4 Due Process’or‘Procedure Established By Law’ THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY’S COGITATIONS

Dr. AJAY K MEHRA

DUE PROCESS’ or ‘PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW’ THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY’S COGITATIONS

by

Ajay K. Mehra

The Judges of Aragon began by setting aside laws and ended by making them. And all this sweeping development could only be possible because of the presence of one little word ‘due’ which in its content, knows no bounds and is not subject to any fixed definition. Whenever a substantive law or some procedure laid down in any law did not find favour with the majority of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court it was not reasonable and, therefore, it was not ‘due’.

The main issue involved in the debate over ‘due process’ of law (as given in the US constitution) and ‘procedure established by law’ (as provided for in the Constitution of India) is whether the courts should have the right to strike down as ultra vires a law enacted or a constitutional amendment made by a legislature elected by people and whether the power of judicial review vested in the judiciary should be allowed to override the basic function and powers of the legislatures to legislate. In other words, and in particular relation to India, whether the doctrine of ‘basic structure’ propounded by the Supreme Court of India in the Kesavanand Bharti case in 1973 has negated the principle of ‘procedure established by law’ given in the Constitution of India.

In the following discussion we attempt to review the debate in the Constituent Assembly (CA) of India in order to understand why the CA gave its preference for ‘the procedure established by law’ and what do the minds of the founding fathers imply for the situation emanating out of the ‘basic structure’ doctrine given by the Supreme Court of India in 1973.

This issue was rather keenly debated in the CA while discussing draft Articles 15 and 15A (Articles 21 and 22), because the Drafting Committee chose to override the recommendations of CA’s Advisory Council on Fundamental Rights. The matter was reopened again nine months later with the introduction of the draft Article 15A by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. In both the cases the Drafting Committee succeeded in having its way with the members’ objections and inserting the Articles in the Constitution of India. The debate, rather the process of this debate and the CA’s decision on it, went through five stages:

1. The CA’s Advisory Council on Fundamental Rights recommended the use of the phrase ‘due process of law’ in the Article meant to secure ‘Protection of life and personal liberty’ to be incorporated in the Fundamental Rights.
2. The Drafting Committee changed it to ‘procedure established by law’ in the Draft Article 15.
3. Most members of the CA taking part in the discussion on the Draft Article 15 argued (6 and 13 December 1948) in favour of ‘due process’ as they felt that parliamentary power emanating from the ‘procedure established by law’ could be misused on partisan grounds to curb ‘personal liberty’ of individuals, both citizens and non-citizens.
4. Dr. Ambedkar in his reply to the debate felt that it was a difficult choice and did not show any particular preference for either, leaving the choice to the members, who eventually voted to retain ‘procedure established by law’, as proposed by the Drafting Committee.
5. The issue was virtually reopened nine months later (15 September 1949) when Dr. Ambedkar introduced Draft Article 15A, now Article 22, for discussion, which, taking account of sensibilities of the members of the CA, attempted greater safeguards for citizens by making two clauses of the Cr. PC constitutional – virtually taking them away from the Parliament’s amending powers, as it were. This, he claimed, brought in the spirit of (substantive) ‘due process’ in the functioning of the ‘procedure established by law’.

Between (i) and (ii) came in CA’s Constitutional Advisor B. N. Rau’s understanding of the functioning of the US constitution, where he thought that the Supreme Court had abused the substantive ‘due process’. Any doubts in his mind were removed after a discussion with Justice Frankfurter of the US Supreme Court, who pointed out to him that the makers of the American Constitution intended to use due process as a procedural safeguard only, but the US Supreme Court enlarged it into a substantive safeguard too. That, according to Frankfurter, made the judicial review undemocratic, because the court could strike down the policies of the government even by taking the stand that they were substantively opposed to provisions of the constitution. He was, therefore, for restricting judicial review to procedural grounds. According to Seervai, ‘By substituting for the words “due process of law” the expression “except according to procedure established by law” the Drafting Committee did not make the American concept of “due process” more precise as a matter of drafting – the Committee gave up the concept altogether.’ The finality in Seervai’s observation regarding the preference of the Drafting Committee for ‘procedure established by law’ as against the American concept of ‘due process’, which was comprehensively rejected despite the strong tilt several members showed towards the concept, suggests the limitations of the doctrine of ‘basic structure’ for the Constitution of India.

Meaning and Implication

Both of these concepts are linked to the evolution and eventual institutionalization of the doctrine of the rule of law as part of democratic theory, practice and governance. Aside from overall importance of the Magna Carta in laying the foundation of civic and human rights, ‘due process’ was among the first legal instruments to create the basis for fair trial of an accused both in procedure and in substance. The following two articles of the Magna Carta deserve attention in order to understand the primacy that the ‘law of the land’ and ‘lawful judgement of the peers’ acquired in delivering and ensuring ‘justice’ in a democratic system.

[39] No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way victimised, neither will we attack him or send anyone to attack him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.

[40] To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay right or justice.

As pointed out by one of members of the CA, the expression ‘Per Legum Terrera’ in the Magna Carta has come to mean ‘without due process of law’. Later, the Statute No. 28 during the reign of Edward III (1331), read, ‘No man of what state or condition so ever he be, shall be put out of his lands or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to death, without he be brought to answer by due process of law’. This was perhaps the earliest use of this expression; certainly earlier than its use in the Constitution of the United States of America. Indeed, as the British constitutional system evolved subsequently, unlike in the US constitutional and legal systems, ‘substantive due process’ did not acquire credence there. The parliamentary supremacy has remained unchallenged in Britain. Obviously, what Magna Carta has given is procedural due process, which is essentially based on the concept of procedural fairness. As a bare minimum, it includes an individual’s rights to be adequately notified of charges of proceedings involving him, and the opportunity to be heard at these proceedings. Thus, while Magna Carta forbade the King from disobeying Parliament, it did not create any instrument to forbid Parliament from doing anything.

The idea of substantive due process was developed in the 18th and 19th century in the USA. The Bill of Rights and ten Amendments (particularly the V Amendment) to the US constitution that were passed as a single unit on 15 December 1791 and the XIV Amendment, ratified in 1868, established that the idea of due process was substantive too. While proposing the Bill of Rights to the Congress James Madison thus explained, ‘Magna Carta does not contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respecting which the people of America are most alarmed.’ Substantive due process has thus developed as limitations on the power or authority of governmental legislative bodies to abridge any person’s life, liberty, or property interests.

The CA Debate on Article 21

The debate on the Draft Article 15 began with members expressing surprise that the Drafting Committee ignored the recommendation of the CA’s Advisory Council on Fundamental Rights to incorporate ‘due process of law’ in the Article meant to secure ‘Protection of life and personal liberty’ in the section on Fundamental Rights and opted for ‘procedure established by law’. And, of course, it prefixed ‘personal’ to liberty, which, except for a few dissenting voices, was generally accepted.

The debate that followed on the draft article was informed by the situation in the USA and concerned with effective judicial protection to ‘personal liberty’. It was felt that since parliament, party politics as well as conventions and traditions governing them had yet to evolve in the country, partisanship was expected to be the guiding element of parliamentary politics. Naturally, most members of the CA who introduced amendments in the draft article to restore ‘due process’ and took part in the debate, were worried that ‘procedure established by law’ would weaken the role of the judiciary in protecting ‘personal’ liberty from an executive and a legislature that had not developed norms for governing a complex and diverse society such as India and could be capricious and impulsive under the existing Indian situation. Kazi Syed Karimuddin (C.P. and Berar: Muslim) strongly argued that ‘procedure established by law’ does not make the rights inalienable. Moreover, since institutions were yet to be developed, political parties were not fully developed and ‘discipline is unknown’, it was advisable to have judicial protection.8 Supporting the amendment to substitute ‘procedure established by law’ by ‘without due process of law’, H. V. Pataskar (Bombay: General) drew attention of the CA to the fact that the new democratic India will naturally have a ‘party Government’, which was new in the Indian context ‘and we have instances which lead us to think that the party machine at work is likely to prescribe procedures which are going to lead to the nullification of the provision which we have made in the Fundamental Rights….’9 Obviously, the arguments of these members strongly emphasized the non-partisan status and role of the judiciary in ensuring personal liberty.

Mahboob Ali Baig Shah Bahadur (Madras: General), for example, wanted ‘except according to procedure established by law’ substituted with ‘save in accordance with law’, because the concept of ‘procedure established by law’ was taken from the Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution, which ensured life and liberty of persons within Japan’s territory ‘according to procedure established by law’, without providing for the safeguard available against misuse of authority by the Japanese law enforcing agencies in subsequent Articles 32, 33, 34 and 35¹⁰. He had no objection to the change made by the Drafting Committee provided the provisions of the rest of the four Articles from the Japanese Constitution were also incorporated to ensure the legal safeguards. In fact, by referring to the Japanese Constitution he raised the issue of police powers of the state, which could be misused unless sufficient judicial protection had been guaranteed to Fundamental Rights. He said:-

… I submit that there must be the right of the citizen to go to a court to prove that the ground on which he has been arrested is wrong and he is innocent. That is the elementary right of the citizen as against the executive which might be clothed with power by a party legislature which might pass a law saying that the executive is empowered to take away the liberty of a person under certain circumstances and he will have no right to go to court and prove his innocence…. But we must understand that the words “without due process of law” have been held in England and other countries to convey the meaning that every citizen has got the right when an action has been taken against him depriving him of his personal liberty, to go before the court and say that he is innocent. That right is given under the expression “without due process of law” or “save in accordance with law”.

Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava (East Punjab: General) objected to too much emphasis placed on procedure and making it ‘sacrosanct’, in the process weakening the substantive law. He said, ‘Though these words “without due process of law” which are sought to be substituted for the words in the section have not been defined anywhere, their meanings and implications should be understood fully. By using these “without due process of law” we want that the courts may authorized to go into the question of the substantive law as well as procedural law.’ ‘Due process’ to him took care of both procedural and substantive law and gave the people greater right to defend themselves against capriciousness of an emerging state. He strongly endorsed Mahboob Ali Baig Shah Bahadur’s contention on the provisions of the Japanese Constitution.

Expressing similar sentiments Chimanlal Chakkubhai Shah (Saurashtra) felt ‘(T)hat connotation (of “without due process of law”) is that in reviewing legislation, the court will have the power to see not only that the procedure is followed, namely, that the warrant is in accordance with law or that the signature and the seal are there, but it has also the power to see that the substantive provisions of law are fair and just and not unreasonable or oppressive or capricious or arbitrary. That means that judiciary is given power to review legislation.’13 Though he did not express strong apprehension about the legislature and executive as expressed by some other members, he thought that since the executive might need emergency powers, which would be granted by a legislature controlled by it, it was only proper to have safeguards against misuse by empowering the judiciary to review legislations. He too, thus, was seeking a check on police powers of the state.

Other members who supported the ‘due process’ against ‘procedure established by law’, such as Krishna Chandra Sharma (UP: General) and K. M. Munshi, also thought that it would provide a necessary judicial protection to personal liberty and fundamental rights against a strong state. They did not think that the functioning of the ‘due process’ in the US Constitution had created such anomalies that it would lead to unexpected and unwarranted strengthening of the judiciary vis-à- vis the legislature. Krishna Chandra Sharma, for example, pointed out that the expression ‘Per Legum Terrera’ in the Magna Carta has come to mean ‘without due process of law’. He pointed out that Statute No. 28 during the reign of Edward III (1331) said, ‘No man of what state or condition so ever he be, shall be put out of his lands or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to death, without he be brought to answer by due process of law’.14 Thus, he felt that ‘due process’, which originated in England much before it came to the USA, meant fair trial both in procedure and in substance and despite assertiveness of the American judiciary in defining the constitutional provisions there, it could protect the fundamental right better. K. M. Munshi too felt that there appeared to be unreasonable suspicion of ‘due process’, despite the fact that it had not upset the legislative process in America, as 90 percent of the cases on the ‘due process’ which went to the American courts, action of the legislatures had been upheld. He strongly felt that while the judiciary might certainly question several actions, it was unlikely to question all the legislations indiscreetly. He felt that ‘there must be some agency in a democracy which strikes a balance between individual liberty and social control.’

Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, however, felt that though ‘due process’ in England meant due course of legal proceedings, it had acquired a different connotation with the US practices, particularly because the US Supreme Court has not been consistent in interpreting the constitution and its decisions have many a times been conflicting. Hence, he indicated his preference for ‘procedure established by law’, as suggested by the Drafting Committee.In his rather detailed reply to the debate in the Constituent Assembly on Draft Article 15 of the constitution on 13 December 1948 Dr. Ambedkar said:-

The question of ‘due process’ raises in my judgment, the question of the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary. In a federal constitution, it is always open to the judiciary to decide whether any particular law passed by the legislature is ultra vires or intra vires in reference to the powers of legislation which are granted by the Constitution to the particular legislature. If the law made by a particular legislature exceeds the authority of the power given to it by the Constitution, such law would be ultra vires and invalid. That is the normal thing that happens in all federal constitutions. Every law in a federal constitution, whether made by the Parliament at the Centre or made by the legislature of a State, is always subject to examination by the judiciary from the point of view of the legislature making the law. The ‘due process’ clause, in my judgment, would give the judiciary the power to question the law made by the legislature on another ground. That ground would be whether that law is in keeping with certain fundamental principles relating to the rights of the individual. In other words, the judiciary would be endowed with the authority to question the law not merely on the ground whether the law was good law, apart from the question of the powers of the legislature making the law. The law may be perfectly good and valid so far as the authority of the legislature is concerned. But, it may not be a good law, that is to say, it violates certain fundamental principles; and the judiciary would have that additional power of declaring the law invalid. The question which arises in considering this is this. We have no doubt given the judiciary the power to examine the law made by different legislative bodies on the ground whether that law is in accordance with the powers given to it. The question now raised by the introduction of the phrase ‘due process’ is whether the judiciary should be given the additional power to question the laws made by the State on the ground that they violate certain fundamental principles.

There are two views on this point. One view is this; that the legislature may be trusted not to make any law which would abrogate the fundamental rights of man, so to say, the fundamental rights which apply to every individual, and consequently, there is no danger arising from the introduction of the phrase ‘due process’. Another view is this: that it is not possible to trust the legislature; the legislature is likely to err, is likely to be led away by passion, by party prejudice, by party considerations, and the legislature may make a law which may abrogate what may be regarded as the fundamental principles which safeguard the individual rights of a citizen. We are therefore placed in two difficult positions. One is to give the judiciary the authority to sit in judgment over the will of the legislature and to question the law made by the legislature on the ground that it is not a good law, in consonance with fundamental principles. Is that a desirable principle? The second position is that the legislature ought to be trusted not to make bad laws. It is very difficult to come to any definite conclusion. There are dangers on both sides. For myself I cannot altogether omit the possibility of a Legislature packed by party men making laws which may abrogate or violate what we regard as certain fundamental principles affecting the life and liberty of an individual. At the same time, I do not see how five or six gentlemen sitting in the Federal or Supreme Court examining laws made by the Legislature and by dint of their own individual conscience or their bias or their prejudices be trusted to determine which law is good and which law is bad.

Though indicating his preference for the Drafting Committee’s proposal, Dr. Ambedkar was non-committal about suitability of either ‘due process’, or ‘procedure established by law’ for India. As is clear from his statement, the federal dimension did not figure in his arguments. The federal dimension did not figure either in the arguments of any of the members who intervened, or in the arguments of Dr. Ambedkar. The sanctity of the fundamental rights, personal liberty to be more specific, and which institution could be more suitable to protect rights and liberty and with what provisions, dominated their arguments. The question of domain of the judiciary on the one hand and of the legislature and the executive on the other in this context too is important and implicit in the discussion and the arguments presented. The suspicion of the representative institutions (of the elected representatives in particular) in a nascent democracy where rules of the democratic game had yet to evolve, appears to be the supreme concern of the members who took part in the discussion. Weak party system and diverse social conditions appeared to be heightening their apprehensions. It is significant, however, that even after Dr. Ambedkar made his dilemma clear, all the amendments were defeated and the draft Article 15 as proposed by the Drafting Committee was passed by the CA.

The CA Debate on Article 22

This issue of due process, or the importance of procedural and substantive law, was virtually reopened by the Drafting Committee when on 15 September 1949 Dr. Ambedkar introduced the draft Article 15A, which was finally incorporated in the Constitution of India as Article 22 after two days of intensive debate with a few amendments on 16 September 1949. Referring to the discomfort of the CA, including his own, and criticism in public of the (draft) Article 15 for giving Parliament a carte blanche to ‘make and provide for the arrest of any person under any circumstances as Parliament may think fit’, he introduced Article 15 A to provide ‘for the substance of the law of “due process”.

In this Article he put two provisions lifted from the Cr. PC, through which he sought to incorporate two of the most fundamental principles which every civilized country follows as principles of international justice.19 The first two clauses of Article 15 A, which added a caveat to detention of a person on any charge by providing him the right to be informed, consult a lawyer and of being produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours, were thus made sacrosanct, and taken away from the authority of both Parliament and State legislatures. Clause 3(b) excluded enemy aliens, or a person arrested under preventive detention from the protection provided in clauses 1 and 2. Clause 3 empowered Parliament to legislate on circumstances and period of preventive detention. On the whole, it was a balancing act in restricting police powers of the state (both executive and legislature), i.e. bringing in substantive due process, and yet maintaining parliamentary supremacy in matters of preventive detention.

The debate on this article too was involved with members not only sticking to the sanctity of ‘due process’ in order to reign in impending ‘parliamentary tyranny’, which, they thought, in a parliamentary democracy would result in enhanced and skewed executive powers too. Pandit Thakur Prasad Bhargava thought that while India needed ‘cent per cent’ due process, a substantive part had been lost in the proposed drafts. Making a marathon speech, he suggested several amendments aimed at giving the accused the right to proper access to legal aid and judicial remedies for defending himself in order to blunt the effect of the provision for preventive detention.20 Similar sentiments were expressed by many members, who welcomed the attempt in article 15A to plug the discrepancy resulting from the preference for ‘procedure established by law’, but were suspicious of the provision for preventive detention, which they thought gave extraordinary powers to the legislature and the executive. H.V. Pataskar (Bombay, General), who proposed that an arrestee should be told of the ground of arrest within twenty four hours and not ‘as soon as possible’ as given in the draft article, pointed out that the persons in Advisory Board would be appointed by the executive, which could turn tyrannical without proper judicial safeguards to the detainees. R.K. Sidhva (C.P & Berar, General) proposed to restrict the total period of detention to nine months with similar arguments.21 Traversing the entire field of debate all over again that was covered while discussing the draft Article 15, Dr. Bakhshi Tek Chand (East Punjab; General) thought that Article 15A, with the proposed clause on preventive detention that had a weak protection for the accused and victims, created more problems not only regarding personal liberty, but also related to ‘tyranny of the executive and legislatures’. ‘I submit this procedure is open to serious objection and it is necessary that Constitutional guarantee be provided, so that legislatures of this country – provincial or central – are precluded from enacting legislation of this kind….It does not give any fundamental right to the people. In fact, it is a charter for denial of liberties ….’ He proposed an amendment which sought to make it constitutional to seek explanation from the arrested accused to be placed before the Advisory Board provided for in the draft article. Jaspat Roy Kapoor (United Provinces; General) echoed similar sentiments that the entire issue of the period of detention was being left to the good sense of Parliament ‘… whereas, as a matter of fact, you (referring to Dr. Ambedkar) are suggesting the extent to which the legislature can freely go to impose limitations on personal liberty? So far as detenus are concerned, they are given no protection in this chapter and I submit this is very hard and strikes at the very root of fundamental rights and personal liberty.’23 Briefly speaking, the members virtually went along with the Drafting Committee, commending it and suggesting minor suggestions on the first couple of clauses which provided constitutional guarantee to the two section of the Cr. PC, but had objections, some of them very serious, to the clauses relating to preventive detention, which they thought gave undue powers to the legislature and the executive, compromising on the spirit of ‘due process’. Various suggested amendments were aimed at blunting the edge of detention in one way or the other.

However, a strong defence of the proposed article came from Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar (Madras; General), who felt that:-

I might mention that the main reason why ‘due process has been omitted was that if that expression remained there, it will prevent the State from having any detention laws, any deportation laws and even any laws relating to labour regulation. Labour is essentially a problem relating to persons and I might mention in the United States Supreme Court, in the days when the Conservative regime dominated the USA politics, enactments restricting the hours of labour constituted a violation of the ‘due process of law’. An American would be employed for five hours, ten hours or twenty hours and make a slave of himself and yet it was held to be interfering with due process of law if there was a restrictions of hours of labour until the United States Supreme Court put a different construction in a later decision.

…. Then the next question is if you guarantee personal liberty in the Constitution either by the use of the words ‘due process’ or ‘procedure’ or any such thing the State will be hampered even with regard to detention and in regard to deportation. It is agreed on all hands that the security of the State is as important as the liberty of the individual. Having guaranteed that a person should not be detained or arrested for more than 24 hours, the problem necessarily had to be faced as to detention, because detention has become a necessary evil under the existing conditions of India. Even the most enthusiastic advocate of liberty says there are people in this land at the present day who are determined to undermine the Constitution and the State, and if we are to flourish and if liberty of person and property is to be secured, unless that particular evil is removed or the State is invested with sufficient power to guard against that evil there will be no guarantee even for that individual liberty of which we are all desirous.

In replying to the suggestions made for amendments, Dr. Ambedkar said:

…I myself and a large majority of the Drafting Committee as well as members of the public felt that in view of the language of article 15, viz., that arrest may be made in accordance with a procedure laid down by the law, we had not given sufficient attention to the safety and security of individual freedom. Ever since that article was adopted I and my friends had been trying in some way to restore the content of due process in its fundamentals without using the words ‘due process’. I should have thought Members who are interested in the liberty of the individual would be more than satisfied for being able to have the prospect before them of the provisions contained in article 15-A and that they would have accepted this with good grace. But I am sorry that is not the spirit which actuates those who have taken part in this debate and put themselves in the position of not merely critics but adversaries of this article.

Dr. Ambedkar accepted some suggestions which were aimed providing extra protection to the detenues under preventive detention, but he strongly turned down the suspicion of the legislature and the executive. He also pointed out that even if preventive detention was dropped from article 15-A, the entries dealing with it would remain in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule, empowering both Parliament and provincial legislatures to make preventive detention law. He emphatically pointed out that this article provided protection against all such laws made by the centre or the provinces.

A detailed reading of the debates on articles 15 and 15-A brings out one point very clearly that while the Drafting Committee led by Dr. Ambedkar had, as he stated at the closing of discussion on article 15, had no particular preference between ‘procedure established by law’ and ‘due process’, they were leaning towards parliamentary supremacy in law making, with sufficient constitutional and judicial safeguards for ‘personal liberty’, as against judicial supremacy in determining whether every law was in accordance with ‘due process’ or not.

In Lieu of A Conclusion

Indeed the CA debates throw only limited light on the preference for either of the concepts within the house. While some members remained strongly in favour of the ‘due process’, Dr. Ambedkar while leaning on ‘procedure established by law’ attempted to occupy a neutral ground, but the house passed the draft Article 15 without any amendment and the draft Article 15-A with a few procedural amendments after prolonged intense debates. Dr. Ambedkar showed concern for personal liberty as well for the spirit of ‘due process’ in order to keep a check on Parliament and legislatures in specific cases. However, his faith appeared to be more on elected bodies and he seemed prepared to give the judiciary the role of a guardian only in specific cases.

The question, however, arises as to how much of substance of due process Articles 22 (1) and (2) give, as claimed by Dr. Ambedkar. It would be in order here to present the perspective presented by Seervai, who has pointed out that the interpretations of ‘due process’, aside from the judiciary vs. the legislature, have been closely linked to police powers of the States. He points out, ‘… “due process of the law” in England conveyed the idea of arrest or imprisonment according to the law of the land, as opposed to the arbitrary order of the King and his Council, and the procedural safeguards considered necessary in the USA were not a necessary part of the concept in England.’ This, according to Seervai, has been buttressed by judgements in the A.K. Gopalan case. Justice Das, for example, said, ‘… It will be incongruous to import the doctrine of due process without its palliative, the doctrine of police powers. It is impossible to read the last mentioned doctrine into Article 21.’ The Supreme Court in the Gopalan case considered a large number of questions, including preventive detention [Art. 22(4) to (7)] and ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21. However, different views expressed by the judges in this case do not lead to a pattern establishing authoritative correlation of Article 19 to Articles 20, 21 and 22, or to the meaning of the expression ‘personal liberty’. It is nevertheless worthwhile quoting from the judgement of Justice Mukherjea in this case:-

Article 19… gives a list of individual liberties and prescribes in various clauses the restraint that may be placed upon them by law, so that they may not conflict with public welfare and general morality. On the other hand, Articles 20, 21 and 22 are primarily concerned with penal enactments or other laws under which personal safety or liberty of persons would be taken away in the interests of the Society and they set down the limits within which State control should be exercised. Article 19 uses the expression ‘freedom’ and mentions several forms and aspects of it which are secured in individuals, together with the limitations that could be placed upon them in the general interest of the society. Articles 20, 21 and 22 … do not make use of the expression freedom and mention the several forms and aspects of it which are secured to individuals, together with the limitations that could be placed on State control where an individual is sought to be deprived of his life or personal liberty. The right to the safety of one’s life and limbs and to enjoyment of personal liberty, in the sense of freedom from physical restraint and coercion of any sort, are inherent birth rights of any man. The essence of these rights consists in restraining other from interfering with them and hence they cannot be described in terms of ‘freedom’ to do particular things…. 

This part of Justice Mukherjea’s judgement gives the impression that a degree of balance has been struck between ‘due process’ and ‘procedure established by law’ in the context of ‘police powers of the state’ and ‘personal liberty’. The question,however, deserves a deeper and more intense analysis by experts on Constitutional Law.