10 Vaiśeşika

G. Vedaparayana

Introduction

The Vaiśeşika system is next to Sānkhya and much earlier to Nyāya in origin. The word “Vaiśeşika” derived from “Visesa” which means particularity, distinction or distinguishing feature. Accordingly, the Vaiśeşika system regards particularity as the essence of things. Sage Kaņāda is the founder of this system. He was called Kaņāda because he used to live as an ascetic by eating the grains picked up from the fields. Kaņa also means a particular and so it suggests one who lives on the philosophy of particularity. Kaņāda has written Vaiśeşikasutra. Prasastapada has written a commentary on it which is known as Padarthadharmasangraha on which Udayana and Sridhara have written commentaries. Vaiśeşika philosophy is pluralistic realism which emphasizes that diversity is the soul of the universe. The Nyāya philosophy, which accepted the ontology of the Vaiśeşika and developed it in the light of its own epistemology. Thus the Vaiśeşika was fused together with the Nyāya. The two together are called syncretic or allied systems (samāntara). They have the same aim, namely, liberation of the individual self from ignorance the root cause of all pain and suffering. Right knowledge of reality is the means of liberation. There is however some difference between the two systems. The Nyāya accepts four independent sources of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, comparison and testimony. The Vaiśeşika recognizes only two sources, namely, perception and inference by reducing comparison and verbal testimony to perception and inference. The Vaiśeşika accepts only seven categories and comprehends all reals under them. But the Nayāyikas recognize sixteen categories which cover the whole of reality.

2. Metaphysics

According to the Vaiśeşika ontology there are seven categories (padārthas) which comprehend all the reals. This system is an elaboration and a critical of those seven categories. Category or padārtha means the object denoted by a word. It means all objects of knowledge or all reals denoted by words. The reals are divided into two classes, namely, being and non-being (bhava and abhava). Being stands for all positive realities such as existent physical things, mind, souls, etc. Non-being stands for all negative facts like the non-existence of things. There are altogether six kinds of being and one kind of non-being. They are (1) substance (dravya), (2)quality (guna), (3)action (karma), (4) generality (sāmānya), (5) particularity (viśeşa), (6) the relation of inherence (samavāya) and (7) non-existence (abhāva).

1. Substance: A substance is that in which a quality or an action can exist. Yet the substance is distinct from both quality and action which cannot exist without substance. Substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. It is also the material cause of the other composite things produced from it, for instance, the threads are the material cause of the cloth which is a composite thing formed by the threads. According to the Vaiśeşika, there are nine kinds of substances, namely, earth (prithvi), water (jala), light (tejas) air (vāyu), ether (ākasa) time (kāla),space (diķ), soul (ātma), and mind (manas). Of these the first five are called physical elements (paňcabhutas) since each of them possesses a specific quality (viśeşa) which is sensed by an external sense. Smell is the peculiar quality of the earth. Taste is the peculiar property of water, color of light, touch of air, and sound of ether. Those five specific properties are sensed by the five external senses each of which is constituted by the physical element whose specific quality is senses by it. That is, the sense of smell is constituted by the element of earth, the sense of taste by water, the sense of sight by light, that of tough by air, that of hearing by ether. The substance of earth is there in all other substances because they have the quality of smell. They have the quality of smell only because they are mixed up with some eternal (nitya) and non-eternal (anitya) quantity of earth. The substance of earth, water, light, and air are of two kinds, namely, eternal (nitya) and non-eternal (anitya). The eternal kind of earth, water, light and air are those which are constituted by the atoms (paramāņus) which are partless and can be neither produced nor destroyed. The non-eternal kind of earth, water, light and air are those which are produced by the combination of atoms and therefore subject to disintegration and destruction. The atoms are imperceptible and so known by inference. They are different in kind. There are four kinds of atoms, namely, of earth, of water light and air.

Ether or ākaśa the fifth substance is the substratum of the quality of sound. Sound is perceived but ether cannot be perceived. Ether is not a colored substance and so it cannot be directly perceived but only inferred from the perception of the sound by the ear. Space and time are also imperceptible substances. They are also all-pervading like ether. Space is inferred as the ground of our cognitions of ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘near’ and ‘far’. Time is inferred from, our cognitions of ‘past’ ‘present’ and ‘future’, ‘older’ and ‘younger’. Although indivisible and one, ether, space and time are distinguished into different parts and conventionally spoken of as many by reason of certain limiting conditions (upādhi). The one ether is limited by a house; one space is limited by the expression ‘filled’ or ‘empty’ space; and one time by a minute, an hour and a day. The soul (ātma) is an eternal and all-pervading substance which is the substratum of the phenomena of consciousness. The souls are of two kinds, namely, the individual soul (jivātma) and the universal soul (paramātma). The former is mentally perceived as possessing some quality when, for example, one says, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am sorry’ and so on. It is not one but many being different in different bodies. The latter is one and is inferred as it is inferred as the creator of the world. Manas (mind) is the substance which is the internal sense (antarindriya). It is the basis for the perception of the individual soul and its qualities, like pleasure and pain. It is atomic and imperceptible. Its existence is inferred from the following grounds. Just as the perception of the external objects of the world, we require the external senses, so in the perception of the of internal objects like, the soul, cognition, feeling, willing, there must be an internal organ, namely, the mind. Every perception requires the contact of the mind with the object through its contact with the particular sense organ. There can be no perception with the mere contact between the sense organ and its objects. So we must admit the existence of the mind as an internal sense.

2. Quality: Quality cannot exist independently by itself but inheres in a substance. It is not a constitutive cause of anything. At the same time the category of quality is called an independent reality because it can be conceived (prameya), thought (jneya) and named (abhidheya) independently of a substance. Although qualities are called objective entities they are not they are not necessarily eternal. They include both mental and material qualities. Quality is the static and permanent feature of a substance. It does not possess any quality or action. It does not also produce anything. According to Kaņāda there are seventeen qualities and Prasasthapada has added seven more to them. So, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeşika school there are all together twenty four qualities. They are of mental as well as material in character, such as, pleasure, pain, smell, touch and so on.

3. Action: Like quality, the category of action inheres in a substance. It cannot exist independently. But unlike quality which is a static and permanent feature of a substance, action is a dynamic and transient feature of it. Action is also the cause of conjunction anddisjunction. Action is of five kinds: upward movement, downward movement, contraction, expansion and locomotion.

4. Generality: Generality or universality is a class concept or a class essence which is the common character of the things which falls under the same class. It is different from the genus which stands for the class and includes the sub-classes or species. Generality stands not for the class but for the common characteristics of certain individuals and does not include sub-classes. It may also be called as refereeing to a class because it is the universal by the possession of which different individuals are referred to as belonging to one-class. Generality is one and eternal and residing in many. For instance, humanity is the generality or the class essence of all human beings. It is the universal of the human beings inhering in them. Kaņāda calls generality and particularity as relative to thought. But yet they are not mere subjective concepts of our mind. Both are objective realities. Generality is eternal and shared by many particulars. The universals reside in substances qualities and actions. They are of two kinds, higher and lower. The higher is that of ‘being’ (satta) which includes everything and itself is not included in anything. The lower generality is that which covers only a limited number of things. In Indian philosophy there are three theories regarding the universals, namely, nominalism, conceptualism and realism. According to the nominalism of Buddhism, the universals are only names and not reals. A cow is called a cow, not because it shares the universal ‘cowness’ but because it is different from all objects which are ‘not-cow’. A cow means only a not non-cow. There is no universal as a real. It is only a name with a negative connotation. According to the conceptualism of Jainism and Vedanta, the universal is not a mere name but a reality which exists apart from our mind in the particulars only. It does not exist independently over and above the particulars. And according to the realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeşika the universals are as objectively real as the particulars. They exist independently of our mind and the particulars.

5. Particularity: The category of particularity signifies that every individual is a single and a unique thing different from others. It enables us to perceive things as being different and unique from one another. Particularity is opposed to generality. It is exclusive whereas generality is inclusive. One forms the basis of discrimination while the other of assimilation. Composite objects are not real particularls for they are composed of parts. Only the ultimate, simple and eternal substances like atoms and souls are particulars. They are both qualitatively and quantitatively different from one another. The Nyāya-Vaisesiika realism is both a quantitative and qualitative pluralism. It emphasizes realistic pluralism by regarding atoms, souls, space, time and mind as having their particularities.

6. Inherence:

Inherence (samavāya) is inseparable eternal relation existing between cause and effect. It is different from the separable and transient relation (samyoga) subsisting among the separable things. Inherence subsists among inseparable things such as the container and the contained. It is the basis of the idea ‘this is in that’. It is eternal, imperceptible and inferred from the inseparable relationship between two things such as the part and the whole, the substance and the quality, the substance and the action, the universal and the particular. The whole inheres in the parts; a quality or an action inheres in its substance. The universal inheres in the individual members of the same class and the particularity inheres in its eternal substance.

7. Non-existence

The seventh and last category, namely, non-existence (abhāva) is neither positive nor absolute like other categories but negative and relative in its conception. Absolute negation is an impossibility and a pseudo-idea. Negation necessarily presupposes some affirmation. The Vaiśeşika realism regards non-existence as a separate category because it treats the knowledge of negation as being different from the thing negated. Absence of an object and knowledge of its absence are different. Non-existence is of four kinds :(1) antecedent non-existence (pragabhāva), (2) subsequent non-existence (pradvamśabhāvā), (3) mutual non-existence (anyonyabhāva) and absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva). The first is the non-existence of a thing before its production. The second is the non-existence of a thing after its destruction. The third is the non-existence of a thing as another thing which is different from it. And the fourth is the pseudo-idea such as the absence of a relation between two things in the past, present and future. To illustrate the four kinds of non-existence, (1) a pot does not exist before its production ;(2) it does not exist after its destruction; (3) it does not exist as a cloth; and (4) it does not exist as a liquid pot. Antecedent negation has no beginning, but it has an end. It ends when the thing is produced. Subsequent negation has a beginning, but has no end.

It begins when the thing is destroyed and has no end since the same thing cannot be produced again. Mutual negation is exclusion and is opposed to identifying. It is both beginning less and endless. And the absolute negation like hare’s horn, sky-flower etc., is a pseudo-idea which is both beginning less and endless.

3. Atomism

The Vaiśeşika system says that the material objects of the world are composed of parts which are further divisible into smaller parts. The smallest parts are the minutest particles of matter which may not be further divisible. This indivisible, partless and eternal particle of the matter is called an atom (paramanu). Creation means the combination of atoms in different proportions and destruction means the dissolution of such combination. The atoms are eternal. They are neither produced nor destroyed. It is only the atomic combinations which are produced or destroyed. These combinations are not the essential nature of the atoms. They do not pre-exist in the atoms. The atoms are of four kinds – of earth, water, fire and air. There is no fifth kind of atom because ether (ākaśa) is not atomic. Ether is one and all-pervading. It works as the medium for the combination and the dissolutions of the atoms. The atoms differ from one another both in quality and in quantity. Each atom has a particularity of its own and exists as a separate reality. The qualities of atoms are eternal. The atoms of the air are the finest of all and they have the quality of touch. The atoms of fire possess the qualities of touch and color. The atoms of water possess touch, color and taste. And the atoms of earth possess all the four qualities, namely, touch, color, taste, and smell. Besides these qualities all atoms have the qualities of velocity, distinctness and number. They also possess the primary as well as the secondary qualities. They are spherical or globular in shape. They are as eternal as the souls. They are inactive and motionless in themselves. During creation they are active and they remain inactive during dissolution. They derive motion from the Unseen power (adŗşţa) of merit and demerit which resides in the individual souls and wants to fructify in the form of enjoyment or suffering. The atoms are super-sensible. They combine in geometrical progression and not in arithmetical one. They increase by multiplication and not by mere addition. When motion is imparted to them by the unseen power, they begin to vibrate and change into dyads which are a combination of two atoms. A dyad is minute, short and imperceptible. There is also a triad which is a combination of three dyads. A triad is great (mahat) long and perceptible. The combination of triads progresses geometrically till the gross elements of earth, water, fire and air arise. The Vaiśeşika atomism cannot be called materialism because it admits the reality of the spiritual substances, namely, Gods and Souls. It also subscribes to the law of karma. God is the efficient cause of this universe. God, assisted by the unseen power, produces or destroys the world. The world presupposes the moral order also. The unseen power consists of merits and demerits of the individual souls. The souls bear fruit of their actions as enjoyment or suffering. The atoms are only the material cause of the world. In producing or destroying the world God is guided by the Law of Karma representing the unseen power of merits and demerits. The unseen power is unintelligent and needs God as the controller. God does not create atoms or souls. They are co-present and co-eternal with God. God simply gives motion to the atoms and gives original impetus for their combination and creation of the world.

4. Bondage and Liberation

According to Vaiśeşika, bondage is due to ignorance leading to suffering. Due to ignorance, man performs actions which are of merit and demerit. Actions are due to attachment and aversion and they also aim at obtaining pleasure or avoiding pain. Meritorious actions are those which are in conformity with the Vedic injunctions. The demeritorious actions are those which are prohibited by the Vedas. The merits and demerits of the individual soul make up the unseen power (adŗşţa). One has to reap the fruits of actions one has performed. Good karmas result in pleasure and the bad ones in pain. This is the law of karma which is also the unseen power. This power, guided by God, imparts motion to the atoms and leads to creation of the world for, enjoyment and suffering of the individual souls. But the soul will remain bound as long as it performs actions. It is only by stopping to act that the soul can overcome bondage. Liberation comes through knowledge that bondage is due to actions the cessation of which puts an end to suffering. When actions stop, new merits and demerits do not get accumulated and old merits and demerits also gradually disappear. The soul gets separated from the fetters of the mind and body. It ultimately realizes its own pure nature. Liberation is the cessation of all pain. It is state of substance which is devoid of all qualities such as bliss, pain, including knowledge. These qualities are the accidental characteristics of the individual. They are acquired by the soul when it is embodied. In liberation they cease to exist because the soul now is not associated with the mind and the body. The Vaiśeşikas characterize liberation as the cessation of all life, all consciousness, all bliss, including pain and other qualities. Liberation is an indeterminate pure nature which is quality less. It signifies the individual soul which is pure substance without any quality. In liberation, the liberated soul retains its own peculiar individuality and particularity. It remains as it is without knowing, feeling or doing anything.

5. Conclusion

It is important to note that the realistic pluralism of the Vaiśeşika is a mere commonsense explanation of the universe. At best it may be regarded as a scientific or systematic analysis of the world. It only gives a mere catalogue of categories without making any attempt to synthesize them. So this system is a not a synthetic philosophy because it treats the categories as ultimate and objects as elements. But at the same time it treats the categories such as action and quality as being dependent upon the category of substance. And the categories like universality, particularity and inherence cannot be treated as being objective realities, because they are concepts dependent more on thought. They cannot be regarded as being substances. So also, the category of non-existence is relative; for it is intelligible only as being related to existence and so it cannot be regarded as being absolute. And even the category of substance cannot also be regarded as being absolute for it cannot be known in the absence of its qualities, and relations. It reduces itself to mere nothing in the absence of its qualities and relations. Thus, the realistic pluralism of the Vaiśeşika involves some contradictions. Its explanations and arguments in defense of their position are also defective. It is more a commonsense thinking than a consistent philosophy.

Web links

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vaisheshika
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vai%C5%9Be%E1%B9%A3ika_S%C5%ABtra
• http://hinduonline.co/Scriptures/VyesheshikaDarsana.html
• http://www.ochs.org.uk/lectures/concept-category-vaisesika-philosophy

Bibliography

• Chatterjee, S.C. & Dutta, D.M., An Introduction o Indian Philosophy , Rupa Publication, 2007.
• Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, 1932.
• Sharma, C.D., A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.