful of its own actions; the public sphere is thus at once mutually integrating and self-reflecting.

Thus, Habermas‟s public sphere is rational-critical – rational because it is composed of members engaging in critical dialogue on the role of the state – both authoritarian and democratic – and themselves, thereby enabling coordinated action to arise out of rationally-motivated consensus. Thus, critique and self-reflective behavior form the hallmark of Habermas‟s public sphere.

However, the public sphere itself is prone to transformation as a result of certain inbuilt paradoxes. Being the public sphere of the bourgeoisie, the rational critical discourse that takes place within this sphere tends to be class-specific. As a result, such a discourse cannot transcend class interests. Therefore, the emancipatory character of the public sphere is applicable only to the particular interests of the bourgeoisie rather than to the universal interests of all members of that society.

Secondly, private, autonomous individuals being members of the public sphere, there is an inherent tension in this sphere between communicative and instrumental reasoning. In capitalist societies, the members of the public sphere are individuals capable of rational, self-critical discourse. However, they are also bourgeoisie and therefore equally prone to instrumental reasoning. This is a characteristic of modern capitalistic societies, where the private sphere comprises both the family as well as the market. However, the market is essentially a place where private individuals engage in what is necessarily a public function – exchange of commodities. As a result of this, there exists in the individual a constant tension between the public, rational aspect capable of communicative reasoning, and the private, functional aspect prone instrumental reasoning.

Finally, Habermas‟s public sphere is also a victim of the increasing bureaucratization of the state on the one hand, and the arrival of the mass media in capitalistic society, on the other. Mass media, a product of bourgeois instrumental reasoning, is interested in culturally integrating the public sphere to meet the economic and political ends of the capitalist state. This has a negative effect on the hallmark of the public sphere – the culture of critique and self-reflection. Rather, the role of the mass media contributes to the growth of a consumer culture; individuals are no longer rational beings capable of critically questioning the state and the public sphere; rather, they become consumers of capitalist commodities. This emergence of an all–powerful media results in the state stepping in to control the public sphere in order to sustain capitalist forces. The new media is not autonomous; rather it is manipulated by the state and market forces, thereby creating tension between communicative reasoning and instrumental reasoning.

To summarize, Habermas‟s bourgeois public sphere is characterized by critical reasoning. This trait of the public sphere makes it amenable for the emancipation and empowerment of private individuals through their rational, critical discourses. However, modern, market-driven, capitalistic society makes evident the paradoxes inherent in the public sphere; paradoxes which result from the tension between the instrumental logic of the bourgeois, who are at the same time engaged as members of the public in a communicative discourse meant to transcend class barriers. These factors, in the end, result in a structural transformation of the public sphere to a space, which is less political, public and governed by critical communicative discourse, to one, which is more privatized, consumer-driven and governed by the instrumentalist logic of the market.

7.  Summary 

A few important points learnt in this chapter are summarized as follows:

• One of Habermas‟s key contributions in sociology is his introduction of the linguistic turn in the study of human interactions. The linguistic turn in social theory seeks to understand the role of human language in the social context, i.e. in any communication setting, to arrive at a consensus, on the basis of which coordinated action is taken.
• Communication follows certain ground rules or pragmatic presuppositions, such as recognizing the equality of all participants and the voluntary nature of speech-acts. These rules are applicable to social, legal-political, economic, moral and ethical discourses, and can help participants arrive at universally recognizable norms which are equally applicable to all members of society.
• Habermas‟s distinction between the lifeworld (society) and the system (polity and economy) is important in the context of modern societies that are in a continuous state of flux, particularly economic flux, as a result of globalization.
• Habermas‟s  warning  of  the  „colonization‟  of  the  lifeworld  by  the  system  in  which  complete disintegration of the former can take place, needs to be taken seriously especially with regard to social pathologies ever-more relevant to the modern world system.  Moreover, Habermas‟s vision of a cosmopolitan world order needs to be understood in the current context where regional players the world over are seeking to assert their power to counteract a unipolar world.
• Finally, Habermas‟s point that the crux of the public sphere is its capacity to critique not just the functioning of the state, but itself, is ever more significant today. This can be seen from the fact that the relationship between civil society and the state at the moment is marred by hostility, with each side seeing itself as a victim of undue interference from the other, and neither capable of or willing to scrutinize itself in the interests of a more equal and just society.

8.  References 

1. Fine, Robert and Daniel Chernilo. “Between Past and Future: The Equivocations of the New Cosmopolitanism”. Studies in Law, Politics and Society 12, no. 31 (2003): 25-44.
2. Finlayson, James Gordon. Habermas: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Web links

1. Theory of Communicative Action
   1. Bolton, Roger. “Habermas‟s Theory of Communicative Action and the Theory of Social Capital”. Link: http://web.williams.edu/Economics/papers/Habermas.pdf
   2. Szczelkun, Stefan. “Summary of the Theory of Communicative Action” Link: http://www.csudh.edu/dearhabermas/publsbm01.htm
   3. Chilton, Stephen and Cuzzo, Maria Stalzer Wyant. “Habermas‟s Theory of Communicative Action as a Theoretical Framework for Mediation Practice”. Link: http://www.d.umn.edu/~schilton/_WORWWW/MediationArticleDraftForConflictResolution Quarterly.pdf

Discourse Theory

• 1. Gimmler, Antje. “The Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas”. Link: http://www.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/Forum/meta/background/agimmler.html
  2. Cavalier, Robert J. “Introduction to Habermas‟s Discourse Ethics”. Link: http://www.unh.edu/democracy/pdf/repository/cavalier_introduction-to-habermas.pdf
  3. Habermas‟s Discourse Ethic in a Nutshell Link: http://tornhalves.blogspot.in/2008/09/habermass-discourse-ethic-in-nutshell.html

Deliberative Democracy

1. Lubenow, Jorge Adriano. “Public Sphere and Deliberative Democracy in Jürgen Habermas: Theoretical Model and Critical Discourses”.  American Journal of Sociological Research, 2012. Link: http://article.sapub.org/pdf/10.5923.j.sociology.20120204.02.pdf
2. Cohen, Joshua. “Reflections on Habermas on Democracy”. Ratio Juris, December 1999. Link: http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/5452/Ratio-Juris-Vol12-No4.pdf
3. Cooke, Maeve. “Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy”. Political Studies, 2000. Link: http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/20679041/1748740721/name/Five_Arguments_For_Deliberati ve_Democracy.pdf
4. Lauridsen, Sigurd. “Morality, Law and Deliberative Democracy – An Enquiry Concerning Jürgen Habermas and Karl- Otto Apel‟s Discursive Programs of Justification”. Link: http://www.habermasforum.dk/Master.pdf

Cosmopolitan World System

1. Horvath, Dora. “Tracing cosmopolitan strands in EU citizenship: A postmodern idea?” Link: http://epress.anu.edu.au/hrj/2009_01/mobile_devices/ch02.html

Public Sphere

1. Susen, Simon. “Critical Notes on Habermas‟s Theory of the Public Sphere” Link: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1101/1/Simon%20Susen%20’Critical%20Notes%20on%20Habermass%20Theory%20of%20the%20Public%20Sphere’%20SA%205(1)%20pp%20%2037- 62.pdf
2. Habermas, Jürgen, Lennox Sara and Lennox, Frank. The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article Link: http://www.socpol.unimi.it/docenti/barisione/documenti/File/2008-09/Habermas%20(1964)%20-%20The%20Public%20Sphere.pdf