14 Advaita

K Srinivas

Introduction

The term ‘Vedānta’ literally means the end of the Vedas. In other words, it deals with the end-portions of the Veda called the Upanişads. Advaita Vedānta is one of the Vedāntic schools. A systematic account of this school of thought was first presented by Śańkara (8th century AD) in his Brahmasūtra-bhāşya. However, he should not be mistaken for the founder of this school as it is one of the oldest schools. The others notable figures who contributed to the development of this school of thought are Gaudapāda, Govinda, Madhusūdana Saraśvati, Vācaspati Miśra, Prakāsātman. The important sources of this school of thought are the Upanişads, the Bhagavadgĩtā, and the Brahmasūtra. These three together called Prasthānatraya. The main objective of this school is to maintain the Upanişadic view that Brahman is the supreme Reality and is One and undifferentiated. All explanations concerning Brahman are worked out in this direction by every Advaitin.

1.1 Pramāņas or the sources of knowledge

Advaita recognized six pramanas as formulated by Kumārila Bhatta of Mĩmāmsā. They are:

1. perception (pratyakşa)
2. inference (anaumāna),
3. testimony (śabda),
4. comparison (upamāna),
5. postulation (arthāpatti), and
6. non-cognition (anupalabdhi).

One does not find much difference between Advaita and Nyāya concerning the treatment of perception, inference, and testimony. However the rest of the three pramāņas are discussed by Advaita in the following manner.

1.2. Comparison (upamāna)

Comparison is regarded as an independent and valid source of knowledge. It is a non-perceptual source in that it is not equated with perception. It cannot also be reduced to other forms of non-perceptual means such as inference. Knowledge obtained through comparison is expressed in the form of judgment ‘A is like B’, where the object ‘B’ is being perceived while the object ‘A’ is perceived sometime in the past and is remembered and compared with ‘B’. To illustrate this point let us examine the following example. A person who saw a cow sometime ago in a barn and later comes across a wild cow in a zoo and claims, ’The cow I saw in the barn is like the wild cow I now perceive in the zoo.’ According to Advaita, this clam cannot be one of perception since one of the objects involved in the judgment is not perceived right now. Also the claim is not regarded as memory-based, for what we perceived in the past and is now remembered is the cow in the barn and its similarity to the wild cow now being perceived in the forest. Therefore, similarity between two objects cannot be treated as the object of memory. Also, the knowledge by comparison cannot be knowledge by inference. The reason is that inference always requires a universal premise stating an invariable relation (vyāpti) between two terms. But one does not find such a universal premise in comparison. In other words, in order to infer from the proposition that wild cow in the forest is like the cow in the barn that the proposition that the cow in barn is similar to the wild cow in the forest, there needs to be a universal premise. The similarity between a cow in the barn and a wild cow in the forest is judged without any inference.

1.3. Postulation (arthāpatti)

It is also recognized by Advaita as an independent and valid source of knowledge. A person employs postulation in order to account for an observed fact which cannot otherwise be explained. For instance, when a person says that he is fasting day and night, but he is nevertheless observed to be gaining weight. Suppose we observe him to be fasting during the day then we can account for the fact that he is gaining weight since he eats during the night. Thus we postulate about his eating during the night to explain the given fact.

What is to be noticed here is that postulation is neither perception nor inference. It is not perception because we have not perceived him eating during night; nor can it be treated as inference for there is no invariable connection between growing fat and eating in the night. Postulation is mostly like hypothesis in Western logic. But one can also notice difference between the two. Hypothesis is tentative and may be rejected subsequently, but postulation is the only way to explain a given observable fact. Further, it can also be noted that postulation is an explanation for observed facts but inference draws conclusions from the observed facts. Postulation is the search for grounds but inference is the search for the consequences of grounds.

1.4. Non-Cognition (anupalabdhi)

This is also recognized as an independent and valid source of knowledge by Advaita. Non-cognition is also a kind of cognition in which we notice the absence of an entity. Therefore, such a form of cognition provides us with the knowledge of absence but not absence of knowledge. This form of cognition is concerned with negative facts or with the non-existence of objects and states of affairs. For example, the non-existence of a camel in my study is known through the absence of my cognition of a camel in the study. Such non-cognition is known as anupalabdhi. This source of knowledge, according to Advaita, cannot be reduced to any other five sources of knowledge. It is not correct to think that non-existence of an object is inferred from its non-cognition for inference requires a universal proposition asserting an invariable relation (vyāpti) between two terms. There is no such proposition employed in my perception of the absence of a camel in my study. Therefore, non-cognition cannot be the case of perception, comparison, testimony or postulation.

It is also important to keep in mind that all the cases of non-cognition are not the cases of non-existence. We do not perceive a chair in a dark room. That does not mean that there is no chair in that room. The non-cognition of an object leads to its non-existence only under the circumstances in which it should have been perceived.

2. The Metaphysics of Non-dualism

Śańkara has provided us with one of the most lucid expositions of Advaita Vedānta in his writing, especially in his magnum opus Brahmasūtra-bhāsya. In his metaphysics, Śańkara examines the levels of Being. For him, Brahman is pure existence (sat), pure consciousness (cit), and pure bliss (ānanda). And this supreme Reality is One, infinite, and indivisible. One of the most interesting features of Śańkra’s metaphysics is the concept of sublation. Sublation is basically a mental process of correcting and rectifying errors of one’s judgment concerning the objects of reality. One can sublate one’s previous judgment in the light of a new experience that contradicts it. In other words, a person may either regard the judgment as false or disvalue it in some significant sense. The sublation of a given judgment necessarily leads to a new judgment. Sublation is not merely intended to sublate judgments alone but can be extended to concepts, objects, relations, and in general any content of consciousness. Śańakra holds that sublatability is the criterion of the ontological status of any content of consciousness. Anything that is sublatable belongs to lesser degree of reality and value that that which replaces it as a result of sublation. It is through this method of sublation Śańakra arrives at his highest metaphysical principle, Brahman.

2.1 Levels of Reality

Śańkara, based on the criterion of sublatabiluty, distinguishes reality, appearance, and unreality. Reality is that which, in principle, cannot be sublated by any other form of experience. Appearance, on the contrary, can be sublated by other experiences. Unreality is that which in principle can or cannot be sublated. It must be noted that the act of sublation presupposes the dualism between knower and the known, the subject and the object, consciousness and the contents of consciousness. Sublatability also presupposes plurality of objects, concepts, judgments and contents of consciousness. It is necessary to have a distinction between subject and object in sublation for it is the subject that sublates the object. Plurality of objects is also necessary for sublation in order to juxtapose one object or experience against another incompatible object or experience for judging that the first object or experience has lesser degree of reality or value than the second. Based on these remarks to say that the experience of reality is unsublatable is to say that no other experience can conceivably contradict the experience of reality. The reason for this is that reality is devoid of all distinctions and contradictions. It is not only the distinction between one object and another but also between the subject and the object, the self and the non-self. Thus the experience of reality transcends all distinctions and is therefore the experience of pure identity between the subject and the object, the self and the non-self. The experience of reality is something unsublatable for there is nothing excepting this unitary experience. Brahman, the supreme Reality, is unsublatable for it is bereft of all qualifications, distinctions, oppositions or relations.

Appearance (phenomenon) in terminology of Plato and Kant is that in principle can be sublated. In contrast to Brahman as pure Being, appearance may be construed in the realm of existents. Śańkara, classifies existence into three levels: absolute reality (pāramārthikasattā), empirical existents (vyāvahārikasattā) and dream reality (prātibhāsikasattā).

Brahman alone can be grouped under absolute reality for its experience can never be sublated by any other form of existence. Empirical existents and the objects of dream can be sublated by other forms of experience. For instance, the cognition of dream objects can be sublated by the cognition of waking experience. The objects of dream and their cognitions are true insofar as the dream persists. Similarly, the objects of empirical existence and their cognitions can also be sublated by a higher order experience which is bereft of subject- object distinction. However, the objects of empirical experience and their cognitions can also be sublated by yet another set of empirical experiences and their cognitions. For instance, Śańkara uses rope-snake analogy to make this point clear. There is possibility that a person mistakes a rope for a snake. However, his subsequent cognition sublates his earlier cognition and confirms it to be a rope. Then the question arises: where did the illusory snake disappear? The illusory snake which is a product of ignorance does not exist outside the rope. The illusory snake’s locus and content is empirically real rope only. In the similar fashion, the knowledge of the objects of empirical reality is sublated by the knowledge of supreme Reality (Brahman/Ǎtman). Therefore, the lower levels of reality, namely, empirical reality and dream reality are sublatable.

Coming to the notion of unreality, it is neither can nor cannot be sublated by other experiences. Anything that cannot become object of our experience, actual or possible, is unreal. The reason why an unreal object cannot be experienced is that the concept of an unreal object is self-contradictory. Round-square, barren woman’s child, sky-lotus are examples of unreal objects. For anything to be sublatable it must in principle be an object of our experience. Since unreal objects cannot be experienced by us it would be misleading to say that they are sublatable or not sublatable. The fundamental distinction between illusory object and unreal object is that the former as a matter of fact does not have any objective counterpart in our experience, whereas an unreal object is one which in principle cannot have an objective counterpart, for the unreal is non-being.

From the above account it is clear that according to Śańkara’s criterion of sublatability only Brahman/Ātman is real and here cannot be any other reality apart from that. The empirical world is a mere appearance and the dream world exists insofar as the dream exists, and unreality is non-being.

2.2. Theory of Causation

In order to understand Advaitic position on reality, it is necessary to understand its theory of causation. Advaita’s causal theory is known as satkāryavāda. According to this doctrine, the material effect is identical with material cause. In other words, the effect pre-exists in its cause. Advaitins do not differ with Sāńkhya up to this point. However, there are two versions of satkāryavāda. They are pariņamavāda and vivartavāda. The pariņāmavāda of Sāńkhya is criticized by Śańkara. The change in form is considered to be a real change by pariņāmavādins. Śańkara questions this view. Although the changes in form are perceived, these changes are not considered to be real as the form does not have any reality of its own apart from its material cause. If a change in form is regarded as a real change, then a person can have many realities as he or she keeps on changing his postures frequently. But it is not the case. Our day-to-day experience tells us that a person is one and the same though there is change in his postures. Another important feature that underscores the view is that if substances are different from their forms, then how can we relate qualities or forms to the substances? Either we must admit formless substances or a third reality that can connect forms with substances. But to connect that reality with the other two, we may require another reality. Thus it leads to infinite regress (anavasthā).

If the view that form does not have any independent existence apart from its substance is admitted, then the change in the mere form is not real. Such a view paves the way for Śańkara’s ingenious doctrine of apparent change (vivartavāda). For example, when one perceives a rope as a snake, it is not that rope has really transformed into a snake. Remaining as a rope, it only appears as a snake. Likewise, we may perceive many other illusory objects which appear to be real. But their existence is only phenomenal. This is the vital point on which Advaita notion of reality is based.

2.3. Nature of Supreme Reality

The supreme Reality, Brahman/Ātman, alone is real. The essential nature (svarūpalakşaņa) of Brahman/Ătman is pure Being (sat), pure Consciousness (cit), and pure Bliss (ānanda). It is free from all contradictions and is infinite and indescribable. It is indescribable for it is bereft of all qualities (nirguņa). The terms such as ‘existence’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘bliss’ are only used in defining sense but not in the qualifying sense to distinguish Brahman/Ātman, the supreme Reality, from everything else. In other words, Brahman/Ātman is trans-empirical, trans-rational, and also trans-linguistic. Hence one cannot describe it positively. It is also unknowable. If it is conceived as an object of knowledge, then it logically follows that it is related to a subject, and therefore becomes determinate. When the Upanişads describe Brahman/Ātman as indescribable and unknowable, what they mean is that Brahman/Ǎtman cannot be described positively, but only negatively as what it is not. This method is called neti neti method. This does not mean that indeterminate Brahman/Ǎtman is empty. Śańkara observes that though it may appear to be empty for a dull-witted (maṅda-buddhi), it is not. Brahman/Ǎtman which is the ground of everything cannot be empty or void.

However, the notion of saguņa Brahman is applied to Īśvara or creator God. Brahman in association with māyā is known as Īśvara. The world of empirical objects is his creation. The two important powers of māyā are the power of concealment (āvaraņaśakti) and the power of projection( vikşepaśakti). With its power of concealment, māyā conceals the real nature of Brahman and projects Brahman as the creator God.

3. Liberation

According to Advaita Vedanta, liberation is possible while one is alive (jĩvanmukti). The legitimate path for liberation is the path of knowledge (jňānamārga). One has to realize that one’s atman is none other than Brahman. But it also prescribes some strict ethical discipline for every spiritual aspirant. In order to gain control over one’s body and mind one has to practice the eight-fold path of yoga of Pataňjali. Apart from that there are four important disciplines to be followed. They are: 1.discrimination between the eternal and non-eternal,

Detachment from all from all selfish pursuits, both worldly and otherworldly, 3. Cultivation of all the six virtues—tranquility, restraint, renunciation, endurance, meditation, and faith.

desire for liberation. Śańkara did not oppose the practicing of the way of action (karmamārga) and the way of devotion (bhaktimārga). Since the nature of Brahman is consciousness, therefore the realization of Brahman is also through consciousness (knowledge). The way of action can only purify our mind and make us non-egoistic. Similarly, the way of devotion also purifies out mind. If I surrender everything to God then my ego also removed through this surrender. But the path of devotion still distinguishes the devotee from God. The ego of devotee still persists. So long as the ego persists liberation is not possible. Once a spiritual aspirant attains the steady of mind, he/she has to practice śravaņa, manana and nididhyāsana to realize one’s own self (aham brahmāsmi). To realize one’s own self amounts to becoming one with the ultimate reality Brahman/Ātman.

4. Summary

Advaita Vedānta is a trans-theistic Vedāntic system, according to which Brahman is the only reality. The world of objects is only a projection of cosmic illusion (Māyā) in association with Brahman who is known as Īśvara or the creator god. Therefore, the world in which we live is only an illusion. One has to realize this transient nature of this world in order to get liberated from this world of bondage. The only right way to attain liberation is through the path of knowledge (jnānamārga). And this liberation is possible while one is alive.

Web links

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advaita_Vedanta
• http://www.advaita-vedanta.org/avhp/
• http://indianphilosophy.50webs.com/advaita.htm
• http://www.iep.utm.edu/adv-veda/

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