9 The nyāya system

G. Vedaparayana

Introduction

The sage Gotama or Gautama is the founder of the Nyāya system. He is also known as Akşapāda. Nyāya means argumentation. So the system is called the science of reasoning (Tarkaśāstra). It is predominantly epistemological – intellectual, analytical and logical. So it is also variously called as the science of logic or epistemology (Pramānaśāstra), the science of causes (Hetuvidya), science of debate (Vādavidya) or the science of critical study (Anvikşiki). Gautama’s Nyāya –sutra is the main source of this school. Vātsayana’s Nyāya–bhāsya, Udayotkara’s Nyāya –vārtika and Vāchaspati’s Tatparya–tika are the other important sources of this school. Udayana’s Nyāya-kusumanjali and Jayanta’s Nyāya-manjari are also the important works of this system. Nyāya is allied to the Vaiśeşika system. The former develops logic and epistemology whereas the latter develops metaphysics or ontology. One deals with the right knowledge of reality and the other takes up the exposition of reality. Nyāya adopts mostly the Vaiśeşika metaphysics. So it is called the system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism. Both the systems view the earthly life as full of suffering and they regard liberation as the absolute cessation of suffering. Both agree that bondage is due to ignorance of reality and liberation consists in the right knowledge of reality. However there are some important points of difference between the two schools. Firstly the Vaiśeşika recognizes only seven categories whereas Nyāya accepts sixteen categories and includes all the seven of the former in the category called Prameya or the knowable. Secondly, the Vaiśeşika admits of only two Pramanas, namely, perception and Inference, whereas the Nyāya accepts the four Pramanas, namely, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

2. Epistemology

According to the Nyāya , Knowledge (Jňāna) is the same as cognition (Buddhi). It is also known as apprehension (Upalabdi), consciousness or experience (Anubhava). Knowledge is that which reveals both the subject and the object. It is also revelation or manifestation of objects (Arthaprakaşa). Just as a lamp reveals objects placed before it, so knowledge reveals objects which come before it. Nyāya says that knowledge may be valid or invalid. Right apprehension of an object is valid knowledge. Knowledge, in order to be valid, must correspond with reality (Paratahpramānya). So, valid knowledge is the manifestation of the object as it is. Invalid knowledge is that which fails to manifest its object as it is. It is of four kinds, viz., memory (Smŗiti), doubt (Samśāya), error (Viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (Tarka). Memory is not valid because it is representative and not presentative cognition. The object remembered is not directly presented to the soul but only indirectly recalled. Doubt is not valid because it is uncertain cognition. Error involves misapprehension of an object and does not correspond to the real object. And the hypothetical reasoning is not valid knowledge because it involves supposition devoid of certainty as in the case of the argument ‘If there were no fire, there cannot be smoke’.

3. Perception (Pratyakşa) :

According to the Nyāya there are four kinds of valid knowledge produced by four valid means, namely, perception, inference, comparison (analogy) and verbal testimony. Perception is the cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. It is the direct or immediate cognition which is not derived by means of any other cognition. It involves the contact of the self with the manas, the manas with the sense-organs, and the sense-organs with the objects. There are two stages in the process of perception, namely, indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa). Indeterminate perception is that which is not associated with a name (avyapadeśya). It is the immediate apprehension, the bare awareness and the direct sense-experience of the object. It is free from assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. It is the consciousness of the ‘that’ which is not yet determined by the consciousness of the ‘what’. The determinate perception (savikalpa) is the cognition of the object clearly with its name and attributes. It is seeing a rope as rope, cow as cow or a chair as a chair with definite knowledge. It is seeing the object not merely as ‘that’ but also as ‘what’. It involves assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. Determinate perception gives a differentiated, relational and conceptual and articulate knowledge. For example, we see a white moving object at a distance and when it comes near we see it as a white cow. The earlier stage of its perception is indeterminate and the latter one is determinate perception. Indeterminate perception presents the bare object without any characterization. It is psychological and not logical. It is confined to feeling and sensation devoid of conception. But it immediately passes into determinate perception which is logical, cognitive and judgmental. The Nyāya holds that the two perceptions are not two different kinds. Indeed, there is only one perception, namely, the determinate one. Indeterminate perception is only the earlier stage of the determinate perception. Thus the two perceptions can be separated only in thought and not in reality.

There are two kinds of perception, ordinary (laukika) and extraordinary (alaukika). The ordinary perception takes place when the sense-organs come into contact with the objects in the usual way. It is of two kinds, namely, internal and external. In the internal perception, the mind comes into contact with the physical states and processes such as cognition, affection, conation, desire, pleasure, pain etc. in the external perception, the five external organs of sense come into contact with their respective external objects. It is of five kinds, namely, visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory and affective. They are brought about by the sense-organs of sight, sound, tough, taste and smell respectively. The external sense-organs are composed of material elements of earth, water, fire, air and ether. That is, the sense- organ of smell is composed of the atoms of earth and perceives smell which is the specific quality of the earth. The same is the case with the other four sense organs and their specific qualities. They are composed of the material elements specific to them and so they perceive the qualities which are specific to them.

The extraordinary perception takes place when there is the contact of the sense-organs with the object in an unusual way. Here, the objects are presented to the senses not in an ordinary way but through an extraordinary medium. The extraordinary perception is of three kinds— the perception of the universals (sāmānyalakşana), the perception through association (jňānalakşana) and the intuitive perception of all objects past, present and future (yogaja). The Nyāya says that when we see a particular cow in the extraordinary kind of perception, we see the universal ‘cowness’ inhering in the cow. In the second kind of perception, the object is not directly presented to the sense-organ but is received in memory through the past cognition of it. The object is perceived through representation and association of different sensations which give rise to one integrated perception. For example, I look at a blooming rose from a distance and say, ‘I see a fragrant rose’. Here visual perception of the rose is reviving in memory the idea of fragrance by association. And third kind of extraordinary perception is possessed by the yogins through the power of meditation. It is intuitive, supra-sensuous and supra-rational also.

4. Inference (Anumāna)

The second kind of valid knowledge, according to the Nyāya , is inferential or relational (anumana) and it is also called inference (anumāna). Inference is the cognition which presupposes some other knowledge. Inferential knowledge is indirect, mediate and arises through a ‘mark’ (hetu). This mark is called the middle term. (linga) which is contained in the minor term (pakşadharmata) and invariably associated with the major term (sādhya). The invariable connection of the middle term with the major term is also called the invariable concomitance (vyāpti or avinābhāvaniyama) between them. It is the nerve of inferential knowledge. It is knowledge (‘mana’) which arises after ‘anu’ other knowledge (paramarsha). It arises through the knowledge of the presence of the major term in the minor term through the middle term which resides in the minor and is invariably associated with major term. The Nayayika illustrates it with the following example : if we see smoke in the hill we conclude or infer that there must be fire in the hill. Our inference here is based on our knowledge that smoke is invariably found with fire (Vyāpti). In this example, the hill is the minor term (pakşa), the fire is the major term (sādhya) and smoke is the middle term (hetu). Here we infer the presence of the fire in the hill from the presence of smoke in the hill as qualified by the knowledge that wherever there is smoke there is fire. This process of inference is called the Nyāya syllogism which has five members. (avayavas) viz., (1) proposition (pratijňa), (2) reason (hetu), (3) the universal concomitance with an example (udāharana), (4) the application of the universal concomitance to the present case (upanaya), and the fifth is conclusion (nigamana). The syllogistic argument of inferring that this hill has fire is as follows: (1) This hill has fire (proposition), (2) Because it has smoke (reason), (3) Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g., (4) This hill has smoke which is invariably associated with fire. (The application of the universal concomitance to the present case); and (5) therefore this hill has fire (conclusion).

There are two kinds of inference, namely, inference for oneself (svārtha) and inference for others (parārtha). In the former we do not require the formal statement of the five members of syllogism. It is a psychological or an internal process. The latter is meant for convincing others and so it requires to be presented in language. From another point of view the Nyāya speaks of three kinds of inference, namely, (1) inferring the unperceived effect from the perceived cause, for example, inferring the future rain from the dark clouds in the sky. This kind of inference is called pūrvāvat; (2) inferring the unperceived cause from a perceived effect, for example, inferring the past rain from the flooded water of a river. This kind of inference is called (sheshāvat); (3) inference based on uniformity of co-existence. For example, inferring the cloven hoofs of an animal by seeing its horns. This kind of inference is called (Samanyatodŗşţa). According to another classification, there are three more kinds of inference, namely, Kevalanvyayi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki. Kevalanvayi takes place when the middle term is positively related to the major term. This can be expressed in the following example: All knowable objects are namable; the pot is a knowable object; therefore, the pot is namable. Kevalavyatireki takes place when the middle term is always negatively related to the major term. The two terms agree only in absence of their agreement. This can be expressed in the following example: ‘What is not different from other elements has no smell; the earth has no smell; therefore, the earth is different from other elements. And the Anvayavyatireki takes place when the middle term is both positively and negatively related to the major term. The concomitance between the middle and major terms is there in respect of both presence and absence. That is, there is double agreement between the terms. They agree in presence in the positive instances. For example: all things which have smoke have fire; this hill has smoke; therefore, this hill has fire. The middle and major terms also agree in the absence in the negative instances as in the case of following example: No non-fiery things have smoke; this hill has smoke; therefore, this hill is not non-fiery (i.e., this hill has fire).

5. Comparison (Upamāna)

Comparison is the third kind of valid knowledge. It is cognition derived by means of analogy or comparison between the two objects. It has also been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. It is produced by the knowledge of the similarity or resemblance, for example, recognizing a wild cow in the forest as ‘gavaya’ depending on its similarity to the cow. A person who has never seen a gavaya and does not know what it is subsequently comes across a gavaya in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow because he was told (sabda) by another person that a wild cow looks like a domestic cow. The person has heard the word ‘gavaya’ and has been told that it is like an ordinary cow and the person himself sees the animal denoted by the word ‘gavaya; and recognizes it to be so. So comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by that name. It is produced by the knowledge of similarity between the wild cow and the domestic cow.

6. Verbal Testimony (Śabda)

The last and the fourth kind of valid knowledge, according to the Nyāya , is verbal testimony (Śabda or Āgama). Its means is also called verbal testimony. It is defined as the statement of a trustworthy or an authoritative person (āptavacana). It consists in understanding the meaning of the authoritative statement. The Nyāya holds that the words and sentences have the power to convey their meaning. They derive the power from God or from a long established convention. Testimony is always personal in the sense that the words of a trustworthy person may be divine or human. So, the Nyāya speaks of two kinds of testimony, namely, Vedic and secular. The Vedic testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas are spoken by God. The secular testimony is not infallible for it is uttered by human beings who are liable to error. However, the Nyāya regards as valid the words of a trustworthy person who always speaks the truth. Besides trustworthiness, the words and sentences of the trustworthy person must also be intelligible for which they must conform to certain conditions. There are four kinds of such conditions. The first is mutual implication or expectancy (ākankşa). That is, the words of a sentence should not be a mere aggregate of unrelated words like’ cow horse man elephant’. Such a sentence is illogical and nonsensical. The second condition is that the words should possess fitness to convey the sense and should not contradict the meaning (yogyata). For example, ‘water the plants with fire’ is a contradictory statement and does not convey any sense. The third condition is the close proximity of the words to one another (sannidhi). That is, the words must be spoken or written in quick succession without long intervals or gaps. And the fourth condition is the intention (tatparya) of the speaker in case the speaker’s words are ambiguous. For instance, the term ‘saindhava’ means ‘salt’ as well as ‘horse’. Now, when one is taking food asks another for ‘saindhava’, the latter should not bring a horse for the former.

7.  Metaphysics : Causation (Asatkāryavāda)

The Nyāya system defines a cause as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect. It defines an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. It also holds that the same cause produces the same effect and the same effect is produced by the same cause. It rules out the theory of plurality of causes. Thus, the Nyāya characterizes a cause with three essential features, namely, antecedence, invariability and unconditionality or necessity. That is, a cause must be antecedent or prior to its effect. It must invariably precede its effect. It must also unconditionally or necessarily precede its effect. That is, the cause must be an immediate and direct antecedent of its effect. Accidental antecedents of an effect like the potter’s staff and remote cause like the potter’s father, the co-effect like the sound produced by the potter’s staff are not the causes of the effect called pot. The mere precedence as in the case of night and day is not casually related. So also, unnecessary things like potter’s ass is not an unconditional antecedent and so not a cause. Thus Nyāya emphasizes the strict sequence view of causality. Cause and effect cannot be simultaneous. It also rejects the theory of plurality of the cause. That is, it does not accept the view one and the same effect can be produced by any other cause. Cause and effect are reciprocal. So, one cause can produce only one effect. There is one-one relation and not many- one relation between a cause and an effect. Each effect has its distinctive features and has only one specific cause.

The Nyāya – Vaiśeşika theory of causation is Asatkāryavāda or Ārambhavāda. It means that the effect was non-existent before its production. It does not pre-exist in its cause. It is new creation marking the beginning of the new entity. It comes into being by destroying its prior non-existence. The effect is an epigenetic and distinct from its cause. It is neither an appearance nor a transformation of the cause. It is newly brought out into existence by the operation of the cause. In this sense, the Nyāya-Vaiśeşika theory of causation is directly opposed to the Sankhya- Yoga and Vedanta view of causation (Satkāryavāda) according to which the effect is pre-existent in the cause and not a new creation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeşika speaks of three kinds of causes, namely, material (upadāna) or inherent (samavāyi) cause, non-inherent cause (asamavāyi) and the efficient cause (nimitta). Material cause is the substance out of which the substance is produced. For example, the threads are the inherent cause of the cloth or the clay is the inherent cause of a pot. The threads or the clay is the material cause or substance of the effect of the cloth or the pot. The second is the non-inherent cause which does not inhere in the material cause but helps in the production of the effect. For example, the conjunction of the threads which inheres in them is the non-inherent cause of the cloth of which the threads are the material or the inherent cause. And the third kind of cause, namely, the efficient cause is the power which helps the material cause to produce the effect. For example, the weaver is the efficient cause of the cloth. The efficient cause includes the accessories like the loom and the shuttle of the weaver. The efficient cause may be a substance, a quality or an action.

Soul, God and the World

The Nyāya accepts the metaphysics of Vaiśeşika regarding the problem of soul, God and creation of the world. Like Vaiśeşika it believes in the teleological creation. The eternal atoms of earth, water, fire and air are the material cause of the universe. God is its efficient cause. The individual souls are infinite and co-eternal with atoms. God is co-eternal with atoms and souls and is external to both. Creation means combination of atoms and destruction means dissolution of these combinations. The combination and dissolution is caused by the motion supplied by the unseen power of the law of karma working under the guidance of God. The law of causation is subservient to the law of karma. God can neither create atoms nor destroy atoms or souls, for they can neither be created nor destroyed. So God is not the real creator of this universe. Although God is regarded as the efficient cause and the ruler of the universe, the real efficiency belongs to the unseen power. The individual soul is the substratum of the quality of consciousness. Consciousness is not the essence but only an accidental property of the soul. The soul is a real knower, enjoyer and active agent. I is also an eternal substance like God or the atom. The individual souls are infinite and distinct from each other. They are different from God who is the supreme soul. Cognitions, affections and conations are the attributes of the individual souls. Each soul has its own mind and empirical life. And it is separated from its mind and empirical life in liberation. It becomes distinct from its mind, body and experiences. Bondage is due to ignorance and karma. Liberation is due to knowledge and destruction of karma.

8. Summary

The Nyāya system is allied to Vaiśeşika. It also advocates atomism, realism, pluralism, spiritualism and theism. It is argumentative, logical and epistemological whereas the Vaiśeşika is metaphysical and ontological. The Nyāya is known for its methodological, systematic and analytical approach to the understanding of reality. In this sense it is regarded as the science of debate, critical study and reasoning (Anvikşiki). But its philosophy of atomism, pluralism and so on is defective because all these theories are not integrated but only muddle together in one mass. Its logical pluralistic realism of the world is more common-sensical than philosophical. The Nyāya conception of liberation is also defective in the sense that the soul in liberation is described as being petrified devoid of any qualities including consciousness and bliss. By propounding such a conception of the liberated soul, Goutama the founder of the Nyāya, has justified his own name ‘Goutama’ which means an excellent bull, says Sriharsa in his Naişada-Charita.

Web links

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nyaya
• http://www.britannica.com/topic/Nyaya http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Nyaya
• http://www.iep.utm.edu/nyaya/
• http://www.publishyourarticles.net/knowledge-hub/philosophy/what-is-the-nyaya-a-theory-of-perception/198/

Bibliography

• Chatterjee, S.C. & Dutta, D.M.- An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Rupa publication, 2007  Hiriyanna, M. – Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, 1932
• Sharma, C.D. – A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy , Motilal Banarsidass 1994.