15 Viśişţādvaita

Introduction

Like Advaita, Viśişţādvaita is also one of the oldest Vedāntic traditions. One of the first systematic exponents of this school of thought is Śrĩ Rāmānuja (1017-1137). However, he is not the founder of this school. The other notable Viśişţādvaitins are Yādava Prakāśa, Yāmuna, Periya Nambi, Goşthipūrņa. The fundamental tenets of Viśişţādvaita are diametrically opposed to Advaita, which is absolute and unqualified non-dualism. The qualified non-dualism of Śrĩ Rāmānuja sets the task of providing an interpretation that would at once preserve the identity of Brahman and the difference between atman and Brahman, and also between jiva and God. In his seminal work Śrĩbhāşya, Śrĩ Rāmānuja equates Brahman, the supreme Reality with Lord Vişņu. Like Advaita, Viśişţādvaita too accepts prasthānatraya (the Upanişads, the Brahma-sūtra, and the Bhagavadgĩtā). In addition to these sources it also accepts Pāňcarātrāgama.

2. Metaphysics: Brahman and Selves

Śrĩ Rāmānuja accepts the Upanişadic interpretation, like Śańkara, that Brahman is the ultimate reality. But for Śańkara, Brahman is nirguņa. According to Śrĩ Rāmānuja, Brahman is the unity of the differences constituting the world of our empirical experience. In other words, Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s Brahman is identity-in-difference (bhedābheda). Śrĩ Rāmānuja argues that pure identity as viewed by Śańkara is an abstraction and it would be pure nothing. The question of identity arises only when there is also difference. Identity presupposes difference just as the latter presupposes the former. Śrĩ Rāmānuja finds justification in some rare Upanişadic passages (Ghaţaka texts. For instance, it is found in the Śvetāsvatara Upanişad that there are three ultimate existences constituting the Absolute: the eternal, omniscient, omnipotent God, the eternal but powerless soul, and the eternal matter. Therefore, Śrĩ Rāmānuja held that Brahman is the unity of different selves and material objects of the phenomenal world. Brahman is the substratum of these constituents. Strictly speaking, Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s concept of unity is not unity but only a union. From a logical point of view it is only a union of ultimately distinct and separate parts. This is clear from Śrĩ Rāmānuja threefold categorical distinctions: the support (adhāra), the supported (adheya), the controller (the niyāmaka), the controlled (niyamya) and the Lord (śeşin), and the servant (the śeşa). The first member of each of these refers to Brahman (the God), and the second to the world. In other words, for Śrĩ Rāmānuja, the distinction between Brahman and the world is ultimate and indissoluble. This view is further substantiated by Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s statement that Brahman is related to world as the soul to body.. Just as the soul of a man, although different from his body, controls and guides the body. In the similar fashion, although Brahman is different from the world, controls and guides it. Thus Brahman is regarded as the ruler and controller of the world. To put it more succinctly, reality is like a person: the various selves and material objects are its body, and Brahman is its soul. Apart from that, since there cannot be any genuine relation of any kind whatever between two entities of which one is real and the other is unreal. From this it follows that the world of variety and multiplicity, in that it is related to Brahman, is real, although not independently real. This is to say that individual selves and objects are real qualities and modes of Brahman. Individual selves and material objects are related to Brahman as parts to a whole. Such an inseparable relationship is technically known as aprathaksiddhi. Each part is separate, yet not different in substance from the whole. Just as qualities are real but cannot exist independent of the substance of which they are qualities. Similarly, souls and objects are real as parts of ultimate reality but cannot exist independently of it. This is the reason that Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s Absolute is not unqualified identity, but identity-in-difference. This made Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s Vedānta, a qualified non-dualism. The world of phenomena is as real as Brahman and such a view is diametrically opposed to Śańkara’s view, according to which the world of phenomena is only an appearance.

3. Epistemology

Coming to knowledge, Śrĩ Rāmānuja, unlike Śańkara, viewed that knowledge analytically implies the knower and the known. Therefore, it cannot be identified either with the knower or with the known. If there is no knower then there is no known too. Śrĩ Rāmānuja argued that experience of reality is not an experience in which the self-non-self distinction is obliterated, but one in which the self becomes conscious of the unity of reality. The self remains distinct even in the experience of ultimate reality just as the distinction between the knower and the known holds through and through in the experience of the empirical world. Unlike Śańkara, Śrĩ Rāmānuja admits only three valid sources of knowledge. They are: perception (pratyakşa), inference (anumāna), and verbal testimony (śabda). All other forms of knowledge are subsumed in one of these three forms. His views on indeterminate (nirvikalapaka-pratyakşa) are also different from those of Nyāya and Advaita. When an object is perceived for the first time we do not know what it is. Such a perception is technically indeterminate. When the same object is perceived second time then we know what it is for we have come to know the identity of it.

4. Attribute Consciousness (dharma-bhūta-jňāna)

The concept of attribute consciousness (dharma-bhūta-jňāna) is central to Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s Viśişţādvaita. According to this view, consciousness directed towards the object is a quality (dharma) of the ātman. To illustrate this point, one has to understand that one’s perception of an object has three factors. They are: myself as the conscious of the object, my consciousness of the object, and the object of which I am conscious. My consciousness of the object reveals itself to me, but not to itself. If it reveals itself to itself, it will be a person or ego or an ‘I’. To claim that I know that I know the object is the same as saying that I know the object. Cognition and the cognition of that cognition are the same. For cognition is self-revealing. No other light is needed to reveal the presence of a light. Now, my ‘I’, as the knower, reveals itself to itself, but not to the consciousness revealing the object. Thus we have two forms of consciousness here. One that reveals itself to another and the other that reveals itself to itself only. The former belongs to the latter and it is its attribute (dharma). According to Śrĩ Rāmānuja, I-consciousness can never know itself without the role of attribute consciousness. And the attribute consciousness arises only when it reveals an object. Therefore, the “I” can know itself only when it knows an object. Further it must be noticed that Śrĩ Rāmānuja distinguishes between the consciousness that turned inward (pratyak) and that which is turned outward (parāk). These two are called existential and attribute consciousnesses respectively. Not only that they are inseparable but also cannot work independent of each other. The existential consciousness, which knows itself, knows itself only when the attribute consciousness also works. In deep sleep attribute consciousness does not work for there is no object in that state. Since the attribute consciousness does not work in this state, even the existential consciousness does not know itself. Both these consciousnesses are eternal, but the existential consciousness is atomic in size (aņuparimāņa) for the ātman is atomic and the latter infinite. Although the attribute consciousness is infinite it has the power to contract and expand like a coil. When it contracts completely we do not know anything, if it contacts partially then we have finite knowledge. If it expands completely then we have infinite knowledge. The attribute consciousness is substance (dravya), although it is an attribute of ātman.

5. Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s Critique of Śańkara’s Doctrine of Māyā/Avidyā

Śrĩ Rāmānuja advances seven arguments against Śańkara’s māyā and avidyā. They are popularly called seven untenables (saptānupapatti). They are as follows:

5.1. The nature of māyā / avidyā is ignorance. They are not two different things. The former is called cosmic illusion and the later individual illusion. Maya is basically understood in two different senses. In one sense it is ignorance and in another sense it is the power of Brahman by which the empirical world is manifested. Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s first objection is: If ignorance is what produces the world, where does ignorance exist? Certainly it cannot be said to exist in the jĩvā for the jĩvā itself is produced by ignorance. Therefore, it is absurd to say that effect produces the cause. Similarly, it cannot be said that ignorance exists in Brahman for otherwise Brahman cannot be omniscient.

5.2. The second objection is that if ignorance is the veil that conceals the real nature of Brahman, then Brahman cannot be self-revealing power. Not only that māyā or avidyā can veil Brahman only when it forgets itself. But it can forget itself only when it is by māyā and avidyā. This is another vicious circle.

5.3. The third objection is that we cannot understand whether māyā/avidyā is positive or negative. If it is positive, it cannot be destroyed by knowledge as Advaitins hold. Knowledge only recognizes the existence of the positive, but never destroys it. If it is negative it cannot combine itself with Brahman to produce the world. As negative, it is only absence of knowledge. But absence causes nothing. Therefore, to say that māyā/avidyā is both positive and negative is to uphold a self-contradictory position.

5.4. The fourth objection is that Śańkara’s Advaita considers ignorance as neither real nor unreal nor both (sadasatvilakşaņa). This is an absurd locution for Śrĩ Rāmānuja. Such a locution violates the principle of non-contradiction for it is inexpressible. Something is real or unreal but it cannot be both and neither. It must be one of two.

5.5. The presence of māyā cannot be established by any valid means of cognition. Ignorance is absence of knowledge and absence can never be perceived. To say that I perceive the absence of a rose on the table is as good as saying that I perceive the table, which exists as a positive entity. Māyā cannot be inferred for it lacks any peculiar characteristic. If it has any characteristic then it must be a real entity. But, according to Advaitins, it is not. It cannot be proved on the basis of scritpture. According to the Veda, māyā is the mysterious power of Brahman. But for Advaitins Brahman has not characteristic hence it cannot have this mysterious power also.

5.6. The Advaita interpretation of avidyā is such that it cannot be removed even by knowledge. What is this knowledge? It is the knowledge of Brahman that removes the ignorance which is responsible for the knowledge of the world. Now, does this knowledge of Brahman have Brahman as its object or is it the knowledge or consciousness that is the same as the Being of Brahman? According to Advaita, Brahman can never be the object of anyone’s knowledge. It is same as one’s ātman. Even the second alternative also does not remove the knowledge of the world, which is due to ignorance. The knowledge of myself does not remove the knowledge of the world. If Brahman is an object of my knowledge, then world is also an object of my knowledge. Thus there are two kinds of objects and two cognitions. How can the knowledge of one can cancel the knowledge of other and show it to be the product of ignorance? Therefore, the knowledge of Brahman does not remove the knowledge of the world.

5.7. Finally, if avidyā is a positive entity, then its removal by knowledge is not possible. If ignorance means absence of knowledge of an object, then knowledge of that object removes that ignorance. If avidyā is a positive entity then it cannot be removed by knowledge, but according to Advaita, avidyā is positive.

6. God

Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s Brahman, unlike Śańkara’s, is saguņa Brahman. He rejects Śańkara’s distinction between nirguņa and saguņa aspects of Brahman. It is unity-in-difference and therefore contains within itself ultimate and indissoluble distinctions. The individual selves or souls and material objects of the world are related to Brahman as parts to whole. Brahman, in other words, is not qualityless, undifferentiated Pure Being but has real qualities. The three essential qualifications of Brahman are reality (satyam), consciousness (jňānam), and infinitude (anantam). Śrĩ Rāmānuja holds that Brahman (God) is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. God creates the world out of his own will. But creation does not mean that creation is out of nothing. Since the souls or selves and matter co-exist with God, creation means God’s bringing about the world of variety and multiplicity which is potentially present in him. God wills himself to be many and manifests himself as many in the form of animate and inanimate entities. Apart from that, creation is not an event in time in the sense of having an absolute beginning in time. The world goes through the cycles of evolution (śrişţi) and dissolution (praļaya) as per the will of God, who is the Lord of karma. (At the time of dissolution God withdraws world into himself. Even in the state of dissolution individual souls and matter remain distinct in Brahman, because individual souls (cit) and the world are eternal. According to Śrĩ Rāmānuja, the souls or selves are subtle (sūkşma) and infinitesimal (atomic/aņuparimāņa), but eternal. The soul or self of Śrĩ Rāmānuja is not atman but only a jĩvā or empirical-I (the ego). At the time of creation God by his act of will manifests himself as selves and material objects. The kind of body that self receives depends upon its karma. However, God gives every self freedom of will. Therefore, he is not responsible for the good or bad karma of the individual. Every soul or self acting out of will which God has graciously bestowed upon it is wholly responsible for its own state of existence. Consequently, Śrĩ Rāmānuja maintains that evil in the world cannot be traced to God, who is embodiment of all auspicious qualities or attributes that elevate him to the highest perfection.

The above descriptions of God clearly show that for Śrĩ Rāmānuja there is no identity between God and soul or self. (Śrĩbhāşya, II,iii.45, Sourcebook, p.555). According to him, the Upanişadic statement “That thou art” is radically different from that Śańkara. In Śrĩ Rāmānuja’s case the ‘that’ here refers to God, the omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent, infinite creator of the world. The ‘thou’ refers to God as existing in the form of man, the embodied self. Consequently Śrĩ Rāmānuja says that the identity between God and man is really the identity between God with certain qualifications and God with certain other qualifications. To put it in other words, God and man are of one substance but possess different qualities. Hence the name Viśişţādvaita, the qualified identity, is the most suitable appellation for the Vedānta of Śrĩ Rāmānuja.

7. Liberation

Śrĩ Rāmānuja holds that the self’s bondage to the body is due to its karma. This karma is produced and sustained by the self’s ignorance as to its true being. Ignorance makes self believe that it is identical with body or with some part thereof and develops desires and attachments to bodily existence. The general tendency of the self is to identify itself with non-self makes it egoistic.

Liberation from ignorance, karma and bondage is to be attained though karma, jňāna and bhakti mārgas. Every individual should perform the rites and ceremonies in accordance with his social duties (varņa-dharmas) and station in life as enjoined by the Vedas. Therefore, the study of Mĩmāmsā, whose objective is to suggest the right performance of rituals and duties, is essential for a Viśişţādvaitin. Every individual interested in liberation must study the Vedāntic texts in order to know who he or she is apart from the nature of the world and God intellectually. As a result of study and reflection, man comes to know that in reality he is not identical with his body or any other material entity but a part of God himself, who is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe. Individuals also realize that liberation cannot be attained either through the performance of rights and duties or by intellectual understanding alone, but only by free, loving grace of God. Therefore, the liberation seeking individual must devote himself or herself to the complete service of God. This is the reason why Śrĩ Rāmānuja regards bhakti-yoga, the path of devotion. It consists of meditation (dhyāna), prayer (upāsana), and devotion (bhakti). The spiritual aspirant must constantly remember God as his/her Lord and Savior. He or she should pray for God’s mercy. The worshipper should completely surrender himself or herself to God for his Grace. Such complete self-surrender is called prapatti. It is only through this act of prapatti a worshipper is worthy of divine grace. Such a grace of God destroys ignorance, egoism, and karma of an individual to liberate him from bondage. The liberation, according to Śrĩ Rāmānuja, does not result in the effacement of the self or its uniqueness but in eternal union with God. The liberated individual, instead of losing himself or herself in God, retains his or her individuality and consciousness and eternally enjoys the highest bliss in the infinite glory of God. Thus liberation, according to Śrĩ Rāmānuja, is not unity with God but eternal communion with God. Such liberation from bondage is possible only when the body falls off. Hence it is called videha-mukti. The liberated soul enjoys perfect love and wisdom.

8. Summary

Viśişţādvaita is an important Vedāntic school after Advaita. It deviates from the fundamental precepts of Advaita by denying the notion of nirguņa Brahman and the concept of māyā. Brahman is saguņātmaka. This saguņa Brahman is none other than Lord Vişņu. The individual souls (cit) and the world (acit) are Brahman’s attributes. Just as Brahman is eternal, its attributes are also eternal although they are dependent on Brahman for their existence. The ultimate goal of every soul is to attain liberation. The way to liberation is bhakti and prapatti. To get liberated from bondage one has to shed the body. Such a view of liberation is technically known as videhamukti.

Web links

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vishishtadvaita
• http://www.vedamu.org/veda/krp-sir/visistadvaita.pdf
• http://www.ramanuja.org/intro.html

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