7 Jainism

K Srinivas

Introduction

Jainism is the product of the 24 teachers (tirthanakaras). Ŗsabhadeva is the first and Vardhamāna is the last of these teachers. Vardhamāna is also called Mahavira which means the great hero. He lived in the 6th century B.C. during the time of Gautama Buddha. The word”Jaina” comes from “jina” which means a conqueror of all passions like raga and dveśa and attained liberation. All the 24 teachers of Jainism are jinas in this sense. Jainism is an unorthodox system like Cārvāka and Buddihism for it does not accept the authority of the Vedas. It is also an atheistic religion for it does not believe in the existence of God. The jains adore the Tirthanakaras the liberated souls through their own effort. The Tirthanakaras are the perfect, omniscient and blissful beings. Jainism advocates that every spirit (jīva) can attain liberation of perfect knowledge, power and joy. The liberated saints are a testimony to the truth that everyone can realize absolute perfection through personal efforts. Jainism has been divided into two sects, namely Svetambaras and the Digambaras. There is not much difference between the two. The only difference is that the Digambaras are most puritanic and rigorous while the Svetambaras are more accommodating to the common frailties of people. The former are the ascetics who give up all possessions, including clothes, whereas the latter put on white clothes. And do not accept the former’s view that the jina needs no food and women cannot obtain liberation. The general philosophical outlook of Jainism is common-sense realism and pluralism. The objects perceived are real and they are many. The world consists of living and non-living beings or realities. The living beings have a sprit (jiva). Non-injury (ahimsa) is the central principle of the jaina ethics. Respect for others opinion, reality is many sided and every judgment is subject to some conditions are the salient feature of jaina philosophy. Jainism has a vast literature mostly written in Prakrta.

2. Epistemology

The Jaina system distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, namely, the immediate (aparokşa) and mediates (parokşa). Immediate knowledge is of two kinds – empirical (vyavahārika) and transempirical (pāramārthika). The former is what is known by the senses and the mind while the latter is what the soul attains by removing the obstacles of Karmas that prevent it from reaching the objects. There are three kinds of immediate knowledge. The first kind of immediate knowledge is the knowledge of the gross objects that are minute and at a far off distance obtainable by a person who has partially destroyed the influences of karma. This known as clairvoyance (Avadhi). Secondly, the immediate knowledge is the knowledge of the present and the other minds obtainable by a person who has overcome hatred, jealousy etc. which create obstacles in knowing. This is known as telepathy (Manahparyaya). And thirdly, the immediate knowledge is the omniscience (kevalajňāna), the absolute knowledge which the liberated soul obtains when all the obstacles to such knowledge are completely removed. The three kinds of perception are called extraordinary perception.

And the Jainas distinguish between two kinds of mediate knowledge. One is the knowledge which we can obtain through senses and through the mind. This knowledge is technically called mati which includes knowledge obtained through memory recognition and inference. The other kind of mediate knowledge is that which is obtained from authority, which is technically called śŗuta. This includes knowledge from what is heard from others and interpreted as knowledge. The authority may be what is spoken or written. The Jainas hold that the knowledge obtained through mati and śŗuti as well as the lowest kind of immediate extraordinary knowledge (avadhi) are not absolutely free from error. But only the two higher kinds of immediate extra- sensory knowledge wherein a person has direct access to the present, the knowledge of other minds and absolute knowledge of the soul (manahparyaya and Kevala) is beyond error. The Jainas accept the three Pramānas, namely, perception, inference and testimony (authority) for all ordinary purposes of acquiring knowledge of the mediate kind. Perceptual knowledge, according to Jaina, is not immediate but mediate in nature, because pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot pass for knowledge. It becomes knowledge only when it is given meaning by conception or thought. So the Jaina includes perception under mati which also includes inferential knowledge. Verbal testimony, according to Jaina, also comes under mediate knowledge, known as shruta. Thus, the kinds of mediate knowledge, namely mati and shruta, have perception, inference and authority as their instruments.

3. śyādvāda :

The theory that every judgment is relatively valid (Hinayāna) is an important part of Jaina epistemology. We have different kinds of immediate and mediate knowledge about objects because the objects have innumerable characteristics. Only an omniscient being can obtain through Kevala-jňāna an immediate knowledge of an object in all its aspects. But imperfect beings can look at an object from one particular point of view at a time and so have the knowledge of only one aspect of the object. Thus an ordinary person can have only partial knowledge of things. Jainas call this knowledge naya. Naya is also the judgment (parāmarśa) based on partial knowledge. It means that every judgment that we pass about any object is true only in reference to a particular standpoint and the particular aspect of the object under consideration. So no judgment about an object is absolutely true. Every judgment is relatively true. So it is foolish to regard our judgments we pass on objects in daily life as being absolutely and unconditionally true. So there is no scope for disagreement and quarrel about the truth of our judgments. Those who disagree and quarrel by claiming that their judgments are unconditionally true and those of others are absolutely false are like the blind people who form their ideas of an elephant by touching either its trunk, ears, legs or tail only. They quarrel about the real form of the elephant because nobody has seen or touched the whole of the animal but each one thinks that his knowledge alone is true and complete and should be accepted unconditionally by others. The quarrel comes to an end as soon as each one of them realized that his knowledge pertains to only one of the aspects of many aspects or parts of the animal. The Jainas point out that the various systems of the philosophy are the different accounts of the many- sided universe grouped from different points of view. The different views may be true like the different descriptions of the elephant by the blind men.

In view of the relative truth of a judgment (naya) the Jainas insist that every judgment should be qualified by the term ‘somehow’ or ‘in some respects’ (syāt) to signify the limitation of a judgment and the possibility of other alternative judgments. For instance if we perceive a black earthen jug existing in a room at a particular time from a particular position we should say, “Somehow, the Jug exists’ and not the jug exists’. The former judgment reminds us the fact that it is true only with regards to the many conditions of space, time, quality etc. the qualification ‘somehow’ (syād) would prevent the possibility of the misapprehension that the jar exists at all times and in every place. The unqualified judgment, ‘the jug exists’ leaves the possibility of misapprehension of the jug in absolute terms. The Jains have called the theory śyādvāda. It means that judgment passed by the ordinary people of imperfect minds holds good only of a particular aspect of the object and from the point of view from which the judgment is passed. The principle underlying the śyādvāda makes the Jaina thinkers catholic in their outlook. That is, they accept the views of other philosophers as different possible versions of the universe from different points of view. They do not like the dogmatic claims, for they lead to the fallacy of exclusive prediction (ekantavāda).

4. Saptabhanginaya:

Depending upon the theory of śyādvāda, the Jaina logicians distinguish between seven kinds of judgment including the affirmative and negative ones. All the seven are qualified with the prefix ‘somehow’. For example, the first kind of judgment about a jar is an affirmative one which is of the form, ’Somehow the jug is in the room’ (syāt asti). It may be symbolically represented as ‘Somehow S is P’. The second judgment is a negative one which takes the form ‘Somehow the jug is not outside the room’ (syāt nasti), which may be symbolically represented as ‘Somehow S is not P’. The third judgment is a compound one which describes the complex situation. It takes the form ‘Somehow the jug is in the room and also not in the room’ (syāt asti ca nasti ca). Symbolically it takes the form ‘Somehow S is and also is not P’. This judgment is obtained by combining successively the first two judgments to get a composite point of view. It gives a comprehensive view of the positive and the negative characters of an object. The fourth form of judgment is ‘Somehow the jar (S) is indescribable. (Syāt avyaktavyam). This is used to describe when the jar is neither in this room nor outside the room but somewhere else which is not known definitely. We cannot describe where the jar would be under always and under all conditions. But to express such a situation we are forced to predicate simultaneously of the object the characteristics which are incomputable. So the judgment takes the above form. This judgment has a great philosophical significance, for it points out that thought of an object can be described from different standpoints, in different aspects separately or successively. An object in general is an indescribable entity and it cannot be described at all without taking a distinct standpoint or aspect. The judgment also points out that philosophical wisdom does not always consist in the ability to answer a question by a straight affirmative or negative judgment. Some questions by their very nature are unanswerable. This judgment also reveals that the Jaina logicians do not violate the law of contradiction. They observe the principle that incompatible characters cannot be simultaneously predicted of any subject in the same aspect or from the same standpoint.

The remaining three judgments are obtained by combining successively each of the first three with the fourth. Accordingly by combining the first and the fourth successively we get the fifth. Judgment which is of the form, ‘the jug is somehow in the room but is also somehow indescribable.(syāt asti ca, avyaktavyam ca). If we take the aspect of its color say red, the judgment would be ‘the jug is somehow red but is also somehow indescribable’. Symbolically it is of the form, ‘Somehow S is P but also indescribable. This judgment points out that the jug is sometimes red when perceived from the aspect of its color but its color cannot be described in definite terms when we do not make reference to its particular state or time. We get the sixth judgment by combining successfully the second and fourth standpoints successfully which is of the general form ‘Somehow S is not P and is also indescribable’ (syāt nasti ca avyaktavyam ca). And lastly, we get the seventh judgment by combining successively the third with the fourth judgment which is of the form ‘Somehow S is P, also not P, and is indescribable too, (syat asti ca, nasti ca, avyaktam ca). So, instead of ‘somehow’ we may add the term ‘relatively’ as a prefix to every judgment. These are the possible seven kinds of conditional judgments (Saptabhaniginaya) the Jaina logic recognizes. It says that though there are innumerable aspects of everything, the forms of judgment would be only seven. The Jaina doctrine of śyādvāda is relativity of a realistic type in the sense that our judgment about things is relative and dependent upon the relational characters of the many sided reality itself. The jaina theory of relativity is not of the idealistic type (of Berkley or schiller) for it is not dependent simply upon the moods of judging mind. So, instead of ‘somehow’ we may add the term ’relatively’ as a prefix to every judgment. The śyādvāda is neither a skeptical nor agnostic. It does subscribe to the Greek sceptic Pyrrho’s view that every judgment should be qualified with a phrase like ‘may be’. Unlike Pyrrho, the Jaina holds that it is not the uncertainty of a judgment but its conditional or relative character that is expressed that is expressed by the addition of the qualifying particlesyat. Subject to the universe of discourse or the conditions under which a judgment is made, the judgment is valid beyond all doubt. Therefore the Jaina is not a sceptic or an agnostic but a realist who subscribes to a realistic view of truth.

5.  Metaphysics Anekantavāda:

Metaphysics is the theory of reality and Jain theory of reality is known as Anekantavāda which holds that every object has an innumerable characters. (ananta–dharmakam vastu). Every object is what it is because of its positive and negative characters. The positive characters which determine, for example, a man, are his size, color, weight, nationality, age education and so on, and the innumerable relations he bears to the countless other objects of the world. And the negative characters which determine the man consists of what he is not. To understand these characteristics we need to know how he is different from everything else – objects and persons—in the universe. So the object to be known is not a simple thing having only a limited number of qualities we ordinarily know but has unlimited characters. Moreover, if we take the element of time into consideration the object takes on new characters with the change of time and so the object is found to possess infinite characters (anantadharma). So we should not think that a finite object is possessed of only a limited characters and our knowledge of it is complete or perfect. In view of the inexhaustible characteristics of an object, the Jaina thinkers hold that one who knows one object fully, knows everything. And it is only an omniscient person (Kevali) who can have such complete knowledge of an object. For all practical purposes (vyavahāra) a partial knowledge of what an object is or is not is quite sufficient.

Conception of Substance:

According to the Jainas, the object is the substance (dravya) which possesses the characters (dharmi). These characters are of two kinds –essential and accidental. The essential characters remain unchanged in the substance as long as it exists. Without these characters, the substance ceases to be what it is. Consciousness, for instance, is an essential character of the soul. The Jainas call the essential characters as qualities (guņas). And the accidental characters of a substance vary. The come and go and succeed one another. For instance, desires, volitions, pleasure, pain and so on are accidental characters of the substance called soul. It is through these characters that the soul-substance undergoes modification. The Jainas also call these characters modes (paryaya). They thus define a substance as that which possesses qualities (guņas) as well as modes (paryaya). The world is composed of substances of different kinds. The essential characters of the ultimate substances are abiding. So the world is permanent. And the world undergoes change in so far as the accidental characters of substances undergo modification. A substance is real (sat) and consists of three factors, namely permanence, origination, and decay. The Jainas distinguish between two kinds of substance, namely, the extended and the non-extended. Time is the only substance which is without extension and all other substances possess extension. The substances possessing extension are called (astikāyas) because they possess a body. They are again sub divided into two kinds, namely, the living (Jīva) and non-living (Ajīva). The living substances has souls which are classified into those that are emancipated (mukta) and those that are in bondage (baddha) the souls in bondage are of two kinds — those that are capable of movement and those that are immobile. The former have the most imperfect kinds of bodies and live in the four kinds of bodies made of earth, water, fire or air. They have only the sense of touch and possess tactual consciousness. And the mobile living substances have bodies of different degrees of perfection and possess variously two, three, four and five senses.

Ethics, Bondage and Liberation:

The most important characteristics of Jainism are that it is a religion without God. It regards ethics of good conduct alone as the means of liberation. According to Jainism a jiva or a soul is a conscious substance. Consciousness is the essence of the soul. And it is present in the soul in various degrees. Souls may be theoretically arranged in a continuous series according to the degrees of consciousness. At the highest end of the scale would be perfect souls of omniscience that are liberated by overcoming all karmas. At the lowest end would stand the most imperfect souls which inhabit bodies of earth water fire and air. According to Jainism union of the soul with body is bondage and karma is the link which unites the soul to the body. Four passions namely, anger (krodha), greed (lobha), pride (māna) and delusion (māya) are the sticky substances (kaşāya), where the karmic particles are stored. These substances attract the flow of karmic matter towards the soul. The flow of the kārmic particles towards the soul is called Āśrava. And the bondage (bandha) is the state where the karmic particles actually infiltrate into the soul. The Jain distinguishes between two types of bondage, namely, the ideal and the material. The ideal bondage (bhava-bandha) takes place when the soul has bad disposition. The material bondage (dravya-bandha) takes place when there is actual influx of karma into the soul. In bondage there is intimate interpenetration of the karmic matter with the soul like water unites with milk or fire unites with red hot iron ball. This is the state of ignorance which conceals the truth of the soul. Strict adherence to the moral path is the only means of liberation. The path begins possession and practice of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct which stops the influx of fresh karma into the soul. Right faith (Samyag–darśana) is the attitude of respect towards truth. Right knowledge (Samyag–jňāna) is a detailed cognition of the real nature of real nature of the ego and non-ego and is free from doubt, error and uncertainty. Right conduct (Samyag-carita) is refraining from what is harmful and doing what is beneficial. It helps the self to get rid of the karmas that led him to bondage and suffering.

1. Liberation cannot take place with the mere stoppage of the influx of new karmas into the soul.
2. The karmas already existing in the soul must be exhausted or wear out which is called Niraja.
3. For this to happen the seeker must practice the five great vows. (Paňcha– mahavŗata), namely :

     (1) abstinence from all injury to life (Ahimsa),

 (2) abstinence from falsehood (Satyam),

 (3) abstinence from self-indulgence (Bŗahmacaryam),

 (4) abstinence from all attachments (Aparigraha) and

 (5) abstinence from stealing. (Asteyam).

Knowledge, faith and conduct are inseparably bound up. So the progress or the degeneration of the one reflects on the other. The seeker should strive for the harmonious development of the three virtues. Then only he succeeds in overcoming the all passions or karmas old and new. And thus the soul becomes free from its bondage to matter and attains liberation of realizing its inherent potentiality. Liberation means attaining the four fold perfection (ananta catusttaya) namely, infinite knowledge, infinite faith, infinite power and infinite bliss. The attainment of the four perfections is called Omniscience (Kevala-jňāna) and the one who is omniscient is called Kevalin. The liberated soul transcends the cycle of birth and death (Samsāra) and goes straight to the top of the world (Sidda-stita) and dwells there in eternal knowledge and bliss.

6. Summary:

Thus Jainism is not only unorthodox but also atheistic in character. It advocates worship of liberated souls only. It is a religion founded on the ethics of strict and right conduct. Its epistemological pluralism and metaphysical relativistic realism are unique in the history of Indian philosophy. Although relativistic and pluralistic Jainism is neither skeptical nor agnostic it subscribes to metaphysical absolutism of substance which has an unchanging essence. Reality is a unity-and-difference. Viewed from the point of view of substance, a thing is one, permanent and real; but viewed from the point of view of modes; it is mainly, momentary and unreal. Thus the Jaina’s pluralism is both realistic and relativistic.

Web links

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jainism
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Jainism
• http://www.britannica.com/topic/Jainism
• http://www.umich.edu/~umjains/overview.html
• http://www.ejainism.com/whatisjainism.html

Bibliography

• Jeffery D. Long, Jainism – An Introduction, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2010.
• Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass,Delhi, 1994.
• Satischandra Chatterjee & Dhirendranohan Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Rupa Publication New Delhi, 2012