28 Partition, Communalism, and Communal riots

Narendra Kumar

Introduction

 

This module engages with the socio-historical background of the partition, its linkages with the rise of communalism and the nature communal riots in India. It attempts to explain the practices of communalism before and after the independence of India. It also tries to explore the discourse of ‘institutionalized riot systems’ when it comes to communal violence (Brass 1998, 2003).

 

Partition, commonly understood as the territorial and political separation of India and Pakistan, is also a history of forced migration of and unprecedented violence against people whose lands were divided to make the new nations. Over the years it, “has deeply influenced communal patterns, generational dynamics and individual life-courses, long-term identity, work, memory and inspiration. As the fabric of social life of communities was shaped for over half a century by this defining event or process, how partition continues to be a reference point in these states and societies is of profound sociological implication” (Jassal & Ben-Ari; 2006: 2213).

 

In any multi-religious society, communalism or simply religious and ethnic strife exists in its political and social dimensions. In the past few decades, all over India increasing trends towards communal frenzy and rioting has been witnessed. At the heart of this is the construction of the ‘others’. In many ways, a politics of the elite sustains this. Religion, when deliberately used as a tool for attaining political gains, often nourishes the growth of communalism. Communal riots are necessary to give credibility to the basic communal ideological precepts. It is the communal ideology and politics, which the communal politicians and ideologues preach in a normal/ peaceful times, which form the real basis on which communal tension and violence occurs. The construction of fear is crucial to this equation. Nussbaum argues that “fear can produce unreliable and unpredictable conduct and it can be exploited by politicians eager to whip up aggression against unpopular groups” (2012: 20).We will look at each of these issues more closely in the following sections. This module is divided into three sections. In section one, we look at the history of the partition and what  about it is left behind which has sustained itself in memories and histories of religious violence. In the second part, we look at the politics of communalism, focusing on the construction of communal ideology and the political affiliation of groups which sustain it. Finally in the third section, we will try to explain the riot politics in post-independence India.

 

History of the partition

 

While 1947 is remembered by most as the year in which India got independent, for many the memories of partition weigh heavier than the celebration of freedom from colonial rule? The states of Punjab and Bengal were partitioned to form West and East Pakistan (eventually Bangladesh), in the process displacing, injuring and killing millions of people. “In a way, the year 1947 got imprinted in the minds of those Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs who were made homeless and penniless by the forces of events, which unfolded on the eve of independence. Remembering partition is an exercise not simply of going into the past and making objective and value neutral observations, but an effort to tread a path in which many issues regarding history, nationalism and independence are coloured by overwhelming violence, which is difficult to quantify” (Judge: 2004, 77).

 

Explanations of why the subcontinent came to be partitioned have long remained trapped within the paradigms of the ‘two-nation’ theory, claimed to be supported by the Pakistani side of the divide and the ‘secular/composite nationalist’ worldview hailed in India. Brass (1970) observes that the separatist roots of the Muslim league and its call for Pakistan actually found expression in support in the Muslim minority regions of the United Provinces. It is only much later Brass observes that this minority sentiment spread to the Muslim majority provinces of Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province. The role of the United Provinces was especially important. It was in this great Northern Province that the Aligarh movement was begun, that the Muslim League was organised, and that the League began the reorganisation after 1937 which led to the call for a separate state of Pakistan. After the Lahore session of 1940, where the All India Muslim League passed a resolution in its three conference which demanded the creation of independent states for Muslim in West and East India. The immense popularity of the League and its idea of a separate nation were difficult to counter. Despite internal differences, the Congress came to accept the partition. In fact among Congress leaders, Patel believed that without the partition, there will be many further divisions and strife in India which could go against the process of unification. For Ambedkar, the roots of partition were much older than Muslim League’s mobilisation. The social and economic marginalization of Muslims in India was one of the crucial driving factors for the demand of partition. In the summer of 1947, partition not just of territories but also resources took place. The greatest loss was on the human front and never-ending debates on the role of various political figures in this matter seem to hoodwink the core of the partition which was a tragic loss of human life and dignity. The 1940s were marked by several instances of communal violence in several places in the then India. The testimony to this is that on the eve of independence, Gandhi was in Calcutta trying to bring peace in a communally charged situation precipitated by the partition.

 

The movement of people across now-hostile territories and social relations which were abruptly imposed upon people living in towns and villages of these newly formed nations were full of strife. The grounding of politics in religion, especially, put women and questions of sexuality in the forefront. As has been the history of religious and ethnic violence, sexual assaults become a oft-used tool to demonstrate power. The collection of testimonies of Indian women affected by partition [Butalia 1998; Das 1997; Menon and Bhasin 1998] show that violence against women was shaped on the basis of seeing women as “repositories” of their communities or as “territories to be occupied”. Hence, this kind of violence became an expression of domination over another community and underlined its humiliation. In the case of women, “murder, abduction, conversion, and forced migration became signs of the moral appropriation and purification of territory and incorporation into a new state” [Gilmartin 1998] (Jassal & Ben-Ari: 2006).

 

Jalal writes that ‘far from healing the multiple fractures which turned the promised dawn of freedom into a painful moment of separation, the march of time has in many instances cast partition historiography into a more rigid mould. The psychological legacy of partition has left a much deeper impact on people’s minds than the social, economic and political dynamics that led to the division. Whether the two dimensions should be separated quite as surgically as India was  dismembered by the partitioner’s axe is itself an issue of considerable disagreement among historians’ (1996, 681). Common images associated with the partition are those of trauma and devastation. Often these turn it into the outcome of the societal and political upheaval of the time. Many scholars have struggles against such a linear understanding of the partition where political figures argued and disagreed, leading people into communal frenzy and causing the greatest human displacement in world history (over 2 lakh people were killed and over 1. 4 crore people migrated during the partition). “The understanding of partition as outcome has been at the centre of many studies in history, political science and political sociology. In India, the association of local territory with group is an achievement of partition, has exemplified this kind of thinking” [Jalal 1985; Talbot 1988; Hasan 1994] (Jassal & Ben-Ari: 2006).

 

Pandey has argued that “in transferring the history of the event into a history of its causes and origins, distance is created from the fearful moments of the past – a disciplinary device widely adopted by historians. Moreover, while partition historians in India have remained overwhelmingly concerned with causes, it is not suffering nor issues of nationalism and nation-building, but questions of India’s unity, that have motivated these concerns. In the “real” history of India of the late 19th and 20th centuries, the history of partition has thus appeared as an intrusion” (2001: 45-51). This construction of India’s history is sees the violence associated with partition as separate issues, and the latter as an aberration. This false division is crucial in its implications as this is the template that the understanding of communal violence post-independence also tends to take. At the core of this is perhaps an anxiety in accepting ordinary people as motivated by violent religious ideologies in their regular lives? “No wonder then, that Indian postcolonial historiography, driven by the need to demonstrate the unity of India’s diverse peoples and traditions, placed undue emphasis on causes.” (Jassal & Ben-Ari: 2006, 2214).

 

Such representations also paint a picture of the participants in these violent acts as people acting purely out of religious mobilization. But in fact, as Brass argues, much of the violence was also motivated by a host of reasons. The violence at the time of partition also was motivated by assertions and attempts at domination by three different communities in the north western region (2003). Butalia also argues, based on testimonies, that a lot violence also took place for material gains and control (2001). This goes along with retributive and vengeful violence in which mobs  of people participated. All of this raises deep questions about the nature of communal violence. While people suffered through partition, many among them also carried out acts of violence. The victim and perpetrator were roles that shifted dynamically (Butalia, 2001). The history of the partition serves as a motif which is constantly reimagined into present narratives of communal politics. Further, this politics has reiterated the dubious agency exercised by individuals in incidents of communal violence. Also, the narrative of violence as ‘rupture’ or ‘aberration’ has come to be critiqued by many scholars.   “In India, partition lingers in the collective imagination and has entered and shaped discourses of nation-building and secularism, caste and religious identities, ideas about majority-minority relations, and a range of issues touching upon refugees and trans border migrations. (Jassal & Ben-Ari: 2006, 32). In the following sections we will examine how this narrative is played out in politics of communalism. Besides this, the partition remains as a history and memory of loss and violence which has not withered with time.

 

 

Politics of Communalism

 

Given the history of partition violence, it was hoped that such deep and bitter divisions over religiously motivated politics will not recur in independent India. Quite contrary to that, communalism is entrenched in the body politic of independent India. The term communalism gets a specific meaning in the South Asian context- it signifies political mobilisation around religious and ethnic identities in order to establish domination and incite violence. Such mobilisations of identity exist everywhere but the particular brand of religio-ethnic tension that is capitalised upon by religiously conservative groups in south Asia is understood as communalism.

 

Many scholars have concerned themselves with the nature of communal politics and the response to it in secularism. Further still, scholars like Nandy in his works, one of which is the piece Anti-secularist Manifesto (1995) critiques the politics of secularism, a western concept, in unable to grasp with the cultural history of societies like India where religion cannot be bracketed off from people’s lives. Further, scholars like Achin Vanaik have shown problems with the anti-secular position in dealing with communalism. In Furies of Indian Communalism (1997) he sharply argues that scholars arguing for secularism to be a western concept that cannot be in harmony with Indian  culture only obfuscate the dangers of communalism. At the heart of this debate is the question of how civil society can fight the menace of communalism.

 

Scholars like Engineer (2003) emphasise the role of the colonial role exacerbating communal hostilities in India. The existing structures of division among religious groups were exploited in order to break mutinies against the British Empire, like the one in 1857. “It was easier to divide as fault lines were sharpening and communal consciousness was emerging among Hindu and Muslim elite. It is further to be noted that communal phenomenon is basically an upper class elite phenomenon. The Hindu elite welcomed the British rule as a ‘liberative’ one and began to aspire for higher administrative jobs”…. “The communal hostilities intensified with passage of time and controversies about sharing power between Hindu and Muslim elite and constitutional arrangement for sharing power” (Engineer: 2003, 1-2). His argues from a specific position on the subject, summarised in the statement that: “It must be noted that communalism is product not of religious hostilities but of political and economic struggle for share in power and resources between the educated elite. It is not a subaltern phenomenon either as they are not involved in such struggles” (Engineer: 2003, 2)

 

Bipan Chandra (1984) says that communalism is a phenomenon where the majority and minority religious ideology and practices confirms the notion of ‘Our belief alone is true’ and ‘rest is untrue or incomplete’. In India, religion is the core weapon which creates the communal ideology with different practices. Communalism is seen as existing primarily between Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians. In contemporary India, “communalism” designates not only the conflicts between extremist religious communities, commentators for long have argued that politicians play an important role in creating communal tension and provoking violence (see for example Engineer 1984, 1989, 1995).

 

Religion is deliberately used as a tool for mobilising communal passions and the spiritual element in religion is not given importance. Apart from the background of communal conflict during and before partition, what fuels the present-day communal politics in India is also the fact that groups that were previously marginalised are gaining social mobility and asserting themselves socially. This seems to threaten the dominant position of the majority community, which is Hindus in the case of India. The response to these dynamics is layered. Communal mobilisation is built around the fear of the ‘other’ ‘taking over’ all that is controlled by the majority community.

 

According to Engineer there are two categories religious revivalism and religious fundamentalism as far as the Indian socio religious scene is concerned. In the context of religious revivalism he includes the babas, yogis, and other religious gurus, who cash in on the growing sense of insecurity, urban tensions, and other stresses generated by the modern industrial pattern of life. In the second category of religious fundamentalism he includes movements like that of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and rise of Islamic fundamentalism. These movements have political aims and reflect the ideology through media. Here the religious revivalism has clearly directed political goals (1989: 5).

 

A sordid culmination of communal politics in the recent history of India was the demolition of the Babri Mosque on 6th December 1992. The Sangh Parivar, an umbrella term for right wing, Hindu nationalist organisations, mounted a campaign to demolish Babri Mosque in Ayodhya and build a temple in its place. The mobilisation for this flared up communal passions all over the country and the demolition itself was followed by riots in Bombay and other parts of the country where thousands died. This illogic of violence and counter violence has escalated in India. This is accompanied by economic policies that promote free market and privatisation of resources and services. A culture of consumerism, along with growing aspirations of mobility have attached with the polarisation of social life. It indeed is a peculiar contradiction where modern day aspirations are combined with primordial conflicts. This new face of the right wing is what Vanaik asks us to recognise while defending the values of secularism (2001). Added to this mix are the changes in demographics of jobs and higher education which reservations for ‘lower caste’ and ‘backward’ communities have brought about. This instability in its domination that the Hindu upper caste formations feel is translated into communal mobilisation against the Muslim ‘other’. Muslim religious conservatives also play upon the fears of the minority community.

 

So far the discussion on communalism has been carried out at the level of political ideology. Its manifestations in social are many but among them, communal violence is of our greatest concern. In the next section, we will focus on communal violence and also take the discussion in a more empirical direction.

 

Riot Politics: communal violence in India

 

       Riots, a manifestation of communal politics in a violent form, have marked much of 20th and 21st century history of India. Conflagrations between religious groups which result in mob attacks on life and property of people from different ethnic-religious communities have occurred at varying scales. The months during which partition-related migration was underway, riots had become an everyday phenomenon. In independent India, riots in Meerut in 1982 and 1987, Bhagalpur in 1989, Bombay in 1992-93, Gujarat in 2002, Muzaffarnagar in 2013 are among those that have been reported widely because of the scale of violence and loss of lives. Beyond the pale of media and citizens’ watch, many smaller instances of communal take place on a regular basis. As many scholars have pointed, these instances escalate around elections, revealing the relationship between communalism and politics. Wilkinson (2004) used an extensive dataset on incidences of rioting throughout India to point out that riots occur significantly more often in the six months before or after elections (Brass 2004).

 

The tacit support and/ or complicity of state agencies in sustaining such incidents are important to note. To understand the actual embeddedness of the state we should not just focus on the symbolic ‘language of stateness’ that shapes the everyday experience of the state, we should also study that ‘blurred boundary’ between state and society as a ‘field of power’(Bourdieu 1977, 1991) marked by intense competition for access to state resources.

 

Violence seems most likely in areas where there are politicians supported by local networks of extremist organizations and individual who specialize in creating and maintaining communal tensions. These networks according to Brass (1998, 2003), are ‘institutionalized riot systems’. “As such actors keep communal tensions alive throughout the years through a steady infusion of communal ideology (Jafferlot 2003), a precipitating incident can easily be interpreted as an instance of broader communal conflict. If the activities of these networks are not kept in check, either by the police or by civic bodies large scale violence may develop” (cited in Ward Berenschot; 2011, 415). Both Brass (2003) and Wilkinson (2004) argue for a close relation between elections and the occurrence of violence.

 

Economic distrust between different strata of society has taken the shape of communal conflicts in many areas during the post–independence period. Several communal riots have a back ground of economic issues. The worst occurrence has taken place in Bombay, Surat, Ahmedabad, Malegaon, Aurangabad, Moradabad, Pune, Meerut, Aligarh, Jamshedpur and Bhiwandi-commercial centres where Muslims have managed to come up economically. In the aftermath they were practically wiped out (Berenschot 2011). He further argues that the dependence of ordinary people on political actors for securing resources often plays a role in mobilisations. Local actors participate in violence to maintain relations of patronage.

 

In a similar manner, several socio-economic changes and distresses get masked in issues of ethnic-religious dominance and we find propaganda being built around them. The usage of symbolism which emphasises threat and the need for the community to come together and defend itself is constructed from aspects of everyday life. Charu Gupta (2004) looks at communalism in the context of gender and sexuality and reveals some of the persistent forms of such propaganda. For example, Hindu propagandists emphasise on the constructed figure of the ‘virile Muslim man’ against whom Hindu women have to be protected. Similarly, they argue about the catastrophic decline of Hindus due to growing conversion. The idea of women converting to Islam to marry Muslim men is the centrepiece of this anxiety, where there is not just the ‘loss’ of a woman from the community but also her reproductive resources get controlled by the ‘other’ community. Here we see a combination of the ‘negative’ portrayals of Muslims as well as fears of agency of the women. Widows are the classic figure of such propagandas (Gupta; 2004).

 

The role of rumours in inciting communal enmity has been pointed by Brass (2003) and others. Rumours claiming some or the other form of hurt or insult suffered by the majority community are a common motif in many conflagrations. Around them, mobilisation is built which often takes violent turns involving mobs damaging property and assaulting people. The role of state in supporting such acts by commission or omission further demands that the distance between state actors and religious ideologies and organisations. Brass (2003) and Berenschot (2011) emphasise the institutional nature of riot machinery. Communal propagandists keep tensions simmering on an everyday basis and once these tensions tip over due to an incident, the organised form of violence comes into play. The particular event, which becomes the tipping point, usually has multiple narratives. Organised mob violence is then sustained by the what Brass calls the Institutionalised Riot System- “far from being spontaneous occurrences, the production of such riots involves calculated and deliberate actions by key individuals, the conveying of messages, recruitment of participants, and other specific types of activities, especially provocative ones, that are part of a performative repertoire” (2004, 4839). This performance gathers greater momentum  around elections. Political representatives and state actors have played their own part in sustaining these riot systems (Brass, 2003; Berenschor, 2011). Patronage from political figures is also a reason why people participate in such mobilisations.

 

Conclusion:

 

The history of the partition, while often discussed in statist terms, has its actual roots in the personal lives and memories of people. Their experiences of migration, violence and loss exist in their personal lives and also in some ways shape how relationships between different religious communities are poised today. The violence of partition continues to animate inter-religious relations, particularly among Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims.

 

The tendency to see violence as an aberration to partition history also continues in the way communal violence is “as the unplanned action of crowds and as conflagrations ignited by a “spark upon a bed of combustible material”. This approach fails to focus on the dynamism of riots and factors such as historical timing and the roles of individuals and groups that contribute to converting events into full-scale riots” (Brass 1996: 7). Communalism as an ideology, over the years, has set itself comfortably with neoliberal growth, while at the same time making the mobility of the minority/ ‘backward’ community an object of suspicion for the majority community. The demolition of Babri Mosque, shift to neoliberal state policy and the revised policy for reservations for jobs and education all need to be seen together here. Organised violence is the cornerstone of this ideology which takes performative dimensions and works itself out as a system. Socio-economic anxieties get wrapped up in symbolic propaganda to keep tensions simmering, to be turned into riots when suitable. Not only does it garner political benefits, it becomes a conduit for ordinary people and locally powerful actors to ‘maintain relations’.

 

An underlying thread in all these discussions is the individual agency of people committing acts of violence. This aspect is very often blurred by explaining riots as a product of frenzy created by politicians. Even during the partition, mobs attacked people from different communities not just out of frenzy but for a host of reasons including taking over property. In order address this issue, its history and its present form need to be understood in all its dimensions. Attempts to respond to these acts of violence and the culpability of state actors in it may produce debates and differences, but first of all its aspects need to be understood.

 

Further readings

 

 

  • Breman, J. (1999) ‘Ghettoization and communal politics: The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in the hindutva landscape’. In R.Gupta and J.Parry(eds.). Institutions and inequaities (pp. 259-83). Oxford University Press.
  • Dixit, Prabha (1974) communalism: a struggle for power, New Delhi: Orient Longmans.
  • Naussbaum, M. (2007). The clash within: Democracy, Religious violence, and India,s future.
  • Cambridge: Belknap Press.
  • Noorani, A.G. (2014) Destruction of the Babri Masjid: A National Dishonour, Tulika Books’
  • Pandey, Gyanendra (2002) Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India, Cambridge University Press.
  • Sarkar, Sumit (2001) Beyond Nationalist Frames: Postmodernism, Hindu Fundamentalism, History, Indiana University Press.
  • Bourdieu, Pierre (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. London: Cambridge.
  • Banu, Zenab (1989) Politics of communalism, Popular Prakashan: Mumbai.
  • Breman, J. (2002). Communal upheaval as resurgence of Social Darwinism’. Economic and political weekly, 37 (16), 1458-88.
  • Fitzgerald, Timothy. (2001). The ideology of religious studies. Religious studies review, vol.27, no.2. 103-146.
  • Pandey, Gyanendra. (2001). The ‘silent When majority’ Backs a Violent Minority. Economic and Political weekly, 37 (13), 1183-1185.
  • Roy, Burman (1996) Hindu- Muslim syncretism in India, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.
  • 31, No. 20 (May 18, 1996), pp. 1211-1215.
  • Donovan, Peter (1993) The intolerance of religious pluralism, Religious Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 217-229.
  • Quinn, L. Philip (2001) religious diversity and religious toleration, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 50, No. 1/3, Issues in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Dec., 2001), pp. 57-80.
  • Gregorios, Polos (1995) speaking of tolerance and intolerance, India International Centre Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, SECULARISM IN CRISIS (SPRING 1995), pp. 22-28.
  • Bourdieu, Pierre. (1991). Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  •      Basu, Amrita (1996): ‘Mass Movement or Elite Conspiracy? The Puzzle of Hindu Nationalism’ in D Ludden (ed) Contesting the Nation, Religion, Community and the Politics of Democracy in India. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, pp 55-80.
  • Berenschot, Ward (2011). ‘Rioting as Maintaining Relations: Hindu Muslim Violence and Politcal Mediation in Guajrat, India’. Civil Wars. Vol. 11, No. 4, pp 414-433.
  • Bourdieu, Pierre (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. London: Cambridge.
  • Brass, Paul (1970) ‘Muslim Separatism in United Provinces: Social Context and Political Strategy before Partition’. Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 5, Issue No. 3-4-5, 17 Jan, 1970.

–          (1996): Riots and Pogroms, New York University Press, New York

 

–          (2003). The Production of Hindu–Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press

 

–          (2004). ‘Development of an Institutionalised Riot System in Meerut City, 1961 to 1982’.

  • Economic and Political Weekly.Vol. 39, No. 44, pp. 4839-4848.
  • Butalia, U (1998): ‘Muslims and Hindus. Men and Women: Communal Stereoptypes and the
  • Partition of India’ in T Sarkar and U Butalia (eds), Women and the Hindu Right: A Collection of Essays. Kali for Women: New Delhi.
  • Chandra, Bipin (1984). Communalism in Modern India. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.
  • Chatterji, J (1999): ‘The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border Landscape, 1947-52’, Modern Asian Studies, 33(1), February, pp 185-242.
  • Das, V (1997): ‘Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain’ in A Kleinman, V Das and M Lock (eds), Social Suffering, University of California Press, Berkeley, pp 67-93.
  • Engineer, A. A. (1989). Communalism and Communal Violence in India. Delhi: Ajanta Publications.
  • –          (1984). Communal Riots in Post-Independence India. Sangam Books, Hyderabad.
  • Giddens, A (1984): The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration. University of California Press, Berkeley.
  • Gilmartin, D (1998): ‘Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative’. The Journal of Asian Studies, 57(4), November, pp 1068-95.
  • Gupta, Charu (2004). ‘Censuses, Communalism, Gender and Identity: A Historical Perspective’.
  • Economic and Political Weekly. Volume 39, No. 39, 4302-04.
  • Jalal, Ayesha. 1996. ‘Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of ‘Communalism’: Partition Historiography Revisited’. Modern Asian Studies. Vol. 30, No. 3, pp.681-737.
  • Jaffrelot, C. (1996). The hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics. London: Hurst & Co.
  • Jassal & Ben-Ari (2006) ‘Listening for Echoes: Partition in Three Contexts’. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 41, No. 22 (June. 3-9, 2006), pp. 2213-2220.
  • Judge, PS (Book Review) (2004) Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India by Gyanendra Pandey. Social Scientist, Vol. 32, No. 1/2 (Jan. – Feb., 2004), pp. 77-80
  • Menon, R and K Bhasin (1998): Borders and Boundaries Women in India’s Partition. Kali for Women, New Delhi.
  • Nandy, Ashis. (1995). ‘An Anti-secularist Manifesto’. India International Centre Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1, Secularism In Crisis (Spring 1995), pp. 35-64
  • Pandey, Gyanendra (1990). The Construction of Communalism in the Colonial North India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
  • Sarveppally Gopalakrishnan (1990). Anatomy of Confrontation-the Babri Masjid Ramajanma Bhoomi Issue. Penguin Books: New Delhi, 1990.
  • Selected Writings on Communalism, People’s Publishing House, New Delhi, May 1994.
  • Tiwari, B N (2005): ‘Domination: How the Fragments Imagine the Nation: Perspectives from Some North Indian Villages’. Dialectical Anthropology. Volume 29, pp 123-40.
  • Urvashi Butalia. (2000). The other side of silence: Voices from the partition of India. Duke University Press.
  • Vanaik, Achin. (1997). Furiesof Indian Communalism: Religion, Modernity and Secularization.
  • London: Verso.- (2001). ‘The New Indian Right’. New Left Review. 9, May-June.
  • Violent Minority (editorial) Economic and Political Weekly. 37 (13), 1183-1185.
  • Wilkinson, S. (2004). Votes and Violence: Electoral competition and ethnic riots in India.
  • Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Web links:

 

Asgar Ali Engineer, On Sociology of Communalism. http://www.csss-isla.com archive, 2003 May 16

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rZ_v1oxGwFQ

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amnevwW0MJo

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nY86mAriKk

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=59szLdE3NoQ

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eR_AaflTIFM