24 India‘s Security Concerns

Professor R.S. Yadav

Structure of the Unit

1.  Introduction

2. Objectives

3.   What is Security?

4.  India‘s Security Concerns

5.  Strategies for Security

5.1. Hard Power Projections

5.2. Soft Power Diplomacy

5.3. Internal Strength

6.  Conclusion

7.  Important Questions

8.   Suggested Readings

1. Introduction

Concept of security is regarded as the most important clement of national interest of any country‘s foreign policy, because it is the first guarantee of a state‘s international personality. Hence it acquires prominent place in the priorities of foreign policy. In this context, the term ―security policy‖ provides broader and far more accurate picture of a country‘s perspective on issues critical to its survival and continuity than merely the term ―defence policy.‖ It is because it does not limit itself only to threats from external sources, but also includes internal threats to the country‘s security. Besides, it does not only examine ‗threats‘, but also looks at the challenges the country is facing both in the medium and the long term basis. However, the increasing scope of national security also involves problems. National security may no longer be synonymous with national defence, but the fact remains that national defence is still the most central issue of this concept and any exaggerated attempts at broadening the concept may well result in losing sight of the central issue. Hence, one has to analyze the broader context of national security in the context of parameters of national defence.

2. Objectives

Main objective of this module is to apprise the students about the changing contours of security in general and India‘s security concerns in particular. Before India‘s security issues are examined, an effort has been made to apprise the students about multifaceted dimensions of security. In this context, first of all an overview of global scenario is made to examine the challenges faced by India due to the changing nature of power politics at international level. After this, politics of South Asia is also explained to understand the regional milieu in which India‘s foreign policy has to operate.

3. What is National Security?

Generally accepted notion of security has been to keep intact the geographical unity or protection of country‘s boundaries. But this answer is not sufficient. It is because sometimes by way of certain treaties, agreements, and military alliances or under duress nations surrender territorial integrity or sometimes lose some territory without the surrender of their sovereignty. National security can be understood through various meanings given below:

• Security means the preservation of the (a) territorial integrity, (b) sovereignty, and (c) life and property of the people. The order of priority of these three elements of security would depend on the given circumstances which tend to vary from state to state and from time to time.
• Security means primarily external security, from the point of view of international relations. Only that aspect of internal interest, which relates to the very existence of the state or which would weaken or strengthen external security, can also be considered as part of security.
• Short term security in terms of militarism often proves false. Long term and durable security is that which results from economic development, state-building, and a non-belligerent foreign policy.
• A military security system outside national frontiers has the seeds of imperialism in it, and does not, therefore, represent security in the true sense; and, in the nuclear age may be detrimental to national interest. Only military security within the frontiers and security through the development of international law, world government, and collective security outside the frontiers can be said to serve the national interest of a state in the nuclear age.

In the contemporary times, the growth of new dimensions of security needs to be understood. Presently, security is neither a one-dimensional concept, nor its environment is unilinear phenomenon only in the military sense. But according to former Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit, to ensure the ―security of a state or society or nurturing a safe security environment, it is necessary to perceive these objectives as a multi-dimensional phenomenon where the totalities of political, commercial, cultural, technological and defence activities nurturing an atmosphere of political stability conducive to cooperation and constructive interaction between states and peoples to their mutual benefit.‖ Thus, states should develop a capacity to communicate and interact and having the capacity to present such communication and interaction from becoming detrimental to one‘s own security and stability which are the essential, dual ingredients in the process of creating the desired security environment. Therefore, to study the security policy in a comprehensive context and in a multi-faceted form is the demand of contemporary international relations.

4.  India’s Security Concerns

After the brief evaluation about the nature and preliminary knowledge about security policy, it is pertinent to analyze India‘s security policy. For a systematic appraisal of India‘s security policy, it could well be analyzed on the three fundamental basis, i.e., global Level Context; regional Context; and, internal context. Though these three aspects jointly produce the compact knowledge of total security system, yet an in-depth analysis of individual factor is likely to provide an objective and utilitarian explanation.

4.1. Global Level Context

Global level challenges for the Indian security could be analyzed into two parts – (i) cold war era; and, (ii) post- cold war era.

(i) Cold War Era (1947-1991): During the cold war period consistency was missing in India‘s security policy, rather on the basis of its experiences and changing international milieu it was changing frequently. Basically, it could be understood under twin categories – (a) During Nehru Era; and, (b) During post-Nehru period.

(a) During Nehru Era: During the whole pre-British period there really was ‗no theory of war‘ and ‗no system of defence‘ to speak of. It was only after the arrival of the British a systematic theory of security was evolved. British policy of Indian security was based on two-fold parameters—strengthening of the naval capabilities and creation of buffer states. Consequently, a well neat security system prevailed during that period. However, such system of security was not based on the internal compulsions of the country rather it was based on the colonial interests of the Britain.

In the post-independence India as well, a well integrated security policy was not adopted due to numerous reasons. First, the partition of the subcontinent fragmented India‘s territory, its economic resources, armed forces, population, productive capabilities etc. which reduced it into a weak state. Second, the new political leaders, like British, neither could follow a forward looking policy in the north, nor do they had any naval policy for the south. Besides, the Indian leadership viewed the Indian army and its leaders with ‗alarm and suspicion‘ verging into deep rooted paranoia. Moreover, being the thrust of Nehru‘s foreign policy based on non-alignment focusing on human development and peace, it could not perceive military as an alternative to achieve this goal. Third, Indian freedom struggle was devoid of the thinking to incorporate military specialists to consider the security issue. Only a very limited concern was shown by some leaders but that too was confined mainly on mechanical aspects such as reduction in military expenditure, reforms in recruitment system, and demand for Indianization etc. Hence, there was little consciousness of the need to dovetail the military into the governmental system, or of the need to develop military power as a liver of state. Thus, Harish Kapur was right when he observed that, post-independent India neither had the power nor the political inclination, nor the military expertise to pursue a century old national security policy designed by Britain.

Besides above reasons, post-world war II strategic environment provided limited options for Indian security. Due to prevailing cold war between the superpowers world was divided into two ideologically opposite blocs. The position of newly independent states was so asymmetrical that they are not in a position to withstand the pressures of these powers single or united. Nor they could withstand their pressures. However, India‘s position was slightly better among the developing countries, yet because of its suspicion and unfriendly ties with its neighbours, China and Pakistan, it got involved in the global cold war politics. Thus, besides the then capabilities and approach, international environment was also not suitable to the needs of Indian defence.

To face these challenges, instead of strengthen its military potentials, Nehru adopted following strategies for its defence – First, which accepted the normal expansion of the armed forces, his perception envisioned the tackling of national security issue essentially through political initiatives. For him designing a defence policy was an anathema to him as he visualized no military threats for India, hence considered ―the police are good enough to meet our security needs?‖ Second, it was considered that international configuration of international forces was a sufficiently good protective barrier for the maintenance of India‘s independence. Nehru thought that the mutual rivalry among superpowers would in itself be the surest guarantee against all attacks on India. Consequently, Nehru never perceived of additional enhanced facilities for India‘s defence. Third, another issue related to global milieu has been Nehru‘s perception towards bipolar world order. He viewed that in past main causes for wars have been the military alliance system. Consequently, India should follow an independent and objective policy unattached to any power bloc system. That is why, after independence India adopted the policy of non-alignment which judged each issue on its merit and rejected all kinds of military alliance system. Nehru might have perceived that by adopting such policy India, on the one hand, will be in a position to keep itself away from power politics and on the other hand, will be in a position to get economic assistance from both the superpowers as it was essential for India‘s economic development at that time. Forth, though India did not perceive any threats to its security at global level, yet it considers it wise to rely on the international organization if such need arises. This might have been the reason that is why India took its issue of Kashmir in 1947-48 to the United Nations rather settling the same by the use of force. Though Nehru was confident about not having any problem for India‘s security at global level, yet he never completely ruled out the possibilities of such conflict at the regional and bilateral levels. But to meet out the latter exigencies also he relied on twin types of means – (i) security through friendship; and, (ii) resolution of conflict through political means. First method of Nehru‘s strategy was very much evident from his policies towards China, particularly his policy of ‗Panchsheel‘. To resolve the issue of tensions on Indo-Myanmar border, arise due to internal disturbances in the latter, and to tackle the China‘s activities in Indian territories, Nehru always applied second method to solve those issues.

Thus, Nehru era (especially prior to 1962 Chinese war) was devoid of any security policy of India. India‘s compensation of such policy through its policy of non-alignment also remains futile as (i) both the superpowers were critical of India‘s such approach and never have conviction for such policy. (ii) Non-alignment did not devise any mechanism of guarantee for India‘s security during cold war tension. (iii) India‘s neighbours though supported its policy and related principles ( panchsheel and peaceful coexistence) but never adopted them in practice while establishing bi-lateral ties with India. (iv) Nehru received support from large number of developing countries to make this movement global, but on ground realities it also proved futile. The attitude adopted by these states in the post-1962 war was a clear illustration of it. (v) Nehru‘s indifference to military alternative and excessive faith in the peaceful nature of neighbours proved to be only imaginary. (vi) Finally, as a result of above policies, India lost two large chunks of territories to its neighbours. Even its assessment that international organization functions in a non-partition manner also proved wrong. Thus, Nehru era represents the lack of concrete policy for national security. Besides, all the principles and diplomacy for defence also proved to be futile. And the incident Nehru had of 1962 India-China war represents the height of such phenomenon.

(b)   During Post-Nehru Period: Post-Nehru era represents the emphasis on new strategies and programmes for India‘s defence. The debate over India‘s defeat in 1962 war brought out new changes in India‘s security policies. The multi-fold changes in this context have been in the following directions: First, country‘s national interests were re-examined in the context of its foreign policy orientations and new assessment about friends and enemies of the country is made. Second, for the first time in post-independent India, foreign affairs were no more allowed to remain the domain reserve of the political leaders. Third, it was brought out into open, with accusing figures pointed out at those who were guilty of having neglected India‘s security.

Finally, the wide freedom that enjoyed in the foreign policy sector had disappeared; at least so far as regional affairs were concerned. Thus, a re-evaluation of Nehruvian concept of national security was clearly evident.

Besides above mentioned changes, a search for new alternatives to Nehruvian model started. After settling itself into power, Indira Gandhi adopted twin types of strategies to tackle the new situation. These strategies were – (i) self reliance in defence; and, (ii) friendship with the powers. Though a detailed analysis of these strategies will be discussed later in this chapter, yet it is clear by now that India realized that in dealing with its neighbours, at least, improvement of military strength is inevitable. Non-alignment and political diplomacy may be sufficient means to tackle macro global issues, but in case of neighbours, increased defence power capabilities could only do the needful. The emerging Sino-Pak axis after 1962 war and culmination of 1965 Indo-Pak conflict further strengthen this thinking. In this context, however, so far development of conventional weapons was only stressed upon.

India knew well that self reliance in defence and development of strong capabilities are not easy to achieve overnight. These processes are time consuming. Consequently, India also followed the strategy of friendship with major powers till the first is achieved. To some extent the departure had already become evident during the last days of Nehru era when he appealed and obtained military assistance from Great Britain and the USA in the wake of China‘s attack on India. This process got strengthened during the Indira Gandhi era when India relied much for its defence needs on former Soviet Union. Though India rejected Brezhnev doctrine of ‗Collective Security for Asia‘ in 1969, yet to achieve its national interest it had to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the erstwhile USSR in 1971. This dependence on Soviet Union with minor ups and down continued almost till the disintegration of the former Soviet Union in 1991.

From the point of view of strengthening military capabilities the decades of 1970s and 1980s had been very important. The war of 1971 not only enhanced India‘s regional status, but also increased its role in international politics. At this juncture, India, on the one hand, was opposing the discriminatory nuclear regime in the firm of NPT, whereas on the other hand, it was busy in enhancing its prestige by conducting ‗peaceful nuclear explosion‘ (PNE) at Pokhran in 1974. The latter led to the imposition of sanctions by the nuclear powers which severely restricted the growth of India‘s nuclear activities. Though India never aspired to make a bomb, yet these developments put stringent control over India‘s general nuclear technological growth.

Visualizing the stringent control over nuclear proliferations, smaller states adopted a simple and shortcut method of developing missiles without conducting nuclear explosions. India was also not behind in this process. Hence, during the decade of 1980s India, along with its space program for peaceful purposes, developed an independent missile development program. The ‗Integrated Guided Missile Program‘ (IGMP), launched in July 1983 with an initial funding of Rs. 7.8 billion, has indeed made the great leap forward. India has not only successfully developed the five different types of missiles ( Trisul, Akash, Prithvi, Nag, Agni ), but also developed the technical expertise to make long range ballistic missile. India, after China, has been considered the most advanced country among the third world countries to acquire such technologies. Thus, efforts towards self-reliance in defence and goodwill with major powers remain the hallmark of India‘s security policy till the end of cold war.

(ii)    Post-Cold War Era (1991-2015): Bizarre and multi-fold changes in the post-cold war era have brought about numerous transformations in the world order in general and security context in particular. As the process is still in transition, so no one could predict in which direction the thing are going to settle. But one thing is certain that now India has to re-assess its old ties and to develop new affiliations. In the context of its relations with China, Russia and America it has to develop new realignments with a view to bring out more straight forward and objective ties with them.

As far as Russia is concerned, India has signed a new treaty of friendship with it as a mark of continuity with old friendly relationships. But India cannot rely upon Russia to that extent as it used to be dependent upon erstwhile USSR. It is certain that on some issue both are going to have similar approach and on some other India is likely to be relying on Russian friendship. But it is still premature for the growth and development of strategic triangle‘ among them along with China as third party. Emergence of this relationship will be dependent on Russia‘s strategic alliance with China and its continued dependence on the West. Thus, new changes have taken place in the Indo-Russian relations, but a coordination among the two to serve India‘s long term interests may continue to remain the same.

Post-cold war situation has brought about substantial changes in India-America relations. They are no more estranged and cold as it used to be earlier. Despite differences, relationship among them is going in a positive direction. Besides, development of ‗military-to-military‘ cooperation among the two, America now considers India as an important power of South Asia. Though both differs on the issues like – nuclear non-proliferation, Kashmir, trade restrictions, supply of arms to Pakistan, restructuring of UN security council etc., yet these have not created obstacle in the emerging Indo-US economic ties. The ban on Pakistan‘s militant organization Harkat-ul-Ansar by the USA has further consolidated the latter‘s relations with India. However, lack of confidence among the two still prevails as the USA is not willing to transfer certain sensitive technologies to India. Hence the augment of friendly ties between the two will be dependent on the USA‘s recognition of superiority of India in South Asia and development of independent foreign policy approach towards it.

Thus, in the post-cold war era India continued its earlier policy of self reliance in defence along with its adaptability with the new changes. Some experts believe that establishment of ‗National Security council‘ is likely to strengthen the institutional growth of India‘s foreign policy making. But it is too early to reach such conclusion about the success of this new institution. Hence, on the basis of the growth of this new institution to conclude that security policy will be more coherent and long term is too optimistic and utopian. Probably, India will continue to monitor its security on its consistent efforts of defence build up and new diplomacy to adopt the changing international milieu.

4.2. Regional Context

India‘s regional Security concerns are related to the developments in and around South Asian region. In this context, apart from eight countries of South Asia, its extended neighborhood also influences the security. Hence, it also includes countries of West Asia, Central Asian Republics, Southeast Asian states and China. Though some of them may not be geographically connected with India and may not have direct bearings on India‘s security, yet indirectly spillover impact of certain developments in these states does affect Indian security. Hence regional context is very sensitive and important for India‘s defence and security planners. Broadly speaking in this context, following factors impinges on India‘s security in a significant manner.

(i) Pakistan Factor: Since its inspection Pakistan continues to remain significant factor in India‘s regional security concern. This is clearly manifest from the four hot wars India had to fight with Pakistan, i.e. 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Besides, Kashmir factor has become a permanent irritant between the two states. Some other issues like Sir Creak, Tulbul project, Siachin, Indus Water etc also become point of debate between the two states. Presence of cold war and role of outside powers added a pinch of salt to their hostile relationship. Hence, so far they have not been able to demarcate their international border, rather continue to observe LOC as their boundary. Now after acquisition of nuclear status by both the states in 1998, it was assumed that this tension might recede. But even end of cold war and acquisition of nuclear capabilities by both have not brought peace in this region. Rather now this conflict is being managed through proxy war, and terrorism got importance. Besides, narcotic drug trafficking also became another irritant preventing good will between the two. Though in between some efforts of peace-building in term of CBMs are made, yet they also have not been successful to establish durable peace. Thus, in South Asia, Pakistan factor continue to remain a permanent irritant in India‘s security concerns. Only change that has been witnessed was probably in terms of degree and style but not in contents.

(ii)    China Factor: China, except for some early phase of ―Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai‖ , continue to remain one of the major areas of concern for the security policy maker in India. Most serious issue that derailed their relations has been the demarcation of boundary between the two counties. When India became free it was assumed that McMohan Line, demarcated during 1914 Shimla agreement by Tibet, British India and China, will work as international border between the two states. But the new government of People Republic of China in 1949 rejected this time as it was drawn by the colonial masters of that time. As a result, war took place between the two states in 1962, which led to the capture of thousands of kilometers of Indian Territory by China in the Aksai Chin region in Western and near McMohan line in the Eastern sectors. Later on, Pakistan also seceded 5180 Kilometers of territory in Aksai Chin region of POK to China by signing an agreement in 1963. This resulted in a deadlock situation between the two states up to 1976.

Though relations between them revived in 1976, yet their border problem continue to exist as it is. Since 1988, both appointed a ‗Joint Working Group‘ (JWG) to resolve the border problem and continued their relations in other areas. Since then, lots of improvement is noticed in their economic, political, cultural and science & technological cooperation, but border issue continue to remain unresolved despite numerous meetings of JWG since 1988. Besides, issues like Chinese assistance in the development of nuclear programme of Pakistan and economic assistance to develop POK; its building of an economic corridor in Pakistan from Korakaram to Gwadar port; its assertive role in South China Sea etc. are working as serious irritants in building goodwill between the two states. Additionally, China‘s pursuit of ‗string of pearls‘ theory by helping naval development in India‘s neighbourhood is a serious matter for the latter. This maritime silk route venture by China is not taken positively by India‘s policy makers. Thus, these developments have serious implications for India‘s security concerns in South Asian region.

(iii)    Indian Ocean: It used to be a neglected region for India‘s security, because in the 1950s and1960s its main focus has been towards threats emanating from northern land borders. But in the decade of 1970s, this region attracted attention due to emerging superpower rivalry after British policy of ‗east of Suez‘ proclaimed in 1967. This competition of powers brought direct threat to Indian sea boundaries, as Diego Garcia was developed as its major military base by the USA. Further deployment of Polaris A3 missiles by the USA created a direct threat to Indian Territory. Beside strategic concerns, economic factors also brought India‘s attention towards

Indian Ocean. It is because nearly 97 percent of Indian trade is done through this route. Moreover 75 percent of India‘s oil exploration work is also done on the high seas of Indian Ocean. Hugh areas of Indian Ocean can be explored for economic resources by India as approved by international law in the form of contiguous and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Its ‗pioneer states‘ also allows it to explore addition 3 million square kilometer area for its economic use, particularly exploring the manganese noodles. Besides, India possesses nearly 1200 islands on both sides of the Indian Ocean, security of which is serious concern for the country‘s policy makers.

In the Post-Cold war era, this region acquired significance in terms of new regionalism to boost economic cooperation among states. As a result, 14 states of this region form a new economic group in the form of Indian Ocean Rim – Association for Regional Corporation (IOR-ARC). Later this number reached to 20. Now India, along all other states of this organization, is concerned with making sea lanes of communication open so that trade and other economic activities of this forum can run smoothly. Even the threat of piracy, especially in the areas near Gulf of Aden and in the area of Southeast Asia, can be controlled through collective efforts.

(iv)   Central Asian Republics: With the growth of terrorism and fundamentalism, northern side of India also became serious menace for the country. This becomes all the more grave as centre of such activities lie in Pakistan and Afghanistan. That is why, India does not like that fundamentalism takes its root in the five predominantly Muslim states emerged as a result of disintegration of former Soviet Union. Besides, Central Asian region is rich source of oil, gas and other minerals. Even it also provides good market for Indian goods and there lies huge scope for joint ventures in this region. But political instabilities are the main source of security concern in this area. To maintain safety and security of oil and gas pipeline in this region may become reason for India‘s security concerns, as it is also involved in the joint explorations and supply of natural oil and gas in this area.

(v)   Indo–Pacific Region: The region from western Indian Ocean to Pacific is also emerging as an important area due to its geo-economic and geo-strategic nature. Since India is mainly concerned about this area, hence developments in this region cannot be overlooked by it. If this larger area of Asia- Pacific is to become a larger economic community, India‘s role is likely to be crucial as it is not only a dialogue partner of ASEAN, but also a member of larger East Asia Summit (EAS) for economic cooperation. In strategic terms as well, India is not only part of ARF, but also making effort towards larger security goals in this region. It is again matter of serious attention due to expansionist role of China, in the region in general and in the area of South China Sea in particular. Consequently, India became part of joint naval exercises being done by the USA, Australia and Japan. As a result, it is important part of US design of ‗pivot of Asia‘ and its larger Asia-Pacific security arrangements.

Thus, India‘s security Interests are not only limited to its proximate neighborhood of South Asia, but also related towards its extended neighborhood of Southeast, Central and West Asia. This is very well manifested in terms of its larger Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific frameworks.

4.3 Internal Context

Some internal crises have serious bearings on India‘s security matters. These are divisive movements, ethnic insurgent groups, naxalite groups etc. This becomes all the more crucial when they are supported and helped by neighboring states. Besides, the issue of direct war has been replaced by proxy wars, which is a serious menace for India‘s security. These are as follows:

(i)   Secessionism: Since India is plural system, it houses numerous different groups in terms of caste, creed, ethnicity, languages, demographic and geographic disparities. As a result, it always faced problem of secessionism since its inception. Such movements have been active in its northeastern part in the form of Nagas, Mizos, Maite, Tripuri movements. In the northern area, such problems are being witnessed in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. From time to time they have directly and indirectly challenged India‘s security and territorial integrity. Such threats become all the more complex when these movements are supported by outside states.

(ii)     Terrorism: Since 1980s, problem of terrorism became a grave menace for the unity and integrity of the country. These activities are being supported not only domestically but also getting outside support from countries like Pakistan. Due to porous and non-demarcate nature of borders have further added complexities to this situation. Moreover, these days terrorism has acquired global dimension and are using very high tech machinery similarly to that of forces. Attacks on Indian Parliament and in Mumbai are examples of such qualitatively transformed nature of terrorist activities.

(iii) Naxalism: Presently, country‗s administrative and political stability is being challenged by the naxalite movements. Starting from terraen region adjoining Nepal border to the activities of people war group in Andhra Pradesh nearly 400 districts of the country are infested with this problem. These groups are running parallel administration in certain areas and are providing full challenge to the various Para-military forces deployed to control such activities. Despite best efforts of the Union and state governments, such activities have not been fully controlled.

(iv) Problem of Narcotic Drug Trafficking: India is sandwiched between two important drug producing regions of ‗triangle of crescent‘ and ‗golden triangle‘ and route to connect the two goes through India. These routes pass through either via Nepal, North Eastern States, Myanmar to Southeast Asia or through Pakistan, Sri Lanka to Southeast Asia. But in both the contexts, India comes in between the two routes. This has created serious problem of drugs addiction in the Indian population creating long term security threats. It becomes all the more significant when the amount received from the sale of such drugs are again invested to promote terrorism in the country. Therefore India‘s concern towards this problem is equally significant.

(v) Problem of Ethnicity: It is historic legacy that states in South Asia do have certain common ethnic population. They are similar but residing in different countries. But if some conflict arises among there with these people in one state, it is bound to have spill over impact in the other country. For instance, Tamil issue in Sri Lanka always had serious bearing not only for the politics of South Indian states, but also happen to influence the politics at national level. Similarly, if something happens to minority community in Bangladesh, serious refugee influx is being witnessed by India. Thus legacies of shared ethnicity, race, religion etc. in India‘s neighborhood do pose serious security problem for the country.

5. Strategies for Security

To handle the security concern, Government has adopted three types of broad strategies in the form of hard power projections; soft power diplomacy; and internal strength.

(i) Hard Power Projections: India always favours the use of peaceful and non-violent means for the resolution of global and regional conflicts. It also favours establishment of arms control and disarmaments in the world. It always supported the use of pacific methods for settlement of disputes at bilateral levels. Simultaneously, it is also engaged in the development of hard power capabilities to handle any eventualities. It is because in the past it has to face wars with both its big neighbours, i.e. Pakistan and China. Even adverse impact of Cold War has been felt on the politics of South Asia. Hence, followings up of such strategy are inevitable. As a result, it has developed a long chain of defence laboratories under the aegis of DRDO. Different ordinance factories are also established to provide basic arms during the need. These ventures have got huge support system in the form of national sciences and technological agencies, educational institutions, public sector undertakings and private enterprises engaged in the R & D work related to defence preparedness. Through this infrastructural support system India is making efforts to be self reliant in defence and indigenous production of weapon system. Besides, since 1983, it has started ‗Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme‘ (IGMDP) to become self reliant in missile developments. It is also working in the field of nuclear and electronic areas to boost its capabilities. This is further supported by its space programme to provide technologies for the use of defence production as well. It is also making effort in naval development by way of acquisition of new aircraft carrier from abroad and indigenous development of different war ships, submarines and frigates.

However, it must be noted here that despite so much efforts, India is still dependent on weapon acquisition from outside powers. Its current opening of defence manufacturing for private sector and ‗make in India‘ programmes are aimed at to reduce its dependence on imports of weapons from outside world. But only time will tell how much success India may attain from such initiatives. Besides, India continues to fall in the category of nations which are spending very less on its defence preparedness. India spends only 2.5 to 3.5 percent of its GDP on its defence which is very meager as compared to spending by its neighbours like Pakistan and China. But is also true that a country‘s security is dependent upon number of factors and how India assesses its security vis-à-vis global, regional and bilateral milieu that can only reveal whether it is secure with current level of preparedness or not?

(ii)   Soft Power Diplomacy: Besides hard power capabilities, India is also engaged in security through soft power as well. In terms of demography; economy; science and technology; and cultural moorings it is advancing its agenda of creating goodwill with neighbours and outside powers. In the early years these goals have been attained through its policies of Panchsheel , Gujral doctrine and non-alignment. Even through the treaty of friendship and cooperation with former Soviet Union, a balance of power situation has been managed. All these policies worked very smoothly during the Cold War years. In the Post-Cold War era, policy of economic engagements through extended neighborhood ‗Look East‘, ‗Act East‘ and new regionalism have been followed. Along with this cooperation, in the form of ‗strategic partnership‘, with major centers of power, has been followed. Besides, through the cultural notion of non-violence, democracy, social harmony etc. an overall peaceful milieu with all the states have been created. Moreover, through active role in UN Peace-Keeping activities and global environmental debates it is creating goodwill for itself in the global order.

(iii) Internal Strength: Successes of above strategies are dependent upon India‘s domestic strength. At internal level, India has to handle the issues of state and nation building by forming a cohesive and integrated social order. Besides, it has to face successfully all the challenges of globalization process. To realize its policies of ‗Make in India‘ and ‗Skill Development‘ it has to boost its pace of economic growth. Consequently, it will be in dire need of energy security with clean technologies. In this complex scenario, when there is thin line to segregate between domestic and external milieu, India has to enhance capabilities of the system to face these challenges. Though working of Indian democracy and youth power are two positive indictors in favour of India, yet the issue of corruption and economic deprivation and marginalization of large populations are two big internal challenges the country has to face in times to come.

6. Conclusion

It can be concluded that defence and security of the country is very vital interest for the foreign policy of any country. India is no exception to this phenomenon. In this context, India‘s foreign policy makers have to look its security in terms of three broad challenges at global, regional and internal levels. At global level, it has to adopt different policies to defend itself during cold war and post-cold war eras. During the first phase, it has mainly to rely on non-alignment, disarmament and UN support system, along with friendship and cooperation with former Soviet Union. In the post-cold war phase, global scenario underwent drastic transformations. It is now to rely more on closer ties with the USA, along with ‗strategic partnerships‘ with other centers of power. Besides, it has to utilize its nuclear option so as to attain parity with club of Nuclear-5 to make efforts to attain UN Veto through democratization of this organization. At regional levels, its policy of extended neighbourhood, along with formation of new economic groupings, are keys to its security concerns in the area. Simultaneously to these developments, it is making efforts to be politically stable and economically developed state through its ‗Make in India‘ ‗Digital India‘ and ‗Skill Development‘ programmes. But time will tell about how India succeeds in these endeavors.