16 Dvaita

K Srinivas

Introduction

Like Advaita and Viśişţādvaita, Dvaita is also a Vedāntic tradition. The first systematic exponent of this school of thought is Madhva (1199-1278). The other names of Madhva were Nārāyaņa, Vāsudeva, Pūrņaprajňa, and Ǎnandatīrtha. He studied under Achyutaprekşa. But he dissatisfied with his teacher’s non-dualistic interpretation of Vedānta and decided to have an independent study. After several years of independent study and reflection of Vedānta he arrived at Dvaita Vedānta, according to which both Brahman and the world are real. It appears that he wrote around 37 works and the most important among them are Madhvabhāşya and Gĩtābhāşya. Apart from them his commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras and the Bhagavadgĩtĩ are equally inspiring. As a committed dualist he advocated personalistic theism. He equated Brahman with Lord Vişņu and founded a sect called Sad-Vaişņavism. It is also known as Brāhma-Vaişņavism. 2. Epistemology

Madhva admits three valid means of cognition. They are: perception, inference, and Scripture (verbal knowledge). All other forms of knowledge can be brought under any one of these categories of knowledge. He defines valid cognition as the cognition of the object as it is. Such cognition is of two kinds: cognition as knowledge itself (kevalapramāņa) and cognition as an instrument of true knowledge (anupramāņa).1 In the former kind there is no distinction between valid cognition and valid means of cognition. The definition, as a matter of fact, itself overlooks the distinction. But this cognition is of two types: 1. Valid cognition which is the consciousness belonging to the knower (sākşijňāna), and 2. Valid cognition which is the consciousness belonging to the functions (vŗttis) of mind and senses. The former is infallible (svatahprāmāņya). The latter is of three kinds. They are: perception, inference and verbal testimony. Memory is also valid form of knowledge, although it is a form of perception.

2.1. Perception

Madhva’s doctrine of perception is same as Nyāya-Vaiśeşika theory. However, the followers of Madhva do not admit six-fold contact relationship between the senses and the object, and the distinction between indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) forms of perception. The six-fold contact relationship cannot be accepted, because Madhva rejected the relation of inherence (samavāya). Since all cognition is of determinate in nature, there exists no distinction between indeterminate and determinate forms of perception. Every object possesses a determinant such as colour, shape, size etc., which is reflected in the perception of that object. Even Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s distinction between indeterminate and determinate forms of perception is not acceptable to Madhva.

2.2. Inference and Verbal Testimony

Madhva’s conception of inference differs from the rest of the Vedāntic schools. Scripture is of two kinds, namely, that which is authored and that which is not authored. All the purāņas, itihāsas, dharmaśāstras come under the former category for they are smŗti texts. The Vedas belong to the latter category for they do not have any author. According to Dvaita, the Veda is eternal and in this respect it sides with Mĩmāmsā. But both the forms of scripture are infallible.

2.3. Validity of Knowledge

Madhva has something new to contribute to the validity of knowledge. Like all other Vedāntins, he holds that knowledge is self-validated (svatahprāmāņya) and its invalidity is due to some extraneous factors (paratahapramāņya). But Madhva raises the question: How does knowledge which is valid in itself, become invalid sometimes? If valid in itself, how can any other factor influence its validity? How can anything make it false? So long as I see mirage as water it is true for me. But later on it may turn out to be false. Thus it may be possible for any knowledge to become false. Therefore, when it is said that some knowledge is self-valid, according to Madhva, it is the knowledge obtained from the scripture or it is the knowledge that is the consciousness of the witness (sākşi), which is the ātman itself. But knowledge that is obtained from the vŗttis or functions of mind and senses is liable to error and is not self-valid. This is totally a different kind of interpretation that Madhva offers for self-valid nature of knowledge. Further Madhva maintains that there are two forms of knowledge, namely, direct and indirect. The knowledge attained by ātman is direct for it involves no instruments such as mind, sense organs and indirect knowledge obtained through mind and sense-organs. Direct knowledge can never be contradicted.

3. Metaphysics

In Madhva’s theory of knowledge perception is the foundation of his metaphysical dualism. He held that to perceive is to become aware of something as being unique and different from other things as well as from the perceiving self. True knowledge arises out of articulation of perceived differences between things as well as between things and the perceiving self. Therefore, to deny perception is to deny the very possibility of knowledge. However, Madhva cautions those who affirm identity, but deny the difference. They are caught in the absurd position of claiming knowledge by rejecting its very foundation. According to Madhva’s argument, perception necessarily implies the perceiver and the perceived as distinct existents. In that case knowledge that is obtained through perception also involves the knower and the known as distinct existents. To put it succinctly, all knowledge is relative in the sense that it is relative to the knower and some known. As such no claim to knowledge can conceivably reject this view without running into contradiction or absurdity. Based on this argument Madhva rejects the tenability of non-dual, absolute knowledge.

It is clear from the above argument that Madhva is both an epistemological and ontological realist. According to him, we not only perceive the world as constituted by different selves and material objects, but in reality too it is the case. The empirical world is real and pluralistic. Further, Madhva held that Brahman, the creator and the Lord of the world, is distinct from the world. Therefore his philosophy is through and through a philosophy of difference (distinctionism). Madhva recognized five fundamental and absolute distinctions. They are: (1) the difference between Brahman and individual selves, (2) the difference between Brahman and matter, (3) the difference between matter and individual selves, (4) the difference between one individual self and another, and (5) the difference between one material object and another. Also, Madhva divides the world into independent (svatantra) and dependent (asvatantra) beings. Brahman, who is identified with Lord Vişņu, is the only independent being. Selves, material objects are dependent upon Brahman for their existence.

3.1. Negation

Like Nyāya-Vaiśeşika, Madhva admits the reality of negation, but with a difference. According to Rāmānuja, difference cannot be reduced to negation, for difference is positive constitutive feature of the object itself. Madhva views differences in the similar manner. Then we have only three kinds of negation left. They are: prior negation, posterior negation, and absolute negation. His views on prior and posterior forms of negation are similar to that of Nyāya-Vaiśeşika, but his views on absolute negation are different. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeşika, absolute negation is a negation of an object at all time and place except when and where it exists. For Madhva the negation of the son of barren woman can be treated as absolute negation. He argues that the idea of negation is to negate everything whether is real, unreal, imaginary, possible or impossible.

3.2 Substance

Madhva interprets substance as the material cause of change and also as that which comes into contact with other substances. However, God, the supernals, and the atman do not undergo change (parināma), but only manifest themselves in different circumstances. Therefore, change in some cases is only a manifestation. Substance in other words is that which changes or manifests itself. It also comes into contact with other substances.

3.3. The Ǎtman

Madhva identifies ātman with witness-consciousness (sākşi, jĩvasākşi, sākşicaitanya). It is the nature of I-consciousness, like in ŚrĪ Rāmānuja’s philosophy, which is different from ego. It is the knower (jňāta), doer (karta), and enjoyer (bhokta) of the fruits of actions. The ātmans are atomistic and constitute a plurality and each having a particularity of its own (viśeşa). They are absolutely dependent on God (paratantra), who alone is self-dependent (svatantra). By nature every atman is existent, conscious, and blissful (sat-cit-ānanda). Due to ignorance (avidyā) its original nature gets entangled with prakŗti. This entanglement results in bondage. Every ātman is different from god, Prakŗti and the other ātmans. In the Upanişads it is mentioned that ātman is the same as Brahman. But Madhva interprets it that ātman is similar to Brahman in the sense that the reflection (pratibimba) of one’s face in the mirror is similar to one’s face. They are not one and the same. Although the ātmans are reflections or images of Brahman, they cannot be destroyed unlike ordinary objects which can be destroyed. They are real and ātmans are the reflections of Brahman by nature. Their reflective nature of Brahman is not created by any external conditions (upādhis). So we cannot say that when the conditions are destroyed, the images are gone. The ātmans are not reflections of God in some material but are the the reflections themselves. Here Madhva differes with Advaita, according to which atmans are reflections of Brahman in māyā/avidyā. Once māyā/avidyā disappears relections also disappear and only Brahman remains. Further Madhva maintains that ātman is self-conscious, self-revealing and self-luminous. It reveals itself to itself. However, the consciousness of ātman is distinct from itself, just as specific gravity of an object is external to it. Both ātman and its consciousness are two particulars.

3.4. Māyā and Avidyā

Although māyā and avidyā are equated to Prakŗti, yet they are viewed as separated from it in Dvaita. Like Śrī Rāmānuja, Madhva rejects Advaitic interpretation of māyā and avidyā. According to Madhva, māyā is the mysterious will of God (ĩśvarecchā). Avidyā is the ignorance of ātman. Like Advaitins Madhva holds that this avidyā is not negative. The locus of avidyā is ātman but not the Brahman. Avidyā has two-fold function. It conceals the true nature of ātman from itself and also conceals the Brahman (God) from the ātman. Although the ātman is self-luminous avidyā enters it due to the peculiar will of God. Then ātman gets entangled in Prakŗti and its modifications. We do not know when avidyā entered ātman. In other words, its relation to ātman is beginningless (anādi). When the ātman attains its liberation, it gets rid of avidyā and frees itself from Prakŗti. The second function of avidyā is to conceal the Brahman from ātman. Such concealment makes ātman think that it is independent of the Brahman (God). The ātman can free itself from this function of avidyā only when it realizes that it is dependent on God. Thus Madhva’s conception of avidyā is different from that of Śańkara and Śrĩ Rāmānuja. But his conception of māyā is similar to that of Śrĩ Rāmānuja but different from Śańkara.

3.5. God and Brahman

Like Śrĩ Rāmānuja, Madhva identifies the personal God with the Brahman and rejects the doctrine of Śaňkara that Brahman is bereft of qualities (nirguņa). The Brahman possesses all the auspicious qualities and is the personal God himself. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. But unlike Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s God, Madhva’s God is completely different from ātmans, Prakŗti, space and time. Madhva being the follower of Pāňcarātra tradition believes that God is independent and self-dependent. God cannot be the material cause for he can only be efficient and instrumental cause. If God is material cause then he undergoes transformation then such self-transformation affects his perfection. Since God being perfect he cannot be the material cause. He must be independent of all such transformations.

3.6. Prakŗti and Causation

Madhva does not accept Nyāya-Vaiśeşika view of causation, according to which the effect does not pre-exist in the cause. If that is the case then the effect is something Non-being. Madhva on the contrary holds that there is nothing absolutely new. Every form of causation is a change from the subtle to gross state and vice-versa. Transformation (pariņāma) means such a change. This kind of change is seen in the case of Parkŗti wherein its evolutes evolve out it. What evolves from Prakŗti is already contained in its potential stage in Prakŗti. But God and souls do not go such transformation. Either they become manifest or unmanifest. In the case of God manifestation is due to his kindness. But if Prakŗti shows what is already contained in it then it is difficult to draw a distinction between change and manifestation. Madhva perhaps means that there are two types of manifestation, and change is one form of manifestation.

The creation of world by God does not mean that the world came into existence at a particular time. It is unthinkable to say that God existed first and then created this world. He is God and creator at one and the same time. The world is created by God means that it is always dependent on him. Creation is something continuous therefore what is created is also continuously dependent on God. Causality means dependence.

3.7. Time and Space

Madhva’s conception of time and space has its own peculiarity. Madhva holds that time is an evolute of Prakŗti along with Cosmic Reason (Mahat). All other evolutes evolved out of Mahat and exist in time. Therefore, time is real. Concerning space, Madhva holds that space is different from ether (ākāśa). Space (dik) is that which offers place for things to exist and move. Ether is the origin of sound. It is one of the bhūtas. Even Prakŗti requires space to exist. Space is therefore a distinct reality independent of Prakŗti and time also. It is formless. Although time and space are infinite they can be infinitely divisible and their divisions also are as real as the infinite wholes. The parts into which time and space are divided are also times and spaces. They are not durationless and extensionless points. Time and space cannot be inferred for there is no major premise from which they can be inferred. They are perceived; but they cannot be perceived by functional consciousness (vŗtti-jňāna), but by witness consciousness (sākşi-jňāna).

4. Liberation

Life’s ideal for Madhva is to get liberated from bondage. According to hi, action leads to knowledge, and knowledge leads to the love of God. There is nothing superior to self-surrender. The souls after liberation live along with God in the same world (sālokya). They live near God (sāmĩpya). They also become like God (sārūpya). They also enjoy together with God (sālūjya). However, they never become one with God. According to Madhva, there are various levels of liberation. Each level is dependent upon the kind of strenuous effort made by the spiritual aspirant (soul) to attain it. For Madhva the liberated souls do not form the body of God. Madhva holds that bondage is due to avidyā and is positive in nature. It has the power of concealment and the power of projection. But avidyā does not veil the original existence of ātman. It always knows its existence. God himself is responsible for avidyā in the ātman. Therefore, God has to be loved and worshipped min order to get it removed. When ātman is covered by avidyā then it keeps on adding other limitations to its being. It is only through direct and unmediated experience of God (aparokşānubhūti) one can overcome avidyā.

Summary

Madhva’s Dvaita regards both the world of objects and God as eternally real. However, the world of objects is continuously dependent on God for its existence. Avidyā is the root cause of bondage. God himself is responsible for it. Therefore it is only through the intervention of God avidyā can be removed. The only way out of bondage is through devotion (bhakti) and self-surrender (prapatti). This is the ultimate goal of human life.

Web links

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dvaita
• http://www.iep.utm.edu/madhva/
• http://michaelsudduth.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/106069725-Dvaita-Vedanta.pdf

Bibliography

• Dasgupta, S. N. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol., I-V. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000.
• Puligandla, R. Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy. New Delhi: D.K. Printworld, 1997.
• Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy. Vol. I & II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
• Raju, P. T. Structural Depths of Indian Thought. New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 1985.
• Sharma, C. D.  A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.