24 Class, Passive revolution and Indian Democracy

Varun Patil

Introduction

 

One of the most important topics of Indian political sociology has been to understand the transformation of India from feudal society to bourgeois industrial democracy. Within India there was a major debate on how this revolution was being accomplished. Many Marxist scholars like Sudipta Kavirajand Pranab Bardhan rejected the classical bourgeois framework of transition and argued instead that the Indian situation has taken the form of passive revolution framework, characterised by coalition rule and the relative autonomy of the state. In this module we will look at the emergence of this approach and the crucial insights it gave us for understanding Indian Politics and Society.

 

1. 1 Rejecting orthodox views of transition to capitalist democracy in India

 

The failure to enact a bourgeois revolution in post-independent India generated some major debates and revisions within the Marxist school in India.

 

Firstly, many scholars like Pranab Bardhan, Sudipta Kaviraj and Partha Chatterjee began to argue that we need to modify the classical Bourgeois revolution paradigm if we want to understand how the transformation towards capitalist democracy is occurring in India. In the dominant mainstream view, it was held that the development of capitalist relations in society leads to capital gaining hegemony which would eventually destroy feudal relations and establish parliamentary democracy. These scholars argued that instead of a bourgeois revolution what we were witnessing currently was a passive revolution. They looked to Gramsci to understand the complexities of transition of Indian society.

 

The term passive revolution was popularised by Antonio Gramsci as a situation where one in which the new claimants to power, lacking the social strength to launch a full scale assault on the old dominant class, opt for a path in which the demands of a new society are satisfied by small doses, legally in a reformist manner, in such a way that the political and economic positions of the old feudal classes are not destroyed, agrarian reform is avoided and most important the popular masses are prevented from going through the political experience of a fundamental social transformation (1971). Gramsci imbibed the term with at least two distinguishable and relatively separate meanings. The first indicated a revolution that was directed from above by elites, and occurred without the active participation of the masses. His second conceptual framework described a passive revolution as a long historical process involving a set of gradual “molecular changes” in society. Gramsci treated passive revolution as a ‘blocked dialectic’ and exception to the paradigmatic form of bourgeoisie revolution, which he takes to be that of Jacobinism. In his terms a “passive revolution” represented the apparently contradictory concept of a ‘revolution’ without a ‘revolution. Passive revolution thus seeks to conceptualise processes through which systemic transformations are achieved by non-revolutionary means. It describes the means by which a dominant group maintains hegemony by incorporating forces which potentially threaten its dominance. The state is modernized without undergoing a political revolution, or having passed through a “revolution without revolution”: those who are disempowered remain so. Contrary to what happens in a real or active revolution, however, – in a passive revolution no fundamental restructuring of social relations takes place. Hence, the term passive revolution refers to a political process that is reformist in nature. Such a process according to Gramsci can either be steered by a liberal party, or by a fascist political force.

 

Applying the Gramscian framework many scholars pointed out that the basis of ‘blocked dialectic’ lies in the inability of Indian nationalist movement to create a bourgeois revolution in India (see Kaviraj 1988, Chatterjee 1993). That the rise of anti-colonial nationalism resulted in the nationalist bourgeoisie establishing hegemony and speaking on behalf of all the nation’s citizens, but it did not result in profound social or political change. Sudipta Kaviraj (1988) argues that leading elites created a passive revolution because of their refusal to mobilize the Indian population for a radical program of reform. He notes how “in principle, ” feudal and conservative resistance could have been overcome if the Indian National Congress or INC had been willing to encourage popular action by using the levels of mass mobilization already achieved in 1945- 1947 for the radical purposes in their stated aims.

 

For a thorough-going bourgeois revolution to be effected, for industrialisation to take place, a domestic market must be built up by reducing poverty in the countryside. This can only be done by effective land reforms, which have been legislated but never effectively implemented because of the influence of landed interests in the coalition of ruling classes. Beyond removing the larger parasitic landlords, land reforms were carried out indifferently, and though the size of the propertied class expanded, land ownership remained largely confined to local dominant castes. The programme of serious bourgeois land reforms was abandoned through a combination of feudal resistance, judicial conservatism and connivance of state Congress leaderships. The entire planning process until the 1980s has therefore been an exercise in trying to promote industrialisation without the radical transformation of agriculture.

 

Efforts to develop and democratize local institutions for community development and democratization, such as village councils and cooperatives, were also defeated by elite capture. In sum, the state enmeshed itself in a matrix of accommodations and patronage networks and thus undermined its ability to pursue transformative projects, including the extension of public legality to rural areas. While this mode of engagement of society did provide a basic framework for political order, it failed to build institutionally robust arenas of civic associationalism and severely curtailed both the instrumental and the authoritative  efficacy of the state. To borrow a phrase from Gramsci, the state-cum-Congress could rule, but it could not lead. Secondly there was also a rejection of traditional Marxist frame works of state studies because it was felt that they tended to reduce politics to societal variables. In general, both earlier Liberal and orthodox Marxist theories focused on social determinants of political process, like level of economic development and detracting attention from the state, a significant agent in shaping and moulding political social process. Early Marxist narratives seriously underestimated the significance of the political functions of the state, and continued to view the state as merely an expression of class relations rather than a terrain, sometimes an independent actor in the power process (Kaviraj, 1988: 2431). Most Indian scholars were dissatisfied with this structuralist and economist accounts of Indian politics. They wanted to emphasise the constitutive role of the political. It was felt that the persistence of instability since the 1970s could only be explained as a larger problem of political crisis.

 

Sudipta Kaviraj (1988) argued that while structuralist analysis was important this was not enough and that we needed to look closely at the actual actors and tactics by which reproduction of hegemony of capital is occurring in India. Kaviraj argued that the transition story would also have to be constructed in terms of actual political actors, suspending the question of more fundamental causalities for the time being. That it must be also told in terms of governments, parties, tactics, leaders, political movements, and-similar contingent but irreplaceable elements of political narratives. The (capitalist) dominance over the society is achieved through the practices of governance, which according to Kaviraj, ‘refers to the process of actual policy decisions within the apparatuses of the state’ (1988). Such a control is achieved through a ‘coalitional strategy carried out partly through the state-directed process of economic growth, partly through the allocational necessities indicated by the bourgeois democratic political system’ (ibid: 2431).

 

Finally it was felt that there was a need to reject the euro-centrism of both orthodox Marxism and Liberalism and instead embrace the unique trajectory of modernity in post-colonial societies. Kaviraj (2010a, 2010b) formulated ‘modernity’ as a set of processes that can follow different sequences in different societies and at different historical conjunctures. This unique trajectory could not but affect the character of both democracy and capitalism in different societies.

 

 

Kaviraj (2010a) argued that this difference in sequence of modernity was all important to understand the transformation of Indian society and the political crisis afflicting the state. He argued that while in the west the processes of modernity stabilised themselves before the pressures for democracy began, in India it played out differently. Capitalization emerged first and then democracy arrived in Europe which was able to cohere around that. But, if democracy had predated, it may have hindered or even stop Capitalism. Precisely because

 

Western modernity followed the sequence it did, it could produce both a ‘disciplined’ labour force (steeped in a new, productive, capitalist work-ethic) as well as a body of autonomous, self-determining individuals so crucial to the production of the ‘citizen’, before the onset of democracy.

 

The fact that both democracy and a liberal discourse of rights appear in the post-colony, prior to capitalist industrialization and ‘individuation’ but alongside an emergent anticolonial nationalism, has far-reaching consequences for both, the nature of its democracy and its capitalist development. Capitalism in the ‘peripheries’ is confronted by democracy and the avenues of protest and struggle that it has made available. It no longer has the means available to ‘discipline’ and ‘normalize’ the working class into the new work ethic through brutal laws on ‘vagrancy’ and ‘vagabondage’, as it did in, say England. It has had to face an organized working class movement almost from the very early stages of capitalist development in India, for instance. As such, we have the existence of trade unions and a labour movement from the very early years of capitalism in India. The capacity of Indian capitalism to produce a disciplined working class was therefore extremely limited from the start.

 

Equally importantly, it had to face growing opposition from ecological movements that make the wholesale uprooting of agricultural populations far more difficult than was possible in say seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. As the instances of recent struggles show, its capacity to ruthlessly tear apart the traditional agricultural communities from their land and throw them into an urban labour market are, likewise, very limited (Kaviraj: 1988). Despite two centuries of colonial rule and over a century of laws like the Land Acquisition Act (1894), India at the beginning of the twenty-first century remains largely an agricultural country.

 

1. 2 Characteristic features of Indian Passive Revolution

 

The critical Marxist scholars argued that the transition to capitalist democracy in India shows two important unique characteristics.

 

Firstly they argued that since capital is not hegemonic in society, power is exercised in the form of a coalition, containing three elements: monopoly bourgeoisie, landed elite, and bureaucratic managerial elite (Kaviraj 1988, Bardhan 1984). Thus the Indian capitalist class exercises its control over society neither through a moral-cultural hegemony of the Gramscian type, nor a simple coercive strategy on the lines of satellite states of the third world. The nature of class power in Indian society is such that capital is not independently dominant in Indian society and state. Power had to be shared between the dominant classes because no one class had the ability to exercise hegemony on its own (Kaviraj, 1988: 2430). Kaviraj also argued that the nature of the coalition (and not just its composition) was also different from traditional Marxist accounts of the ruling coalition. The latter were inadequate because they saw the bureaucratic elite as being too straightforwardly subordinated to the power of the bourgeoisie, and saw what was basically a coalitional and bargaining relation as a purely instrumental one. The key point was that the coalition was not an effect or an accidental attribute of a dominance which is otherwise adequate; it is its condition (Kaviraj, 1988). Thus the contradictions between the interests of fractions of the ruling classes are as crucial in determining state policy as are the contradictions between the ruling class and the ruled.

 

Some scholars like Kaviraj also argued that despite its weakness capital exercised the directive function in the coalition. By its nature, it is the only truly universalising element in the ruling bloc: among the ruling groups, the bourgeoisie alone can develop a coherent, internally flexible development doctrine (Kaviraj, 1988). Pre-capitalist elements have not had an alternative coherent programme to offer; their efforts have been restricted mainly to slowing down capitalist transition, and ensuring comfortable survival plans for their own class. The bourgeoisie thus does exercise a leadership function in this coalition because the non-capitalist sectors and types of production in the economy have been subsumed, economically and politically, under the logic of capital. Several scholars like Ashutosh Varshney (1995), Achin Vanaik(1990) and Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), however emphasized the growing political clout of the rich farmers or agrarian capitalists within the dominant coalition.

 

The coalition was based on an explicit or implicit protocol, a network of policies, rights, immunities derived from both constitutional and ordinary law which sets out over a long period, the terms of this coalition and its manner of distribution of advantages (Kaviraj: 2431). The “sharing” of power was a process of ceaseless push and pull, with one class gaining a relative ascendancy at one point, only to lose it at another. If any of these classes is seriously dissatisfied and leaves the ruling bloc that not only alters the structure of the coalition, but threatens it with political disaster. Kaviraj (1988) argued that the choices of any political moves have real effects on the internal politics of the ruling bloc. If a common ‘objective, say, in industrial policy, can be achieved by three differently worked out policy options, x, y, z, their preference for these options would be often differently ranked by different components of the ruling bloc (ibid). These would result in different states of distribution of long-term and short-term benefits, and among these benefits very often figures the purely political strategic advantages of having a favourable format of procedure of decision. Economic plans led to some serious shifts in the internal power distribution of the society, though primarily within the elements of the ruling bloc itself.

 

Thus for example insistent requirements of capitalist development under Nehru’s regime threatened to infringe that agreement within the protocol of coalition (Kaviraj, 1988). Nehru’s policy initiatives in the late fifties and early sixties led to a double process of polarisation in politics. Government initiatives in three interrelated areas-creation of heavy industries in the public sector, increasing reliance on Soviet assistance in their construction, and the pressure from the planning element in government for changes in the agrarian sector towards co- operativisation led to sharp criticisms of the Congress. These Nehruvian policies, came under strong fire from a panicking combine of representatives of proprietary classes. Congress’ industrial policies were interpreted as the thin end of the socialist stick; land reform proposals, shamefully mild and solidly bourgeois, appeared to the other classes of coalition as a programme of an agrarian revolution from above; the public sector intended merely to displace the centre of control towards the state was seen as an attack on private enterprise (Kaviraj, 1988). Grievance against industrial policy and related issues led to the formation of a Swatantra party; but more significant changes happened in the rural political scene (ibid: 2436). There was a large scale exodus of farmer support from the Congress, and formation of regional farmer’s groupings.

 

The second important feature of passive revolution in India was the relative autonomy of the state as a whole from the bourgeoisie and the landed elites. It is important to see the managerial-bureaucratic elites as major participants in the structure and dynamics of political dominance: they do not merely participate in enjoying the fruits of political dominance, but at significant decisional moments play a major strategic and directive role among the dominant classes (Kaviraj, 1988: 2431). Although not bourgeois in a direct productive sense, culturally and ideologically it was strongly affiliated to the bourgeois order. This class was, even before independence, as some historical works show, the repository of the bourgeoisie’s’ political intelligence’ working out a ‘theory’ of development for Indian capitalism, often ‘correcting’ more intensely selfish objectives of the monopoly elements by giving them a more reformist and universal form. It is not only true that they mediate between the ruling coalition and the other classes, they also mediate crucially between the classes within the ruling coalition themselves. They also provide the theory and the institutional drive for bourgeois rule.

 

Kaviraj (1988) argued that the relative autonomy of the Indian state from the ruling classes, occurred for two reasons. One, as with other post-colonial societies, the Indian state at independence inherited a vast and well-developed state apparatus, that is, a civil and military bureaucracy, which had served the colonial purpose. Thus the state had the potential to be more than merely an ‘instrument of the ruling class’, a potential further enhanced by the fact that colonial policies had resulted in a comparatively weak and unstable bourgeoisie which is incapable of controlling the state apparatus on its own. Another was that since the bourgeoisie is weak and capital resources low, the state was the only agency at independence that could draw together scarce capital resources and invest these in basic infrastructural areas which need large initial investments and yield slow profits. Kaviraj argued that capital on its own cannot expand through market transactions and, therefore, depended on ‘the legitimized directive mechanisms of the state’. For in the growth of a late capitalism like the Indian one, the social form of capitalism itself realises that the state is a historical pre-condition for much of its economic endeavours and for its political security.

The state thus ensured the domination of the bourgeoisie and helped in capitalist reproduction and to subordinate reproduction of other types of economic relations by imposing on the economy a deliberate order of capitalist planning. Those directive functions that capital, cannot perform through the market (either because the market is imperfect or not powerful enough, or because such tasks cannot be performed by market pressures) the bourgeois forms through the legitimised directive mechanisms of the state (Kaviraj, 1988: 2430). Thus the ruling elite adopted a plan for heavy industrialisation and institutional control of capital goods industries through the state sector, a largely untried experiment at the, time in the underdeveloped countries. The government policy was aimed at encouraging import substituting industrialisation, quantitative trade restrictions providing automatically” protected domestic markets, and of running a large public sector providing capital goods, intermediate products and artificially low prices. Sincethe mid-fifties, the government also created several public lending institutions, loans from which form the predominant source of private industrial finance.

 

1. 3 The crisis of the passive revolution processing the 1980’s

 

Increasingly in the 1980’s many critical Marxist scholars felt that the passive revolution in India was in a crisis and beset with deeper contradictions. They argued that this was mainly a result of the crisis of the political, the failure of state and political parties to manage the contradictions of the ruling class and carry out a transition towards capitalist democracy. This crisis had many dimensions and causes.

 

Firstly there was an abandonment of state development planning to enact the transition towards capitalist democracy. An orchestration of pressures-from both internal and external reaction-created a situation in which the Nehruvian plan for a reformist capitalism with its policies of public sector, state control over resources, planning, a relatively anti-imperialist foreign policy were all renegotiated (Kaviraj: 1988). Indira Gandhi’s government initially gave in to some of these pressures, its most celebrated collapse being the acceptance of devaluation of the rupee. There was a gradual decline of emphasis on planning and the policy of large public investments. The subsequent regimes after Indira Gandhi also gradually abandoned the element of historical thinking of agrarian transformation as a matter of dispensable luxury and went for what it rationalised to itself as a more pragmatic programme (Kaviraj, 1988: 2439). It reduced even the planning apparatus, entrusted by Nehru with the task of such serious long-term developmental reflection, to more short-term accounting, though depending on its statistical ability to turn the poverty of the people into the wealth of the nation. Gradually the government allowed a massive campaign to gain momentum for privatisation of industry and other economic activities, reducing public investment, altering the nature of the investment where it still existed.

 

Secondly, there was a persistent crisis in centre-state relations resulting in a climate of political instability (Kaviraj, 1988: 2440). Under Indira Gandhi, the regional-centre situationchanged drastically. Increasing pressures were mounted now for regional allocation of heavy industries and other such symbols of regional prestige. The regionalism that threatened to engulf the polity was quite clearly a consequence of the inequities of the capitalist growth process (Kaviraj, 1988: 2441). Governments have been consistently inattentive to regional economic in-equality inherited from the colonial period. Capitalist development intensified these imbalances even further. Nowhere is this revealed more than in the internal incompatibility between regional demands according to Kaviraj. Regionalism in Punjab is essentially an anti-redistributive agitation which insists on retaining and extending the economic advantage of the state, particularly of the farmers, over other states, regions and classes. The Assam agitation presses what are, in essence, redistributive demands on the central government; and the two kinds of demands are un-composable. The centre also played up regional demands with an incredible short sightedness. Thirdly there was an excessive favouring of Industrial bourgeoisie rather than slowly building up capitalist economy. An elaborate scheme of industrial and import licences were allowed to be turned to the advantage of the industrial and commercial having better ‘connections’ and better access, have got away with the lion share in the bureaucratic allocations of the lines thus pre-empting capacity creation and sheltering oligopolistic profits. This helped create what would be remembered as the dreaded ‘licence raj’ system, contributing to further crisis in governability.

 

Fourthly there was an embrace of populism and plebiscitary democracy than resort to the battle of ideologies and coherent socio-political programs. The Congress government under Indira Gandhi gradually allowed a profitable break down of bourgeois frameworks of formal propriety since they were occasionally inconvenient en-cumbrances in its path. In bourgeois political systems, there must be a reliable relation between the structure of classes and the format of parties. Abandonment of ideological politics by the ruling party and cheerful retaliatory imitation by opposition groups causes this relation to break down through defection, bending of constitutional norms, etc.

 

Fifthly there was an increasing personalisation of power and weakening of democratic institutions which created a governability crisis. Ceremonial leadership of the Congress party became a redundant function: either Indira Gandhi herself was the leader, but she derived her legitimacy from being the premier; or when it was someone else, his position was purely decorative. This development implied the destruction of one of the checks within the Nehruvian structure: the party could often balance the governmental wing. Except for the times of elections, Indira Gandhi ran what could be ironically called a party less government, in which, symbolically, some of her minor office functionaries assumed more importance in terms of access, timing, powers of facilitating and delaying decisions than senior party leaders (Kaviraj: 1988).

 

1. 4 Revising the Passive revolution and class framework for contemporary times

 

In the 1990’s India entered into a period of liberalisation and globalisation which had a major impact on the state and class structure of society. Partha Chatterjee argues that in this changed context it has become important to revisit the question of the basic structures of power in Indian society. He argued that though the framework of passive revolution is still valid for India, its structure and dynamic have undergone a change.

 

Firstly he says there is a distinct ascendancy in the relative power of the corporate capitalist class as compared to the landed elites (Chatterjee, 2008). Capital has come to acquire a position of moral-political hegemony over civil society, consisting principally of the urban middle classes. It exercises its considerable influence over both the central and the state governments not through electoral mobilization of political parties and movements but largely through the bureaucratic-managerial class, the increasingly influential print and visual media, and the judiciary and other independent regulatory bodies. The dominance of the capitalist class within the state structure as a whole can be inferred from the virtual consensus among all major political parties about the priorities of rapid economic growth led by private investment, both domestic and foreign. It is striking that even the CPI (M) in West Bengal, and slightly more ambiguously in Kerala, have, in practice if not in theory, joined this consensus.

 

Secondly it seems that the transition narrative underpinning passive revolution is being questioned. Chatterjee (2008), building from Kalyan Sanyal, argues that capital and state rather than moving towards completely displacing peasantry towards labour market in cities have taken a much more complex position of simultaneously unleashing primitive accumulation as well as measures to counter it. There is primitive accumulation as well as a parallel process of the reversal of the effects of primitive accumulation. Thus we have a curious process in which, on the one side, primary producers such as peasants, craftspeople and petty manufacturers lose their land and other means of production, but, on the other, are also provided by governmental agencies with the conditions for meeting their basic needs of livelihood.

 

Chatterjee argues that the unity of the state system as a whole is now maintained by relating civil society to political society through the logic of reversal of the effects of primitive accumulation. Once this logic is recognised by the bourgeoisie as a necessary political condition for the continued rapid growth of corporate capital, the state, with its mechanisms of electoral democracy, becomes the field for the political negotiation of demands for the transfer of resources, through fiscal and other means, from the accumulation economy to governmental programmes aimed at providing the livelihood needs of the poor and the marginalized. The autonomy of the state, and that of the bureaucracy, now lies in their power to adjudicate the quantum and form of transfer of resources to the so-called “social sector of expenditure”. Ideological differences, such as those between the Right and the Left, for instance, are largely about the amount and modalities of social sector expenditure, such as poverty removal programmes (Chatterjee 2008).

 

Chatterjee thus argues that the social changes that are brought about cannot be understood as a transition to capitalist democracy. To the extent that capitalist democracy as established in Western Europe or North America served as the normative standard of bourgeois revolution, discussions of passive revolution in India carried with them the sense of a transitional system – from pre-colonial and colonial regimes to some yet-to-be-defined authentic modernity. However the changes introduced since the 1990s seem to have abandoned this narrative of transition.

 

Thirdly although the state continues to be the most important mediating apparatus in negotiating between conflicting classes interests, the autonomy of the state in relation to the dominant classes appears to have been redefined. Crucially, the earlier role of the bureaucratic-managerial class, or more generally of the urban middle classes, in leading and operating, both socially and ideologically, the autonomous interventionist activities of the developmental state has significantly weakened. There is a strong ideological tendency among the urban middle classes today to view the state apparatus as ridden with corruption, inefficiency and populist political venality and a much greater social acceptance of the professionalism and commitment to growth and efficiency of the corporate capitalist sector.

 

Chatterjee (2008) says these changes do not mean that there is now a convergence of the Indian political system with the classical models of capitalist democracy. The critical difference, he points out, has been produced by a split in the field of the political between a domain of properly constituted civil society and a more ill-defined and contingently activated domain of political society.

 

For Chatterjee civil society in India today, peopled largely by the urban middle classes, is the sphere that seeks to be congruent with the normative models of bourgeois civil society and represents the domain of capitalist hegemony. If this were the only relevant political domain, then India today would probably be indistinguishable from other Western capitalist democracies. But there is the other domain of political society which includes large sections of the rural population and the urban poor. These people do, of course, have the formal status of citizens and can exercise their franchise as an instrument of political bargaining. But they do not relate to the organs of the state in the same way that the middle classes do, nor do governmental agencies treat them as proper citizens belonging to civil society. Those in political society make their claims on government, and in turn are governed, not within the framework of stable constitutionally defined rights and laws, but rather through temporary, contextual and unstable arrangements arrived at through direct political negotiations (Chatterjee, 2004). Thus the practices of the state also include the large range of governmental activities in political society. Here there are locally dominant interests, such as those of landed elites, small producers and local traders, who are able to exercise political influence through their powers of electoral mobilization. The latter domain, which represents the vast bulk of democratic politics in India, is not under the moral-political leadership of the capitalist class.

 

Further reading

 

  • Bardhan, Pranab. (1984). The Political Economy of Development in India. Oxford University Press.
  • Chatterjee, Partha. (1993). The Nation and its fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories.
  • Princeton University Press, Princeton. —-(2004). The Politics of the Governed. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • —-(2008). Democracy and Economic Transformation in India. Economic & Political Weekly April 19.
  • GramsciAntonio. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. eds. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowel Smith. New York: International Publishers.
  • Kaviraj Sudipta. (1988). A Critique of the Passive Revolution. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 45/47. —-(2010a). The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas. New York: Columbia University Press.—-(2010b). The Trajectories of the Indian State: Politics and Ideas. Permanent Black.
  • Rudolph and Rudolph. 1987. In Pursuit of Lakshmi:The Political Economy of the Indian State.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Sanyal   Kalyan.   (2007).     Rethinking   Capitalist    Development:   Primitive   Accumulation,Governmentality and Post-Colonial Capitalism. New Delhi: RoutledgeVanaik Achin. (1990). The Painful Transition: Bourgeois Democracy in India. London: Verso.
  • VarshneyAshutosh. (1995). Democracy, Development and the Countryside:Urban-Rural Struggles in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

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