11 Horizontal Agreements Under Competition Act 2002
Mr.Saket Sharma
1. MRTP Overview
India was among the first developing countries to have a competition law in the form of the erstwhile Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969i. Anticompetitive agreements were also covered under the erstwhile MRTP in India. MRTP Act used restrictive trade practices (RTPs) as the nomenclature to define such type of practices. Under MRTP, restrictive trade practice was defined as a trade practice which has or may have the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition. Cartels which are pernicious form of horizontal agreements were not defined under the MRTP Act. As decided by Supreme Court in a case discussed in detail below, no extraterritorial jurisdiction was given toMonopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC), so it was unable to take action against cases which emerged outside India having an adverse effect on competition in India.MRTPC was only empowered to pass and cease and desist orders and it was not empowered to levy fines and penalties on the violators.
MRTP Act was the law depicting command and control regime in India as was evident from various provisions like registration of agreements and dominance per se being considered bad. Section 35 of the MRTP Act, 1969 required every agreement relating to Restrictive Trade Practices falling within one or more of the categories enumerated in Section 33(1) of the Act to be furnished for registration within 60 days of the making of such agreement. The dawn of new competition law in India in 2003 has seen not only the nomenclature change but change in the philosophy of the law which is in tune with the times and international jurisprudence.
2. Anticompetitive Agreements under the Competition Act
The term ‘agreement’, has been defined broadly in the Competition Actii. It extends to a mere ‘arrangement’, ‘understanding’ or ‘action in concert’, none of which need be in writing or enforceable by law. In a caseiii, the CCI said that agreement also includes anticompetitive practice which in this case was the anticompetitive practice of not offering discounts on the maximum retail price (MRP) of the drugs to the consumers.The necessity for a broad definition of the term agreement has been aptly described by Lord Denning in an old caseiv “People who combine together to keep up prices do not shout it from the housetops. They keep it quiet. They make their own arrangements in the cellar where no one can see. They will not put anything into writing nor even into words. A nod or wink will do.”
Section 3(1) of the Competition Act lays down that no enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of persons shall enter into any agreement in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India. The Act prohibits an anti-competitive agreement and declares that such an agreement shall be voidv.
3.Horizontal Agreementsunder the Competition Act
The earlier module briefly explained the distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements which can have anticompetitive effects in the market. Though the Competition Act itself does not explicitly classify agreements intohorizontal and vertical agreements, the language used in clauses (3) & (4) of section 3 of the Act clearly indicates this classification. Section 3(3)vi of the Competition Act deals with the horizontal agreements as it covers the agreements between entities engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services. It also includes cartels which will be covered in detail below. The section covers:
a. agreement entered into between enterprises or associations of enterprises or persons or associations of persons or between any person andenterprise
b. practice carried on by any association of enterprises or association of persons
c. decision taken by any association of enterprises or association of persons
From the above it is clear that section 3(3) of the Act not only covers agreements entered into between enterprises or associations of enterprises but also the practice carried on or decision taken by any association of enterprises engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services.
In Re Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association(BCDA) case, CCI held that all actions and practices of BCDA including those relating to issues such as alleged fixation of trade margins, issuing circulars directing its retailer members not to give discount on the MRP in the sale of medicines to consumers, conducting raids in order to ensure strict compliance of its directives, carrying out vigilance operations to identify the retailers defying the direction issued by it, forcing the defiant members to shut their shops as a punishment measure etc. would fall squarely as ‘practice carried on’ or ‘decision taken’ by an ‘association of enterprises’ under Section 3(3) of the Act.
4. Types of Horizontal Agreements under the Competition Act
The agreements between firms at the same level of production chain are called horizontal agreements and are covered under section 3 (3) of the Act. As discussed in the earlier module, horizontal agreements are often due to collusion which can be explicit or implicit. Collusion implies an attempt by competing firms to recognise their interdependence and attempt to act together rather than compete and can be viewed as a move towards joint profit maximisation, normally by controlling the supply of commodities. Section 3(3) of the Competition Act enlists four broad classifications of horizontal agreements which are presumed to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India. Further, this section will describe these four types of horizontal agreements in details with relevant decided cases in India.
Figure: Types of Horizontal Agreements under section 3(3) of the Indian Competition Act
4.1 Agreements regarding Prices
A price fixing agreement occurs when competitors make written, informal or verbal agreements or understandings on prices for selling or buying goods or services, minimum prices, a formula for pricing or discounting goods and services, rebates, the magnitude of profit margins, the level of price increases,and allowances or credit terms. As discussed in the previous module, agreements related to fixing prices are called naked restraints and are given harsh treatment by the competition authorities worldwide. As would be discussed in detail below, the Competition Act also presumes that price fixing agreements have adverse effect on competition.
Fixing Trade Margins and other anticompetitive practices in distribution for Drugs in India In M/s Peeveear Medical Agencies, Kerala v. All India Organization of Chemists and Druggist (AIOCD) and Ors., CCI found All India Organization of Chemists and Druggists (AIOCD) guilty for fixing trade margins and limiting and controlling the supply of drugs in the market. CCI held that AIOCD because of its position as an apex body of chemists and druggists is having full control over the stockists / retailers of drugs and medicines all over the country and is able to continuously engage in limiting and controlling the supply and market and influencing the prices of the drugs and pharmaceutical products through anticompetitive practices like insisting upon NOC for appointment of stockists, fixation of trade margins etc.
In Re Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association(BCDA) case,BCDA was alleged of issuing circulars which directed the retailers not to give any discount to the consumers. The CCI observed that the activities of BCDA inter alia to direct its members to sell drugs only at their MRP is a palpable anti-competitive conduct and activities of the BCDA are in conflict with the objects of the competition law as they cause restraint of trade, stifle competition and harm the consumers.CCI imposed a penalty of Rs 18.38 crores on BCDA and its office bearers and also directed the BCDA and its office bearers and executive committee members to cease and desist from indulging in such anticompetitive practices.
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4.2 Agreements regarding Quantity / Quality
As discussed in previous module, output or product restriction can be exercised in various ways including limiting or controlling production,supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services. By controlling the supply or production of goods or services, the cartel is able to, indirectly, increase prices to maximise their profits.In Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufactures case, CCI directed the cement manufacturers to cease and desist from indulging in activities relating to agreement, understanding or arrangement on prices, production and supply of cement in the market.
Cases Related to Films Distribution decided by CCI
CCI found North Indian Motion Pictures Association (NIMPA) guilty of anti-competitive conduct of imposing compulsory registration of films before their release and refusing to register films.The CCI held that the conduct of NIMPA in refusing to register the film in the name of Eros International Ltd., and not allowing it to exhibit the film by instructing its members was restrictive in nature. The Commission also ruled that the compulsory registration of the film with the trade association was an in-built pressure on the distributor to register its film with the concerned association as the film could not be released without registration.
In another case the CCI observed that film distribution associations like KFCC, NIMPA, CCCA, MPA, FDA and Telangana Telugu Film Distributors Association insist for registration of films before their release in their territories and holds that such act limit the supplies of films in different territories and contravene the provisions of section 3(3)(b) of the Act. Such acts are anticompetitive from the aspect that these actions restrict competition between members and non-members.
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4.3 Market Allocation
Market sharing, or market allocation, is where competitors agree to divide up markets between themselves. This could be by allocating customers, products or geographic regions to each other.As discussed in previous module, market allocating agreements are considered as one of the most restrictive anticompetitive practices, as they do not leave any room for competition in the relevant market and are considered per se illegal in most jurisdictions. Section 3(3)(c) enlist horizontal agreements which are aimed at sharing the market or source of production or provision of services by way of allocation of geographical area of market, or type of goods or services, or number of customers in the market or any other similar way.
4.4 Bid Rigging
The Act provides a definition for bid rigging and it covers agreements having effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or adversely affecting or manipulatingthe process for bidding vii .Bid riggingcan cause serious economic harm as it increases prices artificially, lowers quality and leads to loss of taxpayers’ money. As described in the previous module, there can be various ways by which bids can be rigged. The bid rigging and collusive bidding is done to support the cartel member that has been designated to ‘win’ the tender bid. Thus, other cartel members may refrain from bidding, withdraw their bid, or submit bids with higher prices or unacceptable terms.
Penalty on Suppliers of Food Preservatives to FCI
In Re: Aluminium Phosphide Tablets Manufacturerscase related to the allegations of anti-competitive acts and conduct in the tender for procurement of Aluminium Phosphide Tablets (ALP) required for preservation of central pool food grains by Food Corporation of India.In this case,CCI taking suo-motto cognizance from a letter sent by the Chairman of Food Corporation of India (FCI), imposed a total penalty of317 crores on three companies supplying aluminium phosphide tablets (used for storing food grains) to the Food Corporation of India (FCI) for limiting the supply of the said product in the relevant market under Section 3(3)(b) and for manipulating the bidding process under Section 3(3)(d) of the Act. |
Bid Rigging in Public Procurement in Railway Tenders
In asuo moto case taken by CCI, the Indian Railways floated tenders for procurement of feed valves used in diesel locomotives, it was noticed that all the three bidders quoted identical rates of Rs. 17,147.54 for feed valves pieces and the quoted rate was further found to be 33% higher than the last purchase rates. CCI found that the bidders had indulged in bid-rigging and collusive-bidding in contravention of the provisions of section 3(1) read with section 3(3) (a) and 3(3) (d) of the Act. |
Competition in a market can be restricted in various other ways of entering into horizontal agreements which can adversely affect competition in the market. The Act enlists four types of horizontal agreements as described above. Other examples of horizontal anticompetitive agreements may be agreements among competitors such as price guidelines or recommendations, joint purchasing or selling, setting technical or design standards, and agreement to share business information.
5. Cartelsunder the Competition Act
As also described in the previous modules, Cartels are one of the egregious anticompetitive practices undertaken by market players. Fighting cartels is on the priority list of competition authorities worldwide because of their nature and the effects they have on the consumers and the economy. Unlike the erstwhile MRTP Act, the Competition Act defines cartels. The main ingredients of the definition of the cartelviii provided under the Act are:
- an agreement which includes arrangement or understanding;
- the agreement is amongst producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers i.e. parties engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services, and
- the agreement aims to limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale or price of, or, trade in goods or provision of services.
Thus, cartel is one type of horizontal anticompetitive agreement provided under the Act and is presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition. A cartel is said to exist when two or more enterprises enter into an explicit or implicit agreement to fix prices, to limit production and supply, to allocate market share or sales quotas, or to engage in collusive bidding or bid-rigging in one or more markets.
6. Exceptions & Exclusion
Under the Competition Act, there are certain provisions which provide for the exemptions and carve out exclusion from the provisions of the horizontal agreements. These provisions are as follow:
Efficiency enhancing joint ventures are not treated as illegal.As per the proviso to section 3(3) of the Act, the prohibition on horizontal agreements does not apply to joint ventures if such joint ventures increase efficiencies in production, supply,distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services.
Section 54 of the Act states that by the Central Government’s notification, certain classes of enterprises may be exempted from the purview of the Act. The government can exempt any class of enterprise in public interest or security of State, any practice or agreement arising out ofinternational treaty and any enterprise performing sovereign functions.
For example, under this provision, the liner shipping agreements, which are generally horizontal in nature and aim at fixing freight rates passenger fares over different shipping routesalso amongst other things, were given exemption for one year in Indiaix in 2013.
Export cartels are exempted under the provisions of the Actx. Since exports do not impact markets in India, agreement between exporters, in spite of being horizontal, are exempted. Such exemption to export cartels is provided in laws of various countries.
Section 3 (5) of the Act states that provisions of section 3 would not restrict the right of any person to restrain any infringement of, or to impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting his rights conferred upon him under certain Acts. These Acts are the Copyright Act, 1957, the Patents Act, 1970, the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999, the Designs Act, 2000 and the Semiconductor Integrated Circuits Layout Designs Act, 2000. Thus, the law recognises the special position of intellectual property rights and in order to facilitate their protection, it permits reasonable restrictions in the agreements imposed by their owners for the protection of intellectual property rights under specified Indian IP lawsxi.
The activities of the Government of India relatable to “sovereign functions”, including all activities carried on by departments of the Central Government dealing with defence, space, atomic energy and currency, are outside the scope of the Competition Act.
7. Joint Ventures
The proviso to section 3(3) states that “Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any agreement entered into by way of joint ventures if such agreement increases efficiency in production, supply ,distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services.” This gives an exemption for joint ventures.
The term ‘joint venture’ implies a positive arrangement which is aimed at increasing the synergies and efficiencies of the parties to the joint venture. Such exemption to joint ventures is justifiable economically also and it is important for enterprises to enter into arrangements which enhances their efficiencies and is beneficial to the enterprises. Such efficiencies can lead to joint research & development, innovation, economies of scale & scope and can ultimately be beneficial to the consumers.
8. Standard of Analysis
Horizontal Agreements are presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition under the Competition Act. The onus of proof is on the person or the enterprise concerned to prove that the agreement does not fall under the prohibited category. The presumption contained in section 3(3) of the Act is rebuttable and the opposite parties may produce evidence to controvert the presumption contained therein.xiiIt is pertinent here to mention the observations of CCI regarding the burden of proof in a recent case dealing with fixing of prices of drugs. The CCI observedxiii:
“Once existence of the prohibited agreement, practice or decision enumerated under section 3(3) is established, there is no further need to show an appreciable adverse effect on competition because in such a case, a rebuttable presumption of law is drawn that such conduct has an appreciable adverse effect on competition and is therefore anti-competitive. In effect, the onus of proof shifts on to the opposite parties to show that the impugned conduct does not cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition.”
Cartels, by their very nature are secretive and thus it is difficult to find the direct evidence of their presence. The orders of the CCI clearly point that CCI relies on circumstantial evidence, both economic and conduct-based, to reach its decision on the existence of a cartel agreement. It can be seen with time CCI is adopting a more economics based analysis. In two of the early cases, the tyre cartel casexiv and Deutsche Bankxv, the CCI held that the existence of an agreement must be established ‘unequivocally’. In these cases it appears that CCI was following the standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ for proving the existence of an agreement. Later, in the soda ash cartel and shoe cartel casexvi, the CCI observed that the standard of proof required for establishing the existence of an agreement is one of ‘balance of probabilities’. Circumstantial evidence concerning the market and the conduct of market participants may also establish an anti-competitive agreement and suggest concerted actionxvii.
Cement Cartel Case decided by CCI In Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufactures case, CCI relied upon the settled jurisprudence in other jurisdictions as well as on the guidelines of international agencies such as the OECD in support of its decision that cartels can be prosecuted without direct evidence of agreement and on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone.CCI directed the cement manufacturers to cease and desist from indulging in activities relating to agreement, understanding or arrangement on prices, production and supply of cement in the market. Further, CCI directed the Cement Manufacturers Association (CMA) to disengage and disassociate itself from collecting wholesale and retail prices through the member cement companies and also from circulating the details on production and dispatches of cement companies to its members, as sharing of prices facilitates cartelisation. Besides these directions, heavy monetary penalties have also been imposed on all the 11 major cement manufacturersas well as on the CMA. The CCI imposed a penalty of over Rs 6,000 crore on 11 leading cement producers after finding them guilty of forming cartels to control “prices, production and supply” of cement in the market. |
From the decided cases till date, it can be seen that CCI examines conduct based as well as economic evidence in cases related to horizontal agreements. Example of conduct based evidence examined by CCI include evidence of meetings between competitors, doubtful sharing of documents, similar or identical bidding prices, membership and role of trade associations and any history of cartelisation in India or other jurisdictions. Example of economic evidence examined by CCI include the level of market concentration, trends in capacity utilisation by the enterprises, parallel movement of prices, and variations in cost-structures across firms.
9. Assessing Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition
Section 19(3) of the Act states that the CCI shall while determining whether an agreement has an appreciable adverse effect on competition under section 3, have due regard to all or any of the following factors, namely: –
a) creation of barriers to new entrants in the market;
b) driving existing competitors out of the market;
c) foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into the market;
d) accrual of benefits to consumers;
e) improvements in production or distribution of goods or provision of services;
f) promotion of technical, scientific and economic development by means of production or distribution of goods or provision of services.
As listed above, there are six different set of factors which are specifically mentioned in section 19(3) of the Act. These factors are worded generally and thus prescribe broad tests to be applied while assessing AAEC. Broadly these set of factors can be divided into positive and negative factors. The first three set of factors in this list can be classified as negative factors which mainly relate to the concept of entry barriers. Entry barriers can be divided into structural entry barriers related to economic nature of the industry and strategic entry barriers related to behaviour of the incumbent firms in the market. The aim of considering the negative factors is that market players get a level playing field. The rest of the three factors listed above can be classified as positive factors which aim at promoting competition. It shows that CCI need to contemplate as to whether the action leads to benefit to consumers, improvements in production or technical or scientific improvement leading to economic development.
Thus, both set of factors need to be taken in to consideration while determining the appreciable adverse effect on competition. CCI tends to balance these factors to analyse whether the conduct in question is anticompetitive by causing appreciable adverse effect on competition. As earlier discussed, the rule of presumption regarding AAEC in section 3(3) of the Act shifts the onus on the opposite party to rebut the said presumption. In FICCI Multiplex Association of India case, CCI has held that the factors mentioned in section 19(3) may be considered by the Commission while rebutting the presumption of anticompetitive agreements.
10. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Section 32 of the Act grants the CCI extra-territorial jurisdiction over anti-competitive conduct which has an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India. Any anticompetitive activity taking place outside India but having an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India shall be subject to the application of the Competition Act. The CCI in such cases can pass such orders as it deems fit.
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Comparison of MRTP and new Competition Act in India
In American Natural Soda Ash Corporation(ANSAC) v. Alkali Manufacturers Association of India, it was held that MRTPC cannot take action against anticompetitive conduct arising from outside India. In 1996, an associationof Indian soda ash manufacturers complained to the MRTPC that ANSACwas a cartel that was charginglow prices for its exports to India. MRTPC ordered injunction against the import of ANSAC’ssoda ash. On the issue of the extraterritorial reach, this case was clubbed with another one in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not go into the allegation of cartelisation, but instead held that the wording of the MRTP Act did not give the MRTPC any extraterritorial jurisdiction. The MRTPC therefore could not take action against foreign cartels. Section 32 of the Competition Act empowers CCI to take action over anti-competitive conduct taking place outside India, provided the conduct causes AAEC in India. Thus, CCI can take action against international cartels if there is an AAEC in India. |
An enabling provision has been provided whereby the CCI, with the prior approval of the Central Government, may enter into arrangements and memorandum of understanding with foreign agenciesxviii. CCI can enter into cooperation agreements with competition authorities in other countries. It has entered into agreements with jurisdictions like EU, US and Australia. Such cooperation arrangements are very helpful as they help in mutual organisational learnings, good collaborations for detection of anticompetitive practices and greater enforcement of competition laws. Such cooperation and extra-territorial jurisdiction is pivotal in taking action against hard core international cartels and in proper utilisation of cooperation agreements with agencies of other jurisdictions.
11.Remedies
The Act gives wide discretion to CCI to frame the remedies to overcome the anticompetitive situation due to horizontal anticompetitive agreements. Following orders can be passed by CCI in case of anticompetitive agreements:
a) As per section 33 of the Act, during the course of inquiry, the CCI can pass interim order restraining a party from continuing with anti-competitive agreement.
b) CCI may direct a delinquent enterprise to discontinue and not to re-enter anticompetitive agreement.
c) CCI may also direct modification of such anticompetitive agreement so as to remove the anticompetitive effects.
d) CCI may impose a penalty up to 10% of the average turnover for the last three preceding financial years of the enterprise.
e) Section 27 (b) of the Competition Act, 2002 distinguishes between cartel and other anticompetitive agreements in terms of imposition of penalty. In case of a cartel, the CCI can impose on each member of the cartel, a penalty of up to three times its profit for each year of the continuance of such agreement or up to ten percent of its turnover for each year of continuance of such agreement, whichever is higher.
f) Section 48 of the Act incorporates individual liability and provides for liability of individuals who were actively and/or passively involved in the contravention of the provisions of the Act by the company that they were in charge of, and wereresponsible for the conduct of the business of the company.
g) CCI can direct the enterprises concerned to abide by such other orders as the Commission may pass and comply with the directions, including payment of costs, if any; and
h) CCI may pass such other order or issue such directions as it may deem fit. The enforcement of cartels is a civil law process under the Act. The Act does not provide for criminal liability other than for wilful default in implementing orders of the commission. In case of searches and seizures, certain prior procedural permissions are required to be taken from criminal courts. There is an element of personal liability under the Act. Further, it is pertinent here to mention that new Companies Act provides for a bar on directorship if found guilty under an offence under the Competition Act.xix
In Re Bengal Chemists and Druggists Associationcase, the office bearers and executive members of the BCDA were found to be guilty of the contravention of section 3 and penalties were levied on the BCDA and its those office bearers who were directly responsible for running its affairs and play lead role in decision making @10% and on the executive committee members @7%, of their respective turnover/income/receipts.
From the above, it is clear the CCI has got wide discretion in designing the remedies so that the anticompetitive effects of the agreements are taken care of. Unlike erstwhile MRTPC, the CCI can impose penalties and has got the discretion to pass any order as it deems fit in the case.
12. Leniency Provisions
The leniency programmes have been proved to be a powerful tool in the hands of competition authorities worldwide for detecting, investigating and proving the existence of cartels. Leniency provisions are based on the premise that successful prosecution of cartels requires evidence which can be easily supplied by a member of the cartel. Such provisions were not under the MRTP law. In India, the provisions for lesser penalty are contained in section 46 of the Act and the framed regulationxx. The framed regulation provides for a full and well thought-out leniency programme and procedure. It provides for imposition of a lesser penalty, if any producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider included in any cartel, which is alleged to have violated the provisions of the Competition Act, with respect to anticompetitive agreements:
a) has made a full and true disclosure in respect of the alleged violation;
b) such disclosure is vital;
c) such party continues to co-operate with the CCI till the completion of the proceedings before the CCI.
d) the disclosure should be made before the report of the investigation by the Director General, as directed by the CCI, has been received.
As per the regulations, “vital disclosure” means full and true disclosure of information or evidence by the applicant to the Commission, which is sufficient to enable the Commission to form a prima-facie opinion about the existence of a cartel or which helps to establish the contravention of the provisions of section 3 of the Actxxi. As per the framed regulation, the first applicant might be granted up to 100% immunity, the second applicant up to 50% and the third applicant up to 30% immunity, if the prescribed conditions are fulfilled. The provisions contain a discretionary immunity even if all other conditions were fulfilled. This seems to be the main reason for non-acceptability of leniency programme in India till date.
13.Summary
This module dealt with the provisions related to the horizontal agreements under the Competition Act in India. Horizontal agreements are the agreements between the competitors at the same level and can be in different forms like price fixing, controlling quantity or quality, market allocation and bid rigging. Keeping in view their nature and effect on competition, such agreements are presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition. Cartels are also included in such agreements. Act rightly recognises and exempts situations where there can be cooperation agreements or joint ventures which have efficiency enhancing effects. The Act also contains provisions for the leniency which are in line with the international developments to devise an effective framework for detecting cartels.
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References:-
- All India Tyre Dealers Federation v. Tyre Manufacturers, (MRTP Case RTPE No. 20/2008), CCI order dated 16/01/2013.
- Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufactures (Case no. 29/2010), CCI order dated 20/06/2012.
- FICCI Multiplex Association of India v. United Producers/Distributors Forum and Ors., (Case no. 01/2009) CCI order dated 25/05/2011.
- In Re: Aluminium Phosphide Tablets Manufacturers Case (Suomotu Case No. 02/2011) CCI order dated 23/04/2012.
- In Re Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association, (Suo moto Case No. 02 of 2012 and Ref. Case No. 01 of 2013) CCI order dated 11/03/2014.
- M/o Commerce, Govt. of India v. M/s Puja Enterprises &Ors., (Ref Case No. 01/2012) CCI order dated 06/08/2013.
- M/s Peeveear Medical Agencies, Kerala vs. All India Organization of Chemists and Druggist (AIOCD) and Ors. (Case No. 30/2011)CCI order dated09/12/2013.
- M/s Santuka Associates Pvt. Ltd. vs. All India Organization of Chemists and Druggists and Ors (Case no: 20/2011)CCI order dated19/02/2013.
- Neeraj Malhotra v. Deustche Post Bank Home Finance Ltd. &Ors., (Case no. 05/2009) CCI order dated 02/12/2010.
- Planning Commission Government of India, ‘Report of the Working Group on Competition
- Policy’(2007),availableathttp://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp11/wg11_cpolicy.pdf
- ProvisionsrelatingtoCartel,AdvocacybookletbyCCI,availableathttp://cci.gov.in/May2011/Advocacy/cartel%20book.pdf
- Report of ‘The High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law’, Dept. of Company Affairs, High Level Committee, Govt. of India, (2000).
- Study of Cartel Case Laws in Select Jurisdictions – Learnings for the Competition Commission of India, CUTS International & National Law University, Jodhpur, 2008, available at http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/completed/cartel_report1_20080812115152.pdf
- RRTA v. W. H. Smith and Sons Ltd., [1969] 3 All ER 1065.
- T Ramappa, Competition Law in India Policy, Issues, and Developments, 2nded, 2009, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- The Competition Act, 2002.