30 Sectarian Strife

Heba Ahmed

epgp books

 

Introduction

 

Sectarian strife, i.e. violence between different sects of each religion has been a marked feature of most well-known religions. Such conflict emerges and revolves around not merely over what is ‘religious’ but also crucially over what constitutes the ‘political’. Here we shall study some of the well-known forms of sectarian strife. It is important to bear in mind that such sectarian strife must be studied in their contexts and comparisons and parallels be drawn from both the past and the contemporary to develop a better sense of such conflict. Otherwise there is the danger of slipping into ethnocentric and essentialised understandings of sectarian violence. Social science scholars working on religious/sectarian violence in India have extended the understanding to study inter-religious strife better known as communalism in India. From the early 20th century available data and existing literature on religious conflict demonstrate that communal violence became the most widespread form of religious sectarian strife in India. We shall, however, focus on intra-religious sects and their conflicts in this module.

 

Section 1 deals with sectarian strife among Christians and contains a short history of the major divisions in Christendom: firstly between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches in Western and Eastern Europe respectively. It then proceeds to explain the conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism, with references to the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. It ends with a short examination of the Irish case where sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants continues even in the present day. It examines Irish history and its spate of sectarian violence, which gets reflected in modern day events such as commemortaive parades.

 

Section 2 deals with sectarian strife among Hindus. It begins with a critique of orientalist historiography such as that written by Max Mueller and Max Weber who focused exclusively on what they termed as the ‘other-worldly’ aspects of Hinduism. It argues that Orientalist historiography was echoed by nationalist historiography which posited a ‘Hindu past’ as an antithesis to Muslim periods of rule. By drawing upon the works of historians of Romila Thapar, we can highlight that sectarian strife also existed among Hindu kings, instead of a monolithic contrast between ‘Hindu kings’ and ‘Muslim invaders’. Sectarian strife in Hinduism also exists between Shaivaites and Vaishnavites, and it continues in certain places even in present times such as the Kumbh Mela. Sectarian violence among Hindus and Buddhists also present an important episode in history.

 

Section 3 deals with sectarian strife among Muslims. It explores the history of the Shia and Sunni divide which arose over the issue of succession to the Caliphate a few years after the death of the Prophet. This conflict gets echoed in major events and power struggles in the Middle East, such as the Iranian Revolution, the fall of Saddam Hussein and the geopolitical rivalries with other Western powers.

 

SECTION 1:

 

Sectarian Strife among Christians

 

After the establishment of Christianity in the 1st century AD the first significant series of differences known as the Great Schism of 1054 led to the first division in the Church between the Eastern Orthodox and Catholic Churches1. From 1524 to 1648 Europe was engulfed in religious wars with the onset of the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation brought in an enduring division of Western Christianity into sects of Catholic and Protestant. Martin Luther started the Reformation with his work ‘The Ninety-Five Theses’2 which was issued in 1517. Luther began by criticising the selling of indulgences by the Pope. Indulgence is “a way to reduce the amount of punishment one has to undergo for sins”. He insisted that the Pope had no authority over purgatory and that the Catholic doctrine of the ‘merits of the saints’ had no foundation in the gospel. While theological motivation was central in the critique of the Church many other factors played their role in the Reformation. These factors included nationalism, the erosion of faith in the Pope, the perceived corruption of the Roman Catholic Church, the role of humanism and the Renaissance that led to the questioning of traditional thought3. The leader of the Reformation was Martin Luther but his theological critique of the Pope and the Catholic Church was taken much further by the peasants and the lesser nobility in Germany. The Peasant War in Germany (1524-1525) as it came to be known was one radical attempt made by the peasants and nobles to re-establish the old Christian equality which was destroyed by the Papacy and the existing Catholic Church.4 In ‘The Pursuit of the Millenium’ (1970) Norman Cohn writes about the Peasant War as a millennial movement, whose leader Thomas Muntzer believed that he had been instructed by Christ to lead the Faithful against the Anti-Christ, the Pope5. This War was waged against feudal oppression and the peasant warriors radically extended their movement for the reformation of the Church into the reformation of the society in general. This created a conflict between the Princes who formed the most powerful social class in 16th century Germany and the lesser nobility and the peasantry. Martin Luther came out in support of the Princes and denounced the war waged by the peasants. The war that began in 1524 was brutally suppressed in 1525 by the Princes in alliance with the Protestant clergy and the emergent well-to-do middle class known as the burghers.6 The Catholic Church responded with a Counter-Reformation with Europe splitting into Protestant and Catholic regions. Central Europe was ravaged by the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648).7 Conflict, often violent, between Protestants and Catholics had occurred throughout the history of post-Reformation Christianity. The case of Northern Ireland can especially be cited.

 

The Irish Confederate Wars from 1641-1653  was  both a religious  and  ethnic  political conflict.8  The  primary question involved  was  who  would  govern  Ireland.  Related  to  this  were  questions  of  which religious-ethnic group would own landed interests in Ireland and which religion would be the predominant one. The Irish Confederates represented the interests of the Irish Catholic landed class. The Irish Rebellion that sparked off this long War began in Ulster in October 1641 which led to the killings of Scottish and  English Protestant  Settlers.  With the overthrow of the Monarchy and beheading of Charles I rebellion between monarchists and anti-monarchists in the English Civil War the Irish supported the English Royalists while fighting for their independence from England. The Confederates were finally in 1653 defeated by the English army expedition (1649-1653) led by Oliver Cromwell. Cromwell’s army under his explicit publicly announced orders carried out massacres of Irish Catholic soldiers, priests, and other Catholic civilians, deprived Catholics of owning land, they were not allowed to live in towns and were barred from holding public office except in the Irish Parliament. The wars between Ireland and England erupted in between and the 1916 Easter Uprising9 led to the partition of the Ireland into a free, independent southern Republic of Ireland while Northern Ireland remained under English rule. Persistent discrimination against the Catholic minority by the Protestant majority and the dispute between the Catholics and Protestants (largely identified respectively as nationalists and unionists) over the political status of Northern Ireland led to a renewal of conflict in 1969. It is known as ‘the Troubles’10. Violence escalated in Northern Ireland as a result of armed campaigns by the Irish and Ulster paramilitaries and by the British army. The Good Friday agreement in 1998 between the warring factions leading to a decommissioning of arms by the IRA brought in peace in the troubled region.

 

Sectarian violence however still occurs in the forms of Parades in Northern Ireland. The Protestant Orange Order’s Annual Parade is especially notorious in inciting violence against Catholics since they celebrate the defeat of Irish Catholicism11. Invariably the Orange Parade leads to conflict when it passes through or near Catholic areas. The most contentious of such areas where the Orange Parade has annually passed through is Dumcree in Northern Ireland12. Here parading disputes have a long history going back to the 19th century. Refusal of the Northern Ireland Parades Commission to allow the Orange Order to pass through the Catholic Garvaghy Road led to large-scale riots in the 1990s. Such parades and the trail of violence they leave behind remind one familiar with India, in particular with Bengal’s history, of similar patterns of riotous conflict.

 

SECTION 2:

 

Sectarian Strife among Hindus

 

Since the days of Orientalism and Orientalist historiography (which cannot be dissociated radically from colonialist historiography), classical Indology had painted a portrait of Hinduism as the other-worldly religion concerned with the spiritual rather than with the material.13 Max Muller (1844, 1859)14 is the best known proponent of this Classical Indological position that was greatly influenced by romantic Orientalism. Max Weber (1930, 1998) too had theorised about Hindu religion following the Orientalist position. In arguing why despite the existence of highly favourable material conditions for the development of capitalism it did not emerge in India, Weber pointed out the other-worldliness of Hinduism, especially its theory of karma as the cause (Weber 1998). In Western Europe in particular in centres of ascetic Protestantism the material conditions received the (completely unintended) stimulus from ascetic Protestantism: according to Weber there was an elective affinity between the Protestant Ethic (in particular its Calvinist form) and the spirit of capitalism (Weber 1930). Weber’s specific problem of investigation was why capitalism emerged in western Europe, in particular in certain parts of western Europe and not in the Orient or the East like India or China.

 

In focusing excessively on the other worldliness of Hinduism scholars have not given adequate attention to the political dimension of Hinduism. Focusing on its political aspect becomes necessary to balance gross inaccuracies that have been handed down to us as authentic history of Hinduism and India through history textbooks. In attempting the forging a singular Hindu identity with an allegedly glorious history cut short by Muslim rulers dominant history writing especially influenced by colonial and Hindutva ideologies has led to erasures of historical events and practices. In studying sectarian strife it is therefore important that we focus on sectarian violence in Hinduism; this will also help us to historicise the template of ‘temple destruction by Muslim rulers’ as a political act in its proper context.

 

Orientalism’s approach to Hinduism was also informed by its aversion to Islam. Orientalism and Classical Indology struck a chord with Brahminical Hinduism. 19th century colonial history writing on India especially James Mill’s (1835, 1997) periodisation of Indian history into three stages Hindu, Muslim and British had an enduring impact on Indian history writing.16 Hindu historians and later hindutva ideology took as foundational Mill’s thesis that the Hindus and Muslims formed two distinct communities and that they were perpetually in conflict. As Romila Thapar writes (2005)17, ‘Hindu historians in complete disregard of historical facts projected Indian history as one master narrative of Hindu victimhood and Muslim aggression. Among the foundational tales of such histories is that of associating temple destruction exclusively with Muslim invaders and rulers. From textual sources and inscriptions Thapar demonstrates that “[d]estroying a temple was a demonstration of power on the part of invaders, irrespective of whether they were Muslim or Hindu. We chose to forget that there were Hindu kings who destroyed temples, either willfully as did Harshadeva of Kashmir to acquire the wealth of the temples, or as part of a campaign as in the case of the victorious Paramara raja destroying temples built by the defeated Chaulukya.” Thapar asserts that “temple destruction was not merely an act of religious hostility. Temples were certainly places of ritual space and had a religious identity. But royal temples were also statements of power and were surrogate political institutions representing royalty. They were depositories of wealth and centres of finance, they maintained social demarcations through allowing some castes to enter the temple but excluding others, and they were the cultural nucleus of at least the elite groups of a region. Temple destruction and its aftermath, therefore calls for historical explanations of a wide-ranging kind. It cannot be made the justification for destroying or threatening to destroy, mosques and churches in the present day.’ (Thapar 2005: 209-212)

 

Rivalries between powerful Hindu sects such as Shaivites and Vaishnavites and between Shaivites and Buddhists and Jains leading to violence and destruction of places of worship have been a part of the history of Hinduism as well18. Shaivaites are those who worship the god Shiva as the creator, revealer, concealer and destroyer and adhere to a non-monastic way of life. Vaishnavites venerate Vishnu, and promote the importance of Vishnu and his ten avatars. Kalhana’s Rajtarangini19 refers to the rivalries and hostilities between Shaivite sects and Buddhist monastic orders; evidence of violence and use of abusive terms between Shaivite and Jaina sects can be found from inscriptions from south India. In fact as the recent Nashik Kumbh Mela incident shows this rivalry still continues20. The conflict came out in the open when the Vaishnavite sadhus refused to participate in the flag hoisting ceremony marking the beginning of the Mela on 14th July 2015: ‘The Kumbh Mela, scheduled to begin on Tuesday in Maharashtra’s Nashik district,is caught in a conflict after the ascetics of the Vaishnava sect decided to boycott the flag hoisting ceremony, and proposed to hold a separate one. While the sadhus of Trimbakeshwar, who are Shaivites, have agreed to take part in Tuesday’s flag hoisting ceremony, those of the Vaishnava sect in Nashik say they will have their own on August 14.’ These reports explain the history behind the current conflict: ‘A bloody conflict in 1790 between sadhus of the Vaishnava and Shaivite sects over who would have the right of taking the first holy dip claimed the lives of 12,000 ascetics. This bloodbath had forced Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao to limit Vaishnavs to take the Kumbh dip in Nashik while Shaivaites were limited to the distant village of Trimbakeshwar.” As another report stated “[t]his year, too, the ancient quarrel had a re-run, with Trimbak priests and Nashik sadhus tussling over a flag-hoisting ceremony).

 

Romila Thapar in her works (2015)21 has pointed out the presence of guru-pir traditions, as well as the formation of sects out of an amalgam of existing sects of various kinds such as those of the Bohras, Khojas, Mappilas. Each such sect adopted local customary rituals and beliefs and even family forms (e.g. the Mappilas adopted the matrilineal form from their local caste equivalents) which were in divergence from Arab Islam. However, dominant history writing has tended to suffer from selective amnesia that helped in the portrayal of religious communities as monolithic. Studying intra-sectarian strife allows for a more appropriate reading of multiple identities of communities, their beliefs and practices and their politics. At the same time, selective readings of history that tend to sweep away all contentious and contradictory processes and practices into single/singular communal entities must be resisted.

 

 

SECTION 3:

 

Sectarian Strife among Muslims

 

Strife between Islam’s two biggest and most well-known sects Sunnis and Shia date back to 632 the year of Prophet Muhammad’s death. The question of who should succeed the Prophet as the religious and political head of all Muslims led to a split within the community into two sects the Sunnis and the Shia.22 The majority, who later formed the Sunni sect, backed Abu Bakr who was the father of the Prophet’s wife Aisha. The others backed Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law Ali as the rightful heir. This minority came to be known as the Shia. Although Abu Bakr’s supporters won Ali could rule briefly as the fourth Caliph. Ali’s reign was marred by civil war. The Caliph, the title that was given to Muhammad’s successors was the spiritual and political head of the Muslims. Ali was assassinated in 661 and his sons Hassan and Hussein were denied what Shia considered to be their legitimate right to succeed Ali as the next Caliph.23 Hassan is believed to have been poisoned in 680 by Muawiyah, the first caliph of the Sunni Umayyad dynasty. In 680 in the battle of Karbala that took place in the Islamic month of Muharram Ali’s son Imam Hussain was killed by the reigning Sunni Caliph’s army led by Yazid. These events gave rise to the Shia concept of martyrdom and the rituals of grieving.

 

Shia Muslims commemorate the month of Muharram re-imagining and re-enacting the battle of Karbala and reaffirming their faith in the Islamic principles that Imam Hussein and his followers gave their lives for. While they share many fundamental beliefs and practices these two sects differ in doctrine, ritual, law, theology and religious organisation. While Sunnis stress the primacy of the Sunnah or the Prophet’s teachings, the Shia follow their ayatollahs, the sign of Allah on earth. This has led Sunnis to accuse Shias of heresy24. Likewise the Shia point out that Sunni dogmatism has given rise to extreme forms of Puritanism that find their expression in extremist sects like the Wahabis. Most Shia sects believe that the 12th Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi is in occultation and would one day reappear to restore divine will on earth. Shia Muslims are in majority in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Yemen. They form a substantial section of the Muslim population in Afghanistan, India, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Syria, Pakistan, Turkey and Lebanon. The Shias form around 10% and the Sunnis account for 85%-90% of the world’s Muslim population. In countries ruled by Sunnis, Shias tend to account for the poorest sections of societies there. Shias perceive themselves as victims of discrimination and oppression and Sunni extremists often denounce them as heretics who should be killed. Shia Sunni strife has become especially frequent since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran where the Shiite clergy set on a radical Islamist agenda that was perceived as a threat to the conservative Sunni regimes of particularly the Gulf region. Ayatollah Khomeini in a rather ambitious move declared himself the spiritual leader of not just the Shia but of the entire Muslim world. The Iran-Iraq War, the formation of the Hezbollah as the Shiite militia in Lebanon and Afghanistan and the extant Sunni suspicion about Shias destabilized the peaceful (though not a trust-based) co-existence of the Shia and Sunnis for the most part of the 20th century. As part of its radical Islamist policy Iran has extended political and military support to Shia militia in the Middle Eastern countries and in Afghanistan. In response to this Sunni-ruled states have similarly extended their support to Sunni governments and movements. The recent crisis that flared up in the Middle East is a continuation of the sectarian strife that marked the region since 1979. All said and done these sectarian conflicts must be seen in the context of larger geopolitics25 in particular of those played by Israel and the US. The Sunni regimes which maintained close relations with the Shia ones to ward off the common threat of secularism through imperialism and in its common battle against Israel have come to perceive Iran as a greater threat compared to Israel. Iran’s political ambitions, its much publicized nuclear programme, the 2006 war in Lebanon, and its increasing political significance in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein have threatened to upset the regional power balance where the Sunnis have traditionally dominated. This spectre of a ‘Shia revival’ has been propagated by the USA and Israel since such a fear could and eventually did lead to a productive alliance (for US-Israel bloc) with the Sunni regimes in the region.

 

In connection with this we may mention the strife that has marked Shias and Sunnis in India. Hasan (1996) says that while till the mid-19th century north Indian, in particular Lucknow’s Muslim culture had the hallmarks of a composite one characterized by inter-religious mixing, by the end of the 19th century Shia-Sunni conflict came to mark the region much more than Hindu-Muslim strife.26  In 1906 the construction of a separate Karbala by Sunnis at Phoolkatora opposite the existing Talkatora one and public praise of the three Caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar and Usman led the Shias to  engage  in a  vilification campaign against  Sunnis.  The Sunnis retaliated by declaring the observance of Muharram as ‘heresy’. The appropriation of certain symbols and a simultaneous rejection of others which together had earlier formed the composite culture went a long way in destroying the very foundations of Shia-Sunni harmony. Hasan traces the further deepening of this conflict to the formation of sectarian organizations such as the Anjuman-i Sadr-us Sudoor, which was floated by Maulana Syed Agha Husain in 1901, and the Anjuman-i Jafariya. Hasan writes “A Shia conference was set up in October-December 1907, some months after the Muslim League came into being. There was much talk of ‘Shias of light’ leading the way, mitigating the economic and educational backwardness of their community. Some were keen to take their grievances to the British viceroy”. The Shia Political Conference in the mid-1930s started making political demands including that of separate electorates since they claimed they could have no faith in the Sunni-led Muslim League. Neither the League, nor the Congress, and not even the colonial government recognized the Shias as a formidable political force. In 1938-39 Lucknow became the site of violent Shia-Sunni riots. “The decline of the Shia aristocracy in the second half of the 19th century the impoverishment of their less privileged brethren, and the relative prosperity of some Sunni groups, deepened Shia anxieties over their future. They were estranged from a world dominated by the ‘other’. The British contributed insofar as they gave legal definition to the Shia-Sunni division. The approval or ban of religious commemmorations, arbitration of disputes, and regulating religious procession routes transformed latent doctrinal differences into public, political and legal issues” were some tangible material factors leading to Shia-Sunni violence. Hasan also identifies a more powerful cause for such strife: “It appeared in the form of religio-revivalism, affecting Hindus and Muslims, Shias and Sunnis, Deobandis and Barelwis.” The large-scale attempts by the Hindu organizations to establish Hindu hegemony over Indian society caused Muslims to espouse similar goals: “In relation to the Hindu ‘other’, the meaning of being a Muslim was translated through late 19th century religious and political idioms”. While this was the dominant strain it also caused, due to factors mentioned above, the discovery among Shias and Sunnis new symbols and practices that would allow for their existence as separate entities. Purificatory moves common to all forms of religious revivalism now became a central form of battle between Shias and Sunnis, each accusing the other of being “’corrupted’ by the incorporation of Hindu beliefs and customs”. With the demand for a separate Muslim nation becoming more strident political leaders and the British government advised both Shias and Sunnis to bury their animosities and come under the banner of one identity that of being Muslim. The migration of both Shias and Sunnis in large numbers to Pakistan created only momentary peace. There in Pakistan, Hasan shows, the conflicts emerged with greater intensity: On August 14, 1947 Pakistan was born on the principle of Muslim solidarity. But its rationale is tested year after year as Shias and Sunnis continue to fight each other on the streets of Karachi and Lahore.

 

Conclusion

 

Sects and sectarian strife are common to all religions. An attempt in this module has been made to study the more common forms of such strife that are occurring in contemporary times. They have been placed in their historical and comparative contexts. Here, we have tried to emphasise not only strife but some positive aspects of religious communities and sects. Thus the actual and potential forms of inter-mixing and peaceful coexistence have also been underlined although it must be admitted that increasing communalization and sectarian consciousness make difficult the practice of development of a composite culture.

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NOTES & REFERENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

  1. ‘Schism of 1054’, in the Encyclopedia Brittannica, 2016, available at http://www.britannica.com/event/Schism-of-1054
  2. Full Text, ‘The 95 Theses’ available at http://www.luther.de/en/95thesen.html
  3. Johann Peter Kirsch, “The Reformation.” The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 12. (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911.27 Mar. 2016), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12700b.htm
  4. ‘German Peasant Rebellion, 1525’, available at http://www.revolutionprotestencyclopedia.com/fragr_image/media/IEO_German_Pe asant_Rebellion
  5. Norman  Cohn,  The  Pursuit  of  the  Millennium:  Revolutionary  Millenarians  and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957, 1970)
  6. Klemens Loffler, “War of the Peasants (1524-25).” The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 11. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911. 27 Mar. 2016, available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11597a.htm
  7. John Hungerford Pollen, “The Counter-Reformation.” The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 4. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1908. 27 Mar. 2016, available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04437a.htm
  8. John Dorney, ‘The Eleven Years War 1641-1652: A Brief Overview’, The Irish History: Irish History Online, available at http://www.theirishstory.com/2014/01/10/the-eleven-years-war-a-brief-overview/#.V vdH2NJ97IU
  9. ‘The Easter Rising’ at BBC History, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/insurrection/in03.shtml, Fintan O’Toole, ‘The Terrible Beauty of the Easter Rising Remains Alive Today, The Guardian, February 1 2016, available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/01/easter-rising-century-irelan d-1916
  10. ‘The Troubles: Thirty Years of Conflictaila in Northern Ireland 1968-1998’, at BBC History, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles, ‘1969  Northern  Ireland  Riots  and  and  the  Catholic-Protestant  Conflict’, Documentary, Irish History’ available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwcsSHF3A9w
  11. ‘Northern Irish police attacked at parade, 24 injured by Ian Graham at Reuters, July 10 2015 available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nireland-parade-idUSKCN0PN2DD20150714
  12. ‘The Drumcree March’, BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern_ireland/understanding/events/siege_o f_drumcree.stm
  13. Richard King, ‘Orientalism and the Modern Myth of “Hinduism”’, Numen Vol. 46, No. 2 (1999), pp. 146-185 Published by: Brill Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3270313
  14. Max Müller Hitopadesa: eine alte indische Fabelsammlung. (Brockhaus, 1844), A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature So Far as it Illustrates the Primitive Religion of the Brahmans. (Williams and Norgate, 1859)
  15. Max Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Routledge, 1930, 1992), The Religion of India: Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism (Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1998)
  16. James Mill, History of British India (London: Taylor & Francis / Routledge, 10 volumes, including Horace Hayman Wilson’s continuation to 1835; 1997)
  17. Romila Thapar, Somanatha: The Many Voices of a History (Verso 2005)
  18. ‘Decline and Fall of Buddhism’, at http://www.ambedkar.org/books/dob15.htm
  19. Kalhana, Rajtarangini, translated into English by Jogesh Chunder Dutt (Volumes 1 and 2) available at https://archive.org/stream/RajataranginiOfKalhana-English-JogeshChunderDuttVolu mes12/Rajatarangini-JogeshChunderDuttVol2_djvu.txt
  20. This section is based on two reports from Hindusthan Times dated July 13, 2015 and Sept 06, 2015
  21. Romila Thapar, ‘The Fifth Asghar Ali Engineer Memorial Lecture: Indian Society and the Secular’, 2015, at the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, available http://www.csss-isla.com/5th-aae-memorial-lecture-full-text/
  22. ‘The Battle of Uhud’, available at http://www.shia.org/ohud.html
  23.   ‘Chronology: A History of the Shiite-Sunni Split’, available at http://www.npr.org/2007/02/12/7280905/chronology-a-history-of-the-shia-sunni-split
  24. Raymond Ibrahim, ‘Islamic Doctrines of Deception’, Middle East Forum, October 2008, available at http://www.meforum.org/2095/islams-doctrines-of-deception
  25. Loumi, M (2008): Sectarian identities or geopolitics? The regional Shia-Sunni divide in the Middle East. WP 56, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
  26. Mushirul Hasan, ‘Sectarianism in India: Shia Sunni Divide in the United Provinces’, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1990), Sage Publications