13 Vertical Agreements Under Competition Act 2002

Prof Avtar Singh

 

epgp books

 

 

14.1 Introduction

 

The Competition Act, 2002, the anti-trust legislation in India, aims at preventing practices that have appreciable adverse effects on competition in India. Anti-competitive agreements are prohibited under Section 3 of the Act. The term vertical agreement has not been used in the Act as such. Section 3(4) of the Act, however, provides for certain types of anti-competitive agreement between or amongst firms at different stages or levels of the supply chain of any product or services.It states that:

 

Any agreement amongst enterprises or persons at different stages or levels of the production chain in different markets, in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision of services, including-

 

a) Tie-in-arrangement

b) Exclusive supply agreement

c) Exclusive distribution agreement

d) Refusal to deal

e)  Re-sale price maintenance

 

…shall be an agreement in contravention of section 3(1), if such agreement causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.

 

Section 3(1) and 3(2) read together with Section 3(4) prohibit such agreements and declare them to be void.

 

Section 2(m) of the Act defines the term ‘practice’ as any practice relating to the carrying on of any trade by a person or an enterprise and Sec. 2(a) defines ‘activity’ as a term that includes any profession or occupation. Section 3(5) provides for the exceptions where restrictions imposed by sub-sections (3) and (4) do not apply.

 

To increase their profits, the firms at different levels of the production chain may enter into such agreements amongst each other that may affect the competition adversely. The intention of the economically stronger party behind such arrangements is to compel the other party to supply that goods or service which is the subject matter of such arrangement, in its own favour.

 

Market Power

 

The market power of the firm enacting vertical restraint is important. If the said firm does not enjoy combination of market power to its side, i.e. there already exists enough inter-brand competition, in the market regarding the goods or services produced by the involved manufacturer firm, the alleged vertical restraint will not have any major effect on competition in the market. Market power is different from dominance. Market power refers to power over price and it may occur even in situations where no firm has dominant position.

 

Learning Outcomes:

  • Understanding the concept of vertical agreements as per the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002.
  • Finding various typesof vertical agreementsand the inclusive definition of every type of vertical agreements as per sec. 3 of the Act.
  • Learning about the factors under sec. 19(3) that should be considered while looking into the anti-competitiveness of such arrangements.
  • Knowing about exceptional situations laid by Sec. 3(5) where prohibitions under Sec. 3 are not applicable.

 

 

14.2 Regulation of Vertical agreements

 

Vertical agreements were prohibited per seearlier while rule of reason is being preferred by the Court now to evaluate vertical restraints. The Indian Competition law is in tune with US competition law as far as applicability of rule of reason is concerned. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreement is a landmark decision of Supreme Court of India which aptly illustrated the applicability of rule of reason in cases of restrictive trade practices. The SC,in this case, held that the following three issues should be considered to determine whether a restraint suppressed or promoted competition:

  1. Facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
  2. The condition before and after the restraint is imposed;
  3. Nature of restraint and actual and probable effects.

 

14.3 Types of Vertical Agreements:

 

The Explanation to Sub-sec. 3(4) provides definition to each such type as follows

 

 

a) Tie-in-arrangements includes any agreement requiring a purchaser of goods, as a condition of such purchase, to purchase some other goods. This is an arrangement by which a seller agrees to sell a product known as the tying item only on the condition that buyer agrees to buy a second product known as the tied product from the seller. Such arrangements not only reduce or eliminate the competition completely but also remove buyer’s resistance to the tied product. Following tie-in arrangements were held to be in restraint of trade:

 

In re Hindustan Motors Ltd.case, requiring the buyers of cars to pay towards the servicing of cars with the sale price.

 

In re Anand Gas case, requiring customer to buy gas stove while giving gas connection

 

b) Exclusive supply agreements includes any agreement restricting in any manner the purchase in the course of his trade from acquiring or otherwise dealing in any goods other than those of the seller or any other person.

 

In Jindal Steel v SAIL, an exclusive supply agreement through a memorandum of understanding (MOU), was entered into between Indian Railways and Steel Authority of India (SAIL) to supply rails on a continuous basis. Jindal Steel and Power Limited alleged that the said MOU resulted in foreclosure of the relevant market for it. It was held that the MOU was not hit by Sec. 3(4) and hence, not anti-competitive.

 

Consumer Guidance Society v Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages Ltdis another case dealing with exclusive supply agreements..

 

c) Exclusive distributionagreements includes any agreement to limit, restrict or withhold the output or supply of any goods or allocate any area or market for the disposal or sale of the goods.

 

The main feature of such agreements is that the manufacturer or supplier agrees to supply certain goods for resale to only one party, the exclusive distributor within a defined territory and no other party will be supplied with the goods within that area by the supplier. Exclusive dealing is a way of restraining inter-brand competition.

 

d) Refusal to dealincludes any agreement which restricts, or is likely to restrict, by any method the persons or classes of persons to whom goods are sold or from whom goods are bought. It is a sort of boycott. It means refusal to buy or sell by a mutual agreement with an intention to restrict competition is illegal.Refusal to buy or sell by a mutual agreement with an intention to restrict competition is illegal. The Act, however, does not empower the authority to decide on behalf of any of the parties whether they should enter into any particular agreement or not. To deal or not to deal is the freedom of the enterprise and they can choose not to deal with any specific firm or person. But where such refusal to deal falls within the definition of the Act, the behavior of the enterprises is said to be anti-competitive.

 

In Kapoor Glass Pvt. Ltd. v Schott Glass Pvt. Ltd., the CCI held the joint venture to be anti-competitive since it as created to finish off competition in the downstream market and that various agreements were in contravention of clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) of section 3(4) .

 

e)  Resale price maintenance (RPM)includes any agreement to sell goods on condition that the prices to be charged on the resale by the purchaser shall be the prices stipulated by the seller unless it is clearly stated that prices lower than those prices may be charged. RPM is a form of price fixing

 

Illustrations: A manufacturer Y and its distributor Z may agree that the distributor will sell Y’s products at certain prices, at or above a price floor (Minimum RPM) or at or below a price ceiling (Maximum RPM). If Z refuses to maintain prices due to whatever reason, Y may stop doing business with it.

 

Every case of RPM is to be judged on the basis of its effects to establish its nature. Usually, branded goods are subjected to RPM as opposed to non-branded goods.

 

RPM, however, may prove beneficial in following ways:

  • Ensuring efficient retail services
  • Addressing free rider problem( Free rider is one who enjoys the benefits of someone else’s investment)
  • Limiting inter-brand competition among retailers
  • If manufacturer was in a position to use its dominant power then it would much rather use it through wholesale prices instead of going into resale price maintenance agreement or
  • a product or service might require brand specific promotion by the retailer. Such a promotional activity involves cost on retailer.

 

14.4 Inclusive Definitions:

Since, the definition of the vertical restraints as provided by the Act is inclusive; there may be other types of agreements that may fall in the definition.To determine whether such agreements are anti-competitive or not, careful market analysis of the effects on market forces is needed.

 

14.4 Exceptions to Vertical Restraints:

 

Sec.3 (5) states the exceptions to the vertical restraints. As per this sub-section, the above mentioned restrictions shall not restrict:

 

Agreements permitted by law: the right of any person to restrain any infringement of, or to impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting any of his rights conferred upon him under-

 

a) The copyright Act, 1957

b) The Patents Act, 1970

c) The Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 or the Trade Marks Act, 1999

d) The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999

e) The Designs Act, 2000

f) The Semi-Conductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Designs Act, 2000

 

Right for exclusive export: the right of any person to export goods from India to the extent to which the agreement relates exclusively to the production, supply, distribution or control of goods or provision of services for such export.

 

Hence, in view of the above, even if any agreement falls within the prescribed definition of vertical restraint, it would not be anti-competitive, if it is hit by any of the exceptions specified above.

 

14.5 Factors to be considered while deciding vertical agreements:

 

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) should while conducting any enquiry into the alleged anti-competitive behavior of the enterprises should examine various factors and circumstances. Sec. 19(3) provides for various situations that may result if any of the above types of vertical agreements is present in the market which are as follows:

 

(a) Creation of barriers to new entrants in the market; (b)Driving existing competitors out of the market;

(c) Foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into the market;

(d) Accrual of benefits to consumers;

(e) Any Improvement with regard to production or distribution of goods or provision of services;

(f) Promotion of technical, scientific and economic development by means of production or distribution of goods or provision of services.

 

The situations in clauses (a)-(d) are negative while that in (e)-(f) are positive. It can be said that the grounds or standards mentioned in the above provision are quite open-ended, vague and difficult to determine. Moreover, every type of vertical agreement is to be judged on the basis of the above parameters.

 

14.5 Appreciable Adverse Effects on Competition (AAEC)

 

Section 3 uses the term ‘Appreciable adverse effects on Competition’ (AAEC). The said term AAEC examines the agreement which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse economic effect on competition within India. Adverse effect may be said to occur when the agreement harms the competitors. The harm should be in the consumer welfare sense of economics i.e. effect on prices or output. Only then the agreements would be said to be anticompetitive. The word ‘appreciable’ is also too fluid and vague. Overall lot of scope has been left by the law that gives way to subjective approach and multiple interpretations. Also, no exemption has been given to vertical agreements on the basis of threshold levels as has been done by EC (Block exemptions or de minimis exemptions, discussed in next module).

 

Relevant Market – Since Sec.3 (4) uses the word ‘different markets’, the term ‘Relevant Market ’ is to needed to determine AAEC. The ‘relevant market ’ is where the demand and supply interact or the area of competition where the other party operates. Sec. 2(r) defines relevant market with reference to relevant geographic market or relevant product market. But there are no standards or effective guidelines in the Act to determine relevant market.

 

Hence, it is a complex issues and the CCI, the regulator, faces great difficulty while determining the same for both the Sections 3 as well as 4.The burden is on the CCI to prove that a particular agreement is anti-competitive and should be prohibited.

 

Summary:

 

The term ‘vertical agreement’ does not find a place in the Competition Act 2002. Sec. 3(4) of the Act, however, provides for agreements amongst persons or enterprises at different stages or levels of the production chain in various markets, with respect to production, supply, distribution, storage, sale or trade in goods or provision of services. Such agreements are referred to as vertical agreements and are prohibited under Section 3(1). The Rule of Reason is used to determine the nature of vertical agreements since the definition uses the term ‘which causes or is likely to cause appreciable adverse effects on competition’. Exclusive supply and distribution, Tie-in-Sales, Resale Price Maintenance and Refusal to Deal are few types of vertical restraints expressly mentioned in the Act though there could be other types that may fall under the description. The definition of each of the vertical restraints is also inclusive i.e. there could be other vertical restraints as well even if not prescribed under sub-sections. Section 19(3) further provides for the factors that may be considered while evaluating the effects of such agreements.

 

you can view video on Vertical Agreements Under Competition Act 2002

 

References:-

 

1. The Competition Act, 2002

2. Raghavan Committee’s Report on Competition

3. Jindal Steel Power Ltd. v SAIL [2012] 111 SCL 382 (CCI)

4. www.cci.gov.in

5.KapoorGlassPvt.Ltd.vSchottGlassPvt.Ltd.http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/Case22of2010OrderMemberR.pdf

6. Pawn Hans Ltd. v UOI (2003) 114 Comp Cas 676 (SC)

7. D.P.Mittal, Taxmann’s Competition Law and Practice

8. T.Ramappa, Competition Law in India

9. S.M. Duggar, Guide to Competition Law