14 Discipline, surveillance and governability

Kaushiki Das

INTRODUCTION

 

In the last couple of years, there have been a number of movies like V for Vendetta (2006), Closed Circuit (2013), and documentaries like Panopticon (2012) that have discussed the problems of surveillance.

 

Closer home, in January 2016, the National Security Council Secretariat had put forth a proposal for a New Media Analytic Centre, which plans to track and monitor content on the social media, particularly “negative news” about the government. It will also follow past pattern of the writer to evaluate his stance on an issue, his background, preference for certain websites and his areas of interest. In case, the government senses trouble or “radicalisation”, higher authorities will be alerted.

 

This seems to exemplify panopticon-like surveillance, as discussed by Foucault. Moreover, a move like this may deter social media users, critical of the government policies, from posting anything and may force them to toe the government’s line. Nishant Shah, the co-founder of the Centre for Internet and Society, has expounded in the Indian Express on the Orweillian nightmare awaiting the country’s citizens. As such, the contours of a disciplinary society, as described by Foucault, appear to fortify here.

 

Before we learn more about the disciplinary society, we will begin with a brief note on Foucault. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was a distinguished French historian, philosopher and a prominent critical theorist. Among his several works, Madness and Civilization (1967), The Birth of the Clinic (1963), The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences (1966) have provoked intense academic discussions about power, knowledge and discourse.

 

FOUCAULT’S DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH

 

Discipline and Punish, authored by Michel Foucault in 1975, is a seminal work that traces the historical genealogy of carceral institutions and punishment practices from mid-18th century to mid-19th century, particularly pertaining to the penal system in France [Sergiacomo, 2009:2]. However, the focus was not only on prisons, but also on disciplinary institutions like schools, asylums, hospitals, barracks and factories, that gradually began to employ similarmeans of governing behaviour. Foucault contests the notion that there has been singular, continuous trajectory, by highlighting the ruptures in the display of power of the sovereigns, and in the system of surveillance, constraint, control, examination and education of prisoners. Foucault also examines the development of prisons, modern disciplinary institutions.

 

From Scaffolds to Penalties: Describing the horrendous punishment in 1757 inflicted upon the mutilated body of a prisoner named Robert Damiens, Foucault reflects upon the public spectacle that was made of physical punishment, evident in the scaffold. Robert Damiens, a soldier had tried to assault King Louis XV and hence, was condemned to death. Foucault shares the grotesque, graphic details of the brutal dismemberment of Damiens in public. Till the middle of 18th century, punishment of criminals in Europe was a cruel affair.

 

However, late 18thcentury onwards, there were calls for reforms, for a more civil and humane mode of punishment. It signalled the end of the public executions and torture rituals, especially scaffolds and ritual chain-gang around the body of the criminals. The bodies of criminals were no longer to be dismembered by the State. Rather, the State began to concentrate upon disciplining the ‘soul’ of criminals. Penalties serve to be a far more powerful restraint on the people. Foucault also adds that that “the system of punishment is situated in a certain political economy of the body. . . such that the body becomes useful only when it is a productive body and a subjected body. . ” [Sergiacomo, 2009:3].

 

In an environment where the crimes were perpetrated against people’s goods and properties, violent punishments were to be replaced by more humanitarian ones. Henceforth, a ‘calculated economy of the art of punishment thus emerged, striving to achieve more efficient and effective punishment practices’ [Sergiacomo, 2009:3].

 

According to Massimo Sergiacomo (2009), Foucault highlights the transition from the power of the sovereign to avenge towards the defence of society. The emphasis was now upon the prevention of crime and establishing order rather than on severe torture. Foucault outlines the rules undergirding the new penal system—graduated scale of punishment, according to the crime committed; less arbitrariness of punishments; punishment to discourage potential criminals; punishments to have a more concentrated impact on society, rather than on criminals; crime verification process to be more transparent; classification of illegalities into such categories so that there is less scope for impunities. The decisions regarding the nature and duration of punishment was to be handed over to a coterie of ‘experts’ such as psychiatrists, social workers and parole boards, instead of judges who dispensed penalties according to the law.

 

Punishment is meant to instil within society, the idea of pursuing only legit activities and to deter people from illicit activities. According to Sergiacomo, it thus has a representative function, to convey a ‘legible lesson of morality’.

 

Multiple Disciplinary Institutions: Foucault examines how the techniques of discipline in schools, army barracks, hospitals, mental asylums, monasteries and factories, wherein the bodies’ operations are subjected to a docility-utility relationship, eventually became generalised as formulas of domination during the 17th and 18th centuries [Sergiacomo, 2009:5]. He identified the discipline in these institutions to be related to their architectural design, which he calls the ‘art of distribution’. Firstly, these are all enclosures, protected spaces. Secondly, they all inhere partitioning, such that ‘each individual has his own place and each place has its own individual’ [Sergiacomo, 2009:5]. Secondly, they are structured in such a way that while communication among the individuals is discouraged, surveillance and control is facilitated. Thirdly, they all have elaborate hierarchies, wherein they have elements like ‘organizing cells’, ‘ranks’, or ‘places’. Thus, the objective of modern architectural design i. e. to render visible those under observation was a shift from the earlier one, i. e. to display the privileged status of those in power.

 

In addition, Foucault highlights how activities in these institutions are controlled. Firstly, they all follow a time table, which divides time into slots and creates daily rhythms and cycles as well as an occupational routine to be followed by the individuals. Secondly, the activities are broken down into sub-elements which follow a specific sequence of progression and definite period. For instance, in the army, teaching to shoot itself is decomposed into many tiny steps, like how to hold the gun, how to look down the barrel, how to position it on the shoulder and how to pull the trigger. By doing so, it puts into effect micro-management, which creates docile bodies that not only carry out the activity the supervisor wants them to, but also in the way it is desired.

 

Thirdly, by aligning the overall body with certain gestures, it is schooled into being efficient and fast. Fourthly, they lay out the relations that bodies should have with the manipulated objects. Fifthly, the specific internal arrangement, maximum efficiency and hasten the use of time, which are intrinsic to discipline, in are essential for achieving positive economies [Sergiacomo, 2009:6]. By better aligning time, bodies and forces, bodies are made amenable to capital.

 

Foucault states that like a machine, discipline intends to create a productive force with maximum efficiency. At the same time, he also states that the individuality created out of the bodies controlled by discipline has four characteristics—- it is cellular (due to spatial distribution), it is genetic (accumulation of time), it is organic (coding of activities) and is combinatory (composition of forces) [Sergiacomo, 2009:6]. Discipline intends to train the individual and this is made possible through hierarchical observation, examination and normalizing judgement.

 

a)  Hierarchical Observation: The individuals under observation are made aware that they are under continuous surveillance. In fact, the entire area is brought under a sweeping disciplinary gaze.

 

b)   Normalizing Judgement: Since the new art of discipline is meant to be corrective, it tends to dispense both punishments as well as gratifications while training individuals. Individuals are subjected to scrutiny, whether or not they adhere to a standardised benchmark of behaviour. This hierarchy of values is derived from the quantification and qualification of behaviour, which enables a series of comparisons [Tadros, 1998:16].

 

The intrinsic right or wrong nature of their act does not matter; only whether they can be placed on a ranked scale of behaviour. There is no respite from being judged since there is this constant goading to move on to the next level of achievement. Gary Gutting (2005) adds that since in the modern age, individuals are afraid of being judged ‘abnormal’, they are restrained at every moment in their lives. Gutting states that normalization is evident for instance, in national standards for educational programmes, for industrial processes, etc.

 

c)  Examination:It combines the above two techniques. Examination is extremely ritualised wherein the individuals being examined are made visible and are enmeshed in a web of written documentation and records. Also, every individual is reduced to a single case which can be measured and weighed against with others. Categories, norms and averages can be churned out on the basis of the accumulated information. Documentation is thus intended to dominate and control. It is a ‘prime locus of modern power/knowledge, since it combines into a unified whole, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth’ [Gutting, 2005:86]. Gutting states that it reveals the truth about those who undergo the examination (tells us what they know or what is the state of their health) and controls their behaviour (by forcing them to study or directing them to a course of treatment). For instance, absentee records in schools enable them to control students.

 

Panopticism: Lastly, Foucault elucidates Panopticism. Panopticism originated during the control of plague in 17th century. Spatial divisions were imposed to separate the infected from others, while all stray animals were killed. Houses were subjected to constant scrutiny and permanent written registration. Every house was locked and the syndic (government official) would retain the key with him, and no one was allowed to leave the town. If any individual tried to move, he would either die of the contagion or face the wrath of punishing authorities. The army surrounded the town, there were soldiers posted at every nook and corner. Observation towers were erected at the town gates. The syndic visits each and every house and does a roll call of its residents, who have to show their faces at the windows. In case, the latter do not respond, they will be suspected of harbouring the sick or the dead. Subsequently, the syndic would report to the intendents (holders of public administrative office) and magistrates who would control the medical treatment as well. The surveillance of the ‘pathological bodies’ was thus centralised.

 

Foucault refers to philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s design for a prison—Panopticon (1843), wherein ‘delinquent individuals’ are under surveillance. The panopticon is a tower present in some prisons, schools, hospitals and factories, which is used to keep a check on every individual. It is a situated in a ring-like formation. The central tower has large windows, facing the building surrounding it. The building encircling the tower has double sets of windows—one turned inwards and the other positioned on the outer side, enabling sunlight to illuminate the cell. Each cell in the building imprisons the delinquent (a lunatic, a criminal, a worker, etc.) and the sunlight flooding the cell reveals the imprisoned occupant to the gaze of the supervisor sitting in the tower. There is no protection from the latter’s gaze. An instance of the panopticon has been given below.

 

Foucault creates a foreboding picture when he describes the effect of the panopticon1. The individual is isolated, atomised and made conscious of being constantly watched, although he cannot pinpoint the exact moment when he is being watched. He states that ‘the individual is the 1http://prisonphotography. org/2010/08/21/stateville-prison-joliet-il-art-object/  object of information, but he is hardly the subject in communication’ [Sergiacomo, 2009:8]. Panopticon thus embodies the functioning of power. It is an efficient machine since while it enhanced the number of individuals under observation, it also drastically cut down on the number of supervisors required. Mills states that even if the supervisor is absent, the disciplinary gaze has been internalized by the individual under surveillance that he conforms to the laid out behavioural norms. These disciplinary techniques gradually were legitimated, cast in a positive light, particularly its propensity to train individuals.

 

Although Bentham’s Panopticon model never saw the light of the day, it did become generalised and permeated throughout other organisations. The state especially relied upon the police apparatus, which would render each individual visible while simultaneously remaining invisible [Sergiacomo, 2009:8]. Mills cites another example by referring to the use of closed circuit televisions/CCTVsin the streets of Britain whose presence and the notion that the police were watching discouraged crime. Closer home, activist groups like the Centre for Excellence for Protection of Human Rights in Cyberspace/CLPIC, have expressed concerns about the implementation of the Aadhar project. The project, which issues Unique Identity Number/UID to the citizens, claims to facilitate financial inclusion and targeted subsidy payments. The CLPIC however alleged that the project was the ‘digital panopticon’ of India and condemned it as a ruse for surveillance.

 

Rise of Prisons: Foucault also elucidates the remoulding of the institution of the prison in line with the new penal system, which brought together deprivation of freedom with the technical transformation of individuals’ [Sergiacomo, 2009:9]. The prison inheres alienation, routine and controlled conduct, and the modulation of penalty. As the prison registers, records and accumulates a mass of data about the criminal bodies, it is oriented towards not only enhancing efficiency and productivity, but to also ‘normalize’ the latter.

 

As an instance, he cites from a document dated to 1837, which states that delinquents in Paris have to undergo a regimented schedule. While they have to arise at six in the morning during winter and five in the summer, they have to sleep strictly at 9 o’clock during winter and at 8 o’clock during summers. They have to put in around nine hours of work and two hours every day, they have to sit for instructions. Victor Tadros (1998) states that discipline thus homogenises individuals through the activities conducted in the institutions. Foucault traces the complete institutionalisation of the penal system to the launching of the Mettray prison on 22 February 1840. The prison wardens were portrayed as technicians of behaviour and engineers of conduct who could foster ‘governable bodies’ [Sergiacomo, 2009:10]. Foucault points to a coterie of factors —- psychiatry, judicial apparatus and power of normalisation—   which facilitated the emergence of a body of knowledge, laced with power, targeted towards delinquents. This power-knowledge, in turn, was responsible for the metamorphosis of the erstwhile castigatory system into the penal system. The new development was not to retaliate against the crime, but to reform and rehabilitate the criminal. It was concerned about the  environment, heredity and parents’ actions that were perceived to be responsible for the criminal behaviour [Gutting, 2005:80].

 

Despite all these efforts geared towards efficiency, productivity and determent of illicit activity, the penal system has failed to do so and hence, continues to exist. Foucault recounts the failures— unable to diminish crime rate; unable to prevent lapses into criminal behaviour; unable to stop emergence of delinquents. On the contrary, the pushing of the criminals’ families towards the poverty trap only ends up increasing the number of delinquents. Prisons also tend to urge and forge future criminal deals by organizing the criminals. Even when the convicts leave the prison, the societal conditions are such that they are forced to resort to their previous illicit activities. However, it should be noted that the penitentiaries were not meant to eliminate the offences but were meant to distinguish and distribute them [Sergiacomo, 2009:10].

 

Foucault also criticises the courts’ penchant for handing definitive sentences to criminals, which disposes of their cases once and for all [James and Faubion, 2001:462]. He claims that the guilty charge against a criminal cannot be prolonged for a very long time and no individual is inherently dangerous. Foucault argues that the present judicial system tends to penalise very few crimes, such as industrial accidents, which are randomly determined. Moreover, few crimes that are committed are prosecuted like tax evasion, while ignoring the rest. He suggests that rather than simply fining and imprisoning delinquents, there can be other alternatives, such as public service. By imposing a set of obligations, it can ensure that there are constrains on the delinquents’ behaviour.

 

Gutting states that Foucault’s criticism of disciplinary penal system was also meant to contest the idea that the new system was a progressive, enlightened development. The idea of the new penal system was not to diminish punishment but to improve it.

 

Foucault clarifies later in an interview with A. Spire (1981) that rather than simply outlining the history of the penal and carceral system or simply criticising its problematic aspects, he wanted to attack the system of thought undergirding it. He wanted to challenge the supposed rationality of the idea that the prison is the most efficient institution to deal with crime. He dismisses the claim of the earlier reformers that the modern system of penalties that they were advocating was more humane, different from the earlier one. Rather, he argued, they had uncritically accepted the logic behind the earlier system and were only trying to figure out which institutions would best serve its purpose and help attain its ends.

 

Concept of Power and the Marginal: One may ask, how does discussing the details of modern penal systems help us? Foucault’s work on the penal system helps reveal the way power operates in the society. Parallel to the change in the system of punishment, there is a transition in the way power circulates. Earlier the king represented the nation and dispensed power from above, exhibited through public torture rituals, now power permeated the whole of society. Sara Mills (2003) states that Foucault’s work is focused on the functioning of power in the everyday relationship between the individual and social institutions, as well as on individuals’ conformity with or resistance against power. For Foucault, power is not a possession, assumed to be held by those dominant while those dominated attempt to extract it from the former. Power is also not imposition of the will of the powerful on subservient individuals. Rather, power is a strategy and is constantly performed. He says that ‘Individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application’ [Mills, 2003:50].

 

Gutting too states that Foucault does not give credit to any particular class or world historical factors for the rise of modern power. Rather, he claims that modern power, in the manner of genealogy, was the chance result of multiple, uncoordinated cases. Power permeates throughout society, and is dispensed through a number of micro-centres.

 

This sets Foucault’s work apart from earlier Marxist theorists, who held particular groups and institutions—the bourgeoisie, the central bank, the military high command and the government press— responsible for societal domination. They were convinced that by taking over these institutions and groups through a revolution, freedom is attainable. For instance, renowned Marxist theorist Louis Althusser (1984) had conceived of power in a one-dimensional manner, as emanating from the top downwards. The State represses individuals, who fall prey to its ideology.

 

However, Foucault contests that there are numerous centres of power that do not succumb to the revolution. He attacks the State apparatus of Soviet Union for changing leaders and yet, there is no destabilization of the hierarchies of the society like family, sexuality, the body, that exist in capitalist society. He says, “The State consists in the codification of a whole number of power relations which renders its functioning possible and. . . revolution is a different type of codification of the same relation. . ” [Mills, 2003:52]. Since the revolutionaries strive for a top to bottom, centralised control, their revolutions tend to be inclined towards totalitarianism. Rather than striving for global transformation, there should be a shift towards local politics. In addition, Marxist theorists evince faith in the permanence of the State, rendering them oblivious to the possible ruptures in power and hence, the potential for change. Foucault calls the State a ‘mythicised abstraction’, which is rather limited.

 

He puts forth the concept of the Marginal. The marginalised individuals and groups occupy an interesting position. While they are part of the same society as their non-marginalised counterparts, yet they are sidelined because of the values they hold are not in line with the latter or their welfare is not taken into consideration unlike the latter. For instance, homosexuals, migrant workers, prostitutes, etc. Gutting adds that to incorporate the marginalised into political programmes means a complete overthrow of our society’s core values need not be carried out, only some measure of reform is needed.

 

Foucault cautions that the politics of marginalisation may further marginalization since it may institute a spokesperson for them, thus muffling the voices of the marginalised. Hence, his group Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons, founded during the early 1970s, relied upon Foucault’s public intellectual status only to publicize the testimonies of prisoners. As such, Foucault’s conception of power acknowledges individuals, not as passive dupes but as active agents [Mills, 2003:49].

 

CRITICISM

 

Firstly, Foucault has been accused by Donnelly (1986) of not clarifying the process through which disciplinary practices of the prison get diffused throughout society.

 

Others were critical of his exposition of the role played by reformers for developing the prison during the 19th century. Foucault had argued that reformers, in their zeal for efficient control, ironically ended up giving rise to the very institution that they disapproved of. David Rothman and Michael Ignatieff however place the reformers at the heart of modern prison system and argue that they had mandated religious pedagogy in jail, feeding and clothing the inmates, their sanitation, etc.

 

Secondly, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault argued that there is no chance for resisting since power is inbuilt in us. This is contrary to Foucault’s work in History of Sexuality (1978), where he tried to transcend the conventional view of power as only constraining or suppressing of the powerless. Instead, repressive institutions could be productive and could engender novel kinds of behaviour. It is also unstable, has to be repeatedly sustained and hence, is amenable to resistance. As such, feminist theorist Sandra Bartky (1988) argued that Foucault appears to deny at times the challenges posed to control.

 

Thirdly, Foucault has been criticized by historians like Pieter Spienrenburg for misinterpreting the period and the reasons behind the ending of public execution. Spienrenburg (1978) dismisses the idea that the abolition was a singular event, arguing that it was a series of gradual steps towards privatizing punishment. He instead traces the end of public punitive system to as early as 1600, when judicial use of mutilation had considerably diminished in Europe.

 

Fourthly, D. Garland (1986) argues that with the exception of power and control, Foucault does not recognize the role played by any other value in the development of the penal system. The latter also appears to turn a blind eye to the ideological and political opposition to the new punishment system and the attempts to protect liberties. Garland also attacks him for exaggerating the extent of spread of the disciplinary practices, which remain bound by the legalistic, judicial framework. A completely disciplinary society is yet to be fully realized and remains at best, an ideal type.

 

Also, when it comes to local, anti-authority struggles, Foucault in an interview with Mike Gane (1986) had acknowledged that the subordinated may denigrate into violent and dictatorial power, and had not rejected such forms of popular justice. He claimed that given proper information and discussion, the need for retaliation among the masses can be better developed. However, Sara Mills criticizes that Foucault misjudged the situation, citing the example of backlash of mob justice against individuals accused of paedophilia, who were attacked outside courts in Britain in 2001. She argues that championing the power of proletarian groups, lynch mobs and murderers, individuals who have of their own volition disturbed society, is problematic.

 

In spite of all the criticisms levied against his work, Foucault’s work has elicited interest of feminists and other critical theorists, who have challenged the earlier theories about power which typically concentrated on the State, ideology or patriarchy since they are unable to explain the power relations between men and women. For instance, Judith Butler, a theorist working on issues of gender, power and identity, had incorporated Foucault’s work and had claimed that gender identity is always performed in specific contexts. Similarly, Foucault’s work on the panopticon has garnered interest from post-colonial theorists working on the colonial landscape. For instance, Mary Louis Pratt (1992) states that the British traveller, positioned on a hilltop, often surveyed the landscape and subsequently described it in great detail so that the colonial rulers could exploit it later.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Foucault recounts the transition from 17th century’s public spectacle of scaffold to the 18th century’s invisible disciplinary apparatus which is bent on classifying people according to the ‘appropriate social order’. The latter strives to attain, at the lowest cost, the maximum social power and the greatest utility of the elements in the system [Sergiacomo, 2009:8]. Foucault regards punishment in terms of power, as a political technology and also, as a political tactic.

 

There is a marked shift from arbitrary, sadistic backlash to less violent, but more invasive and pervasive psychological control. Unlike the earlier punishment system, there is no painful avenging but the effort to instil a change in altering the criminals’ psychological attitudes, with the hope for gaining greater control over their bodies. As Foucault puts it, “The soul is the prison of the body. . .

 

”[Gutting, 2005:81]. Mills states that Foucault’s discipline comprises of maintaining time, monitoring one’s own posture and bodily functions, repressing one’s desires and emotions, which she calls ‘discipline of the self by the self’. It is extremely internalised and naturalised and hence, resistance appears to be pointless.

 

Prisons, rooted in a disciplinary system that emerged amidst 18th and 19th centuries’ class conflicts, acted as strategies of domination. Through particular architectural configurations, constant observation and domination of the criminal bodies as well as documentation, they create the ‘knowable man’. By being rendered visible to scrutiny, not just criminals, but every other individual becomes the subject of modern power. By keeping a constant check on the individuals, one can mould their behaviour as desired and foster efficient conduct. Surveillance thus is a critical hub in the wheel of the production or labour process.

 

In addition, Foucault looks at power. He argues that power stems from a particular set of relations not between two parties, but from a system of relations pervading society. Also, individuals are not passive subjects of power, but are sites where the enactment of power can also be challenged. Foucault insists on the materiality of power relations at the local level and highlights how the individual negotiates with it.

 

Lastly, he offers an alternative to the modern power systems through the concept of the Marginal. He argues that political agenda should incorporate self-critique and appreciation of the Other [Gutting, 2005:90]. He also lauds localised anti-authority struggles, for springing up in response to the immediate conditions of their lives, attacking a specific form of power and not dwelling on larger forces of power.

In conclusion, Foucault’s Discipline and Punishis undoubtedly an influential piece of work and has immensely contributed to the fields of criminology, feminism, post-structuralist, post-modernist and post-colonial studies.

 

FURTHER READING

 

 

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