22 India and Regional Organizations: SAARC, ASEAN & EU

Dr. Suresh Dhanda

Structure of the Module

1. Introduction

2. Objectives

3. India-SAARC Relations

3.1. Formation of SAARC

3.2. Objectives of SAARC

3.3. India‟s Role in SAARC

3.4 .Constraints in SAARC

4. India-ASEAN Relations

4.1. Economic Relations

4.2. Political Relations

4.3. Strategic Relations

5. India-EU Relations

5.1. Political Relations

5.2. Economic Relations

5.3. Strategic Partnership

6.  Conclusion

7. Important Questions

8. Suggested Readings

1. Introduction

In today‟s globalizing world, regions can be seen as an effective bridge between the international and national systems. A regional organization as a regional entity, working from cultural and linguistic commonalities, can provide a forum for building trust and familiarity that is not possible on a global scale. For these reasons they can be more effective in establishing common policies and resolving issues of contention. That is why regional organizations are growing in number, expanding in scope, and becoming more active in many areas like economic, political, security, strategic, cultural, political humanitarian etc. Regional cooperation offers several benefits, for instance greater economic integration, frequent and easier people-to-people contact, sustainable peace and development at the regional level. Almost all the countries are involved in such kinds of regional organizations directly or indirectly. And India is no exception in this regard. India is directly involved and having membership in many such regional organizations while with some other organizations it has maintained good relations. In this module, we are confined to only three regional organizations i.e., SAARC, ASEAN and EU with which India has sound relations. India is a key player in the activities of SAARC. India‟s size and central location in South Asia makes it very important for SAARC members. India is strengthening its economic, political and strategic relations with ASEAN also. In case of EU, India is cementing its strategic partnership with the countries of EU and enhancing its trade relations also.

2. Objectives

This module will apprise the readers about the India‟s relations with SAARC, ASEAN and EU. India is the main player in the SAARC activities. India has maintained sound political and economic relations with SAARC countries. India‟s „Look East Policy‟ concentrates on maintaining good political, economic and Strategic relations with ASEAN countries. As far as EU is concerned, India is doing good efforts to establish and maintain economic, political and strategic relations with the countries of EU. This module evaluates various dimensions of India‟s relations with the countries of SAARC, ASEAN and EU in detail. And finally, important questions and list of suggested readings is also included in this module.

3. India-SAARC Relations

SAARC has the potential to vastly improve the lives of its 1.5 billion citizens – nearly one-fourth of all humanity – particularly the inhabitants of its largest member, India. While the gesture of inviting SAARC leaders to his swearing-in ceremony by Indian Prime Minister, Narender Modi in 2014 might be considered symbolic, it provided the necessary impetus in bringing SAARC to the forefront of India‟s foreign policy lexicon. Since then, several measures have reinforced the government‟s resolve to forge closer strategic ties with countries in the region. High-level visits to Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan not only signal their importance in India‟s foreign policy priorities, but have also laid the groundwork for stronger and more substantive cooperation. Similarly, out-of-the-box thinking on avenues for cooperation – including the proposal for a SAARC satellite and a Centre for Good Governance – signal the government‟s intention to play a proactive role in providing a leadership and governance structure to a region characterized by fragmentation and tension. During the visit of the Prime Minister of Nepal to India, Modi described SAARC as a “vital instrument to add to the strength of each member nation and advance collective action for shared prosperity in the region.” India-SAARC relations can be understood through the study of following points:-

3.1. Formation of SAARC

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an organization of South Asian nations, established on December 8, 1985. It‟s headquartered is in Kathmandu, Nepal. The very first proposal for establishing a framework for regional integration in South Asia was made by the late president of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, on May 2, 1980. Prior to this, the idea of South Asian integration was discussed in at least three conferences: the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in April 1947, the Baguio Conference in the Philippines in May 1950, and the Colombo Powers Conference in April 1954. The governments of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka formally adopted its charter providing for the promotion of social, economic and cultural development within the South Asian region and also for friendship and cooperation with other developing countries. Its seven founding members were Bhutan, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh while Afghanistan joined the organization in 2007. Observer states include USA, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, Myanmar, Mauritius, Iran and European Union. Meetings of heads of state are usually held on annual basis and meetings of foreign secretaries twice a year.

3.2. Objectives of SAARC

The objectives of SAARC, as defined in its charter, are as follows:

• To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and improve their quality of life;
• To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region by providing all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and realize their full potential;
• To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia;
• To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another‟s problems;
• To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;
• To strengthen co-operation with other developing countries;
• To strengthen co-operation among themselves in international forms on matters of common interest; and
• To cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.

3.3. India’s Role in SAARC

India‟s initial attitude towards SAARC was lethargic and suspicious. It, consequently, played a limited role in the alliance, choosing instead to engage with its neighbors bilaterally based on reciprocity. However, as its economic position improved in the mid-1990s, India began to assume a greater role as a regional leader. The adoption of „Gujral Doctrine‟, changed this attitude in a big way. The Doctrine stemmed from the belief that India‟s stature on the world stage was closely tied to its relations with its neighbors. Subsequent governments – notably those led by Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh – continued to engage with India‟s neighbors in this spirit. During the SAARC Summit of 2007, India‟s External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, in an address to a Conference of Parliamentarians from the SAARC Region, declared India‟s readiness – as the largest nation in the region – “to accept asymmetrical responsibilities, including opening up her markets to her South Asian neighbors without insisting on reciprocity.” The change in posturing notwithstanding, India hasn‟t been able to translate all of its promises into action. Studies find that the presence of a large economy often has positive externalities for smaller economies in the region. The International Monetary Fund finds, howev-er, that India‟s growth has had only a minuscule impact on the growth of its neighbors. The paltry level of intra-regional trade stems from the region being the least open in the world, but within the region, India remains the least open country, with the lowest trade-to-GDP ratio. Besides, SAARC is still a long way from achieving even the most basic objective of a regional organization – a no-war scenario among its members. Despite SAARC‟s dismal past, the present government of Narender Modi has boldly stroked new hope for the future of SAARC. Modi is widely seen as a reformist prime minister, who is expected to open up the economy and liberalize trade. In addition, agreements stemming from visits to neighboring countries reveal a certain line of thinking – cooperation, particularly in infrastructure and energy, targeted at resolving shared problems. It is therefore logical that the government would seek similar opportunities to expand and deepen the engagement with SAARC. Modi‟s ambition for SAARC, however, is confronted by external and internal challenges. Externally, the continuing tensions with Pakistan, the uncertainty over Afghanistan and the role of outside actors, notably China, pose threats to revitalizing SAARC. Internally, the limited capacity of the Indian state, particularly the miniscule size of the Foreign Service as well as the ability to engage key state governments as stakeholders in foreign policy are also challenges that need to be addressed. Despite these challenges or indeed because of them, cooperation through SAARC on infrastructure, energy, water, trade, climate change mitigation, higher education, healthcare, terrorism and even military cooperation would contribute to India‟s twin goals of development and stability in the neighborhood. Modi has thrown down the gauntlet that “South Asian countries should identify specific areas of common heritage, challenges and opportunities to foster region-wide cooperation.”

3.4. Constraints in SAARC

There are some serious constraints which are not allowing South Asian cooperation to develop. Some of these hurdles are as under:-

1. Mistrust, mutual security perceptions and hostility among members.
2. India-Pakistan rivalry.
3. Fear of Indian Domination member countries.
4. Civilizations Clash.
5. Unstable and weak financial positions of SAARC members.
6. Asymmetry between India and Member Countries.
7. The charter of SAARC itself has some self-imposed anomalies as it has the provision of not discussing the contentious and bilateral disputes.
8. South Asia has not been a strong democratic region.
9. Lack of People to People Contacts.
10. Lack of Strong Infrastructure in South Asian countries.
11.  Pathetic Condition of South Asia.
12. Lack of political will at the leadership level.
13. Absence of collective vision for rejuvenating the region in the face of the globalization challenge.
14. Border clashes and war like situation accentuated by infiltration and terrorism accusations.

But despite all these barriers, SAARC remains a hope for almost ¼ of the world population residing in South Asia for better understanding among the nations of this region and regional integration.

4. India-ASEAN Relations

The civilization and cultural links between India and ASEAN countries date back thousands of years and are still visible today in their architecture and religion. But ideological differences precluded the development of close political ties for most of the Cold War. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao decided to engage Southeast Asia by initiating a new chapter as „look east policy, in Indian foreign policy paradigm as part of a broader effort to liberalize the country’s economy in an increasingly globalized world. The Look-East Policy portrays a strategic shift in India‟s vision of the world and India‟s position in the rapidly developing global economy. Since the inception of the Policy, India and ASEAN have embarked upon multiple bilateral, regional and sub-regional initiatives for the flourishing and pursuit of the Policy. India and ASEAN relations can be studied under the following headings:- 1) Economic Relations: 2) Political Relations: and 3) Strategic Relations.

4.1. Economic Relations

The Look East Policy gave a tremendous boost to economic ties between India and countries of ASEAN. A number of institutional mechanisms and provisions have been put in place to promote economic exchanges in the fields of Trade, Foreign Direct Exchange and Joint Ventures.

Trade: The trade relations between India and countries of the ASEAN region, though quite old, were not quantitatively significant up to the end of the cold war. But these relations got momentum after the end of the cold war in 1990s. During 1990s, the reason for development in bilateral trade between India and ASEAN was the positive signs shown by the then Indian government in 1990’s to liberalise the economy and move towards fewer government controls leading to a more competitive and open economy. This was looked upon with great anticipation by the ASEAN states. Further, the global recession, which started in the wake of the second oil price hike, also stimulated ASEAN states‟ interest towards India. From 1992 onwards, ASEAN, on the basis of its higher exports, enjoyed favourable trade balance with India. It implies that though India could increase its exports to ASEAN but simultaneously its imports also increased. The ‘look-East policy’ made positive impact on India’s trade with ASEAN in value terms. Since then, there is considerable development in bilateral trade between these two regions. The deepening of ties between India and ASEAN is reflected in the continued buoyancy in trade figures. India‟s trade with ASEAN countries has increased from US$ 30.7 billion in 2006-07 to US$ 39.08 billion in 2007-08 and to US$ 45.34 billion in 2008-09. In 2008-09, India’s exports to ASEAN totalled US$ 19.14 billion and India imported goods worth US$ 26.3 billion in 2008-09 from ASEAN, according to data released by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Two-way trade has reached to the figure of US$50 billion in 2010 with both sides witnessing higher exports. India’s exports to the region went up to $22.3 billion while imports increased to $27.8 billion. Presently, India-ASEAN trade has reached to the figure of U. S. $ 70 billion in 2012. During 2011-12 India-ASEAN trade has shown 41% growth. At India-ASEAN Summit held at New Delhi on 20-21 December 2012, a trade target of US$ 100 billion has been set for 2015.

Foreign Direct Investment: Like trade, foreign investment during 1980s and 1990s played important role in shaping rapid economic development of the ASEAN. Singapore was the most favourable investment destination among developing countries. The principal attractions of ASEAN were rapid industrialization, export orientation, policy of openness, progressive and positive attitude towards foreign investment. On the basis of number of investments approved, the cumulative ASEAN number of FDI and technology agreements in India during 1991-2002 has been 866, i.e. about 4.6 percent of total agreements which India entered with all other countries. Out of these 542 were financial and 324 were technical agreements. Singapore’s share among ASEAN-5 total agreements (with India) was about 65 percent, followed by Malaysia 17 percent and Thailand with 12 percent. Philippines‟s and Indonesia’s share in these approvals were 5 and 2 percent respectively. However, India‟s overall FDI in ASEAN was insignificant and most of that was concentrated in Singapore specifically in infrastructure, IT sector and petrochemicals.

Joint Ventures: India- ASEAN investment in the form of joint venture started in 1960s; these are of industrial as well as commercial nature and are mainly concentrated in Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. Now India is 18th biggest investor in Indonesia. India-Indonesia joint ventures are mainly in the areas of petrochemical plants and township developments. Malaysian joint ventures are mainly concentrated in infrastructure especially in highway development. In 2010 Malaysian companies were engaged in 28 projects worth US $ 1.8 billion in India and over 10 Indian companies were operating in Malaysia in near about 60 joint ventures. Singapore and India were having nearly 50 joint ventures in 1995. Now Singapore is involved in projects in electronic & telecommunication, cargo development, ware housing and software technology parks like Madras Corridor Project and International Tech Park Ltd. Bangalore. FTA (Free Trade Agreement) in Service and Investment was signed at ASEAN-India Summit held at Phno-Pneh, Cambodia, on 19 November 2012.

4.2. Political Relations

India has adopted multi pronged diplomacy to strengthen the political relations with ASEAN members. Efforts were made to maintain closer relations between the countries of Southeast Asia and India through various ways and means like bilateral agreements, India-ASEAN Dialogue Mechanism & India-ASEAN summits and high level political visits from India to ASEAN member countries and vice versa. To forge deeper bilateral relations, India signed various agreements with individual countries of ASEAN. Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DATT) 1994, Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement 2005 and Memorandum of Understanding for Army-to-Army Exercises 2005 are some of the important agreements signed with Singapore. Showing Indian culture and cuisine, through „India Evening‟ hosted in “Indian Show” in Singapore from January 14-16, 2011 is also an evidence of solid bilateral political relations of India and Singapore. Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology 1998, Trade Agreement 2000, Agreement (CECA) July, 2011 and Cultural Exchange Programme for 2010-13 are a few of many other agreements which are signed between India and Malaysia. India has also inked some agreements with Thailand. To name a few are Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 2000, Framework Agreement for Establishing a Free Trade Area in 2003 and MoU on Cooperation in the area of Renewable Energy 2007.The proposal for India-Thailand-Myanmar trilateral cooperation in the roads sector is also an indication of strong emerging relations among these nations. The Indonesia has also a special place in India‟s efforts to establish bilateral relations with ASEAN countries.

To conduct and maintain smooth political relations a dialogue mechanism was also evolved which encompasses four areas: (i) ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) (ii) ASEAN-India Senior Officials’ Meeting (iii) ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) and (iv) ASEAN-India Working Group. India was granted status of regional dialogue partner in January 1992 in four areas as a result of the improvement in its political relations in these countries, later on; India’s position was elevated to full dialogue partner in December 1995. Going on this track on strategic front India was also made a member of ASEAN regional forum (ARF) on July 23, 1996.

Interest of India and countries of ASEAN in each other is also revealed by bilateral political visits. Political leaders of India paid visit to ASEAN countries in order to boost political and economic relations. Reciprocally, political leaders of member countries of ASEAN also paid visits to India. In addition to this, delegates of these countries had also visited both regions to enhance mutual cooperation. Besides government-to-government interaction, steps were also taken to develop relations on non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) level as in the context of Southeast Asia, NGO’s have also a major role to play.

4.3. Strategic Relations

The broader agenda of Phase-II Look East Policy also focuses on security cooperation including joint operations to protect sea lanes and pooling resources in the war against terrorism. The military contacts and joint exercises, India launched with ASEAN, started on a low key basis in the 1990s, are now expanding into full fledged defence cooperation and it has also reached to the level of training of defence personnel and trade in military equipments. Malacca Straits is the main point of maritime security cooperation between India and Malaysia in recent times. India‟s security cooperation with Singapore dates back to mid- 1960s, however, it was not until 2003 that a defence cooperation agreement was signed between two countries. This agreement led to setting up of an India-Singapore Defence Policy Dialogue. A Joint Working Group on security between India and Thailand was set up in 2002 and was institutionalized in 2003. India and Philippines signed MoU for defence cooperation in 2006 during President Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam‟s visit to Philippines.

ASEAN-Indian defence relationship can be understood at two levels. First, the bilateral defence ties between individual ASEAN states and India. Second, the multilateral collaboration between ASEAN as a regional bloc with India as well as involvement of ASEAN member-states in various defence activities those are largely multilateral in character. During 2nd India-ASEAN summit in October 2003 “ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation” was signed by India and “Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism” was adopted. During 3rd India-ASEAN summit, Prime Minister signed agreement on “India-ASEAN Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity”.

Besides the ARF, ASEAN member-states and India have also participated in other multilateral initiatives. For example, Singapore has participated in the MILAN series of naval exercises off the Andaman and Nicobar Islands that have been held biennially since 1995. The ASEAN member-states that participated in the „MILAN’ exercises held in February 2010 included Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam and Myanmar. The annual Western Pacific Naval Seminar (WPNS) established common communication procedures among Asia Pacific navies in 2001 and facilitated the sharing of information on piracy. In 2006, Singapore became the Information Sharing Centre for the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia [ReCAAP]. Such regional efforts to improve maritime security would in turn complement existing defence ties between India and ASEAN member-states. In September 2007, Singapore participated in Exercise Malabar, a naval war game in the Bay of Bengal, alongside Indian, American, Australian and Japanese naval vessels. Of watershed significance in Southeast Asia-India multilateral defence cooperation was India‟s participation in the inaugural ASEAN defence ministers meeting + 8 (ADMM +8) forum, held for the first time in Hanoi in October 2010. At the ADMM + 8, India was represented by Defence Minister A.K. Antony. At the India-ASEAN Special Commemorative Summit held in New Delhi on 20th and 21st December, 2012 participating nations underlined the need for cooperation on maritime security, a move that comes amid growing tension between China and other claimants in the potentially oil-and gas-rich South China Sea.

Hence, India-ASEAN engagement that began with a strong economic emphasis has now also become increasingly strategic in its content, political dialogue between the two has grown, consultations in regional forums have intensified, and defence and counter-terrorism cooperation have expanded. Thus, India and ASEAN could succeed in converging their respective „vision2020‟ and march together beyond the year 2020 by drafting shared Asian Vision.

5. India-EU Relations

Considered „natural allies in a wide range of global issues‟ by both parties, diplomatic relations between India and the EU were established in the early 1960s. Since the 1990s, cooperation between the two increased and their relationship was institutionalized. A cooperation agreement signed in 1994 took the bilateral relationship beyond trade and economic cooperation. At the 5th India-EU Summit held at The Hague in 2004, the relationship was upgraded to a „Strategic Partnership‟. The two sides adopted a Joint Action Plan in 2005 (which was reviewed in 2008) that provided for strengthening dialogue and consultation mechanisms in the political and economic spheres, enhancing trade and investment, and bringing peoples and cultures together. The relations between the two can be studied under the following heads:-

5.1. Political Relations

The first India-EU Summit took place in Lisbon in 28 June 2000 and marked a watershed in the evolution of the relationship. Since then, twelve annual Summits have been held, the last one in New Delhi on 10 February 2012. The 12th Summit was the first Summit to be held in India after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The then Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh led the Indian delegation while the EU was represented by Mr. Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council and Mr. Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission. The two sides reviewed bilateral relations as well as exchanged views on regional and global issues. The leaders expressed satisfaction at the intensification of negotiations on the Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement, welcomed the enhanced cooperation in the field of security, and called for finalization of an agreement on R&D cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The two sides also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Statistics and issued Joint Declarations on Research and Innovation Cooperation and Enhanced Cooperation in Energy. The 13th Summit could not be held in 2013. India and the EU also interact regularly at the Foreign Minister level. The 23rd India-EU Ministerial Meeting took place in Brussels on 30 January 2013. The then External Affairs Minister, Salman Khurshid, led the Indian delegation while the EU side was led by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton. Bilateral relations as well as international and regional issues of mutual interest were discussed at the meeting. The two Ministers met again on 11 November 2013 in New Delhi in the margins of the 11th ASEM Foreign Ministers‟ Meeting hosted by India.

Both sides have recently instituted Foreign Policy Consultations at the level of Secretaries. The first meeting took place in New Delhi on 15 November 2011, followed by a second round in Brussels on 20 July 2012. The last round of Foreign Policy Consultations was held in New Delhi on 24 January 2014, led by Mr. Dinkar Khullar, Secretary (West), MEA and Mr. David O‟Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer, European External Action Service. The last meeting of the JWG on Counter Terrorism and Cyber-Security dialogue were held in Brussels on May 20 and 21, 2015 respectively. In 2013, both sides also agreed to the institution of a dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament under the umbrella of the Security Dialogue, and the first meeting of this dialogue took place in New Delhi in May 2014. An annual India-EU Ad-hoc Dialogue on Human Rights is held in New Delhi, the eighth meeting of which took place on 27 November 2013. There is also a Delhi-based Joint Working Group on Consular Issues. In addition, a High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Mobility has been instituted at Secretary level between the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs and DG Home Affairs, the third round of which took place in New Delhi on 2 July 2012.

5.2. Economic Relations

The EU as a bloc of 28 countries is India‟s largest regional trading partner while India was the EU‟s 9th largest trading partner in 2014. India‟s bilateral trade in goods in 2014 was €72.52 billion as compared to €72.66 billion in 2013 and thus registered a marginal decline of 0.20% in 2013 when compared to 2013. The trade balance in goods which turned in India‟s favor in 2013, continued to remain in India‟s favor by €1.62 billion in 2014 with an increase of €0.6 billion when compared to the trade balance of €1.02 billion in India‟s favor in 2013. Indian exports to the EU amounted to €37.07 billion during 2014 as compared to €36.84 billion in 2013, showed an increase of 1.03% while India‟s imports from EU in 2014 stood at €35.45 billion as compared to €35.82 billion in 2013, thereby reflecting a decline of 0.63%.

The EU is one of the largest sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for India.FDI inflows from the EU to India were €5.48 billion in 2012 and € 4.3 billion in 2013. Indian investments in the EU28 were € 1.4 billion in 2013. The most important EU countries for FDI inflows into India in 2013 were the Germany, UK, Italy, Sweden and Belgium. India and the EU are in the process of negotiating a bilateral Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) since 2007 which will significantly enhance the commercial relationship once implemented.

5.3. Strategic Partnership

The European Security Strategy (ESS) (December 2003) was the first EU document to mention strategic partnerships as a kind of foreign policy tool. After working for over a year, the European Commission came out with a communication on “An EU-India Strategic Partnership” (June 2004), which proposed a series of “strategic policy dialogues” and “strategic sectoral dialogues” to streamline the architecture of the relationship. It proposed to develop a “genuinely” strategic partnership with India in four key areas:- a) cooperation, especially in multilateral fore, on conflict prevention, the fight against terrorism, and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; b) a strengthened economic partnership through strategic policy and strategic dialogues; c) development cooperation; and d) fostering intellectual and cultural exchanges. The objective, the attached 46-page Commission Services Working Document added, was to have “a firm and visible upgrading” of the relationship from the existing dialogue between “good friends to a truly strategic partnership between two major international players”. Six weeks later, in a detailed 31-page Response to the EC Communication – the first ever Indian strategy paper on relations with an outside entity –New Delhi presented a number of proposals for enhancing more systematic interaction with the European Union.

The strategic partnership was endorsed at the fifth India–EU summit (2004). Two texts were negotiated: a new Political Declaration and a Joint Action Plan divided into four sections (politics, trade and investment, economic policy, and cultural and academic matters) covering issues of mutual concern were adopted at the next summit in September 2005. The Joint Political Declaration was deemed to be the “starting point” of a joint reflection that would lead to “a firm and visible upgrading” of the EU-India relationship, from the existing dialogue between “good friends” to “a truly strategic partnership” between two major players.

An Implementation Report on the working of the strategic partnership was presented at the Helsinki summit (October 2006), where it was agreed that an annual progress report on implementation of the JAP would be presented. The eighth summit (November 2007) resolved to make an “overall assessment” of the JAP in 2008 and assess the “ways and means” to further upgrade the overall framework of EU-India relations (India-EU Joint. At the Marseilles summit (September 2008), a revised JAP was adopted, which added 40-odd new activities in four areas (peace and comprehensive security, sustainable development, research and technology, and people-to-people and cultural exchanges). The Joint Action Plans read more like a laundry list which were “long on shared fundamentals and abstract political objectives but short on specifics and deliverables, and devoid of timelines”. They lead “mainly to dialogue, commitments to further dialogue, and exploratory committees and working groups rather than to significant policy measures or economic breakthroughs”.

6. Conclusion

In the rapidly changing global environment, regional integration in South Asia has assumed a new strategic significance. Not surprisingly, the potential political-economic and strategic gains from SAARC for all member countries have increased significantly. As the largest economy of the region, it is imperative and an opportune time for India to take a lead in building an environment of trust among SAARC members, which would encourage greater commitment to regional integration by all.

The ASEAN-India partnership holds ample potential for a successful future. As things stand, it is evident that both India and ASEAN are keen to establish a strong relationship with a long-term emphasis on greater cooperation and integration, apart from the strengthening of economic and strategic ties. While there are definite challenges to be addressed before achieving a consolidated East Asian Community, it is evident that conscious efforts are being made on both the sides in developing synergies for the shared prosperity and mutual benefit of India, ASEAN and the Asian region at large.

An integrated trade relationship is crucial for promoting economic growth between India and the EU. India has initiated „big-ticket‟ reforms such as allowing foreign direct investments in retail and civil aviation sectors. Investment cap in insurance sector has also been raised. The Government of India has indicated to take more measures for improving investment environment, fiscal consolidation and new projects in finance, infrastructure and energy sectors. The potential India-EU market would be huge, consisting of around 1.7 billion people. Both India and the EU constitute „strategically important markets‟ for each other. The FTA has potential to boost to the trade relations but it should be made balanced and mutually beneficial. India‟s concerns should be adequately addressed and the FTA must not further increase the imbalance in India-EU trade relations.