{"id":150,"date":"2018-08-03T06:16:31","date_gmt":"2018-08-03T06:16:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/socp07.epgpbooks.inflibnet.ac.in\/?post_type=chapter&p=150"},"modified":"2019-01-02T05:11:57","modified_gmt":"2019-01-02T05:11:57","slug":"urban-decentralisation-and-municipal-arrangements","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/ebooks.inflibnet.ac.in\/socp07\/chapter\/urban-decentralisation-and-municipal-arrangements\/","title":{"rendered":"Urban decentralisation and municipal arrangements"},"content":{"raw":"
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\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nSection 1 Introduction<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n

In this module we discuss urban decentralisation and municipal arrangements in India. The aim of this module is to understand decentralisation in the larger context of globalisation, the retreat of the state from traditional functions, greater involvement of non-state actors like market players and civil society organisations (CSOs), good governance and citizens\u2019 participation. In the globalised scenario, the state is transforming itself. It can legitimately transfer power or sanction new powers above it through agreements between states to establish and abide by the norms of international government. At the other end, it can allow constitutional ordering within its own territory in respect of the relationship of power and authority between different levels of government and civil society, best described as \u201cglocalisation\u201d.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Turner and Hulme (1997) consider delegation of tasks to non-state actors like non-government organisations (NGOs) as a form of decentralisation, whereas Swyngedouw (2005 in Singh 2012) considers ...decentralization as essentially a process taking place within the state with either administrative or political overtones and involvement of other organizations could come under the banner of public private partnerships( Swyngedouw: 2005 in Singh 2012:112).<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Decentralisation is often seen as a virtue and advocated by many. Chandhoke(2003),for instance, offers the pluralisation of the state theory. She explains that pluralisation replaces the bureaucratic, hierarchical and overloaded structures of decision-making with a multiplicity of agencies that can respond immediately and efficiently to problems. For instance, institutional innovations like public-private partnerships(PPPs) could be an example of pluralisation of the state.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Further, the decline of the state is accompanied by increasing attention towards civil society institutions by which organised interests seek to influence and engage with state institutions. This vision of decentralised, people-centric governance resonates with those that have happened globally as corroborated in several studies (Kearns and Paddison 2000; Pierre 1999; Rhodes 1997; Jessop 1999). Elander (2002) specifically locates the emergence<\/span> of the concept of <\/span>decentralised urban governance in the 1990s following the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio and the 1996 Habitat II Conference in Istanbul, when actors representing central governments, local governments and NGOs were brought together for concerted action directed towards environmentally and socially sustainable development. This was the time when \u201clocal government faced a movement towards fragmentation and more differentiated forms of governance: local government became urban governance\u201d (Elander 2022:191)<\/span>.The impetus for such changes came from financial restrictions on lower levels of government, especially in European countries. Local governments, in turn, responded by contracting out services to private producers, devolving responsibilities to the voluntary sector and developing bases of internal competition directed more towards the efficient use of restricted financial resources. Globally, the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand and Australia are forerunners in adopting new forms of <\/span>decentralised local urban governance(Singh 2012:112).<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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In the model of good governance, decentralisation and devolution of administrative and financial power and functions are central themes. The intellectual origin of the good governance approach is traced to neoliberal theories that treat conservative governments and organised business interests in unison to bring about efficiency and accountability which began with Thatcherism and Reaganism since the late 1970s (Singh 2011:16). Decentralisation often means greater participation of non-state actors including private companies and CSOs. The inclusion of private players in service provision like water, solid waste management, sanitation and infrastructurelike roads is believed to make them more efficient. Zerah (2009) notes that a process of commodification increasingly characterise these shifts that \u201cinvolved the introduction of pay and use services (toilets, garbage collection), higher user fees for municipal education and health, and increased water charges to cope with rising infrastructure costs\u201d (Zerah 2009: 860).<\/p>\r\n \r\n

International agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) (funding important projects in many cities of India including Mumbai,eg, the Mumbai Urban Transport Project(MUTP), \u201cwhich were earlier working exclusively through national governments, now prefer to work through non- government(NGOs) in implementing some of their projects\u201d (Baud and De Wit, 2008:8). The Bretton Woods institutions, namely, the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank promote a model of good governance that involves collaboration between the state and market interests. Appadurai (2001) observes that \u201cnon-governmental actors are\u00a0here to stay and somehow need to be made part of new models of global governance and local democracy\u201d (Appadurai 2001: 24). Least governance is seen as the sign of good governance.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n \r\n

This is a global phenomenon. Therefore, globally,there has been a steady rise of local and international NGOs working in various domains of governance such as poverty, environment, citizen participation and corruption and more importance is being given to the role of citizens and their social networks\/social capital and CSOs (Cornwall 2002; Crook and Sverrisson 2003; Goetz and Gaventa 2001; Houtzager et al 2003 in Baud and De Wit 2008:8).<\/p>\r\n \r\n\r\nSection2: Constitutional Framework of Decentralisation in Urban India: 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA), 1992<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n

Urban development is the responsibility of the second-tier state level according to the Constitution of India. Therefore, the central government can issue directives on urban matters, but it does not have the power to legislate. Only state governments in India have the power to legislate on urban development. Despite being a state subject, it was the central government in New Delhi that initiated and supported most of the urban development programmes, especially those under the Five-YearPlans. The 74th CAA, 1992 conferred constitutional status on urban local bodies (ULBs), such as municipalities, which were provided with elected councils, and constituted the third-tier of government, the other two being the central government and the government of each state of the union. This Act also allowed for participation of women and weaker sections of society through reservation of seats \u2013 one-third for women, and for the scheduled castes and tribes in proportion to their demographic weight in the population of the corresponding constituency; and transferred, to the ULBs, the responsibility for urban development \u2013 in particular, of providing urban infrastructure and services, and mobilising the required financial resources through taxes, levying of users\u2019 costs and the attracting of private national and foreign investments.<\/p>\r\n \r\n\r\n \r\n

Article 243Q of the 74th CAA has stipulated the criteria for three types of ULBs. They are (1) municipal corporation for a larger urban area; (2) municipal councils for a smaller urban area and (3) nagar panchayat for an area in transition from rural to urban. It lists five criteria for constituting ULBs, namely, the population of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities and the economic\u00a0importance. For the first time, thus more comprehensive parameters were laid down for <\/span>declaration of municipal areas. However, specific quantitative criteria were not specified in the 74th CAA for \u201clarger urban area\u201d and \u201csmaller urban area\u201d. Article 243 Q of the 74th CAA 1992 on the Constitution of Municipalities reads (1) there shall be constituted in every State,<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

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\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0(a)\u00a0 anagar panchayat (by whatever name called) for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area;<\/p>\r\n

(b)\u00a0 amunicipal council for a smaller urban area; and<\/p>\r\n

(c)\u00a0\u00a0 amunicipal corporation for a larger urban area, in accordance with the provisions of this part: Provided that a municipality under this clause may not be constituted in such urban area or part thereof as the governor may, having regard to the size of the area and the municipal services being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment in that area and such other factors as she\/he may deem fit, by public notification, specify to be an industrial township.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

(2) In this article, \"a transitional area\", \"a smaller urban area\" or\" a larger urban area\" means such area as the governor may, having regard to the population of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as she\/he may deem fit, specify by public notification for the purposes of this part.As per the 12th Schedule of the 74th CAA, 18 new tasks were added to the functional domain of ULBs.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Section 3: Decentralisation and Participatory Governance: Ward Committees and Area Sabhas<\/strong><\/p>\r\n \r\n

To allow for citizens\u2019 proximity and participation in governance, the 74th CAA provided for the formation of ward committees. These are committees at the level of municipal constituencies consisting of elected representatives, municipal officers and representatives from CSOs to deal with local issues. Nainan and Baud (2008) note that the functions and powers allotted to the ward committees have led to changes in power in the ULBs between the executive wing headed by the municipal commissioner and the deliberative wing headed by the mayor. Ward committees give councillors more authority over the ward officers who represent the executive wing. With respect to planning and implementation of larger works in the ward area, ward committees can play only an advisory role. Sivaramakrishnan (2006) points out that only in states like Kerala and West Bengal have ward committees been functioning in a participatory manner for over a decade.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

In other states of India, ward committees have hardly been formed, and where they exist, they are usually large and formed by clubbing <\/span>togethermany wards, which ultimately defeats the purpose of proximity to citizens (Lama-Rewal 2007).<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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Ward committees are institutionalised mechanisms for meaningful interaction between citizens, councillors and ward personnel, for redressing grievances and promoting good governance at the local level. They also provide spaces for citizen and CSO participation. In practice, however, it is the municipal councillors who have used these spaces to access the ULB in a situation when they fail to win municipal elections. Moreover, civil society participation in the ward committees is narrowly defined, as CSOs can be nominated as members of the ward committees to put forward proposals and suggestions, but are not permitted to vote (Nainan and Baud 2008). It is the municipal councillors who nominate CSO members; therefore, nepotism prevails. In a situation where CSOs are either unable to enter the ULB through the ward committees or choose to disregard them, forging partnerships with the executive wing of the ULB serves as a viable alternative.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Through the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) in New Delhi has directed state governments across urban India to enact a Community Participation Law as a mandatory reform in urban governance. The ministry has also drafted a model law as a guideline. The model Community Participation Law introduces the concept of the area sabha, defined as \u201cthe body of all persons registered in the electoral rolls pertaining to every polling booth in the area in a municipality\u201d(MoUD quoted in YUVA 2010: 16).<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Area sabha is a micro unit which consists of the electoral part (residential\/commercial buildings, chawls and slums) of the electoral roll which consists of 1,200 enlisted voters. These voters elect the area sabha representatives and 35 of such representatives form a ward committee under the chairmanship of the municipal councillor of that ward. Election of thearea sabha representatives can take place along with the municipal elections. This way the councillor becomes accountable to the people of the area. These 35 representatives form a permanent body called the Area Sabha Samiti, which will hold monthly meetings where all residents of the area can attend, discuss problems, pass resolutions, and decide budget allocation of the area. Thus, power vests on the people.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Section 4: Decentralisation in the Form of Civil Society \u2013 -ULB Partnerships<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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Though decentralisation in India is provided within the constitutional framework, citizen activism, community-based partnerships, citizens\u2019 participatory initiatives are varied ways in which decentralised attempts of service provision and development goals are carried forward. Many of these initiatives advocate efficiency and good governance and influence policy changes through such decentralised efforts. NGOs, community-based organisations(CBOs) and Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) are forerunners in such efforts.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

CSOs are regarded as important participants in these emerging forms of urban governance such as via partnerships (Goetz and Gaventa 2001; Cornwall 2002; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Houtzager, et al 2003). The World Bank has advocated for citizen representationamong users of public services, and as clients or members of NGOs and voluntary associations. (World Bank 1997: 113).Harriss (2007: 2716) argues especially with reference to India that \u201cgovernance in the context of liberalisation is the idea of the desirability of partnership both between government and the private sector, and government and citizens\u201d.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

The emergence of such parallel structures of decentralisation involving CSOs can be seen against the backdrop of three interlinked forces in the context of urban India. The first force is the policies of economic liberalisation that were set in motion in 1991. The second force is good governance discourses that have been championed most ardently by international agencies \u2013 namely, the World Bank and the IMF. The third force is the urban reforms that were initiated by the Government of India (GoI) in New Delhi such as the JNNURM. These three forces have independently or conjointly led to changes in urban local governance across India, variously described as: \u201cpublic sector restructuring in accordance with the standards of the new public management, private sector participation and the rise of new forms of service provision based on multi-stakeholder arrangements\u201d (Zerah 2009:854); \u201cdepoliticising and commercialising the functioning of institutions of governance, avoiding political interference and promoting greater efficiency\u201d (Baindur and Kamath 2009: 19); \u201cpromotion of a corporate-led economy\u201d (Benjamin 2000:37); \u201cmarket-based reforms\u201d (Ranganathan et al 2009:54); and \u201cnew managerialism in local governance\u201d (Desai and Imrie 1998). Kennedy (2013) notes that the outcomes of India\u2019s new policy regime are not only the product of impersonal market forces, but that they are also the result of endogenous political strategies, acting in conjunction\u00a0with the territorial <\/span>reorganisation of economic activities at various scales, ranging from local to global.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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The need to overcome basic shortfalls in public service provision, like poor maintenance of roads, public gardens, open spaces and footpaths, the irregular collection and disposal of garbage, and lack of scientific techniques in the management of solid waste, provided the impetus for the formation of CSO partnerships with the municipal authority (for details see Ruet and Tawa Lama-Rewal2010).Unable to utilise the constitutionally allocated spaces for participation in urban governance (namely, the ward committees) or to gain the confidence of the elected representatives\/municipal councillors, who were perceived as having low status and education, and who seemed to favour urban poor groups, middle class and elite citizens began to form their own associations.1<\/p>\r\n \r\n

In contemporary India there are many examples of such decentralised, participatory experiments that claim to have brought the citizen and government closer and more responsive. Examples include the Bhagidari initiative in Delhi, PROOF in Bangalore, Advanced Locality Management (ALM) groups in Mumbai. Elite citizens groups like the Bangalore Action Task Force (BATF) in Bangalore and Citizens Roundtable in Mumbai also have implications on the questions of inclusion and accountability (for details see Singh and Parthasarathy2010). In this section we discuss the ALM partnership of Mumbai and the Bhagidari partnership of Delhi.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

The ALM model in Mumbai, for instance, was first experimented within 1996 through a pilot project in the residential colony of Joshi Lane, Ghatkopar East \u2013 a suburban area in Mumbai. An ALM is an identified area or locality, whose residents and users have committed to improving the quality of life in close co-operation with the municipal authority of Mumbai. An ALM covers a neighbourhood or street, with about 1000 citizens, and is registered at the local municipal ward office, which appoints a nodal officer to attend to citizen complaints. The active and prominent ALMs \u2013 located across alphabetically labelled administrative wards like AWard, D Ward, KWestWard, MWestWard and NWard \u2013 have made themselves visible over the years through effective use of the media through community and local activism. Most of the prominent ALMs in Mumbai have graduated to larger issues like the branding of localities, as in Malabar Hills, the holding of festivals, as in Chembur and Bandra, and the formation of larger 1For a detailed discussion refer to the module on Middle Class Ideologies and the city including Resident Welfare Associations.\u00a0federations, like the Juhu CitizensWelfare Group and the Malabar Hills Residents Association, to gain more visibility (Singh 2012: 116).<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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The Government of Delhi initiated the Bhagidari (meaning citizen-government partnership) in 2000 between government agencies in the National Capital Territory(NCT) like the Jal Board and the Vidyut Board and neighbourhood associations (RWAs,senior citizens associations, market traders associations) to develop some kind of citizen-government interface in the management of localaffairs (Rewal 2007). It was envisaged that byconsulting these organisations on specific schemes, by promoting their interaction withmunicipal officials concerning the maintenance of civic infrastructure, and by entitlingthem to a role of supervision of local public works the local government would becomemore responsive to the needs and views of the people. The Bhagidari scheme ensured itsown visibility through regular announcements in the press.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Harriss (2005) describes how under the Bhagidari partnership RWAs, havegained prominence mainly in planned colonies and other higher incomeareas, and not in slum clusters and other poor parts of the city. These groups are involved in suchtasks as securing payment and collection of water bills, electricity meter reading, housetax collection, the supervision of sanitation services, and the maintenance of communityparks and community halls. Harriss (2005), however, questions whether \u2013 the scheme really doesrepresent partnership or whether it rather involves the off-loading of tasks by citygovernment onto local associations (Harriss 2005:1043).<\/p>\r\n \r\n

In an assessment of the partnership, Lama Rewal (2007) pointed out that the Bhagidari allowed the RWAs to gain more visibility. Through this initiative, RWAs popularised issues like rainwater harvesting, problems of civic administration like solid waste management (SWM), pollution, house tax disputes and redressal. A system of awards was also instituted for RWAs for achievements in the above. However, the Bhagidari could not cover the slum areas of Delhi and it also failed to get the active participation of municipal councillors (Rewal 2007: 36-37).In another assessment, Mehra(2013) explains that\u00a0 Bhagidari itself became a site of political entrepreneurship for some RWA members, who now had access to the city administration at many different levels \u2013 from neighbourhood official to city minister \u2013 seemingly providing the opportunity to act\u00a0\u00a0as political middlemen for other residents, make political alliances, build a local base for the Chief Minister, and for \u2018self-serving\u2019 RWA office bearers themselves(Mehra 2013:219).<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nSection5: Implications <\/strong>on the Larger Questions of Participation and Inclusion<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n

By now it is quite clear that decentralisation is valorised because it brings governance closer and makes it more responsive to the people and even aims at their participation. This has been time and again proclaimed, whether as part of the good governance, participatory governance or the decentralisation discourse. To that end, several decentralised, participatory, civil society partnerships have already been taking place both globally and in India. Some of these initiatives have been discussed in the last section. In this section, the discussion revolves on the deeper implications that such efforts have on the questions of participation and inclusion, the cherished goals of decentralisation.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

It is initially necessary to articulate what participation and exclusion mean for purposes of this module. The term participation, widely used in development discourses since the early 1970s, is interpreted in various ways according to its usage in particular contexts, with authors like Cooke and Kothari (2001) even emphasising the \u201ctyranny of participation\u201d. For purposes of this module, the term participation is essentially understood as \u201chow ordinary people gain political agency\u201d, as described by Cornwall and Brock (2005:1046), and the varied and contested ways in which participation is practised in real-life situations. Using examples of decentralisation this module thus explains how participation unfolds in the urban context in India.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

The term \u201cexclusion\u201d can also have varied meanings depending on its usage in specific contexts. In this module, the word exclusion is used both in the political and the sociological sense. In particular, it describes the political exclusion of lower socio-economic city residents like slum dwellers and street vendors from the decentralised units of governance created by decentralised initiatives like ALMs and Bhagidari. This political exclusion is in turn linked to the sociological variable of class and that of status that derives from class. These sociological variables distinguish middleclass and elite citizens who spearhead such associations from lower socio-economic city residents.\u00a0In the processes of forming partnerships with the executive wing of the municipal authority, citizen groups and CSOs often bypass elected representatives (Coelho et al 2013).2<\/span>Thework of many of these CSOs and attendant discourses have implications for the goals of <\/span>decentralisation as envisaged in the 74th CAA. ALMs and elite RWAs in cities like Bangalore and Delhi have claimed that the municipal <\/span>councillors are apathetic to citizens\u2019 needs and have alienated their constituents. These RWAs<\/span>,therefore,have hardly interacted with elected representatives, and instead, have relied heavily on their interactions with the ward officers of the municipal authority. In the process of partnering with the executive wing, these associations have bypassed elected representatives and undermined their legitimacy.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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In Bangalore, and Hyderabad citizen initiatives and partnerships have excluded elected representatives (for detailed accounts of the Bangalore Action Task Force in Bangalore, see Ghosh 2005; for Public Record of Operations and Finance in Bangalore, see Vijayalakshmi, 2004; and for the Bhagidari partnership in Delhi, see Chakraborty, 2007).<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Administrative efficiency preceding electoral accountability defeats the goals of strengthening local self-governance as envisaged in the 74th CAA, as one of the goals of the amendment has clearly been to vest more power with the elected representatives\/municipal councillors, who represent the people of the locality. Singh and Parthasarathy (2010) note that autonomous citizen bodies, like those of the City Roundtable, the Mumbai Task Force and the Road Monitoring Committee in Mumbai, all hinder rather than facilitate the goals of democratic decentralisation and undermine the power of the municipal authority by ignoring their views.<\/p>\r\n \r\n\r\nSection 6Privatisation of Municipal Functions: The <\/strong>Caseof Industrial Townships<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n

Another way by which the provision of key infrastructure, security and spatial planning functions outside the rubric of local and regional governments is through what authors call \u201ccorporate urbanism\u201d in India \u2013\u201csettlements developed by the corporate (private or public) sector, often as part of concomitant industrial activity\u201d (Denis et al 2012 in Sood 2015).<\/p>\r\n \r\n

In her analysis, Sood(2015) explains that the legislative foundation for these new 2\u00a0 For a detailed discussion refer to the module on Middle-class Ideologies and the City including Resident Welfare Associations\u00a0forms of corporate urbanism lies in the constitutional provision of \u201cindustrial township\u201d, incorporated as an exception to the representative municipal framework envisaged under the74th CAA <\/span>.Urban development through industrial townships like special economic zones (SEZs) and the national investment and manufacturing zones (NIMZ) has provided the scope for <\/span>privatisation of municipal functions. The defining governance framework for industrial townships comes from a proviso in Article 243Q (1) of the Constitution of India, which states that:<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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Provided that a Municipality under this clause may not be constituted in such urban area or part thereof as the Governor may, having regard to the size of the area and the municipal services being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment in that area and such other factors as he may deem fit, by public notification, specify to be an industrial township.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Key functions of local governments, namely, executive and representative functions, infrastructure and services provision, urban planning, and security have been entrusted to private players in the case of SEZs in India(Sood 2015). She cites the examples of states such as West Bengal (1993), Maharashtra (1965), Tamil Nadu (1997) and Jharkhand (2011) have adopted the industrial township exception in their own municipal acts and SEZ frameworks. \u201cThe Jharkhand Municipal Act 2011, for example, gives the state government wide leverage in prescribing the industrial township authority\u2019s functions. States such as Karnataka have gone the furthest in some ways in providing procedural gloss to the industrial township, with functions ranging from birth and death registration to broader infrastructure provision\u201d(Sood 2015:10).<\/p>\r\n \r\n

Roy (2009) similarly explains that such zones are created by exempting areas for rapid growth and infrastructural investments from the masterplan in force. She cites the examples of Buddha Purnima Project Authority, Cyberabad Development Authority and Hyderabad Airport Development Authority from Hyderabad. Each of these was once a parcel of urban territory subject to the planning vision of the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority. Once exempted from the masterplan in force, the special development zones are brought under the discretionary powers of the executive with no framework to regulate them. Each of these special development\u00a0zones may become thriving hubs of commercial growth because decision-making at the highest level is quick and <\/span>favourable to new investments.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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Similar to the examples of ALM and Bhagibari partnerships described above corporate urbanism encouraged through SEZs also have serious implications on electoral representation, a crucial element in a functioning democracy like India. In the industrial township model as Sood (2015) explains non-representative governance mechanisms enabled by the constitutional provision and its state adaptations run against the spirit of the 74th CAA, which has otherwiseattempted to introduce more democratic forms of governance (Sood 2015:11).<\/p>\r\n \r\n\r\nIn Brief\r\n\r\n \r\n

In this module we have discussed about urban decentralisation. Decentralisation is treated as a coveted goal in international and national contexts. In India the 74th CAA 1992 provided the constitunal framework for urban decentralisation.This amendment has the provision of ward committees to faciltate partcipatory governnace. Decentralisation is also valorised within the good governance discourse, pluralisation of state theory, market reforms and privatisation of urban infrastructure and service provision. The idea is to to make municipal authories self- reliant so that they able to generate renenue. This goal cannot be accomplished if municipal authorities only depend on funds from the central and state governmnets. The need for private partcipation (contractors, private companies, NGOs, CBOs and citizen partnerships) in servic and infrastructure provision,therefore, became imminent. There is also an attendant motivation that greater participation of non-state actors will make local governance more responsive and build proximity between administration and citizens. Therefore, decentralisation is a cherished goal in the governance reforms launched by flagship urban missions like the JNNURM. The JNNURM has further instituted reforms like the Community Partcipation Law and local bodies calledarea sabhas to bring about greater partcipation of citizens and CSOs in governance than what ward committees offer.<\/p>\r\n \r\n

As far as citizens\u2019 participation in decentralised governance processes is concerned, various experiments and initiatives have happened since the 1990s. Examples like the ALMs in Mumbai and the Bhagidari in Delhi have been discussed.Most of them have been outside the parameters of the 74th CAA, however. Many of these bypass elected representatives, are exclusionary in their operations, and thereby, go against the letter and spirit of democratic decentralisation as envisaged in the 74th CAA.\u00a0Finally, the constitutional provision of \u201cindustrial township\u201d, in Article 243Q (1) of the Constitution of India incorporated as an exception to the representative municipal framework as envisaged under the 74th CAA also allows for <\/span>privatisation of municipal functions. Urban development through industrial townships like SEZs and NIMZ has provided the scope for <\/span>privatisation of municipal functions, namely<\/span>,executive and representative functions, infrastructure and services provision, urban planning, and security.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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you can view video on Urban decentralisation and municipal arrangements<\/strong><\/td>\r\n\"\"<\/a><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n\r\nReferences (highlighted in yellow are not found in text; in green are incomplete.)<\/strong>\r\n\r\n \r\n