30 Regionalism, Self Determination and Ethnic Chauvinism

Apoorva Gautam

Regionalism, Self Determination and Ethnic Chauvinism

 

 

Since the time of its inception, the union of India has had a particular history and politics, with diverse regions, linguistic groups and cultures keeping their distinction while being under the sovereignty of the nation-state. Time and again, movements that have demanded varying degrees of autonomy within or from India have emerged and followed trajectories of negotiations and sometimes even armed resistance (2014). On one end of the spectrum are movements which have demanded some degrees of regional autonomy, redrawing of state boundaries, etc. through a non-violent process. On the other end are movements that have demanded secession from India and these movements have, in parts, been armed struggles between regional groups and the Indian government. The autonomy movements in Kashmir, Nagaland and Punjab are case in point.

 

At the heart of these struggles are aspirations of groups of people to determine their political futures. These struggles reinforce the fact that India is actually a collection of diverse political identities and smaller nationalities. This sets apart a nation like India from its western counterparts where cultural and linguistic homogeneity has been crucial to the nation-building process. This also means that certain movements for regional autonomy, especially as they take a violent turn, are perceived as threats to ‘national unity’ (2014). At the same time, the diversity of culture, history and languages is sometimes so immense and powerful that suppressing such struggles becomes the actual threat to democratic principles inherent in the Indian constitution.

 

Regional aspirations demanding autonomy of varying degrees have been a part of India’s postcolonial history right from the beginning. The State Reorganisation Commission, which ultimately resulted in a parliamentary act by the same name in 1956, is itself testimony to these struggles and processes. At the time of independence, India was divided into regions under British control and several smaller princely states. In its first version, India was divided into fourteen states and six union territories, some which had reorganised boundaries. Goa was still under Portuguese rule and became a part of India only in 1961. After the language movements of the 50s and 60s, newer boundaries between states were drawn, for example, Maharashtra and Gujarat were carved out as separate states. The boundaries of the North Eastern states were redrawn several times and with differing degrees of autonomy. This history is important in understanding that the operation of democracy and integration of the nation are not pre-given but dynamic processes which are testimony to the fact that nations themselves are always in the making.

 

In this light, regionalism is actually a term capturing various kinds of political movements. Some of them demand separate territory within the nation, thereby exercising political autonomy within the structure of the nation state, but separate from the larger regions which seems to marginalise and deprive the region seeking the status of a separate state, as in the case of Telangana, Jharkhand, etc. Then there are movements for autonomy that are rooted in mobilisation ethnic identities, based on which ‘outsiders’ to the region are identified as responsible for the marginalisation of this region. Political autonomy which gives power to the ‘original inhabitants’ (also a form of ethnic chauvinism) is demanded so that the local can benefit materially. There also are movements demanding separation from India. These movements see their region and its people as forcibly under the control of the Indian nation. The political and socio-economic liberation of people is then sought in the formation of a new, separate nation.

 

In the following sections, we will briefly look at various movements for regional and political autonomy that have marked the history of independent India. We will look at movements that have demanded a separate state and or territorial autonomy at the regional level as in the case of Telangana. We will look at movements where the demand has been autonomy and political control along ethnic lines and against ‘outsiders’, as in the case of Assam movement. Lastly, we will look at movements for secession or self-determination which have undergone various mutations and negotiations through the example of Kashmir. In each of these movements, we will go over a brief history of the socio-political context within which these movements emerged, we will look at the demands they made and also the changes within them, and finally we will try to understand where these movements stand in the present context. It must be stated at the outset that all these movements have complex histories and it is nearly impossible to do justice to all the aspects of the story.

 

I.    Movements for regional autonomy: Telangana

 

Regionalism, as mentioned earlier, reflects the aspiration of a region to gain more political power within a larger political entity like a nation. This could be materialised by carving out a new state or autonomous areas or other such political and administrative bodies. In India, based on the report submitted by State Reorganisation Commission in 1955, the first phase of large scale reorganisation of state boundaries was implemented in 1956. Since then many changes and further reorganisations have resulted in India having 29 states, 7 union territories and several autonomous districts with varying degrees of autonomy in Manipur, Assam, Tripura, etc. like the Bodoland Territorial Area District in Assam. For a better understanding of these processes, one could look at Majeed Akhtar’s Regionalism: Developmental Tensions in India (1984), Louise Tillin’sRemapping India: New States and Their Political Origins (2013) and the SudhaPai’s (ed) Handbook of Politics in Indian States: Regions, Parties and Economic Reforms (2013).

 

In these on-going processes of state reorganisation, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand were formed in 2000 and the most newly formed state in India is Telangana, which has had a long history of a movement for autonomy. Often at the heart of such struggles is an experience of economic and social deprivation and marginalisation of the region. The politics of regionalism will be discussed through the example of the Telangana movement.

 

The history of the movement for the formation of Telangana state is rooted in a history that precedes colonial rule, even as it located in present day economic and social factors. The present day region of Telangana came under the princely state of Hyderabad. The Nizam, operating through the Deshmukhs, who were both landlords and moneylenders, had instituted a highly oppressive system of agrarian labour. Reeling under its effect and inspired by a cultural identity of the people of Telangana that was fomenting, thousands of people revolted against the rule of Nizam from 1948-51. The movement was led by the Communist Party of India (Ram; 2007). Finally, the Nizam, who so far was refusing to accede to India, signed the instrument of accession based on the condition that the Indian army be called in to crush the revolt. The movement was crushed in 1951 and Telangana became a part of India and got integrated with the Telugu speaking Andhra region (Ram; 2007). While the communist history of the Telangana movement had long been removed from the discourse, the demand for a separate state continued to be based in terms of economic deprivation of the region of Telangana within the larger Andhra region.

 

From 1952 onwards, agitations against non-mulkis (outsiders) began which highlighted the abysmal treatment of the people from Telangana by officials and administrative bodies run by people from coastal Andhra and districts which were part of the Madras Presidency. This agitation turned towards a programme for state reorganisation. In the 1953 State Reorganisation Commission of the Indian government, leaders from Congress and socialist parties opposed the formation of larger Andhra state, Vishalandhra. While the commission recommended the autonomy of the Telangana state, the powerful lobby of Andhra leaders ensured that Telangana stayed within Andhra. The Andhra leaders wanted the Telangana region to be a conduit in the economic growth of the entire state while the proponents of Telangana felt that their educational and economic backwardness will be further exploited in this larger formation. However for many infrastructure and development related issues in Telangana, regional committees were formed (Ram; 2007).

 

These eventually lost their power and from 1968 onwards, the demand for a separate state re-emerged. Over these years and in the future as well, the rich farmers from Andhra emerged as a powerful class, directing resources, particularly irrigation related, toward themselves. Tank irrigation declined in Telangana and dependence on pumps (and therefore on electricity) increased. In coastal Andhra, on the other hand, irrigation facilities were hoarded along with the benefits of the Krishna-Godavari basin (Ram; 2007). The culture and dialect of the Telangana region also suffered in this long period.

 

The movement for a separate state eventually consolidated under Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS), which came into existence in 2001. After decades of agitation, strikes and deaths, in 2013 a resolution was passed in the parliament for the formation of a separate Telangana state which finally came into existence on 2nd June 2014. K Chandrashekhar Rao of TRS became the first Chief Minister. The state has retained Hyderabad as the capital. The formation of the new state is too recent to comment upon the changes that might have taken place for the people of Telangana, however the history of marginalisation and agrarian distress pose urgent questions.

 

II.     Ethnic politics and regional aspirations: Assam

 

The tying up of ethnic origins with regional politics, often termed as ‘sons of the soil’ mobilisations, presents a situation where claims over authentic belongingness are pitched against influx of outsiders. And these outsiders are argued to be responsible for the economic and social marginalisation of the ‘original’ inhabitants on the region. This kind of politics, in the case of Shiv Sena politics in Bombay, saw itself within the federal structure of the nation. The Assam movement however reached a phase where separation from India also got raised as a demand. The politics of ethnic chauvinism and its tying up with aspirations of regional autonomy will be discussed through the example of the Assam movement. Some texts which can help understand this kind of politics are: Thomas BlomHansen’s Wages of Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay (2001) and Sanjib Baruah’s India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality (1999).

 

While several regional movement express a discontent towards ‘outsiders’, few have risen to the scale and violence of the Assam (Asom/ Axom) movement. Starting in 1979 under the banner of All Assam Students Union (a non-party students group), the movement right from its inception pitted itself against ‘outsiders’, mostly identified as ‘illegal immigrants’ from Bangladesh who were supposedly hijacking resources of the state, which was suffering from widespread poverty and unemployment despite being in rich in resources like oil and coal and a long history of tea plantations (2014).

 

The complex ethnic composition and long history of migration makes Assam quite the opposite of the homogenous entity of Asomiya/ Axomiya nationalism which the movement tried to present in its opposition to ‘illegal immigrants’ assumed mostly to be coming from Bangladesh. Assam is made of various tribal and caste groups. There are Assamese in many parts of upper Assam, Bengalis in lower Assam, plains tribes like Bodos, Cachars, Tiwas, KochRajbanshis, etc. some of whom have assimilated into the Assamese identity while others maintain their separate identities. Tea plantation owners had brought in labourers from Chhotanagpur region from Oraon, Santhal and other such communities who have lived in Assam for many decades now. Several Muslim peasants came from parts of East Bengal to work for Assamese landlord. The Brahmaputra valley was in some senses consolidated under the Ahom kingdom, which largely consolidated only in the 17th century, even though they came and began taking establishing themselves from 12th century onwards. They were never the rulers of all of Assam, especially when it came to many of the tribal groups. These Ahom rulers also maintained many cultural ties with mainland India and converted to Hinduism. This detour into the ethnic history of Assam is important because it is the claims to a unified history of Assam (under the Ahoms) that became the rhetoric for excluding ‘outsiders’ (Srikanth; 2000).

 

During the post-partition communal riots, many Bengali Hindus sought shelter in Assam, neighbouring East Pakistan. During the Bangladesh liberation war, Bengali Muslims similarly came to Assam, seeking a way out of violence. It is this group that was made the target of the anti-outsider movement, against which an ethic unity of the Assamese people was mobilised. The agitation peaked from 1979 onwards and regular agitations, strikes and violence became a part of everyday life. Before this period, the economic failures of the government were already being used by the Assamese middle class to whip up an anti-Bengali sentiment. The most horrific event of this movement, and perhaps one of the most horrific ones in the country, was the Nellie massacre of 1983 when AASU had called for a boycott of state elections. Many people of Bangladeshi origin were promised voting rights by the Indira Gandhi government. Accusing this group of defying the boycott, around 2200 Muslims (by conservative estimates) were killed in span of 6-7 hours1. It is claimed that Tiwas, one of the plains tribes, who were assimilated into the Assamese fold, carried out this massacre (Srikanth; 2000). In 1985, the Rajiv Gandhi government signed the Assam Accord which had provisions for ‘securing’ the ethnic population of the state from ‘encroachment’ by outsiders. By this time,along with AASU, a political party by the name of Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) had in some ways taken the lead of the movement. After the Accord, they won the 1986 elections. However, not much changed in the lives of Assamese people. Another outfit, which had emerged during this period, was the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). This came from a radical group within the Assam movement which took a militant form and “tried to direct the movement against the Indian state. Many Assamese intellectuals lent support to the movement, justifying it on grounds of nationality, federalism and internal colonialism” (Srikanth; 2000: 4121).

 

 

1 nchro.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6610:it-is-26-years-since-nellie-massacre-victims-still-await-justice-&catid=12:stateviolations&Itemid=7

National Confederation of Human Rights Organisations (NCHRO)

 

While initially finding support in the AGP, slowly ULFA lost its base among Assamese people due to its activities which were turned into large scale extortion, kidnapping, murders and acts of terrorism. A counter-insurgency outfit of surrendered ULFA militants, SULFA, was eventually found to be doing pretty much the same. This also became the starting point for militant groups in the name of the various communities of Assam, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), Karbi National Volunteers, etc. Eventually, with counter-terrorism operations, ULFA was brought to the negotiation table except one faction of it. However, this entire history has not only turned the various ethnicities, which were claimed to be unified under the Assamese banner, against each other, it has also set grounds for the continuing marginalisation of Bengali Muslims. The Indian state, against which the movement was pitched at one point of time, has not given much of recourse except military operations and electoral alliances. The economic conditions of the people remain deprived, no matter what community they come from. For many commentators, the anti-outsider movement was a sentiment that was whipped up by the middle class which has now created only more ‘others’. The root cause of the issues which gave rise to the movement and its militant phase remain unaddressed (Srikanth; 2000).

 

III.     Political Autonomy and Self Determination

 

In its ultimate form, movements for regional autonomy have also taken the form of demands for a separate nation. The Nagas, since before the independence of India, had demanded a separate nation. The Khalistan movement of 1980s also made such a demand for a few years. Here the question of nationality takes precedence, going beyond autonomy within the federal  structure of a nation, and historical, economic and socio-cultural factors together shape the demand of a separate national identity. Movements for self-determination in India have all taken a violent turn at some point. Armed conflict between groups demanding separation from India and Indian state’s military and para military forces have obviously resulted in loss of life and property and displacement of ordinary people.

 

In this section, we will look at the Kashmiri and Naga movement in order to understand a context where demands for regional and political autonomy have been in the form of movements for self-determination. Like in the other sections, a brief understanding of the movement’s history is important in contextualising it. For an understanding of secessionist movements, some key texts are: Balraj Puri’s Kashmir: Insurgency and After (2008), Udayon Misra’s The Periphery Strikes Back: Challenges to the Nation-state in Assam and Nagaland (2000) and A G Noorani’s The Kashmir Dispute 1947- 2012 (2 volumes) (2013).

 

Nagaland:

 

The Naga people2, since before independence, saw themselves as separate from the Indian union. As far back as in 1929, the Naga Club, an all-Naga organisation, submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission that they seek to be independent. Dissatisfied with the prospect of being a part of the Indian union, the Naga National Council appealed to the British and Indian government for independence, “Their leaders argued that since the Nagas were historically, racially and culturally different from Indians and were never occupied by the Indian rulers, they should be granted freedom as a sovereign country when the British would finally leave India” (Srikanth, Thomas; 2005: 61). It was decided, under the Nine Point agreement, that in a period of ten years, “the Nagas will be free to decide their future” (2005: 61).

 

Indian government’s disregard for the agreement led the NNC to declare Nagaland to be independent on 14th August 1947, under the leadership of ZapoPhizo. Indian state continued to disregard Naga demands and sought to have autonomous bodies for hill tribes wherein

 

2 The Nagas are actually a collective of various indigenous groups, spread across Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and parts of Burma. The movement’s demand is actually the demand for Nagalim or greater Nagaland which included Naga regions of all these states/ nations. Nagas featured as a part of Assam. The NNC, on the other hand conducted a plebiscite in 1961 which they claimed that 99% of the Naga people wanted an independent Naga nation. They also boycotted elections, following which the Indian state used indiscriminate force to suppress the movement. It is this period that various laws providing extraordinary power to the defence forces were brought in. T Sakhrie, one of the moderate leaders was killed in 1956 and many leaders of NNC had to go underground. In this period, Phizo took charge of the movement which started to take a militant form.

 

Nagaland became a separate state in 1963, but the leadership was not satisfied with this move. The armed movement continued in all these years with several reports of excesses committed by the army on the locals. In 1975, Shillong Accord was signed which came in the backdrop of emergency and extended military repression. Many of the NNC leaders signed the accord which paved way for their surrender and creating space for peace talks. Disappointed with this, some leaders like Isaac Swu, ThMuivah and Khaplang formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. It gained popular support in the following years but gradually fragmented into factions (2005).

 

Over the years, the militant aspect of the movement has subsided, leaving aside a few instances. Caught in the middle of insurgent and counter-insurgent violence, many people have started to see benefits in integration with the Indian state. Several rounds of peace, including one in 2015, have pointed towards a decline in the secessionist political sentiment. But it must be remembered that this stage of integration comes from a violent past and is reflective of a fatigued by violence. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 continues to be in force in the state. Demilitarisation, it has been argued, is one of the crucial steps in bringing in a sense of equality and respect, apart from focus on development of the region. If the Indian state is concerned about the integration of Naga people, democratic mechanisms, justice, peace and equality have to ensured (Kikon; 2005).

 

Kashmir:

 

      One of the most long running, violent and sensitive conflicts, perhaps in the world, is that of Kashmir. The kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir, at the time of independence, was under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh. The region is divided into three parts- the Jammu hills and plains region which has a Hindu majority, the Kashmir valley which has a Muslim majority and the Ladakh region which has Buddhist and Muslim population. Hari Singh wished to rule over the independent state of J & K but the region became the centre of conflict between India and Pakistan during the independence. Sheikh Abdullah, a popular leader of the secular National Conference wished the Kashmiri people to not be under the rule of Hari Singh, and neither join Pakistan. The demand for ‘Azaad Kashmir’ was resonant (2014).

 

However, J & K was forced to join the instrument of accession with India as in 1947 Pakistan had invaded the north western region of the state and Hari Singh sought support from the Indian state in defeating them. It was agreed that after the Pakistani insurgents were driven back, Kashmiri people will decide whether they wish to stay with India. Sheikh Abdullah became the first chief minister of the state. As a result of the invasion, Pakistan captured a part north west Kashmir which remains under its control. Soon after the 1947 war, the demands for autonomy of Kashmir began to be raised. As a consequence, Sheikh Abdullah was removed from his post and arrested in 1953 (Puri; 2008).

 

Till Abdullah’s release in 1974, several incompetent governments ruled the state, often coming under control of the Congress party at the centre. There were allegations of rigging in elections. These discontents reached a new stage with the elections of 1987 which were widely believed to have been rigged. In the meanwhile, Farooq Abdullah, Sheikh Abdullah’s son, ran a government which was dismissed and then again came to power after negotiations with the Congress. It is after this period that the insurgency took roots in Kashmir (Puri; 2008).

 

The demand for Azaad Kashmir, with its multiple interpretations, flourished in the midst of insurgent violence, often supported by Pakistan, and the escalating violence and civil rights abuses by Indian military and paramilitary forces. The demand for Azaadi, for some, means the independence of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan; merger with Pakistan for some and greater autonomy within the Indian union for others. Regional groups with different hues have also emerged and command authority in the region. People’s Democratic Party, Hurriyat Conference (Mirwaiz Umar Farooq faction and SAS Geelani faction), Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Yasin Malik), etc. are some of the crucial parties and leaders at the moment. Amidst all this, the regions of Ladakh and Jammu have different aspirations as well.

 

The 1990s was the most violent decade for the people of Kashmir whose daily lives were very much suspended. Since early 2000, the insurgent forces have been on the decline but the resentment among ordinary people is high. The stories of ordinary people being picked up and tortured, rapes of women by men of security forces3, the enforced disappearances4 of local men are abound and have been reported by different human rights organisations.

 

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act continues to be in force in the state. It must be understood that amidst competing claims, it is the idea of Kashmiriyat, a secular culture of Kashmir that many people defend and argue for when they talk about Azaad Kashmir. In this understanding, the mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits, who were driven away by fundamentalist militants, is seen as a loss of this very history and culture (Puri; 2008). For the defenders of Kashmiriyat, it is hoped that the Kashmiri Pandits will return, as will harmony in the region. With the militancy being more or less curtailed, it is the aspirations and questions of lives and dignity of Kashmiri people that the Indian nation has to sincerely respond to. Instead, what we have seen time and again, is highly emotive responses which offer no solution to the complex problems of the region.

 

Conclusion

 

Through the various examples that we saw, it becomes clear that the demand for autonomy is a multifarious one. In the case of Jharkhand and Telangana, it was separate statehood within the Indian union that, for the moment, led to a culmination of the respective movements. In Assam, an ethnic chauvinist sentiment against immigrants eventually turned against the Indian state only to find itself caught up in knots with various competing

 

 

3 On the intervening of 23rd February 1991, units of Indian army launched a search operation in the villages of Kunan and Poshporain Kupwara district. The men were asked to leave the premises and the women of the villages were raped through the night by army men. The number of victims is anything between 53- 100, some being young girls at the time. The military and the government have completely denied the allegations and not one person has been punished yet. Source: ‘Rape in Kashmir’; Human Rights Watch report.

 

4www.disappearancesinkashmir.org

 

ethnicities vying for power and autonomy. In Nagaland, the movement lost steam and people saw more safety in integration; the Khalistan movement also got addressed with negotiations but the movement in Kashmir has several unaddressed problems and continuing injustices-all three secessionist movements have had immense violence as a part of their history.

 

The history of these movements also have to be seen along with changing dynamics of the present day world and national as well as state level politics, all of which shape the turns these movements have taken and will take. The important conclusion, however, is that the demands for autonomy as part of any modern nation-state, especially one as diverse as India. The response to these movements also has to be found democratically and not determined by the fears of the nation being broken or weakened. After all, nation building is an ongoing process: it is never final.

 

Extended Reading List

 

 https://ipmsdl.wordpress.com (International Indigenous Peoples Movement for SelfDetermination and Liberation)
 Misra, Udayon. 1989. North-east India: Quest for Identity: a Collection of Essays onSocio Political Topics. Guwahati: Omsons Publication- 2000. The Periphery Strikes Back: Challenges to the nation-state in Assam andNagaland. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advances Studies.
 Noorani, A G. 2013. The Kashmir Dispute 1947-2012: 1 & 2. New Delhi: Tulika Press.
 Pettrigrew, Joyce. 1995. The Sikhs of Punjab. London: Zed Books.
 Prakash, Amit. 2001. Jharkhand: Politics of Development and Identity. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.
 www.insightonconflict.org/conflict-profile/resource-page/ (Insight on Conflict)
 Dhillon, Simrat. 2007. ‘The Sikh Diaspora and the Quest for Khalistan: A Search for  Statehood or for Self-Preservation?’ IPCS Research Papers. New Delhi: Institute of  Peace and Conflict Studies.
 Horo, Albert. 2013. ‘Jharkhand Movement’. International Journal of Humanities anSocial Science Invention. Volume 2, Issue 4, pp 01-06.
 https://libcom.org/library/jharkhand-movement  accessed on 30-03-2016
 http://schools.aglasem.com/23397 Class XII Political Science NCERT textbook accessed on 29-03-2016
 Kikon, Dolly. 2005. ‘Engaging Naga Nationalism’. Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 40, Issue No. 26, pp 2833- 2837.
 Puri, Balraj. 2008. Kashmir: Insurgency and After. Tracts of the Times series. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
 Ram, M Kodanda. 2007. ‘Movement for Telangana State: A Struggle for Autonomy’.  Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 42, Issue No. 2, pp 90-94.
 Srikanth, H. 2000. ‘Militancy and Identity Politics in Assam’. Economic and Political  Weekly. Volume 35, Issue No. 47, pp 4117- 4124.   – Srikanth, H and C J Thomas. 2005. ‘Naga Resistance Movement and the Peace  Process in Northeast India’. Peace and Democracy in South Asia. Volume 1, Issue