19 Movements of Political Autonomy and Statehood

Contents

1. Objective

2. Introduction

3. Learning Outcome

4. What is autonomy movement ?

4.1. Difference between autonomy movement and secessionism

5. Proliferation of small states

6. Case Study I: Formation of Jharkhand

7. Case Study II: Formation of Uttarakhand

8. Case Study III: Formation of Chhattisgarh

9. Case Study IV: Naga Movement

10. Summary

1. Objective

Present module intends to focus on one of the most visible forms of social movement – the movement for political autonomy and statehood. These movements are also called regional movements as they centre on regional aspirations. This type of social movement is often suppressed by the state machinery as the line of demarcation between demand for political autonomy via statehood and secessionism is not always very clear. Movements like Jharkhand Movement, Uttarakhand Movement, Chhattisgarh Movement and Naga Movement have been analyzed to make the students understand different aspects of autonomy movement.

2. Introduction

Social movements are one of the principal social forms through which people give voices to their grievances and concerns about their rights, welfare, and well-being, and start various types of collective action, such as protesting in the streets, that dramatize those grievances and concerns and demand that something be done about them (Snow et. al. 2004). The nature of such actions to register protest varies from country to country, from place to place; but one thing is almost clear that most of the social movements originate from a concern of the people over the discrepancy between what is existing and what people want it to be. In other words, social movements mark people’s dissatisfactions over the existing situations. According to Wilkinson (1971, cited in Horo 2013) a social movement has the following features:

(a)  It is a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into utopian community.

(b)   A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organization. This may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organization to a highly institutionalized or bureaucratized form.

(c)  A social movement’s commitment to change and the raison d’être of its organization are found upon the conscious violation, normative commitment to the movement’s aims or beliefs and active participation on the part of the followers or members. According to Partha Nath Mukherji (2012), a social movement is a product of the social structure and has consequences for it. In other words, social movement crystallizes under certain structural conditions. It is not necessarily ‘change promoting’; sometimes social movements are ‘change resisting’.

It is obvious that movement for political autonomy is a natural demand for a country like ours that beset with numerous ethnic, religious, linguistic identities. Existence of social and cultural diversities among people living in different regions of the country along with different levels of development of economy and infrastructure has contributed to regional aspirations for autonomy. The demand for states on linguistic basis was developed even before India achieved independence from British rule. Moreover, the issue of unemployment or deprivation of ‘sons of the soil’ in the wake of large scale immigration of ‘outsiders’ have cropped up large scale protest in many parts of the country. Even in developed states like Maharashtra, insider-outsider conflict has become the bone of contention for political mobilisation.

Hopefully, our federal constitution is bestowed with a well-equipped administrative device to co-opt the said diversities by providing mechanism of self governance. The government has also applied the provisions of the fifth and sixth schedule of the constitution to create many autonomous regional councils or district councils in many parts of the country. Regional councils attempt to contain ethnic separatism and in particular tribal alienation through the new experience of community governance. Despite these initiatives including the reorganization of states since 1956, the issue of regional disparity could not be mitigated. Even after the formation of a particular state, a region or more within it start fresh movement for autonomy, independence or even secession from the country. Till today, India has been territorially reorganised into 29 states and 7 Union Territories. But if all the existing demands for new states are recognised by the Government of India, India would be divided into nearly 70 states and union territories. In the large states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, there are many demands of state hood. Some of these movements are dormant, some very active. Notwithstanding these trends, there is hardly any single theoretical frame within which we can explain the movement for political autonomy and statehood in India. In fact, such movements assume many different forms in different parts of India, centring round the issues like identity, economy and politics. Consequently, the nature of autonomy movement in the North-Eastern part of the country differs widely from that of the South. It can be better understood as the fallout of the incompleteness of the process of nation formation. As a wider psycho-sociological process, nation building calls for a deep-rooted feeling of oneness that binds its citizens along with the political process of state building. However, like most of the post-colonial countries, the process of nation formation did not precede or coincide with the political process of state formation. The state formation processes had started soon after the dissolution of colonial rule, but no deliberate effort had been made to psychologically integrate various parts of the country together that could strengthen the process of nation building as such. Such hasty initiatives for state building in the post-independent period without the corresponding emergence of the Indian nation as a coherent entity have a background. The nationalist imagery of a developed nation-state got fractured even before the independence due to the sinister community-centric political mobilizations by the colonial masters. Independence coincided with the fructification of the communal design in the form of the division of the nation on communal basis. In the background of such communally vicious environment, our nationalist elites did not let the regional aspirations to flourish. Instead, they advocated for an overarching nation-state that would accommodate all the regional aspirations. The spurt of autonomy movements across the country may be considered as the reiteration of the suppressed regional identities. It is often thought that smaller state may reflect the regional aspirations more effectively. But in reality, the proliferation of the new states brings no substantial change in the standard of living of its citizenry. However, it is very difficult, at this stage, to comment on whether these trends of resurgence of regional aspirations augur any good for the democracy or not.

3. Learning Outcome

This module will provide the learner with a thorough exposure to different aspects of movement for regional aspirations and state autonomy in India. The module will engage the students with distinct case studies to delve deep into the issue.

4. What is autonomy movement?

Autonomy movements are those movements, where drawing on the primordial and local identities, people of a particular region ask for separate and independent administrative arrangements for themselves. As these movements stress on primordial, local or regional identities, they try to oppose the dominant identity that does not allow any space for the growth and preservation of particular identity of the people concerned. While doing so, the local/regional leaders demand special privileges, protection and concessions from the state. It is therefore argued that autonomy movements are often movement for regional self-governance. The notions of freedom and self-determination also become cardinal issues for autonomy movement. In other words, such movement very often involve a process of state formation by seeking pluralisation and federalisation of existing polity and political process. Following Benedict Anderson (1982) it may be argued that ‘nation’ is a socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group. A nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (ibid.: 49). Members hold in their minds a mental image of their affinity. Quite interestingly, assertions of regional and ethnic identities are also facilitated by modern political processes, technology and social transformation. Rise of ethno-nationalism and formation of ethnic group based states in the whole of Europe today is a pointer to this fact. In many other parts of the Western world, there is growing stress on ‘nativism’ as against the counter trend of ‘multiculturalism’ to assert one’s identity. One therefore should not think that regional aspirations are only seen in the societies of the third world. There is however no fixed pattern of the autonomy movement across the country. The nature of this autonomy movement is usually determined by the context and the history. Yet, these movements normally try to oppose the centralised decisions and authority structures of modern institutions imposed from outside and involve people directly in decisions affecting their everyday lives (Katsiaficas 2006: 6).

4.1. Difference between autonomy movement and secessionism

Conceptually speaking, the line of demarcation between movements for state autonomy and secessionism is very thin. Both are social movements; but autonomy movement remains within the constitutional framework and aspire to be culminated to autonomous statehood; the secessionist movements do not remain within the constitutionally stipulated path of ventilating popular aspirations. Secessionist movements are more common in those states which share boundaries with sovereign nation states. It is often argued that a popular mobilization for more state autonomy could have easily snowballed into a more destructive secessionist movement had there been any international border in close proximity.

5.  Proliferation of small states

Demand for autonomy and the resultant proliferation of small states is often considered as a healthy sign of our federal democracy. Though movement for state autonomy often ends with new statehood, there is no such proposition that the creation of new state necessarily improves political representation and makes the state more responsive to the needs of the local people. Another popular justification for the autonomy movement is that the creation of small states attempts to redress the historical injustices and marginalization of certain groups. However, ground level reality speaks something else. New states in many occasions appear as mere prototypes of the parent states, carrying the same legacies of those parent states. In fact, in many cases a clear political motive can be identified behind the birth of new states. Here again no generalization is possible. The impetus for autonomy movements in India widely differs from one state to another. In case of southern parts of the country, the demand for separate states was centring round the rich inheritance of the non-Aryan Dravidian culture rooted in Tamil culture and language; whereas, the movement in the northern heartland primarily represents the sentiment of Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan. The autonomy movements in the hilly terrain of the India’s North-East presents altogether a different trajectory. The movement for separate statehood in the North-East has been the saga of protracted resistance and protest movement of the tribal population against ‘encroachment of their language and culture and more importantly their self supporting economy by the outsiders representing the people of the plain both during and after colonial rule’ (Mukhopadhyay 2014: 68). This region, unlike other parts of the country has some unique features, which often compelled the Indian state to concede to their demand for state autonomy. This region, for instance, is marked by a high level of literacy and socio-political articulation along with the religious bonding with Christianity. Again, most of the autonomy movements in this area have a secessionist overtone. Moreover, the remoteness of the region from the national headquarters on the one hand and its proximity to international borders of China, Myanmar, and Bhutan on the other, provide the region a very special geostrategic status. Look at the Khalistani movement. In this case, the demand for state autonomy had subsequently assumed an armed secessionist turn. Here, poverty was not the issue behind the autonomy movement. In fact, ‘affluence and an inflated sense of pride in group identity, marked by religious-cultural distinctiveness and martial superiority’ among the Punjabis prompted them to go for separate statehood (ibid.: 71)

As autonomy movements in India very often have critically questioned the constitutional validity of centre-state relations, rise of regional political aspiration in the form of Dravida movement in Tamil Nadu, Akali movement in Punjab or Ahom movement in Assam have been able to put up a stiff challenge to the Congress hegemony in politics. In this sense, regionalism can be seen as a conflict between national and regional elites. But as Khan (1979) argues, regional consciousness is equally generated by the euphoria created by the establishment of nation state. There are many other factors that promote various types of regionalism. For instance, inter-state conflict over water resources or boundary has given rise to conflict. Often state response to certain justified demands of a community gives rise to ethno-national movements. For instance, the Punjab agitation, which begun with some secular demands like Chandigarh as capital of Punjab, water sharing between Punjab and Haryana and territorial tribunal to settle the dispute was ethnicised by the Central and the Congress party for political gains (Gupta 1996). Yet, when the Akalis came to power in 1977, it did precious little on these demands even though it was a significant member of the national level Janata Party government in New Delhi. There was also clear involvement of the government machinery in Delhi and Gujarat in riots during 1984 and 2002 respectively. The Tripura instance (Ghosh 2003) also corroborates the fact the ethno-nationalism is encouraged and sustained by the lack of developmental initiative on the part of corrupt state administration as well as untimely or delayed state response.

6. Case Study I: Formation of Jharkhand

The new state of Jharkhand was formed taking the southern districts of Bihar. These districts were rich with minerals and large areas of forest. These areas are also known for its tribal population and a rich tribal heritage. It is not a mere coincidence that Jharkhand, the 28th State of the country, was formed on 15 November, 2000 to mark the birth anniversary of Birsa Munda, the leader of Santal rebellion. Jharkhand shares its border with Bihar to the north. On its west side, there are Uttar Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Odisha lies on the south and West Bengal is on its east. The formation of Jharkhand, as a new Indian state, has a long history of struggle. The people of these areas of erstwhile Bihar, mainly the tribals, out of a feeling of enduring deprivation started agitation for a separate state of their own, which they considered would restore their dignity, autonomy and give them the opportunity to determine their own destiny. So the formation of this new state was welcomed by these people, who were waiting for it for more than 50 years (Chaudhuri 2000). 

As early as 1921, an association was formed with a view to do something for the downtrodden people living in the Chhotanagpur area. The name of this association was Chhotanagpur Unnati Samaj. Gradually this organization set out its political agenda with the demand for a separate state. The Jharkhand movement started with this. The Chhotanagpur Unnati Samaj placed its demand before Simon Commission in 1928 demanding a separate Jharkhand state. The Chhotanagpur Unnati Samaj was basically an organization of Christian Adivasi students. Later they widened their activities to include the non-tribals as well. Chhotanagpur Unnati Samaj appeared in new avatar and took the name Adivasi Mahasabha under the leadership of Major Jaipal Singh in 1939. It should be noted that these districts were extremely backward in terms of all available parameters. They received very little support from the state government. The people, mainly the poor tribals, thought that whatever the state government is spending for the development of these areas, the major share of that was grabbed by the non-tribal co-residents. The Adivasi Mahasabha started raising voices against economic disparities and soon realized that these ‘economic problems called for political solutions’ (Chaudhuri 2000). The demand for a separate state for the tribals slowly got crystallized and United Jharkhand Party was formed in 1948. The Adivasi Mahasabha was merged with the United Jharkhand Party and took the name of Jharkhand Party. The Jharkhand Party contested the Bihar Assembly polls in 1952 for the first time and emerged as the second largest party, by winning 35 seats (ibid). Horo (2013: 4) has written:

The modern tribal movement for regional autonomy is a phenomenon after India got independence. Jharkhand movement too is such a phenomenon. The main aim of the Jharkhand movement was the creation of a separate “Adivasi state”. Before independence, it was the main issue. But after independence, decks were clear to orient the movement from ethnicity to regionalism.

In 1954, Jaipal Singh of Jharkhand Party drew the attention of the Parliament to the extreme impoverished conditions of the tribal people of Chhotanagpur and Santhal Pargana and raised the issue of a separate Jharkhand state which, in his opinion, would help to put an end to the economic deprivation of the people of this region as they would be able to make their own future if they were granted autonomy through a separate statehood. Initially the leaders of the movement wanted 16 districts of south Bihar’s Chhotanagpur and Santhal Pargana regions for the new state. All these districts were tribal dominated (Chaudhuri 2000). Like any other movement, Jharkhand Movement also witnessed many ups and downs. In 1970, a group of people under the leadership of Sibu Soren, left Jharkhand Party and formed Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. This organization although fought for the same demand. The infighting between Jharkhand Party and Jharkhand Mukti Morcha as a whole weakened the spirit of the movement. Just ten years later, in 1980, again there was a split and Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Soren) was formed. It is interesting that all these organizations aggressively moved to fulfil their demand of a separate state for the downtrodden tribals. And the story ended with success. The new state of Jharkhand was formed on 15 November 2000.

7. Case Study II: Formation of Uttarakhand

The state of Uttarakhand (erstwhile Uttaranchal) was formed carving out the hilly regions of Uttar Pradesh on 9 November 2000 after a long movement organized by the common people these areas. Uttarakhand is comprised of two divisions – Garhwal and Kumaon. Although there were traditional rivalries between these two hilly regions from time immemorial, they unanimously joined the movement for separate statehood. Uttarakhand movement is a kind of non-secessionist movement (Mawdsley 1997) because this movement, to a large extent, was organized following the constitutional means to push forward the demands of a separate state. Srivastava (2011) has mentioned the causes of the resentment of the people that led to such demand: Lack of development in the geographically unique (93% of the area in the state is hill region and 64% of the total area is forest) area, rising unemployment gave impetus to the age-old demand for a separate state.

There was another reason as well. The people of this part of Uttar Pradesh had to travel long distances to go the state capital and felt marginalized in all respects. They started thinking that the new state would be their own, and the government of the new smaller state would be able to deliver for the development of this deprived, hilly and forest-covered region. Slowly public opinions in favour of a new state got snow balled. In 1930, the people of these hilly areas adopted a resolution in favour of separate statehood, which, in their opinion, would solve the problem of underdevelopment and consequent massive unemployment and poverty. Over the years the resentment against the deprivation became widespread. According to Srivastava (2011): It all started in 1930 when residents of the hill region had moved a resolution by majority vote claiming for a separate state of Uttarakhand. The demand took shape of an agitation in 1957. Demonstrations were held under the leadership of erstwhile ruler of Tehri — Manvendra Shah. However, it was nearly 15 years later that the agitation became a common cause of the people of the region after formation of Uttarakhand Rajya Parishad in 1973. The Parishad became a platform for statehood struggle. If Chhotanagpur Unnati Samaj played the pivotal role in Jharkhand Movement, UttarakhandKranti Dal took the centre stage in pushing forward the demand of separate statehood and in providing the leadership of Uttarakhand movement. Uttarakhand Kranti Dal was established in July 1979. Gradually the movement took political turn. In fact Uttarakhand Kranti Dal was a political party. BJP in course of time supported the demand of the people for separate statehood and joined the movement. Uttarakhand  Movement  took  a  decisive  turn  in  1994.  In  this  year,  the  students  started  demonstrations throughout the state in support of the cause for a separate state. Uttarakhand Kranti Dal started fast-unto-death and the government employees called for a strike. This strike continued for three consecutive months literally paralyzing the state administration. In fact the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav was against the formation of a separate state. The peaceful demonstrations gradually took violent forms. Confrontations with the police took place in different parts of the state as the state administration tried to apply force to suppress the movement. In September 1994, Uttar Pradesh Police opened fire on the peaceful demonstrations   in   Khatima   region.   Several   innocent   protesters   were   killed   and    the Uttarakhand movement reached its peak as a consequence. On 2 October 1994, Samyukta Morcha,  a  joint  forum  of  the  protesters,  organized  a  massive  demonstration  in  Delhi. Thousands of Uttarakhand activists and protesters marched towards Delhi. To stop them, police opened fire near Rampur Tiraha. Several protesters were killed and several others were severely injured. The heat of the movement reached at the national capital. The movement continued and in 1998, the central government passed “Uttaranchal Bill”. It was sent to the Uttar Pradesh government. With several amendments the Bill was returned back to the central government. And ultimately on 9 November 2000, the central government declared  the  formation  of  ‘Uttranchal’  as  the  new  state.  However,  in  2006  the  name ‘Uttaranchal’ was changed and the state was renamed as ‘Uttrakhand’. The age old movement finally came to an end.

8. Case Study III: Formation of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh was formed taking 16 districts of Madhya Pradesh on November 1, 2000 (Venkatesan 2000). The people of these areas felt deprived both economically and politically. Venkatesan (ibid.) writes: The truth is that Chhattisgarh was not only exploited by the rest of Madhya Pradesh, but by the Centre. Forests and mineral wealth, which abounds in the region, is under national control regimes. Out of this feeling, the people of these areas demanded a separate state as early as 1920s. Despite some sporadic demonstrations, rallies, seminars etc., the movement could not take a concrete form until 1990s. During this period Chhattisgarh Rajya Nirman Manch was formed and this organization took the leadership of Chhattisgarh Movement. People, irrespective of castes and communities, started showing their solidarity towards the demand for a separate state. Political parties like Congress and BJP also supported the demand of the common people of the state. Ultimately Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act 2000 was passed and the new state of Chhattisgarh came into existence.

9. Case Study IV: Naga Movement

The political turmoil in entire Northeast, particularly in Nagaland has ever since reflected a conflict between the need for integration with the Delhi-centric political processes and a strive for autonomy and self-determination of the Northeast Naga tribes (Patra and Manna 2009). The identity movement-turned-insurgency of the Nagas originated from a fear of being merged with the rest of the Indian population losing their own hegemony. It is called hegemony because the group of communities, call themselves as Nagas (like Angami, Ao, Mao etc), had no association, political or cultural, with the so called mainstream of the Indian population prior to the British rule. This isolation, not only helped these tribal groups continue a completely separate existence, but also created a world of their own in the true sense. As per the Naga history, the first contact between the British and the Nagas occurred in 1832 when Captain Jenkins and Lieutenant Pemberton passed through that region. And ‘that was the beginning of British domination’ (Dutta 1994). The tribal communities of Northeast could not take it easily, but the British started to extend their control over them. The seeds of hostility were sown at that time. The reasons were simple. The freedom-loving Nagas became afraid of losing their identity and autonomy. They neither were ready to be merged with the mainstream nor were prepared to give up their age-old right of self-determination (Patra and Manna 2009).

The nature and degree of isolation these tribal communities had in the past before the British intervention become clear from the fact that even the inter-tribal interactions were limited in that area. Dubey (1982) explained that these communities did not have their ethno-tribal identities in pre-British period as well. The name ‘Naga’, ‘Kuki’ etc were given to them by the non-tribals. At present, almost twenty communities of Northeast call themselves as ‘Naga’. However the consolidation of British rule had three direct consequences, which were felt seriously later. First, the process of dissociation between the Northeast tribes and the rest of the Indian population got strengthened and they started thinking more sceptically of India as ‘their land’. Second, different tribal communities adopted the name ‘Naga’ and thereby strengthened their group solidarity (of course there are other factors as well). Third, hostility towards the people of India was increased. In 1835 the troops of the Princely states of Manipur occupied Semkhor Naga village. But there was a clear indication that this was done according to the strategy of the British government to subjugate the Nagas forcefully. The attitude of the Nagas towards the rest of the Indian population and the problem of Nagaland has its root in the colonial history of our country.

The identity politics in Nagaland revolving around the issue of Nagaland in India or Nagaland and India has raised one important question: why do the Nagas believe it impossible to retain their identity en tout if they accept the political integration with India? Does there exist any doubt between integration and independence? It is true that the Nagas never accepted political subjugation in the past. At the same time, the political strategies initiated to manipulate them always had a negative influence on the process of negotiation. Even the British adopted a two-way policy of using force to subdue the Nagas while generally they allowed them to stay in isolation. The impact was obvious. The Nagas developed a hostile relationship with the rest of the Indian population designating them as others but their interaction with the mainstream remained minimal. It is not difficult to understand that the processes, which helped emerge nationalism among the people of our country as such, were almost absent in the North-eastern part of the country. The relationship between British-represented India and the freedom-loving Nagas deteriorated further when in 1855 the British, according to Mcculloch policy, established Kuki settlements in Langting as a buffer region to resist the Nagas. The Kukis were also supplied firearms by the British to fight with the Nagas. It is worth noting that the British used the Kukis, known as fierce fighters, first to insulate British territory from any Burmese threat and then against the Naga protesters. The Nagas conversely regarded the Kukis as foreigners who have encroached their land. Hence, there was much ethnic animosity between these two tribal Christian groups (Dena 2007).

Thus, the entire political situation of the Northeast became complicated because the colonial policy of divide and rule. But the British allowed the Naga hills to remain as Excluded Area. In course of time a sort of ethno-nationalism was developed among the tribal communities, who adopted the name Naga. The demand for Nagaland or Nagalim (greater Nagaland) including the secessionist tendency of the Northeast tribes, argues Doshi (1997), originated from this ethno-national feeling. Before independence, this ethno-national feeling of the Nagas took a political turn and in February 1946 Naga National Council (NNC) was established under the leadership of T Aliba Imti. Four months later, when Omeo Kumar Das, a social worker and a Minister at the Government of Assam, came to Kohima with his wife, the NNC leaders warned them to ensure Naga independence as quickly as possible otherwise they would start war. Incidentally Mr. Das was the first among the Indian leaders to visit Kohima.

The point to note is that right from its beginning the first full-fledged political organization of the Nagas, NNC, demanded their right to decide their own future. Even they claimed to establish an interim government before the departure of the British. And ultimately NNC declared independence on 14 August 1947 and expanded state machineries in Naga hills. The demand for a separate political existence led to bring down the Indian flag in Kohima, which was hoisted on 15 August 1947 by Indian administration.

The Nagas did not accept Indian constitution and decided not to send any Naga representative in Assemblies and Parliament. In accordance, they boycotted the first general election and ‘not a single voter turned up’ (Das 1982). They, on the contrary, adopted Yehzabo, their own constitution. The issue of integration, thus, on the one hand, led to the emergence of the Nagas as a distinct category; on the other hand, increased the rivalry between the Nagas and all Delhi-centric political leaders. And the problem of identity gave rise to the politics of identity. Gradually the ‘culture of violence’ emerged in that part of India that led these people to civil war. After a series of armed conflict and peace missions, the Government of India agreed first to create the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) as a union territory and later in July 1960 Nagaland was recognised as a full-fledged state. Despite the formation of a separate state, Naga nationalism has not died and it co-exists today with Indian nationalism. Demand for establishment of a `Greater Nagaland` comprising all Naga-inhabited areas within India and Myanmar continue to influence the violent activities of some Naga militants.

11. Summary

A feeling of deprivation and inequality sometimes binds people of a particular region together to move collectively against it. A corollary of such feeling is a demand for self-governance and political autonomy. The origin of Jharkhand movement, Uttarakhand movement, Chhattisgarh movement and Naga movement lies in such feeling. The participants of these movement believed that a separate state for them would give them better governance and better economic opportunities. The Nagas do not want a separate state, rather they want a separate country for them. It is clear that there are both imaginary and real reasons for the rise of such movements. Issues like language, culture, territory, unemployment, economic backwardness, apathy of the central government have instigated the masses to rally behind their political bosses to raise regional demands. The state response to most these movements at least initially remained negative. As Oommen (1997: 158) argues, the approach of the state is one of tension management preferably with force. But, at the same time, positive response on the part of the state has inspired many more communities to launch similar movements. While the demand for separate state for the people of Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh or Telengana have been resolved, there is growing assertions of regional aspirations in the name of Gokhaland, Bodo Land or Kamatapur state. Regional movements therefore appear to be an ongoing process in a country like India.