11 Politics of Land and Infrastructure

Sejal Patel

1       Meeting Urbanization and Industrialization needs: Infrastructure and Land development

The levelofurbanizationinIndiahas gradually increasedfrom17%in1951 to 28 % in 2001 to31%in 2011.From2001 to 2011, the number of towns has increased from5161 to 7935 of which 4041 are statutory towns and 3894 are census towns (Census 2011). The growth of census towns has nearly tripled in a decade from 2001. However, urbanization is expected to accelerate from 31 percent in 2011 to 41 percent by 2030 and to 55 % by 2050. Metropolitan cities holding population more than 1 million are expected to increase from 50 in 2011 to 87 by 2031(Ahluwalia, 2011).

Though cities constitute 31 % of population, they contribute to nearly 63 percent of national economy measured as GDP (Planning Commission, 2013). The corresponding figure was around 60 percent, 55 percent, and 41 percent in 2001, 1991 and 1981 respectively (YASHADA, 2009). Research shows that higher levels of per-capita income are associated with urbanization in India and that an average urban job has 1.9 times more productivity than average rural job in the manufacturing or industrial sector (C.Maitra et al., 2014). Maybe these factors and the quest for better life increasingly attract people from rural to urban centres causing slow but sure urbanization. Paradoxically, though cities are positioned as national economic growth engines, they are also sites of deprivation and contestation. First, the Indian cities suffer an acute shortage of basic infrastructure. Current and projected infrastructure deficit in Indian cities is pegged at 1.3 trillion USD of investment by 2030, which will include 2.5 billionssq.m of urban roads and 7400 kms of metros and subways (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). At the same time, cities also represent socio -economic disparities with 17 percent of urban India residing in informal settlements or slums with inadequate access to safe drinking water, sanitation, land tenure and housing conditions (Registrar General of India, 2011).

Second, Indian cities suffer an acute shortage of serviced urban land. The urban settlement area in India constitutes only 7.74 million hectares or 2.35% of India ’s total land area. Ironically though cities contribute to one third of population and almost two third of national economy, they occupy a mere 2.35% of the landmass! In fact,many Indian cities along with few Asian cities are the densest and most compact in the world. While the total land available per capita in India estimated in 2008 was 2700 sq.m/cap, the urban serviced land was less than one tenth of that at a mere 200 sq.m /capita for urban population(Department of Land Resources, 2013) . The majority of the cities are traditionally located along water resources, be they perennial rivers, lakes or coastline and are surrounded by agriculturally productive areasand environmentally sensitive belts in which they are gradually expanding. The peri-urban areas or fringes of cities and their agglomerations are fast transforming into haphazard growth, unauthorized colonies, informal settlements, piecemeal commercial and social amenities development and inadequate basic infrastructure and social amenities (Dupont 2007). The cores which have remained highly dense are witnessing regeneration and gentrification processes.

To accommodate the accelerated urban growth, cities are thus expanding into peripheral agricultural areas as well decongesting core cities of ‘non-fructuous’ informal settlements and gentrifying them with economic and leisure activities and infrastructure. In both components of the urban growth story, land is being forcibly appropriated. In peripheral growth, the land is being appropriated from farmers or formal land owners for ‘public purpose’, though tendency of farmers are willingly selling land in response to higher land prices is also emerging. In processes of urban regeneration, informal settlement residents who do not have formal ownership of the land are often evicted. These twin processes cause displacement of both farmers and slum dwellers from their residences, livelihood opportunities and social networksthe government sometimes justifieswith the rhetoric that ‘for the collective good, some have to pay the price’(Patel et al., 2015).Some authors have argued that quite often it is the marginalised who pay this price, especially in the increasingly neo liberalising and globalising cities of India (Patel et al., 2015).

Seen as growth engines and vying to be ‘world class’, cities appropriate land for beautification and luxury projects such as river and lake front developments,international airports, stadia, logistics parks etcto attract global capital rather than for basic infrastructure and social infrastructure. This phenomenon has gained prominence in the last decade after the implementation of the national government’s flagship investment programme, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). The JNNURM also represents the largest infusion of public funds to urban local governments for infrastructure development and urban renewal (Patel et al., 2015). Given this context, the objective of this module is to introduce the politics and regimes of land appropriation for ‘public’ purpose and infrastructure development and financing by the state.

It is important to note that apart from urbanization, industrialization process also consumes land on large scale. The National Manufacturing Policy  2011 of the Government of India(GoI) has setas target an industrial growth rateof12 to14%in the medium run and the contribution of industrial sector national GDPat2 5%. Itaimstocreate 100 million additional jobs by 2022 for which National Manufacturing and Investment Zones (NMIZs) int he forms of Industrial Clusters and Integrated Townships are proposed (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion,2011).These are required to have a minimum area of 5000 hectare The industrial development that is seen in the form of industrial estates Special economic zones(SEZs),  special used industrial parks,investment zones, NMIZs, special investment regions, Petroleum,Chemicals and PetroChemical investment regions (PCPIRs)and industrial corridors will require land which will be appropriated from private landowners, most likely farmers. For example, the DelhiMumbaiIndustrialCorridor(DMIC) will run a lengthof1483 km and pass through six states i.eUttar Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra and the National CapitalRegionofDelhi. It is tohave24identified IndustrialAreas and InvestmentRegions requiring large masses of and fo the development not only of the industrial areas but also to house the3 million workers expected to be employed along this corridor(Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, 2007).

The creation of SEZs following heS EZ Actof2005 have added substantially to already aggravated and relations in India. Research has shown that people have lost access to farmlands, grazing grounds, water bodies and other common resources. Agrarian protests and social mobilization against the SEZs have been witnessed everywhere in India(Jenkins et al., 2015; Levien, 2012, 2013). However the politics of appropriation of land for industrial development in rural context will not be discussed in this module where the focus will be limited to the urban context.

2      Why do cities need private land for ‘public purpose’

Cities need private land for ‘public purposes’ such as basic infrastructure, social infrastructure and economic activities. The basic infrastructure includes roads, bridges and flyovers; water supply network, source development and treatment plants, sewerage network and treatment plants, solid waste management system including disposal and landfill sites, public transport system; power generation, transmission and distribution; and communication networks and systems. The standards and benchmarks for most of the basic infrastructure components are given by Government of India’s (GoI)Central Public Health & Environmental Engineering Organisation (CPHHEO) and adjusted by the state and local governments as per their specific local context. Going by these standards, Indian cities suffer a severe deficit of the basic infrastructure pegged at $ 1.3 trillion investment by 2030. This deficit is largely attributed to inability of the state and local governments to generate required financial and land resources i.e to acquire or consolidate land for infrastructure from private land owners(HPEC, 2011).

      Social infrastructure includes health, education, recreation and cultural amenities.Standards and benchmarks for it are given by GoI’sUrban and Regional Development Plans Formulation & Implementation (UDPFI) guidelines and adjusted by the state and local governments as per their specific local context. Going by these standards, Indian cities suffer a severe deficit for the same reasons as discussed above. For instance, per capita open space in Mumbai, the financial capital of India is only 1.24 sqm, substantially less than the prescribed standard of 10 sqm per capita by the UDPFI and of 9 sqm by the World Health Organisation and United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization(Limaye, 2011; Pinto, 2015).

City peripheries often become sites of industries for spurring economic growth(Levien, 2013; Kennedy, 2007). From the earlier focus on industrial towns by Public Sector Units (such as steel towns) and estates by state Industrial Development Corporations (such as GIDC, MIDC etc.) the focus has now shifted to industrial SEZs and SIRs by private sector or through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Most of these industrial agglomerations are located outside city limits and the government does not get involved in direct acquisition of lands for them from the private owners but rather supports in negotiated purchase for the PPP or private industrial entities.

Land for defence and cantonments, natural disaster management and emergency services is also designated ‘public purpose’ but the above three i.ebasic infrastructure, social infrastructure and economic activitiesform major components.

It is ironical, that though cities are on one hand facing severe deficits of both basic and social infrastructure, on the other hand globalisation and neoliberal agenda at local level, are compelling cities to vie for world class city identities and for inflow of global capital. Towards this aspiration, cities are investing in beautification and luxurious projects such as lakefront and riverfront developments, ‘Smart City Enclaves, Hi-tech financial hubs, Logistics parks etc., flyovers and new road links, international airports, stadia etc. Thus on one hand, parts of cities are struggling with access to even basic infrastructure, on the other hand leap-frogged luxurious enclaves are provided with  highest and best levels of infrastructure leading to convoluted socio-spatial landscape and increasing contestation between the privileged and the dispossessed (Bhan, 2009 ). Such appropriation of land from informal settlement residents and their displacement has been witnessed in major cities including Ahmedabad, New Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Chennai, Kolkata etc. and the estimates vary from 75000 families in Delhi under Yamuna river front and commonwealth games development, 12000 families in Hyderabad under Musi riverfront development, 10000 families in Ahmedabad for Sabarmati riverfront development and Bus rapid transit projects(Dupont, 2008; George and Nautiyal, 2006 ; Patel et al., 2016; Patel et al., 2015). In this context, it is imperative to understand the shifting position of Indian Constitutionality on right to land and shelter for both formal land owners as well as informal settlers.

3      Indian constitutionality and politics on right to land

According to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, land is a state subject in India. Therefore, land, that is to say, “ rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization”(Government of India, 2007;323)falls under state government jurisdiction. Interestingly acquisition of land and transfer of property other than agricultural land are under the concurrent list of the Constitution of India(Government of India, 2007). Therefore the rights on land and the related law and politics are largely dealt under the state government jurisdiction with minimal advisory role of central government. This politics largely determinethe governing rights over land, land appropriation and redistribution of land. In this discussion, land tenure is understood as defined by the Global Land Tool Network at UN-Habitat i.e as the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land (Payne and Durand-Lasserve, 2012).

The legal and political emphasis on land tenure in the Indian Constitution was in response to colonial policy favouring the Zamindari system. Over time, land revenue regulations of individual states allowed for tenure conversions to avoid underutilization of urban and peri-urban land.

determined Source :Compiled by the Author from relevant source  On the other end of the land tenure system are the informal settlements which lack any form of secure tenure rights and hence largely remain ineligible for entitlements under development projects or for compensatory housing in case of eviction. Security of tenure is the certainty that a person’s rights to land will be recognized by others and protected in cases of specific challenges.

3.1    For formal settlements

Post- Independence,the Indian Constitution’s stance on rights over land have shifted from view of land as private property to public property to again back to private property(Phatak, 2013).1Thenotionthatlandisaprivatepropertyandifitistobeacquiredforpublicpurposetheprocesshastobejustandfairwasrecognizedwellbeforeth eadoptionofConstitutionin1950.TransferofPropertyAct1882andLandAcquisitionAct189

4 reflectedtheseconcerns. In the same spirit, the Constitution ensured rights over land  in three fold provision with the objective to safeguard land as private property (Basu, 1996). First, the Constitution guaranteed the right to acquire any property by any lawful means as a Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(f) with reasonable restrictions  imposed by the state to serve the exigencies of public welfare. Second, the Constitution  guaranteed that no person be deprived of his property except  by authority of law2  under Article 31(1). Third, the Constitution enrooted the doctrine of eminent domain  where the state could acquire private property only for public purpose andonly on  making compensatory payment to the owner either by fixing the amount or by

1 Fro another perspective on the legal regimes governing land in India, see Sud (2014). Analyzing land market policy in Gujarat, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu, Sud (2014) argues that in fact the sub-national state scale that is central to land policy formulation and implementation.

2  The word ‘law’ in Art. 300A means an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature, a rule or a statutory order, having the force of law, that is positive or State-made law

specifying the principle upon which it is determined under Article 31(2). However the way private property was viewed in the Constitution evolved over the years.

The failure of the state to define compensation in land acquisition for public purposes under Article 31(2) led to litigations over time. In response 4thConstitutional Amendment Act (1955) and 25th Amendment Act (1971) were passed to define compensation. But the acts made the compensation non justiciable. (Basu, 1996;118).

In Emergency era fundamental right to property was found to be incompatible with social, economic and political ambitions of the state paving way for 44th Constitutional Amendment act (1978) under which ‘Article 31 – right to property as a fundamental right’ was deleted and ‘ Article 300- A- right to property as constitutional right ’ was inserted. Eventually, the notion to safeguard land as private property shifted to land as public property. But with ‘The Right To Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (LARR Act 2013)thestate has againassumed the stance to safeguard land as a private property.

The Land Acquisition Act (LAA), 1894 failed to meet desired outcomes due to its flawed valuation techniques, costly and cumbersome procedural delaysand lack of relocation and rehabilitation of Project Affected People (PAP). These anomalies eventually led to the formulation of LARR Act, 2013 which allowsacquisition of land by private sectoralso by adding ‘infrastructure development through private market’ under the list of public purposes. But while doing so, it mandatesprior consent of minimum 80 and 70 percent of land owners in private development and PPP projects respectively. In addition, LARR Act, 2013 mandates Social Impact Assessment (SIA) and ensures 100 percent solatium3with equivalent increase in compensation values.

Thus with LARR, Act 2013 the notion of right to land appears to stand at where it started under Art. 19(f) and 31 (1) ie, ‘land as private property’.

3Solatium is the compensation for injured feelings from loss of property and is distinct from financial loss or physical suffering.

Source : Adapted from Phatak (2013).

Pertaining to rights over land,another controversial law was the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA), 1976 aimed to redistribute the surplus vacant private land for public purpose mainly for housing the urban poor. Its objective was to strengthen the self-reliance of poor by increasing the supply of land at affordable prices. The ULCRA came into force in 1976 in 64 urban agglomerations in 17 states and covered towns with a population of more than 200,000 as per 1971 census. But the competent authorities largely misused ULCRA due to ambiguityin discretionary powers to state governments, lack of transparency and lack of clear determination of compensation to the land owners. The maximum compensation given to land owners was fixed at INR 10 per sq.mt with a cap of INR 2 lacs per owner and this remained un-amended for a long time making the acquisition unviable and subject to litigation. Meagre compensation led the land owners to withhold information on surplus vacant landholdings to the authority. Overall, the act failed to attain desired outcome of equity and hence GoI decided to repeal the act with the passing of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act in 1999(Phatak, 2013; also see Joshi 2009).

3.2    For informal settlements

Informal settlements or slums have insecure tenure and are excluded from development interventions. Indian Constitution never explicitly identified right to shelter but it was understood to be enshrined in right to property.

In the phase upto 1980s which coincided with the phase of state led welfare development, the Supreme Court responded impressively to the pleas of civil rights by expanding the interpretation of the fundamental right to ‘life and personal liberty’ in article 21 of the Constitution of India and by additionally reading some directive principles4 also into the fundamental right to life (Mahadevia, 2014; Rajagopal, 2007) in landmark cases such as Olga Tellis Vs Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 5. The right to ‘life and personal liberty’ espoused in article 21, was interpreted by the Court to mean therighttolive with dignity,whichwas thenlinkedtodirectiveprinciplessuchasrighttoeducation,righttolivelihood,righttohuman econditionsofworkand habitation.In this manner, right to shelter came to be subsumed under ‘Right to Life and Personal Liberty ’ under article 21 and right to basic services such as water, sanitation, etc. came to be subsumed under right to shelter. Since then, cases of eviction of slum dwellers and denial of basic services are petitioned in the court under article 21.

However since liberalisation of economy and neoliberal local agenda begun in 1990s, judiciary has shown increased reluctance to assert any right that openly contradicts the grand vision of neoliberal development of the state and thus has been a significant contributor to the evolving jurisprudence of ‘illegality’ of slums and shelter rights of urban poor(Baviskar, 2003; Dupont and Ramanathan, 2008; Ghertner, 2008; Ramanathan, 2006). Studies (Bayat, 2001; Bhan, 2013) have shown that illegality in cities exist in multiple ways i.e as type of labour, a type of settlement, a type of built environment or a type of building and hence illegal practices are not limited only to poor but are also as evident in the elite residents. Yet the consequences of illegality are more severe on poor than on the elite residents. Bhan et al (2014) show that though only 25 percent of Delhi’s population lives in ‘planned’ or legal colonies, it is mainly the poor resident settlements which are framed as ‘illegal’ while the elite residences under non planned areas or unauthorized construction are spared from such framing.

The framing of spatial illegality of slums by the state and judiciary also reflects in the empirics of Slum Census 2011 of India (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 2011) which categorises slums as ‘notified ’, ‘recognised’ and ‘identified’ with increasing degrees of illegality (Bhan et al., 2014). The ‘notified’ slums represent legal slums which are notified under ‘Slum Acts’ of different states. Usually these slum dwellers are framed to be legal and ‘eligible’ to rehabilitation on eviction. The second category represents slums that an authority in a state recognizes through a survey or in a program or a policy. Such slum dwellers may be ‘eligible’ for rehabilitation only under a specific policy or program. The third and the largest category (constitutes 37 % at India level), represents slums which are only ‘identified’ as one but lack either legal

4In the Indian Constitution, fundamental rights are enforceable whereas Directive principles are policy aspirations for the State and non enforceable. Indian Constitution offers six fundamental rights from article 14 to 35, of which article 21 is ‘right to life and personal liberty’.

5   The petition was filed by Olga Tellis and other slum dwellers against their eviction against Municipal Corporation of Mumbai. The pleas was against infringement of article 21. Thought the Supreme Court upheld the eviction of the slum dwellers, it provided the remedy of alternative rehabilitation. The judgment was landmark as it expanded the ambit of article 21 to include right to shelter, livelihood and right to reside in cities for migrant workers. notification or recognition by the state. These are most vulnerable to eviction and have no claims to rehabilitation post eviction or other entitlements. In the next section, various land management tools are discussed.

4      Land Management and infrastructure development

Land management tools are the statutory instruments used by the state and local governments to appropriate privately owned land for public purposes. The majority ofland related problems do not originate with city growth but prevail due to poor land management. In this regard, land management instruments are central to urban development, expansion as well as redevelopment of cities.

Since land is a state subject in India, these instruments are supported by legislation as a statutory backup for various land development authorities. Typically they are part of Town and Country Planning Act of the state such as Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 etc.

In India, land management instruments are largely categorized in to three categories :

1.     Land Acquisition

a.     Compulsory Acquisition of land

b.     Negotiated Land Acquisition

2.     Land Readjustment

a.     Land Pooling

b.     Town Planning Schemes (TPS)

3.     Transferrable Development Rights (TDR)

4.1    Acquisition of land

In India, Land Acquisition is the conventional method for stocking land for public purpose. But since its enactment, it continues to remain controversial and debatable instrument in terms of social justice and equity. Even after constant amendments to LA Act, 1896 the process continued to be time consuming process and contentious. Analyzing land market policy in Gujarat, West Bengal, and Tamil NaduSud (2014) argues that in fact the sub-national state scale that is central to land policy formulation and implementation.

a.  Compulsory land Acquisition

The notion behind the provision of rights to acquire, hold and dispose of property in Art. 31 of the Constitution is due to the colonial LAA, 1894. After the independence, successive governments have used it as a means of building mega projects with meagre payments of compensation to land owners. The act empowers the states (public planning authorities and development agencies) to acquire large portions of land for public purpose and then re-plan them in a desirable or appropriate manner and the land owner is given monetary compensationat the government rates and a meagre solatium and that too with time delays. The act was comprehensively amended by the GoI in 1984 with the central stipulation that the acquisition procedures would have to be completed and compensation paid by the Collector within three years of the preliminary notification. Despite this, the process of payment of compensation continues for 15 to 20 years after land acquisition (TCPO, 2007).

Because of these concerns finally, LARR Act, 2013 was formulated as a paradigm shift in the government’s stance on forced land acquisition in two ways. First, that for the first time, it combined both the land acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R & R) within one law which was not the case under the earlier act LAA and hence R & R was quite often neglected after acquisition. The second is that by mandating R & R of both ‘theownersofthelandandotheraffectedfamilies’ (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2013) the act brings all those whose primary livelihood is dependent on the land being acquired such as ‘agricultural labourers and tenants, share croppers, fisher folk…etc. (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2013)’ under the ambit of rehabilitation and resettlement.The appropriation of land for modern planned cities such as Chandigarh, New Delhi, Gandhinagar, Navi Mumbai, Rajarhat new Town etc has been done through compulsory land acquisition.

b.  Negotiated Land Acquisition

LAA Act, 1984 Amendment stated that if all persons party to land acquisition reach an agreement on the award, the Collector, without making further enquiry, can make an award without effecting the determination of compensation for land in the same locality or elsewhere. In India, Tamil Nadu Housing Board has been increasingly resorting to negotiated acquisition of land. The recent example is of the Greater Noida Industrial Authority which estimated the compensation package on the basis of the sale price of land registered in the sale deeds during the last three years, solatium and interest, and negotiated with the landowners on the basis of these rates (TCPO, 2007). Negotiated LA ensures speedy acquisition of land and lower risk of land encroachment.

4.2    Land Readjustment

Land Readjustment ( LR) is in practice since two hundred years in several countries like Germany, Japan, South Korea, France, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Israel, Australia, India, Malaysia, Bhutan(Boano et al., 2010) as well as India. The key for wide-spread use of LR across globe isits inherent self-financing mechanism. LR enables urban development and facilitates the provision of infrastructure through its low-cost land assembly technique. Based on the approach of LR mechanism in India, they are categorized in two ways which are Town Planning Schemes and Land Pooling.

a.  Town Planning Schemes (TPS)

TPS was introduced in India by the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1915 and has been widely used in Gujarat and and selectively used in Maharashtra, Kerala and Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh (Ballaney and Patel, 2009; Nallathiga, 2009). In Maharashtra and Gujarat, TPS is implemented under the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, respectively. In Maharashtra, between 1915 and 1985, TPS projects with area coverage ranging from 200–800 ha were implemented in several towns. Due to inordinate delays in their completion, all the concerned parties, especially the government showed less and less interest. Gradually, the scheme was phased out in Maharashtra.

A TPS is usually prepared for an area of about 100 ha, particularly in those pockets which are under pressure of urban development and need priority attention(Nallathiga, 2009). A TPS is prepared in two parts, physical and financial. These two parts are linked through a mechanism of compensating reconstitution of  plot based on its original size and value. The scheme is conceptualized as a joint venture between the local authority and the landowners who voluntarily agree to pool their land, redistribute the reconstituted plots of land among themselves, and share the development cost. A TPS in implemented by the authority only after 70 to 70 % of the landowners have given their consent.

For preparation of the scheme, land parcels are marked with original survey number/ plot number on a map. All such original plots form one area for planning purposes. In the layout plan, areas are demarcated for roads and public spaces and the remaining area is then planned into regular plots known as fi nal plots. The final plots, though reduced in size but better in shape, buildability, and accessibility, are allotted to the landowners preferably in close proximity to their original plots.Since the reconstituted plot has better accessibility and good potential for development, its value gets enhanced. Part of such increment in land value is to be paid by the landowners to the authority as a betterment levy to be used for development work in the scheme.

In Gujarat 80:20 or 70:30 or 60:40are the typical ratioof land returned and appropriated though the Act allows ratio upto 50 : 50. From the plotsearmarked for public purposes, about 10 percent is allotted for Socially and Economically Weaker Section (SEWS) housing. (Ballaney and Patel, 2009; Nallathiga, 2009). TPS is the most democratic and equitable tool of land management currently being practiced. Most states in India have the provision for TPS in their Town Planning Acts but it is Gujarat cities which extensively use this instrument.

a.  Land Pooling (LP)

Land Pooling in India is misinterpreted same as TPS, but is slightly different. However both are guided by similar principles of using LR as a statutory, democratic, low cost land management tool. LP considers the whole neighbourhood area as a single plot or entity regardless of ownerships. The fundamental difference is that here a much smaller final plot (12.5 % to 25 %) or reconstituted plot is returned to the owner after developmentand it is not necessarily located near the original plot, as in case of TPS. Similar to TPS, the increase in the value of land with the provision of infrastructure is captured by the authority through levy of betterment charge from the land owner(Nallathiga, 2009).

     The newly formed Andhra Pradesh State has adopted land pooling strategy to pool 33,000 acres of privately owned land for the development of the new capital Amrawathi in which the owners will get back 30 % of the original plot surrendered to the authority. CIDCO adopted land pooling mechanism for development of part of Navi Mumbai which was termed as ‘12.5% scheme’ . The scheme was announced in 1990. In this scheme, the land owners from who the land is taken, are returned 12.5% of their land holding as developed plot. Out of the 12.5%, 30% is reserved for social facilities and public utilities. Thus net allotment is 8.75% of the land acquired from the owners. The plot allotted to the individual has 1.5 FSI and 15% commercial component permissible on the plot. The 12.5% Scheme became fully functional in 1994 but the disbursal of land was slow till 2005.

4.3    Transferrable Development Rights

Instead of resorting to monetary compensation for compulsory land acquisition for creating public amenities it is possible to do so by providing incentives to landowners. This is possible when the development right over land is separated from land and is made utilizable either in situ or ex situ. In such cases, the development right is called Transferable Development Right (TDR), which can be used by the landowner or can be sold to other landowners. Thus, it becomes a significant instrument of developing and financing urban infrastructure (Nallathiga, 2009; Phatak, 2009). In essence, TDR mechanism is similar to land acquisition but here instead of monetary compensation to the land owner, development right in the form of a certificate is awarded. TDR is also used as a mechanism to achieve planning objectives such as slum redevelopment, heritage buildings, etc. As a mechanism, it works successfully in cities where land markets highly appreciated or where land and built spaces supply is scarce.

Mumbai was the first city in India to have adopted TDR mechanism in a regulated manner for providing public amenitiesearmarked in the development plan, for slum redevelopment and for reconstruction of dilapidated buildings.Currently TDR prices in Mumbai range between INR 5,000 to 6,500 per sq.ft, and heritage TDRs are traded at INR 18,000 per sq.ft. Over the years, the mechanism has resulted in concentration of TDRs in the hands of few with the ability to control prices.To prevent such cartelisation of TDRs, Maharashtra state government is planning to dematerialise the certificates issued to land owners. The demat form of TDRs is assumed to bring transparent pricing and avoid control of the market by a few developers.

4.4    Comparison of instruments in terms of equitable distribution of costs and benefits

Land Readjustment, be it TPS or Land Pooling is considered a much more democratic, equitable and inexpensive mechanisms compared to land acquisition. This is illustrated below through the comparative examples of Ring Road development in Ahmedabad and Hyderabad for which land acquisition and TPS were respectively adopted as land management instruments.

Ahmedabad ring road was about 76 km long with 60 meters Right Of Way (ROW).Typically, the Right Of Way for such roads is appropriated using the land acquisition method. However, Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA)used a combination of minimal land acquisition and an extensive use of the TPS mechanism. The Land Acquisition was carried out under the Land Acquisition Act and TPS was carried out under Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act (GTPUDA). While the LAA can be used in both urban and rural areas, TPS is applicable only in adevelopment area designated under the provisions of GTPUDA.Init’s Development Plan itself AUDA delineated about 35 TPS along the alignment of the proposed Ring Road. AUDA initiated an outreach programme and contacted all the landowners affected by the ring road and those owning land in the surrounding area. AUDA explained the TPSmechanism to them and offered the opportunity to participate in the benefits of building the ring road by undertaking TPSs along the Ring Road, on either side of the alignment. Most of the farmers owning the land agreed to the scheme. Land in approximately 1 km wide belt along the Ring Road was reorganized, creating the road. The original landowners got back 60 per cent area of their original land holding as final plot in locations very close to the original holding.The original owners were a able to reap the benefits of the land value appreciation that happened as a result of the Ring Road construction as well as implementation of the TPS. The full road was operational in a record time of 5 years. The project was completed with an investment of mere INR 250 crores which included cost of construction of two lanes and no cost for appropriated land(Ballaney and Patel, 2009).

Hyderabad ring road was about 158 km long with 60 metres ROW. Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA) used land acquisition under LAA as the mechanism for land appropriation. Compulsory acquisition of land has unequally distributed the costs and benefits of the Ring Road. Small land holders who lost disproportionately high portion of land, the monetary compensations awarded by HUDA, the time delays in award, court petitions etc. imposed time delay and cost over runs on the project. Consequently even after close to fifteen years the road is not fully implemented. The investment cost has surpassed INR 6700 crores including construction of six lanes and monetary compensation for the acquired land.

5      Social mobilization against forced land appropriation

In response to the hegemonic appropriation of land from formal land owners through compulsory land acquisition and of informal settlement residents, quite often people have mobilised to claim both right to shelter and rehabilitation, taken judicial recourse and compelled the state or local government to acquiesce to their demands and rights. Two such famouscases are discussed below.

5.1    Sabarmati NagrikAdhikarManch, Ahmedabad

In the recent past, Ahmedabad has experienced significant spatial restructuring through numerous beautification and infrastructure projects such as Bus Rapid Transit System, Ring roads and flyovers, Lake front developments etc. One such city rejuvenation project is Sabarmati Riverfront Development initiated in 1997. The proposal envisaged land reclamation along a nine kilometerstretch of the river for development of promenades, recreational spaces, realestate commercial and residential development and construction of roads and public amenities. In addition to city transformation, the project claimed transformation in the living conditions of 14500 odd households living in informal settlements in the river bed for more than three decades by including their rehabilitation sites in the reclaimed project land.

Sabarmati NagrikAdhikarManch (SNAM) was created in 2003-2004 by mobilisation of these 14500 slum households which were going to be displaced by the project(Desai, 2012; Mathur, 2012). SNAM’s objective was to negotiate with the state and local government and political parties the right to shelter of slum dwellers in general and the right to resettlement in alternative sites in proximity to the current residences of the households displaced by SRFD in specific. Through negotiating efforts they met with limited success as the state and local government authorities responded with vague assurances of resettling all the slum households to be displaced but did not follow up with concrete actions or share information on the project ’s Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R & R) policy. When it became increasingly clear that there was no mention of R & R in the project, SNAM stopped negotiating efforts and took judicial recourse by filing a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the High Court of Gujarat in 2005 with help from NGOs and civil rights activists. Through judicial intervention SNAM could claim and achieve compensatory resettlement dwelling units for 10000 displaced households albeit in a non-transparent and adhoc manner from the local government. But SNAM could not become a platform for claiming a rights-based, and transparent resettlement andrehabilitation process for slum dwellers(Desai, 2012; Mahadevia, 2014). SNAM and PIL were one – off mechanisms of claiming spaces for engagement with the local state. Hence when the judicial process ended, the negotiations also ended .A recourse to judiciary to claim shelter rights has become an expensive process for the informal settlement residents in Ahmedabad, Mumbai, Delhi, Hyderabad and other cities of India(Bhan et al., 2014; Dupont, 2008; Mahadevia, 2014; Menon-Sen and Bhan, 2008).

5.2    TheNandigram Case

To’ promote industrial development’ the left based West Bengal government declared development of chemical hub SEZ in 2007 in Nadigram, a small town located 70 km south-west of Kolkata. Thegovernment declared intention to compulsorilyacquire 10,000 acres of land from formal land owners, mainly farmers, covering 29 villages. The land to be acquired was fertile land with multiple cropping and a principal source of livelihoodfor the land owners. The state government claimed to rehabilitate the livelihoods of the land owners in the industries along with land and shelter but without a concrete R & R policy.

Since the declaration of the project and intent to acquire land in November 2006, the local CPI(M), party including the local Member of Parliament relentlessly attempted to mobilise public support through a series of public meetings in favour of land acquisition in Nandigram and adjoining areas. Protest meetings, organised by the CPI, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) and others were also simultaneously held. On a score of occasions, even the public meetings organised by the CPI(M ) could not be completed due to the protests of local CPI(M) members and supporters. This continuous campaign and counter- campaign, coupled with a contentious circular of the implementing authority Haldia Development Authority (HDA), led the peasants to put up strong protests and resistance. The farmers mobilised to form Bhumi UcchedProtirodh Committee (BUPC ) to protest against forceful land acquisition.

The state government directed the administration to break the BUPC’s resistance at Nandigram and a massive operation with at least 3,000 policemen was launched on March 14, 200. However, prior information of the impending action had leaked out to the BUPC who amassed a crowd of 2000 villagers at the entry points into

Nandigramwith women and children. In the police firing, at least 14 people were killed. The ruling CPI(M) party diminished the gravity of the incident by de fining it as merely a ‘fall-out’ and ‘police action’ and by claiming that the violence was started and perpetuated by the BUPC members ( Bhadra and Ray, 2007).

The deaths of BUPC members in this confrontation, media and civil society censure and pressure from other political parties finally led to the relinquishing of the project and the victory of BUPC in claiming their right to land.

For Further Reading

• Ahluwalia I J, 2011, “HPEC Report and Recommendations”, (High Powered Expert Committee)
• Ballaney S, Patel B, 2009, “Using the ‘Development Plan—Town Planning Scheme’ Mechanism to Appropriate Land and Build Urban Infrastructure”, in India Infrastructure Report 2009 ( Oxford University Press, New Delhi)
• Basu D D, 1996 Introduction to the Constituion of India (Prentice Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi) Baviskar A, 2003, “Between Violence and Desire: Space, Power and Identity in the Making of
• Metropolitan Delhi” International Social Science Journal55 80-98 Bayat A, 2001, “From Dangerous Classes to Quiet Rebels : Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South” International Sociology15 533-557
• Bhadra, S. and Ray, S.G., 2007. Reflections on Nandigram. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(38):3886-3887.
• Bhan G, 2009 “”This is no longer the city I once knew”. Evictions, the urban poor and the right to the city in millennial Delhi” Environment and Urbanization Vol 21 127–142
• Bhan G, 2013, “Planned Illegalities : Housing and the ‘Failure’ of Planning in Delhi 1947-2010” Economic and Politcal Weekly48 58-70
• Bhan G, Goswami A, Revi A, 2014, “The intent to Reside : Spatial illegality, Inclusive Planning, and Urban Social Security”, in Inclusive Urban Planning : State of the Urban Poor Report 2013 (Oxford University Press, New Delhi)
• Boano C, Lamarca M G, Hunter W, 2010, “The Frontlines of Contested Urbanism Mega projects and Mega-resistances in Dharavi” Journal of Developing Societies27 295-326
• C.Maitra B, Rohra S, Gupta S, 2014, “India’s growth engines and gateways” Livemint, 30- 10-2014 Deapartment of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 2011, “National Manufacturing Policy 2011”, Ed D o I P a Promotion (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, New Delhi)
• Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, 2007, “Concept Paper Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor”, Ed G o I Ministry of Commerce & Industry (New Delhi)
• Department of Land Resources, 2013, “National Land Utilisation Policy-Framework for Landuse Planning and Management”, Ed M o R Development (Government of India, Nw Delhi)
• Desai R, 2012, “Governing the Urban Poor: Riverfront Development,Slum Resettlement and the Politics of Inclusion in Ahmedabad” Economic & Political Weekly 47 49-56
• Dupont, V., 2007. Conflicting stakes and governance in the peripheries of large Indian metropolises–An introduction. Cities, 24(2), pp.89-94.
• Dupont V, 2008, “Slum Demolitions in Delhi since the 1990s :an appraisal” Economic & Political Weekly43 79-87
• Dupont V, Ramanathan U, 2008, “The Courts and the squatter Settlements in Delhi- Or the intervention of the Judiciary in Urban ‘Governance'”, in New Forms of Urban Governance in India : Shifts, Models, Networks and Contestations Eds I Baud, J De.Wit (Sage Publications India, New Delhi)
• George S, Nautiyal S, 2006 Eviction Watch India-II (Human Rights Law Network, New Delhi) Ghertner A, 2008, “Analysis of New Legal Discourse behind Delhi’s Slum Demolitions”
• Economic and Politcal Weekly43 57-66
• Government of India, 2007 The Constitution of India (Government of India, New Delhi) HPEC, 2011, “Report on Urban Infrastructure and Services : The High Powered ExpertCommittee (HPEC) for Estimating the Investment Requirements for Urban Infrastructure Services”, (New Delhi)
• Jenkins R, Kennedy L, Mukhopadhyay P, Pradhan K, 2015, “Special Economic Zones in India : Interrogating the Nexus of Land, Development and Urbanization” Environment and Urbanization Asia6 1-17 Joshi, R., 2009. Integrated townships as a policy response to changing supply and demand dynamics of urban growth. India Infrastructure Report 2009, p.167.
• Kennedy, L., 2007. Regional industrial policies driving peri-urban dynamics in Hyderabad, India.Cities, 24(2), pp.95-109.
• Levien M, 2012, “Regimes of Dispossession: From Steel Towns to Special Economic Zones” Development and Change44 381–407
• Levien M, 2013, “The Politics of Dispossession: Theorizing India’s ”Land Wars”” Politics & Society41 351-394
• Limaye A, 2011, “Where is the open space in Mumbai?”
• Mahadevia D, 2014, “Institutionalising Spaces for Negotiations for the Urban Poor: New Vocabulary for Urban Planning”, in Inclusive Urban Planning : State of the Urban Poor Report 2013 (Oxford University Press, New Delhi)
• Mathur N, 2012, “On the Sabarmati Riverfront” Economic and Political WeeklyXLVII 64-75 McKinsey Global Institute, 2010, “India’s Urban Awakening : Building Inclusive Cities,
• Sustaining Economic Growth”, (McKinsey & Company, London)
• Menon-Sen K, Bhan G, 2008 Swept off the Map : Surviving eviction and Resettlement in Delhi (YODA Press, New Delhi)
• Ministry of Law and Justice, 2013, “The Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013”, Ed L Department (Government of India, New Delhi)
• Nallathiga R, 2009, “Potential of Land and Land Based Instruments for Infrastructure Development in Urban Areas”, in India Infrastructure Report 2009 (Oxford University Press, New Delhi)
• Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 2011, “Primary Census Abstract for Slum, 2011”, Ed M o H Affairs (Government of India, New Delhi)
• Patel S, Sliuzas R, Georgiadou Y, 2016, “Participatory local governance in Asian cities:
• invited,closed or claimed spaces for urban poor? ” Environment & Urbanization Asia7 1-21
• Patel S, Sliuzas R, Mathur N, 2015, “The risk of impoverishment in urban development-induced displacement and resettlement in Ahmedabad” Environment and Urbanization27 231-256
• Payne G, and Durand-Lasserve, A, 2012, “Holding On: Security of Tenure – Types, Policies, Practices and Challenges”, in Expert group meeting on Security of Tenure (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Geneva)
• Phatak V, 2009, “Charges on Land and Development Rights as a Financing Resource for Urban Development”, in India Infrastructure Report 2009 : Land- A Critical Resource for Infrastructure (Oxford University Press, New Delhi) pp 227-234
• Phatak V, 2013, “Land Based Fiscal Tools And Practices For Generating Additional Financial Resource “, (Capacity Building for Urban Development Project, New Delhi)
• Pinto R, 2015, “2 sqm open space per person in Mumbai? Number jugglery, sneer activists” The Times of India
• Planning Commission, 2013, “Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-2017) Faster, More Inclusive and Sustainable Growth”, Ed P Commission (Government of India, New Delhi)
• Rajagopal B, 2007, “Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A critical Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a Social Movement Perspective” Human Rights Review8
• Ramanathan U, 2006, “Illegality and the Urban Poor” Economic and Political Weekly41 3193-3198 Registrar General of India, 2011, “Primary Census Abstract for Slum”, Ed C o India
• (Government of India, New Delhi)
• Sud, N., 2014. Governing India’s land. World Development, 60, pp.43-56.
• TCPO, 2007, “Model Guidelines for Urban Land Policy”, Ed M o U Development (Government of India, New Delhi)
• YASHADA, 2009, “Best Practices in the Financial Management of Urban Local Bodies in India”, (Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India)